British Analysts Expressed Concern Over September 2002 Dossier, Retired Official Says

A number of British Defense Ministry analysts expressed concerns last September over the claims made in a British dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, a retired ministry official told a parliamentary inquiry yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 3).

Some analysts believed the dossier exaggerated claims about Iraq’s chemical weapons production capabilities, said Brian Jones, a retired senior official with the defense intelligence analysis staff.  While some experts believed Iraq was continuing to produce chemical weapons, there was no solid evidence to support such a judgment, he said.

There was a tendency to “shall we say, over-egg certain assessments in relation particularly to the production of (chemical warfare) agents and weapons since 1998 — the difference between making a judgment that the production of CW agent had taken place as opposed to that judgment being that it had probably taken place or even possibly taken place,” Jones said.

There were also doubts over a claim in the dossier that the Iraqi military could deploy biological and chemical weapons within 45 minutes of being ordered to do so, Jones said.

“We had not seen the weapons being produced,” Jones said.  “We had no evidence of any recent testing or field trials and things like that.  So that all cast some doubts in our mind on that particular piece of intelligence,” he said (Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, Sept. 4).

Jones also said, however, that none of his team of analysts had argued that the claim should not have been included.

“We at no stage argued that this intelligence should not be in the dossier.  We thought it was important intelligence,” he said (Warren Hoge, New York Times, Sept. 4).

Jones told the inquiry that his team’s concerns were for the most part ignored and not included in the final draft of the dossier — a process that he said was “very unusual.”

A second witness who testified before the inquiry yesterday, a chemical weapons consultant identified as “Mr. A,” said the dossier had incorrectly focused on an Iraqi plant that produced phosgene — a chemical that can be used both as a weapon and to produce plastics and pesticide.  There was no evidence, however, that the plant had been used to produce weapons, Mr. A. said.

The dossier’s focus on the plant was “a stupid mistake for the British to make,” Mr. A said (Frankel, Washington Post).

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Officials Plan Shipping Interdiction Effort at Paris Meeting

Eleven nations began two-day talks yesterday in Paris to further develop the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led effort to interdict illicit shipments of WMD cargo, according to U.S. State Department release (see GSN, Aug. 4).

The U.S. delegation is being led by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

“The Paris meeting will focus on the further development of a statement of interdiction principles that will enable countries to better work together within domestic and international law to enhance and expand efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related technologies to and from countries of concern,” said a State Department spokesman.

The group — including Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States — held meetings in June and July (U.S. State Department release, Sept. 3).

Intelligence experts were scheduled to meet behind closed doors yesterday, with a plenary session scheduled for today.  Representatives from the participating countries are seeking to “make life more difficult for ships with suspicious cargo” by getting permission from nations to conduct at-sea inspections, according to French diplomats (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 3).

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U.N. Weapons Inspectors Ready to Return to Iraq If Asked

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.N. weapons inspectors are ready resume their work in Iraq on “short notice” if the U.N. Security Council were to request them to do so, according to a report released late last month by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (see GSN, June 19).

According to the report, most of the inspectors’ equipment has been safely maintained in storage on Cyprus.  In addition, UNMOVIC technical experts received valuable experience from their work in Iraq before Operation Iraqi Freedom and international weapons experts have indicated their “continuing interest” in serving as inspectors, the report says.

The U.N. inspection infrastructure in Iraq experienced a blow in mid-August with the attack on the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Center, the report says (see GSN, Aug. 20).  It is currently unknown if the center can be repaired for future use or if a new facility would have to be found, it says.

“Apart from this, UNMOVIC would be able and ready to resume field operations in Iraq, including confirmation of any findings related to disarmament, at short notice if the [Security] Council so requests,” the report says.

Since inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in March, shortly before the war began, they have continued work on several disarmament-related projects such as the development of a new monitoring plan for postwar Iraq, according to the report.  Other projects include the compilation of information on aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs, such as financing, staffing and procurement; as well as the compilation of technical files on Iraq’s efforts to destroy its WMD stockpiles, the report says.

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Pentagon Report Criticizes Planning for WMD Search in Postwar Iraq

A secret report prepared last month for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff says the U.S. military waited too long to plan for the WMD search in postwar Iraq, causing the U.S. Central Command to conduct the search ineffectively, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The report, Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned, says the military did not plan soon enough to allow the Central Command to effectively search for and eliminate suspected Iraqi WMD stockpiles.  In addition, the extent of planning for the search was underestimated and there were not enough U.S. personnel allocated to conduct the search, the report says.

The report blames the poor planning for the WMD hunt on the military’s unfamiliarity with that type of mission and an unclear division of responsibility, according to the Times.

“As a result, planning occurred on an ad hoc basis and late in the process,” the report says.  “Additionally, there were insufficient assets available to accomplish the mission.  Existing assets were tasked to perform multiple, competing missions,” it says.

According to the report, which is labeled “final draft,” U.S. military commanders should establish permanent units of WMD specialists.  In addition, future operational plans should contain sections on dealing with weapons of mass destruction, it says.

A U.S. Defense Department spokesman yesterday refused to comment on the report.

“We always look closely at everything we do to find ways to improve and do better and Operation Iraqi Freedom is no exception,” the spokesman said.  “As to specifics of the lessons learned, it’s still a draft document and classified, so it would be inappropriate to comment on that,” the spokesman said (Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Sept. 3).

British Intelligence Inquiry

Meanwhile, a British parliamentary inquiry is scheduled to hear from two Defense Ministry intelligence officials tomorrow about their concerns as to how a September 2002 dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was prepared, according to Agence France-Presse.  The inquiry is investigating the apparent suicide of David Kelly, a former U.N. weapons inspector who was cited as the source for a BBC report that alleged that British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s office exaggerated prewar intelligence to build the case for war (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 3).

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Suspected Iraqi Aircraft Not Designed for Use in WMD Attacks, U.S. Analysts Say

U.S. weapons experts working in Iraq have concluded that Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicles were not designed for conducting biological or chemical weapons attacks, contrary to claims made by the Bush administration prior to the war, the Associated Press reported last week (see GSN, Aug. 22).

Senior administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, had warned that Iraqi UAVs were intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction and cautioned that even U.S. territory was at risk.

However, reports are now emerging that prior to the war, U.S. Air Force intelligence analysts and analysts from the Missile Defense Agency said they believed the UAVs did not pose a threat to either Iraq’s neighbors or the United States, U.S. officials and weapons experts said.  There was also little evidence that Iraq’s UAV program was connected with its suspected biological weapons program, said Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency Director Bob Boyd.  The Iraqi drones were also believed to be too small to carry weapons, he said.  

“We didn’t see there was a very large chance they (UAVs) would be used to attack the continental United States,” Boyd said.  “We didn’t see them as a big threat to the homeland,” he said.

Evidence found in July by U.S. weapons experts in Iraq support the views of the Air Force and MDA analysts, according to two U.S. scientists involved in the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

“We just looked at the UAVs and said, ‘There’s nothing here.  There’s no room to put anything in here,’” one of the scientists said (Linzer/Lumpkin, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Aug. 24).

Blair Says He Would Have Resigned Over Intelligence Dispute

Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said last week that he would have resigned if there were any truth to the allegations that his government exaggerated prewar intelligence on Iraq, according to Reuters (see GSN, Aug. 21).

“This was an allegation that we had behaved in a way which ... if true would have merited my resignation,” Blair said

In testimony before a parliamentary inquiry, Blair denied that his government had exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq in a dossier released in September 2002.  Blair also said, however, that his government had been under public pressure to justify going to war, adding that he wanted the dossier to make “the best case we could have.”

Blair said that he continued to support the dossier.  “We described the intelligence in a way that was perfectly justified,” he said (Evans/McBride, Reuters, Aug. 28).

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