Iran Conducts Uranium Enrichment Experiments

Iran has begun uranium enrichment experiments, Iran’s top diplomat at the International Atomic Energy Agency announced in an interview published Monday (see GSN, Sept. 23).

“The factory at Natanz has been in operation at an experimental level for several weeks,” said Ali Akbar Salehi.

The announcement comes despite a recent resolution from the IAEA Board of Governors that called on Iran to stop enrichment activities (see GSN, Sept. 12).  The United States has alleged that Iran’s nuclear program is being used to develop nuclear weapons but Tehran insists that the effort is only to generate power for its burgeoning civilian population.

Some diplomats at IAEA headquarters in Vienna said the enrichment announcement could be a sign that Iran has no intention of meeting an Oct. 31 deadline to prove that its nuclear program is not geared toward weapons development.

“This was expected to happen.  It was not desired.  It is not the best answer to what we have requested,” a Western diplomat said (Siavosh Ghazi, Agence France-Presse/Jordan Times, Sept. 24).

Salehi also said that Iran is still open to signing the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive monitoring of its nuclear activities.

“We have decided to fulfull our obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not beyond that,” he said.  “It doesn’t mean that we are rejecting the Additional Protocol or are not prepared to talk on that,” Salehi added (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Washington Post, Sept. 24).

Suggesting Iranian interest in the protocol, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh said earlier this week that Iran can only benefit from signing the protocol.

“If we wanted to build a nuclear bomb, then transparency wouldn’t be in our interests, but if we don’t want to build a nuclear bomb, which is the case, then signing the protocol and preserving our civil nuclear capacity is in our interests,” Aminzadeh said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 24).

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Early Retirement of Russian Nuclear Scientists Could Ease Proliferation Concerns, Paper Recommends

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — International funding for the early retirement of Russian nuclear weapons scientists could help efforts to reduce the size of Russia’s nuclear complex, according to an academic paper released today.

The paper suggests that as many 10,000 Russian nuclear weapons experts could be persuaded to retire early in exchange for receiving additional annual pensions as small as $500.

The proposal was made by Jean Pierre Contzen, professor at the Instituto Superior Tecnico in Lisbon and Maurizio Martellini of the University of Insubria and LNCV in Como, Italy.  Martellini participates in an international consortium of 20 research groups focused on helping implement the Group of Eight’s $20 billion effort to secure WMD materials and promote nonproliferation measures in the former Soviet Union.  The consortium, called Strengthening the Global Partnership, is administered by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has decided to cut 35,000 nuclear weapons workers by 2010, according to the report.  To aid the downsizing effort, several U.S.-Russian and multilateral programs are working to provide civilian jobs for scientists and technicians, the report says, but it says the success of these programs has been “very limited.”

To help accelerate the downsizing process, the report proposes creating an early secure retirement buyout program for Russian nuclear weapons scientists.  About 20 percent of Russian nuclear weapons workers are over 50 years old and 5 percent are over 60 years old, the report says, noting that the retirement age in Russia is 55.  Many Russian nuclear weapons workers are continuing to work beyond retirement, however, because pensions are too low, according to the report.  For example, the average pension in the closed Russian city of Sarov in 2001 was about $37 per month, less than one-fifth of the wage the laboratory’s active employees.

According to the report, if a system were established to provide adequate pensions for Russian nuclear weapons personnel, then about 10,000 workers could be persuaded to retire by 2010.  The report also says that such a system “would be by far the cheapest way to address the problem of excess nuclear scientists and workers.”  It notes that the director of one Russian nuclear weapons facility has said that he could persuade 2000 workers of retirement age to retire early if provided an additional pension bonus of $500 annually per person for 10 years. 

“An early secure retirement buyout program over 10 years for 10,000 workers might cost only $50 million, rather than the $100 million needed only to start 10,000 new civilian jobs in the territories of the RNCs [Russian nuclear cities],” the report says.

An early retirement program would have to include several provisions to ensure that nonproliferation objectives are met.  For example, workers who choose to accept early requirement may need to give up their security clearances and access to Russian nuclear weapons facilities to ensure that they do not return to work, the report says.  It also proposes that those who accept early retirement also be required to live within the restricted area of the closed cities so that they do no become private consultants for rogue states or terrorists groups seeking to obtain nuclear weapons.

To attract the confidence of Russian nuclear weapons workers, funding for an early retirement program should be independently managed, according to the report.  It proposes that a fund of $50 million over the next 10 years be created to provide additional pension bonuses.  Such a fund could be managed by either the G-8 partnership or the U.S.-Russian International Science and Technology Center (see GSN, July 2).

Several nonproliferation experts told Global Security Newswire today that while an early retirement program would be helpful in reducing the number of Russian nuclear workers, it would not fully solve the problem.  Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, said that while some workers are at, or near, retirement age, new workers are also being employed at the closed cities who would not be affected by an early retirement program.

Luongo also said that there would be implementation concerns in any early retirement program, including determining eligibility and ensuring that retired workers were either not being re-employed or being hired by other countries or terrorists groups.  In addition, a multilateral funding mechanism might also hinder implementation, he said. 

It is also still unclear as to Russia’s position on any type of early retirement program for its nuclear weapons workers, Luongo said.

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Abraham Thanks Senate for Maintaining Nuclear Weapons Funding

U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham Monday praised the U.S. Senate for preserving the full Bush administration request for funding nuclear weapons research in the fiscal 2004 energy and water appropriations bill (see GSN, Sept. 17).

In a letter to Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), Abraham lauded Domenici’s efforts against a Democratic amendment to the bill that that would have eliminated funds for research into low-yield and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons and would also have prevented other nuclear weapons activities.  The Senate last week approved the bill with the Bush administration’s funding request intact.

“Your committee and the Senate have twice overcome challenges from those who do not understand the importance of acting to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent,” Abraham wrote.

Abraham also called on Domenici to work to maintain the nuclear weapons research funding in the final version of the bill when its goes into conference with the House of Representatives.  In his letter, Abraham criticized the House for failing to include the full White House weapons research-funding request in its version of the bill.

“The House version of the appropriations act precludes us from even investigating options for modest transformation of the stockpile and increases the risk we will be unable to respond to unforeseen technical problems.  It thus represents a risk that the United States simply cannot afford to take,” Abraham wrote (U.S. Energy Department release, Sept. 22).

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Senior Chinese Official Readies for Visit to North Korea

The second highest ranking official in China’s Communist Party is scheduled to visit North Korea this week to discuss the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula (see GSN, Sept. 23).

Wu Bangguo, chief of China’s parliament, would be the highest ranking Chinese official to visit Pyongyang in recent years, Agence France-Presse reported.

“I think he will go tomorrow or Friday,” a Chinese Foreign Ministry official said today.

Wu’s visit is an indication of China’s determination to peacefully settle the standoff between North Korea and the United States, AFP reported (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 24).

U.S. President George W. Bush, meanwhile, yesterday praised Beijing’s involvement in the North Korean crisis.

“U.S.-China relations are full of energy, and this is important for both sides,” Bush told visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the White House (Willy Wo-Lap Lam, CNN.com, Sept. 24).

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NNSA to Appoint Official to Oversee Sandia Security Improvements

The U.S. Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration will appoint a senior official to oversee security improvements at the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks announced yesterday (see GSN, July 2).

Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Thomas Neary, who has experience with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, has agreed to take the temporary position, which will expire in six months, Brooks said.  Neary will oversee efforts by the NNSA’s Sandia Site Office and the facility itself to implement new Energy recommendations, according to a NNSA press release.  Neary will also help improve security oversight conducted by the Sandia Site Office.

“The best way to achieve our objective in a timely fashion is to bring in a topflight manager whose sole responsibility is to make sure this important job is done well and completely,” Brooks said (NNSA release, Sept. 23).

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New Zealand to Build Nuclear Test Monitoring Station

New Zealand announced today that it would build a nuclear test monitoring facility in Fiji, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, April 15).

New Zealand Health Minister Annette King has signed a contract with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to build the station, AFP reported.  The facility will become part of a global network of 321 stations to monitor treaty compliance (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 24).

In addition, New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff today criticized the failure of full nuclear disarmament worldwide, citing concerns of North Korea, Israel and Iran possibly possessing nuclear weapons.

“The only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again,” Goff said at the U.N. General Assembly in New York.

New Zealand is the only country that prohibits nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels from entering its territory (Associated Press, Sept. 24).

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Russia to Create New ICBM Unit in December

Russia plans to deploy in late December a new regiment armed with Topol-M ICBMs, ITAR-Tass reported Monday (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2002).

The Russian military is working to arm a missile division based at Tatishchevo in the Saratov region with the silo-launched version of the Topol-M, according to ITAR-Tass.  The unit will be the fourth to be armed with the missile (ITAR-Tass, Sept. 22 in FBIS-SOV, Sept. 22).

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Iran Set to Receive IAEA Friday, Will Offer Required Cooperation Only

The International Atomic Energy Agency announced today that it would send a team of nuclear experts to Iran Friday to discuss the current standoff over Tehran’s nuclear activities (see GSN, Sept. 22).

“We have a detailed list of requirements covering all of the areas outlined in our reports (on Iran) — including uranium conversion and uranium enrichment,” said IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming.  “October will be a period of very intensive inspections and talks in Iran,” she added (Louis Charbonneau, Reuters, Sept. 23).

The agency set an Oct. 31 deadline for Tehran to prove it has only civilian nuclear intentions.  In response to that ultimatum, however, Iran’s IAEA representative said yesterday that Tehran would scale back its cooperation with the agency.

Ali Akbar Salehi said U.N. inspectors have been taken to visit non-nuclear sites and allowed to collect environmental samples.

“This has been beyond our obligations, but from now on we will act according to the current regulations,” he added (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 22).

Iranian leaders are still debating, however, on how to ultimately respond to the IAEA deadline, according to the BBC (BBC News, Sept. 23).

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U.S., Russia Advance Joint Nonproliferation Efforts

The United States and Russia are “on the brink” of a new agreement to provide U.S. funding to transfer Russian-origin, highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors worldwide back to Russia, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said Friday (see GSN, Sept. 22).

The first operation under the new program, the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Initiative, occurred Sunday when a joint U.S.-Russian operation recovered stockpiles of highly enriched uranium from a Romanian research reactor facility.  The new program is intended to complement a U.S.-effort to recover highly enriched uranium provided by the United States to foreign research reactors, Energy Daily reported (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, Sept. 23).

Abraham also announced U.S. funding for a new project to construct a $9 million nuclear imaging center in the closed Russian city of Snezhinsk as part of the Nuclear Cities Initiative (see GSN, Sept. 22).

“I am proud of NCI’s accomplishments and recognize that it serves a vital nonproliferation goal by assisting in the transition of Russian nuclear scientists and engineers to nondefense, commercial efforts,” Abraham said.

The NCI program has expired because of U.S. concerns over a lack of liability protections for U.S. officials and workers involved in activities conducted through the initiative.  U.S. and Russian energy officials last week, however, signed an agreement to continue 69 NCI projects until completion (U.S. Energy Department release, Sept. 19).

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Bush, Putin to Discuss Nonproliferation During Camp David Summit

U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to discuss nuclear nonproliferation and the threat of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction during a two-day summit scheduled to begin Friday at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, according to ITAR-Tass (see GSN, Sept. 19).

“The mounting threat that WMD may get into the hands of terrorists and the growing number of countries that seek to possess them require further joint moves by Russia and the U.S. to increase interaction in efforts to combat proliferation of the WMD,” said Putin deputy Sergei Prikhodko.  He added that such nonproliferation efforts include the need “to raise the effectiveness of the existing multilateral mechanisms.”

During their meeting, Bush and Putin are also expected to discuss Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, which centers on the Bushehr nuclear reactor that Moscow is constructing for Tehran, ITAR-Tass reported.  Putin said Russian intelligence has information that “very many West European and American companies maintain cooperation with Iran, including that on dual-purpose technologies.”  Putin also said he did not want suspicions that Russian may be aiding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program to be used as a pretext for unfair competition in international markets (ITAR-Tass, Sept. 23).

Putin said Sunday that he believes the United States and Russia “are becoming strategic partners and allies” on some issues, including nuclear nonproliferation (Dina Pyanykh, ITAR-Tass, Sept. 22).

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said last week that he has seen “considerable convergence” between the United States and Russia on a number of issues.

“I think we have very few conflicts of interest today,” Vershbow said.  “We both have an interest in strengthening democracy, in combating global threats such as (weapons) proliferation and the spread of narcotics. … When we have differences, it’s more over tactics than over strategic interests,” he said.

U.S. officials have said that Russia has begun to agree more with the U.S. position on Iran’s nuclear program and has joined the United States in pressuring Tehran to meet an Oct. 31 deadline set by the International Atomic Energy Agency to explain its nuclear program (David Sands, Washington Times, Sept. 23).

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North Korean Rejects IAEA Resolution

North Korea today dismissed an International Atomic Energy Agency appeal to halt its nuclear development, accusing the U.N. nuclear watchdog of acting on behalf of the United States (see GSN, Sept. 19).

The IAEA passed a resolution Friday calling on North Korea “to promptly accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and cooperate with the agency in their full and effective implementation.”

The state-run Korean Central News Agency released a statement today, however, saying that “we don’t accept such an unjust resolution and declare it null and void.”

The “IAEA has manifested itself as the stooge of the United States,” KCNA added (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 23).

Pyongyang also referred to the IAEA as a “political maid for the United States” (CNN.com, Sept. 23).

The United States, meanwhile, will begin flying unmanned aerial vehicles near the border of North and South Korea this week, the Associated Press reported.

Military officials plan to put the Shadow 200 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in service to monitor North Korean military activity (Associated Press, Sept. 23).

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Joint U.S.-Russian Operation Recovers Uranium from Romanian Research Reactor

A joint U.S.-Russian operation yesterday recovered about 30 pounds of weapon-grade uranium from a Soviet-era research reactor facility in Romania, according to the Washington Post (see GSN, Jan. 3).

During the operation, eight canisters containing 80-percent enriched uranium were removed from storage at the Pitesti Institute for Nuclear Research, west of Bucharest, according to the Post.  The Romanian uranium was chosen for removal because of the significant amount present and because it could have been easily stolen by terrorists, U.S. officials said. 

“You could throw it in the back of a truck and drive away with it,” said Paul Longsworth, U.S. Energy Department deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation.  Because the uranium was “fresh fuel” that had not been irradiated, it could have been transported with relatively low risk, he said.

The uranium was transported to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in Russia, where it will be blended down to a lower enrichment level for use as nuclear power plant fuel, according to the Post.  The Energy Department provided $400,000 for the operation.  The uranium retrieval operation was planned over the last several months with Russia, Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Longsworth said.  To obtain Romanian cooperation, the United States agreed to convert the research reactor at the Pitesti Institute to use nonweapon-grade uranium, the Post reported. 

“It’s win-win,” said a senior U.S. energy official.  “The Russians wanted the (highly enriched) uranium, the Romanians wanted a new (low-enriched uranium) core for their reactor and to be seen as helpful in the nonproliferation world, and we’ve wanted to get this done for a long time and remove this threat,” the official said (Susan Glasser, Washington Post, Sept. 22).

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U.S.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill for Threat Reduction Programs

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — As a key U.S.-Russian measure to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation expires today, observers are concerned the thorny legal questions that sank the agreement could have broader repercussions, ultimately increasing the risk that Russian nuclear technology, materials or know-how could fall into the wrong hands.

Washington is refusing to renew the Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement, which expires today, because of concerns that liability language in the agreement is inadequate to protect U.S. officials or workers in case of injuries or damages arising from activities carried out under the initiative.  The move follows the related expiration in July of the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, another U.S.-Russian threat reduction measure (see GSN, July 25).

NCI is a vehicle for the United States to help Russia decrease activity at nuclear weapon sites, converting some of them to other uses.  The U.S. Energy Department has described the program on its Web site as  “the only U.S. government program whose primary aim is to help downsize the Russian nuclear weapons complex.”

Sixty-nine NCI projects will continue until completion, despite the end of the pact itself, under an agreement signed Friday in Moscow by U.S. and Russian energy officials (see GSN, Sept. 19).  No new projects envisioned by the initiative will begin, though, and U.S. officials expressed concern that the liability dispute could drag on, ultimately affecting Washington’s ability to reduce the Russian proliferation threat.

“It’s significant,” a U.S. official said of the liability dispute, “but you won’t see the effects in NCI. … If we don’t resolve the liability, you will begin to see the impacts at some time.”

The NCI agreement and the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, both reached in 1998, stipulate broad liability exemption for Moscow, including in cases of “premeditated” actions causing damage or injury.  The United States is seeking to have a tougher approach — such as the one taken in the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction “umbrella agreement,” which does not protect Russia against liability for premeditated acts — accepted as a standard for threat reduction texts.

The dispute is relevant not only to bilateral measures such as NCI but also to the Group of Eight’s Global Partnership for nonproliferation, an ambitious multilateral counterproliferation program launched in June of last year at a G-8 summit in Canada (see GSN, June 6).

U.S. officials have said G-8 countries generally favored umbrella agreement-style liability protections when they launched the Global Partnership last year.  Deeming its position to be bolstered by the G-8 agreement, Washington has been pushing for ratification this year by the Russian Duma of the CTR umbrella agreement, an event that could presage the acceptance of U.S.-sought protections as a template for liability language in threat reduction texts.

A U.S. official said today that President George W. Bush’s administration expects the Duma eventually to ratify the umbrella agreement and that the NCI agreement is no longer a priority for the United States.  According to another U.S. official, NCI’s demise is of relatively little significance because of Friday’s extension of ongoing projects under the initiative and the existence of various other mechanisms for advancing the same nonproliferation goals.

Democratic members of Congress and nongovernmental organizations have nevertheless opposed terminating both 1998 agreements.  In a statement issued in July as it became clear that the agreements would expire, Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Executive Director Kenneth Luongo said that “allowing these agreements to expire is wrong and unnecessary at this time” and “sends a terrible signal about the importance of securing the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction on Earth as rapidly as possible.”

At a PIR Center-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nonproliferation conference over the weekend in Moscow, U.S. and Russian participants disagreed over how best to address the liability impasse.

Russian Ambassador-at-large Anatoly Antonov said the United States has been unwilling to compromise, seeking simply to impose U.S.-style legal standards on the international stage.  Citing the possibility of an al-Qaeda strike on a Russian nuclear facility, Antonov criticized the United States for seeking to make Russia liable for the results of premeditated acts.

“Why should Russia be held liable for something somebody else did intentionally?” Antonov asked.

Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate Rose Gottemoeller, a former nonproliferation official in the U.S. Energy Department, said there is “good reason to be looking at some new and innovative approaches to tackling the liability problem.”

Gottemoeller added, though, that the Duma should “release the steam” that has built up over the dispute by ratifying both the CTR umbrella agreement and the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for Russia, signed in May of this year by Russia, European Union countries and the United States (see GSN, May 22).  A U.S. official today said the Duma has made MNEPR its priority and is unlikely to ratify the CTR umbrella agreement soon.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies Washington Director Leonard Spector, a former assistant deputy administrator in the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, called for an international pooling of resources to pay any liability claims under the threat reduction agreements.

Spector, who along with the Fridtjof Nansen Institute’s Douglas Brubaker has published an article in the Monterey Institute’s Nonproliferation Review supporting reform of U.S.-Russian liability arrangements, said asking Russia to accept liability is illogical, since the existence of the threat reduction agreements presupposes financial need on Moscow’s part.

Both Antonov and Natalya Kalinina, an assistant to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, said that, because of stumbling blocks such as the liability dispute, the West is not making good on its Global Partnership promise of increased nonproliferation aid to Russia.  “Realistically, funding has not begun for many of the projects,” Kalinina said.

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Three European Countries Offer Iran Nuclear Carrot

France, Germany and the United Kingdom last month offered Iran greater civilian nuclear technology cooperation if Tehran were to accept more intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities (see GSN, Sept. 19).

The offer came in direct contrast to Washington’s hard-line position on Iranian nuclear development, Reuters reported Saturday.  The foreign ministers from the three European powers sent a letter to Tehran suggesting that technology cooperation was possible, but not offering direct nuclear assistance.

“Washington did not consider it very helpful at all,” said a diplomat familiar with the offer.  “They were worried it ran the risk of splitting Europe and America on this issue, and they talked to their friends and colleagues in Europe about that and attempted to dissuade them from sending the letter,” the diplomat added.

A British official said, however, that the letter had been sent with U.S. knowledge and that if Iran fully complies with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, “that would bring certain rights with it” (Taylor/Charbonneau, Reuters/Washington Post, Sept. 20).

French President Jacques Chirac supported the letter in a recent interview.

“[German Chancellor] Gerhard Schroeder, [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair and myself sent a joint message to the Iranians, telling them, ‘We are not trying to bully you, but we cannot accept that you tell us that everything’s perfectly all right while we are not sure that there isn’t a nuclear weapons manufacturing process behind it all,’” Chirac said.  “We agree on the fact that there is no reason to prevent a country from producing nuclear energy for civilian use, naturally if all the safeguards are there, particularly if all the IAEA inspections are completely unrestricted,” he added (New York Times, Sept. 22).

The International Atomic Energy Agency, however, said that Iran should not be offered a special deal to adopt the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

“It’s a one-size-fits-all thing.  The protocol is working in 37 countries right now, and nobody’s complaining of our abusing the authority in it,” said IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky.  “It works well.  Remember, Iran was one of the countries in our membership that helped to negotiate this additional protocol, push it through and umpteen times encourage everybody in the world to sign it. Iran is part of the process that brought us the protocol,” he said (Voice of America, Sept. 20).

An top Iranian cleric, however, suggested Friday that Iran should quit the nuclear treaty.  Ahmad Jannati, the leader of the powerful Guardian Council, called the demands for intrusive inspections “extra humiliating.”

“What is the problem with withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?” asked Jannati.  “North Korea withdrew from the treaty.  Many other countries have not even signed it,” he added.

Iranian nuclear chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh said last week that Iran is committed to complying with the treaty (Nazila Fathi, New York Times, Sept. 20).

Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, questioned Iran’s hesitance in signing the Additional Protocol.

“If Iran is not striving to develop nuclear weapons, it has nothing to hide.  I see no grounds for refusing to sign these additional protocols,” Putin said Saturday (Saradzhyan/McGregor, Moscow Times, Sept. 22).

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Bush to Use U.N. Address to Call for Increased Nonproliferation Efforts

In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly tomorrow, U.S. President George W. Bush is expected to urge the body to give greater attention to nuclear nonproliferation efforts, according to the New York Times (see GSN, March 5).

During his speech, Bush will describe stemming nuclear proliferation as one of the “next big challenges facing the United Nations,” a senior official said yesterday. 

Some senior U.S. officials had expected Bush to use his U.N. address to outline new proposals for strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by amending treaty provisions exploited by Iran and North Korea to develop their nuclear programs, according to the Times (see related GSN story, today).  Those proposals, however, have only been discussed in general terms within the White House and have not yet been examined by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, officials said.

“Nobody thinks they are ready for prime time,” a U.S. official said.

There are still several issues that would need to be resolved before attempting to strengthen the NPT, such as how to deal with countries that have never signed the treaty and whether it would be possible to prevent treaty members that have developed nuclear programs from leaving the treaty such as North Korea did, midlevel U.S. officials said.

In his speech, Bush is expected to focus on the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led effort to interdict WMD-related cargo shipments, the Times reported (see GSN, Sept. 17).  Four of the 11 initiative members recently completed the first of a series of interdiction exercises (David Sanger, New York Times, Sept. 22).

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IAEA Team to Visit Niger to Accelerate Safeguards Agreement

An International Atomic Energy Agency team is expected to travel to Niger in the next few months to accelerate the country’s approval of a safeguards agreement that would allow the agency to monitor Nigerien uranium exports, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 12).

Niger is a producer of processed uranium, known as “yellowcake,” that can be used to produce enriched uranium.  Niger and Kazakhstan are the only two countries out of 22 that reported producing uranium in 2000 to not have signed an IAEA safeguards agreement, according to the Associated Press. 

The purpose of the IAEA visit is “to break any legal logjam” in approving the safeguards agreement, said IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky.  The IAEA does not view Niger as a source for terrorists or countries to illicitly obtain uranium for use in weapons, he said.

Nigerien yellowcake “would require considerable conversion and processing to be usable for nuclear weapons,” Gwozdecky said.  “We don’t start tracking this stuff until it’s in a form suitable for reactor fuel,” he said (Bruce Stanley, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 22).

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India to Build Nuclear-Proof Bunkers for Leadership

The Hindustan Times reported today that India has decided to build two bunkers to protect top officials from a potential nuclear strike, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The first bunker is set to be built in central New Delhi, with the second to be built at a location within 250 miles of the city, AFP reported.  The decision to build the bunkers was made earlier this month during the first meeting of the Indian Nuclear Command Authority (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 22).

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Iran, U.S. Trade Barbs on Proliferation, Disarmament

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

MOSCOW — One week after the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors set a deadline for heightened Iranian cooperation with the agency, U.S. and Iranian officials traded criticisms here today over Tehran’s nuclear program and Washington’s allegedly lagging efforts to disarm (see GSN, Sept. 12).

The remarks came during the opening day of an international nonproliferation conference organized by the PIR Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and attended by high-level officials and top experts from around the world. 

Amid widespread concern that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon under cover of legitimate nuclear activity, the IAEA board found last week that Iran has insufficiently explained contradictions between Tehran’s description of its programs and the findings of IAEA experts.  As the board handed down a deadline to Tehran, the Iranian delegation walked out of the boardroom and appeared to threaten noncooperation with the agency — a threat since tempered.

U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe, in a lunchtime address today, said, “There is an urgent need for Iran to accept the recent IAEA governing board resolution and to conclude and implement an Additional Protocol.”  Such a protocol to Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement has been called for by the agency, the United States and others and would allow for more intrusive IAEA monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities.

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said this morning in an opening address to the conference that “there are very good reasons to ask whether Iran is heading down the same road” as countries such as North Korea.  Vershbow said such countries demonstrate the “weakness” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by remaining within the NPT framework long enough to obtain the building blocks of a weapon program, then abandoning the nonproliferation regime.

In particular, Vershbow cited Iran’s refusal to let IAEA inspectors visit one site until after it had been substantially modified and the country’s shifting statements on whether elements of its uranium enrichment program are indigenous or imported.

“Nothing about Iran’s behavior,” Vershbow said, “is consistent with what one would expect from a country that is honoring its NPT obligations. … Iran is a critical test for the NPT and the international community’s ability to give effective power to the IAEA.”

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Shafei, in remarks read by an aide as part of a panel discussion this morning, largely avoided discussion of the specifics of the case against Iran.  Another Iranian representative, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, who is deputy director general of international political affairs in Iran’s Foreign Ministry, said heightened questions about his country’s nuclear activity are the result not of suspicious behavior but of greater access granted in recent months to the IAEA.

Shafei declared his country theologically opposed to nuclear weapons, alluded to Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapon program as unfair and criticized declared nuclear weapon states for insufficient progress toward disarmament.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran believes, under Islamic principles and beliefs, … that nuclear weapons are inhuman and illegal, and in our defense doctrine, we have not included weapons of this kind,” Shafei said.

Apparently referring to Israel, Shafei said the fact that some countries do not participate in the international nonproliferation regime is a “violation” of the regime that creates rivalries among countries.  He called for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East and a “very just and nondiscriminatory global decision vis-a-vis international mechanisms of nonproliferation.”

The Bushehr nuclear power plant, set to become Iran’s first major nuclear facility when Russia completes its construction, was also a focus of discussion today at the conference.  Despite caution voiced by the United States, Russia has indicated it is moving ahead with agreements to supply Iran with fuel for the facility and to take back spent fuel from the reactor (see related GSN story, today).

Shafei said Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation is “pursued in the context of the peaceful use of nuclear energy” and is conducted with appropriate IAEA monitoring.  He stressed that the IAEA’s role is not only to pursue suspected nuclear weapon proliferators but also to aid peaceful nuclear programs.

“The A-bomb and the weapons of mass destruction,” Shafei said, “should have no place in this world.  We are saying no to the A-bomb and WMD, but we are saying yes to the peaceful use of the atom.  No one will ever be able to push us from this way we have taken.”

Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate George Perkovich said Iran “shows the importance of having rules,” since the IAEA will resolve the situation if the country’s programs are in fact peaceful in nature.  He added, though, that if Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, the international nonproliferation system is “not designed to solve that problem” and that a “broader international effort” will be needed that addresses politics and security in Iran and its region.

Perkovich said U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan or another high international official could “convene a regional dialogue of parties” to determine “just what is the future structure of the Persian Gulf security environment.

U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev are scheduled to speak this evening at the conference.

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U.S., Russia Extend Specific “Nuclear Cities” Projects Before Broader Agreement Lapses

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

MOSCOW — With a key U.S.-Russian threat reduction effort set to expire Monday, U.S. and Russian officials here signed an agreement today authorizing the continuation of ongoing projects under the program (see GSN, July 23).

The Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement will be allowed to expire Monday, U.S. officials here confirmed today, because of U.S. concerns that its liability provisions would not sufficiently protect U.S. officials or contractors in case of injury or damages.  The 1998 Plutonium Science and Technology agreement was allowed to expire in July because of the same liability concerns, which have been a hot topic at an international nonproliferation conference that began here this morning (see GSN, July 25).

Through the initiative, the United States has helped to scale back activities in Russian nuclear weapon sites and to convert some sites to other uses.  According to the U.S. Energy Department’s Web site, the initiative “is the only U.S. government program whose primary aim is to help downsize the Russian nuclear weapons complex.”

Despite the lapsing initiative, 69 existing projects under the agreement will be allowed to continue until completion.  Paul Longsworth, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, and a Russian counterpart signed a protocol this morning invoking language in the NCI agreement that allows for such extension of projects beyond the life of the agreement itself.

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Prospects for Russian-Iranian Fuel Agreement Played Down as Bush-Putin Summit Nears

Just three days after suggesting that a Russian-Iranian nuclear power plant fuel arrangement was close to completion, a senior Russian official said the agreement was actually far from finished (see GSN, Sept. 17).

“I cannot name a date,” Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told reporters earlier today in Moscow.  Negotiations were “taking a long time — these are prolonged discussions,” he added.

The two countries are trying to finalize a deal in which Russia would provide fresh fuel for the nuclear reactor it is building in Iran and then Tehran would later return the spent fuel to Russia.  Rumyantsev said Tuesday in Vienna that the deal was nearly done (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 19).

Rumyantsev’s remarks today followed a meeting with U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham (Richard Balmforth, Reuters, Washington Post, Sept. 19).  These talks in turn followed nonproliferation discussions earlier this week in Moscow between U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak (RFE/RL, Sept. 18).

Rumyantsev denied, however, that Russia was deliberating slowing its cooperation with Iran in response to U.S. pressure.

“This does not correspond to reality,” he said (Balmforth, Reuters).

Addressing a nonproliferation conference in Moscow later today, Rumyantsev said the process was only slowed because Iran was conducting these types of talks for the first time.

“Our Iranian colleagues, they have no experience in the use of nuclear energy,” he said, expressing optimism that the deal would be completed.

“They commit themselves to return the fuel,” Rumyantsev said, “We’re going to take it back for them.  There’s no problem” (Joe Fiorill, GSN, Sept. 19).

The slow pace toward finishing the agreement was likely to ease U.S.-Russian tensions on this issue when U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold a scheduled Sept. 26-27 meeting at the Camp David presidential retreat, Reuters reported (Balmforth, Reuters).

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Cuba Signs IAEA Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol

Cuba yesterday signed a comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (see GSN, Nov. 5, 2002).  In addition, Cuba also signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, which gives the IAEA the authority to conduct more intrusive monitoring of Havana’s nuclear activities (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Sept. 18).

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U.S. Analysts Struggle to Count North Korean Nuclear Weapons

Although the CIA officially estimates that North Korea might possess one or two nuclear weapons, some U.S. intelligence analysts now fear that Pyongyang could actually have as many as a half-dozen, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 17).

North Korea’s nuclear program is so secretive, however, that precise assessments are difficult to make, officials said.

Analysts said three key variables affect U.S. estimates — how much plutonium North Korea produced in the 1980s, how much it produced this year (see GSN, Sept. 12) and how much plutonium is needed to make a North Korean nuclear weapon.

“We’re trying to nail that down,” said U.S. Senator Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), who serves on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  “The consequences of them having more nuclear warheads is significant, in terms of conducting a test, or possibly trafficking in nuclear materials,” he added.

With so few weapons, each additional warhead would substantially add to North Korea’s nuclear capability and its leverage at the negotiating table, experts said.  If Pyongyang has just one or two nuclear weapons, it could use them only as weapons of last resort, but additional weapons would give North Korea the ability to use some in tests or in warfare and still retain a small number for deterrence.

Furthermore, a surplus of weapons would ease the way toward exporting nuclear materials, the experts said (John Lumpkin, Associated Press/San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 18).

Chinese Denies North Korean Border Pressure

Meanwhile, Beijing yesterday denied that troop activity along the Chinese-North Korean was intended to pressure Pyongyang.  Hong Kong media reported this week that 150,000 Chinese troops were recently deployed to the border (see GSN, Sept. 15).

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said troops recently took over border control duties as part of a long-planned administrative transition.

“The border between China and the D.P.R.K. is relatively stable, generally speaking,” Kong said, “There are many exchanges, including trade, along the border” (Joe McDonald, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 18).

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Russia Suspends Tu-160 Bomber Flights

Russian Air Force Chief of Staff Boris Cheltsov has said that Moscow has suspended flights of the Tu-160 “Blackjack” strategic bomber after one crashed during a training exercise, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, July 18).  The flights will be suspended until the cause of the crash has been determined, Cheltsov said (Washington Post, Sept. 19).

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IAEA General Conference Approves Agency Budget, New Board Members

Delegates at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, ending today in Vienna, approved the agency’s fiscal 2004-2005 budget yesterday and elected new members to the IAEA Board of Governors (see GSN, Sept. 18).

The conference yesterday approved an agency budget of almost $270 million, which the IAEA board had approved this summer.  The budget represents the “first significant increase” in IAEA funding in 15 years, an agency press release said.  The budget also calls for further phased funding increases through 2007 (see GSN, July 21).

Most of the approved budget’s funding will go toward the IAEA’s verification program.  In addition, funding has also been allocated for safety and nuclear science and technology programs (International Atomic Energy Agency release I, Sept. 18).

The conference yesterday also elected 11 new members to the 35-member IAEA board.  The new members are Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, South Korea, Tunisia and Vietnam.  The board is scheduled to meet next week to elect a chairman and vice chairman for the 2003-2004 period (International Atomic Energy Agency release II, Sept. 18).

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IAEA General Conference Delegates Briefed on Radioactive Waste Safety Convention

Delegates at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, being held this week in Vienna, were briefed yesterday on the status and benefits of an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste and spent fuel management (see GSN, April 4).

The briefing session was in preparation for the first peer-review meeting of convention members, scheduled to be held Nov. 3-14, according to an IAEA press release.  The meeting, the first to be held since the convention entered into force June 2001, will include reviews of national implementation reports to be submitted by the 32 countries that have ratified the convention (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Sept. 18).

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CTBTO Holds Out Hope for U.S. Test Ban Ratification

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

VIENNA — Despite the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — and its efforts to shorten the time needed to prepare for resumed nuclear testing — top international officials here are holding out hope that patient diplomacy can reinvigorate the stalled global effort to ban nuclear test explosions (see GSN, July 25).

Twelve specific countries’ ratifications are still needed for the treaty to take effect, but a special focus on the recalcitrant United States was apparent in interviews here last week with those behind the push to bring the treaty into force.

“What is really important is where the United States are going, and without the United States, this treaty really … would have no future — if the United States would pull out of this.  But this is not what is happening,” said Wolfgang Hoffmann, executive director of the CTBT Organization, the institution created to implement the 1996 treaty.

Although Washington has observed a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests for 11 years, officials in the Bush administration have said unforeseen stockpile problems or newly developed weapons might require resumed testing, and the administration has openly expressed its opposition to ratifying the treaty.

The CTBTO convened countries here early this month in a bid to jump-start progress on the treaty, but the United States, citing its opposition to the pact, sent no delegation (see GSN, July 9).  The organization this week released its report on the Sept. 3-5 meeting (see GSN, Sept. 5).

Several countries at the meeting expressed frustration at the pace of progress toward implementation of the treaty and the course of U.S. nuclear policy.  Speaking on behalf of the increasingly visible Nonaligned Movement, Malaysia expressed concern at both the U.S. treaty position and Washington’s recent Nuclear Posture Review, which envisions the possibility of new nuclear weapon testing.

“We believe that the principle of leadership by example should be displayed by the nuclear weapon states in this important endeavor,” the statement said.

Besides promoting signatures and ratifications, the CTBTO is overseeing the establishment of a global system to detect nuclear explosions, with an eye toward monitoring treaty compliance.  Hoffmann stressed progress on the latter front, as well as U.S. support for the effort — the United States supplies 22 percent of the CTBTO budget, much of it devoted to the monitoring network — despite Washington’s avowed intention not to ratify the treaty.

“On the technical track, we have made a lot of progress. … We are confident now that there are no ‘white spots’ on the globe, at least with our mainstay, which is seismic detection,” said Hoffmann, drawing a link between the effectiveness of the monitoring system and prospects for new ratifications.

“The United States are very much interested in what we are doing technically, and there we are having an excellent cooperation.  They are helping us, we are helping them, and the money is coming in. … We would be lost without this money; this is quite clear. … This very practical approach to the CTBT is very important for us,” Hoffman said (see GSN, Sept. 18, 2002).

Finnish envoy Tom Groenberg, who led preparations for this month’s conference, said he views the United States as bound by the CTBT under the Vienna Convention on treaties, despite its failure to ratify the test ban pact.

“We hope, of course, that they would” ratify the treaty, Groenberg said, “but this administration has indicated what the position of the current administration is.”

“If you are cynical,” he said, “you could ask yourself, ‘So what?’ … According to international law, you are bound by a treaty with your signature … as long as there is a perspective that it would enter into force — and we do have that perspective.”

“Whether you have ratified or not isn’t actually that important,” he said.

In any case, according to Hoffmann, a new multilateralism may be on the rise in Washington, signaling better times ahead for measures such as the CTBT.

“We see changes in the American position towards multilateral approaches.  I mean, you see what’s happening now as far as Iraq is concerned.  The Americans are approaching the U.N., and this is a question of burden-sharing,” Hoffmann said.

“For a time,” he added, “multilateralism had a bad name in the United States; this you can see across the spectrum. … Now, the pendulum seems to swing more in the direction of a multilateral approach, and if this is true for Iraq, this might become true for other areas as well.”

Citing technical and political considerations, both Hoffman and Groenberg said new U.S. tests are not necessarily imminent, and neither offered any assessment of the implications of such tests for the CTBT.

“We, of course, do hope that no tests will take place, and, of course, according to the treaty, you are not supposed to make any tests. … And there is the good old British saying that you shouldn’t cross the bridge before you have reached it,” said Groenberg.

Said Hoffmann, “I don’t think [tests are] a necessity, and I think that this might … in global politics … give the wrong signal to others, and therefore, I think the United States will weigh this very carefully. … They will always act along with their own lines of interest.”

CTBTO Pushed “Road Map,” but  Some Seek More Radical Change

Under the terms of the treaty, entry into force requires signature and ratification by 44 specific countries, 32 of which have ratified.  Nine others — China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States and Vietnam — have signed but not ratified, and three — North Korea, India and Pakistan — have not signed.

Several European countries have pushed for U.S. ratification during Washington visits this year, and this month’s conference ended with a call for more such diplomacy.  The meeting, a biannual affair authorized under Article XIV of the treaty, yielded a declaration that included a general call for new signatures and ratifications and the proposal of 12 specific measures — including regional seminars and a heightened attention to the pact in bilateral talks involving signatories — to promote the treaty’s entry into force.

“New in the declaration,” said Groenberg, “is that it isn’t just a repetition.  We do have … what you could call a … road map or an action plan. … And that, I hope, will be a kind of motor in order to get countries to do something.”

“There definitely won’t be an entry into force in the very near future,” he added, “but if you have a longer-term perspective, I think there are reasons that one could be optimistic.  We are certainly going to be able to bring down the number of 12 to, I hope, less than 10, in a year or two — in a year, actually, in one year. … We have got indications that a number of countries are actually prepared now, and the obstacles are technical, not political.”

China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo appear to be among the countries cited by Groenberg.  China has vowed to ratify the treaty quickly, but, as Hoffmann said, “‘Quickly’ in Chinese terms can be long in European terms.  What is important now is that they say they are moving toward ratification” (see GSN, Sept. 4).  Hoffmann added that, with a new D.R.C. legislature set to begin work Oct. 3, the CTBTO has “the assurance of the political leadership that they will bring this into parliament and have this ratified.”

Among the developments at this month’s meeting that could lead to more ratifications, Hoffmann cited a proposal to create a permanent special representative of the signatory states “to look after this question of entry into force … a sort of coordination point who would pull together the strings, the endeavors of different states and also coordinate with the secretariat.”  He also noted that a “special fund” has been proposed “to further ratifications,” but he acknowledged that the concrete uses to which the money would be put remain unclear.

Many nongovernmental organizations appear to support such efforts.  Klaus Renoldner of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War said getting the CTBT on the agenda of various bilateral meetings should be a main mechanism for exerting pressure on recalcitrant signatories.  Speaking for 97 NGOs earlier this month at the CTBTO meeting, Renoldner said NGOs, governments, international organizations and members of the media should all contribute to the effort.

Calls have begun to be heard, though, for more innovative efforts to speed the treaty’s entry into force.  South African representative Alfred Tokollo Moleah said Sept. 5, as the Article XIV meeting drew to a close, that his country has doubts about the effectiveness of the biannual conferences.  He called this year’s meeting less “dynamic” than those held in 2001 and 1999 (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2001).

Under Article XIV, countries that have ratified the CTBT could be justified in pursuing more dramatic means than the stepped-up diplomatic measures that have been tried so far.  The treaty is written in broad terms, giving countries that have ratified the ability to use Article XIV conferences to “consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process.”

Groenberg maintained that signatories are bound by the text for now and as long as there is a “perspective” of entry into force, but he added that different measures could one day become appropriate.

“We might one day, of course, face a situation where there is a need, perhaps, to do something in order to either keep the perspective or … to amend the text so that it would enter into force. … That time hasn’t yet come,” he said.

Hoffman said questions of “whether one could change this formula for entry into force or whether one should declare provisional application of the treaty” have “not been part of the official dealings of the conference,” adding, “Multilateral diplomacy is always long-term.”

The executive director added, though, that if the CTBT monitoring network is completed before the treaty enters into force, “The question arises, ‘What are we doing with this?’”

“I think only then,” he said, “we have the serious question of whether we would like to apply this treaty, with all its assets, provisionally.  And for me, it’s difficult to see whether and when such a path would be taken.  I mean, at the moment, the clear hope is that the Americans, among these 12, will come around and ratify the treaty at their own will and decision.”

Hoffmann added that political progress in regions such as South Asia and the Middle East could ease ratifications of the treaty independently of any U.N. or CTBTO action.

In the Middle East, he said, “it would be … important that one of the countries that play a major role would be the first to do it.”  India and Pakistan, he added, “will sign” when “the train starts moving,” but for now are both observing a test moratorium.

“If India signs, then Pakistan will sign immediately.  Pakistan would not feel secure enough to sign first,” Hoffmann said.

“Everybody is looking at everybody else,” he said, “and, in the long run, they probably can go together, hand in hand, to [U.N. Secretary General] Kofi Annan and hand in their instruments of ratification, to be sure that the other one is not holding back.”

In the case of Iran, which is under a deadline to step up cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and demonstrate it is not covertly developing nuclear weapons, the prospect for CTBT ratification is unclear.

 “When I visited Iran,” Hoffmann said, “I met some people who really were with us, but others who were adamantly opposed to this treaty, because they thought that we just came in to spy on them. … The Iranians will have to make up their minds what they really want, but of course, foremost in their mind is the dealings with the agency at the moment.”

Renoldner, the NGO representative, cited a conversation with an Iranian delegate at recent CTBT talks, who said his country supported the treaty.

“I said to him, ‘Why didn’t you sign?’ … The answer that he gave me was not a reasonable answer,” he said.

Ultimately, the fate of the treaty could depend on the will of the United States, which under former President Bill Clinton supported ratification of the treaty.  Countries that have not signed or ratified may be more likely to do so if the United States came into the fold, sources agreed.

“We can just hope,” Renoldner said, “that one day, there will be another president of the United States who maybe will restart a campaign for the CTBT again.”

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Saudi Arabia Examining Nuclear Options

Saudi Arabia has begun a strategic review that includes considering the option of acquiring nuclear weapons, the London Guardian reported today.

According to the Guardian, senior Saudi officials are currently examining such options as obtaining nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, maintaining or entering into an alliance with a nuclear-armed country for protection, or attempting to create a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone.  It is unknown if Saudi officials have made any decisions on any of the three approaches.

David Albright, director of the Institute for Science and International Security, said that Saudi Arabia, if it were to choose to obtain nuclear weapons, would be more likely to buy them outright rather than attempt to build them.  If Saudi Arabia were to do so, it would become the first nuclear-armed country to obtain its weapons by purchasing them, according to the Guardian.

“There [have] always been worries that the Saudis would go down this path if provoked,” Albright said.  “There is growing U.S. hostility which could lead to the removal of the U.S. umbrella and will the Saudis be intimidated by Iran?  They’ve got to be nervous,” he said.

A senior U.N. official involved in nuclear nonproliferation efforts said Saudi Arabia’s examination of its nuclear options would be carefully monitored.

“Our antennae are up,” the official said.  “The international community can rest assured we do keep track of such events if they go beyond talk,” the official added (MacAskill/Traynor, London Guardian, Sept. 18).

Saudi Arabia today, however, denied the Guardian report.

“Saudi Arabia is not considering acquiring a nuclear bomb or nuclear weapons of any kind,” the Saudi Embassy in London said in a statement.  “There is no atomic energy program in any part of the kingdom and neither is one being considered,” it said (Reuters, Sept. 18).

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Arab League Calls on Israel to Sign Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The Arab League yesterday submitted a draft resolution to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, currently meeting in Vienna, calling on Israel to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to open its nuclear sites to international inspections (see GSN, July 28).

“The minimum is that Israel could sign the NPT,” Omani IAEA Ambassador Salim al-Riyami said.  “All the countries in the region have signed it,” he said.

While Israel has never formally acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, experts believe it has between 100 and 200 bombs, according to Al-Jazeera.net.  Al-Riyami said it was unfair for Western countries to call on the IAEA to apply pressure on Iran while ignoring Israel’s nuclear weapons program. 

“I think in the Arab region, people do think that there is a double standard regarding the countries and how (their nuclear programs) should be tackled,” al-Riyami said.

Gideon Frank, head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, called on conference members to not support the Arab League’s resolution, saying “We see no factual basis for this draft resolution”(Al-Jazeera.net, Sept. 17).

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Experts Warn of Iranian Nuclear Intentions

U.S. and Israeli officials, joined by private analysts, warned yesterday that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program that threatens the Middle East, the United States and the international nonproliferation regime (see GSN, Sept. 17).

At a Washington session of the U.S.-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee, the panel of experts offered a dire outlook of Iran’s intentions.

“Iran is in fact emerging rapidly as the new mass destruction weapon threat in the Middle East.  It is clear to me, at least from what I know, that if Iran continues down its present path, we will be looking at a new nuclear weapons power within the next few years,” said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Milhollin said Iran’s pursuit of ballistic missile technology was intended only to provide the means to deliver nuclear weapons (see GSN, Aug. 6).

Israeli Knesset member Yuval Steinitz agreed.

“The Iranian nuclear program is really a military nuclear program with the aim of threatening not just the Middle East or Israel, but NATO and Europe, and maybe to be able to target the United States of America,” he said.

A U.S. State Department official said Iran’s efforts were endangering the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other international efforts.

“If left unchallenged, Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons program will seriously weaken the NPT and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].  Already faced with North Korea’s brazen disregard for its treaty obligations, the NPT would be undermined still further if Iran were able to disregard its treaty obligations in a similar way,” said Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter (Deborah Tate, VOA News, Sept. 18).

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