U.S. Food and Drug Administration Calls for New Radiation Treatments

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration Friday called for the private development of new treatments to counter exposure to radioactive elements using two new drugs (see GSN, May 19).

The FDA has determined that pentetate calcium trisodium (Ca-DTPA) and pentetate zinc trisodium (Zn-DTPA) help eliminate plutonium, americium and curium from the human body, according to an agency press release.  The FDA is now calling for drug producers to submit marketing applications for treatments using Ca-DTPA and Zn-DTPA because there are currently no such products.

“One of FDA’s most urgent new challenges is to protect Americans from heightened threats of terrorism,” FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan said.  “We are doing all we can to help product developers provide safe and effective countermeasures for biological, chemical, and radiological attacks,” he said (U.S. Food and Drug Administration release, Sept. 12).

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Los Alamos Researchers Develop Quick Dirty Bomb Analysis Technique

Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico have developed a method for quickly identifying the components of a “dirty bomb” and discovering the culprits behind such an attack, the laboratory announced yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 3).

Before this development, identifying the isotopes used in a radiological weapon was expected to take 24 hours or more, according to the laboratory.  A team led by scientist Bennie Martinez has now developed a method to complete the work in as little as six hours.

“It’s clear the method can identify a variety of radionuclides that might be present in dirty bomb debris,” Martinez said.  “Since the method is fairly simple and uses a minimum of equipment, we believe it could be forward deployed and could provide early data to law enforcement and others following a terrorist event.  We want to help officials close in on the culprits as fast as possible,” he added (Los Alamos National Laboratory release, Sept. 10).

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U.N. Conference on Disarmament Ends 2003 Session With No Progress on Program of Work

The U.N. Conference on Disarmament yesterday ended its 2003 session without reaching consensus on a program of work, according to a U.N. press release (see GSN, Aug. 8).

This is the fifth straight year that the conference has been unable to reach agreement on what to discuss, according to the U.N. release.  Because the conference operates by consensus, a single member can prevent the entire body from formally discussing an issue.

The conference ended yesterday with the adoption of its annual report, which noted that conference presidents had tried throughout the session to reach consensus on a program of work.  The conference has also requested that future presidents continue consultations among member countries before the 2004 session begins.

The conference also scheduled the three parts of its 2004 session: Jan. 19 to March 26, May 10 to June 25, and June 26 to Sept. 10, the U.N. release said (U.N. release I, Sept. 9).  Representatives from Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco and Myanmar will preside over the conference throughout 2004.  Kazakhstan has decided to not assume the rotating presidency (U.N. release II, Sept. 9).

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GAO Finds Poor Accounting of Sealed Radioactive Sources

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Congressional auditors have found that poor accounting of sealed radioactive sources, which could be used by terrorists to produce a “dirty bomb,” has led to an inadequate understanding of precisely how many such sources are in use, according to an August U.S. General Accounting Office released today.

In addition to poor accounting practices, the GAO also found that there are weaknesses in both federal and state controls of the security of sealed radioactive sources, as well as in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing process to obtain such sources, according to the report.  The study is the third commissioned by Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) to examine U.S. controls over the security of sealed radioactive sources.  The two previous reports examined U.S. Energy Department efforts to control radioactive sources containing material that cannot be disposed of at commercial facilities (see GSN, May 14) and department efforts to help other countries secure radioactive sources (see GSN, June 17).

While the NRC has estimated that there about 2 million sealed sources in the United States, the precise number is unknown because the commission and individual states only track the number of licenses issued and not the number of sources themselves, according to the report.  It adds that users of some devices that contain sealed sources, known as “general license” devices, do not have to apply for a license from the NRC, making it more difficult to account for such devices.  The report recommends that the NRC determine whether the owners of generally licensed devices should be required to obtain licenses and if such a move would be cost-effective commensurate with the level of risk posed by the diversion of such devices. 

According to the report, since 1998 there have been more than 1,300 reports of lost, stolen or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, with a majority subsequently recovered.  While the NRC and Energy Department are working to categorize sealed sources by their level of risk, the agencies’ efforts are limited because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in “agreement states” — 32 states that have obtained the authority to regulate the use of sealed sources within their borders — that regulate about 80 percent of U.S. radioactive materials licensees, the report says.  The NRC lacks information on state-issued licenses due to a lack of access to individual state databases and a lack of information sharing between states, it says. 

Poor Security

Besides poor accounting of sealed sources, the GAO found weaknesses in U.S. and state security controls.  Visits by congressional investigators to licensees in 10 states found varying levels of security ranging from extensive security measures at a medical device manufacturer to a medical use licensee that kept its sealed sources in “an unlocked, unguarded space with the door propped open,” the report says. 

In addition, the report says, the NRC licensing process to obtain sealed sources assumes an applicant is “acting in good faith” and allows them to acquire a source as soon as a license is issued by mail.  It can then take up to a year before the commission conducts its first inspection of the licensee, “leaving the possibility that materials will be obtained and used maliciously in the meantime,” it warns, adding that the NRC should modify its licensing procedure to ensure that sealed sources cannot be purchased before their intended use can be verified.

In a press statement released today, Akaka criticized the lack of security controls and the apparent “loophole” in the NRC’s licensing process.

“The extent of the lack of tracking and security of sealed sources in this country is alarming.  Almost one radioactive source a day is lost in the U.S. and it seems anybody can get a license to purchase radioactive sources without a background check,” Akaka said.  “Tighter controls are needed, but the NRC and the agreement states are moving too slowly to improve tracking and security of sources in this country,” he said.

The GAO also found that the NRC and some states disagree over the role of states in regulating sealed source security, according to the report.  While the NRC has the legal authority to order licensees, including those whose licenses were issued by states, to implement additional security measures, more than 80 percent of agreement states surveyed wanted to have responsibility for the inspection and enforcement of security measures, the report says.  It adds that while the NRC has argued that agreement states lack the resources to secure sealed sources, about 75 percent of those states surveyed reported that they could “effectively respond” to a radiological incident with current resources.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the NRC and states have notified licensees of the need to improve security, but have not until recently began to issue legally binding orders to do so, the report says.  For example, in early June the NRC issued orders to improve security at large irradiator facilities.  The report says that NRC officials said a draft version did not fully present the current efforts of the commission to improve security or the work conducted over the past year-and-a-half, according to the report.  The report adds, however, that agreement states agreed with GAO recommendations.

Akaka today suggested that congressional action might be necessary to improve NRC-state cooperation.  “Congress may need to act to change the Atomic Energy Act to ensure coordination between the NRC and the states,” he said.

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