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China's Missile Exports and Assistance
to Iran
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 Scope
of Activities |
China's missile trade and cooperation with Iran has been a subject of substantial proliferation concern in Washington since the 1980's. China's missile exports and assistance to Iran have generally fallen into two areas: the provision of anti-ship cruise missiles and related technology, and technical assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program, as well as some exports of complete ballistic missiles. Washington fears that Chinese ballistic and cruise missile exports and assistance to Iran could provide the material and technical base for Iranian development and deployment of missiles that could be used in the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Iran's growing military capability, of which the missile program forms an important part, could raise regional tensions in the Persian Gulf, and directly threaten US interests in the region, especially the safe passage of oil tankers, as well as the security interests of US allies in the region, such as Israel. Disputes over Chinese missile exports and assistance to Iran have impeded bilateral relations and undermined the bases for US-China cooperation in other areas of mutual and global concern.
In reaction to US pressure, China took specific steps to stem its missile exports and assistance to Iran, including suspension of sales of the C-801/802 cruise missiles. This progress coincided with the US-China summits in 1997-1998. To a large extent these initial concessions by the Chinese were part of a broader Chinese strategic thrust where compromises in these issue areas were intended to pave the way for achieving significant results in others. In the past, China implicitly linked its MTCR commitments to issues of increasing salience to its own security concerns, namely, ballistic missile defense and US arms sales to Taiwan. However, in the last few years, China's increasing acceptance of international arms control and nonproliferation norms, and growing dependence on imported energy has made Beijing increasingly concerned about the stability of the Middle East.
Although the summit diplomacy of 1997 and 1998 improved cooperation between Washington and Beijing for a time, US-China relations deteriorated significantly in the last year of the Clinton administration and the first year of the Bush presidency. This downturn in the relationship was precipitated by a number of events, including the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy, the release of the Cox Report, the growing tension over the Taiwan issue, passage in the House of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, and the EP-3 spy plane incident. In this period, bilateral cooperation in arms control and nonproliferation stagnated.
Bilateral relations improved once again, however, after the September 11th
attacks in the United States, and cooperation between Washington and Beijing has
since increased. In reaction to U.S. pressure and a recognition of the threat
that proliferation of WMD has on China's national security, Beijing released a
comprehensive set of export controls in 2002. Although not entirely
addressing U.S. concerns about transfers to Iran, the new export controls went
far in strengthening China's control on exports of missile related technology.
Recent US sanctions against Chinese firms indicate that despite evident progress
in Chinese export controls, US officials are still not satisfied with Beijing's
efforts at controlling the spread of WMD and missile technology.
Since the early 1980s, Chinese arms transfers were increasingly driven by commercial considerations. With declining defense budgets, the various defense industrial sectors were under tremendous pressure to turn to consumer goods production and try to market military products abroad. Indeed, the need to earn foreign currency may have been the single most important factor motivating Chinese military exports, including missiles. This export-push is clearly evident in the space industry. Facing severe financial difficulties due to insufficient domestic military orders and a two-thirds cut in R&D appropriations in the early 1980s, industry officials were forced to come up with plans to make up for the short-falls. Indeed, the designing and developing of the M-series missiles in large measures were a practical response to the financial crunch.1
China first began exporting missiles to Iran in 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war, when China supplied weapons and military technology to both sides. In 1986-1987, China reportedly transferred HY-2 (Silkworm) anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, causing the United States to issue a protest to Beijing and to temporarily freeze liberalization of high technology exports to China.2 In 1989, China also sold around 150-200 M-7/8610 ballistic missiles to Iran, and began providing Iran with production technology for an indigenous ballistic missile, the Iran-130.3 Throughout this period, China denied that it had directly supplied missiles to Iran or Iraq, stating that Chinese arms were available on the international market, and criticized the US for "spreading rumors" about China's arms sales.
Evidence surfaced again in the early 1990s that China was directly providing Iran with production technology, equipment, training, and testing facilities for the indigenous Iranian manufacture of Chinese-designed HY-2 anti-ship missiles as well as for ballistic missiles, particularly at the Isfahan missile facility in Iran.4 Some reports indicated that the transfer of missile guidance technology might violate Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, but there was no real discussion from the US government about imposing sanctions. Some in Washington worried that Iran would use Chinese missiles as delivery systems for nuclear weapons, should Iran succeed in developing them. China also reportedly assisted Iran's efforts to upgrade its North Korean Scud missiles, and has also supplied technical and manufacturing assistance to a number of indigenous Iranian missile programs, including the Iran-130 (a.k.a. Mushak-120), Iran-700, NP-110, and Zelzal-3. China continued to vigorously deny that it was supplying ballistic missile technology to Iran.
A 1995 CIA report suggested some Chinese transfers of missile technology to Iran might have violated MTCR guidelines, which would require US sanctions. However, no sanctions were ever imposed for the transfers, largely because the evidence was inconclusive.5 The possibility of sanctions was again raised in 1996, when media reports stated China had transferred advanced C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, which could trigger US sanctions under the 1992 Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act. US officials decided, however, that the number and type of weapons transferred were not "destabilizing" and thus did not meet the legal requirement for sanctions. In 1996, China reportedly began assisting Iran in developing indigenous anti-ship cruise missiles, based on Chinese designs. According to another CIA report, China and Iran signed a $3 billion deal in August 1996 that included the sale of Chinese ballistic missiles, missile guidance technology (including sensitive gyroscopes), and missile production equipment.6 When the contents of the CIA report appeared in the US media in October 1996, China called the report "fictitious" and "not worth refuting." US State Department officials at the time indicated that they believed Beijing was generally operating within the nonproliferation assurances it had given Washington.
The CIA's 1997 report to Congress stated that China continued to help Iran's missile programs. According to this report: "The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs" during the second half of 1996. Much of this assistance continued for a number of years, mainly in the form of missile technologies for Iran's short-range, MTCR-compliant missile programs which can also be used for longer range systems.
However, under US pressure, China began to curb its missile cooperation with Iran. In September 1997, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen informally pledged to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that China would halt its new sales of cruise missiles to Iran. This pledge reportedly included the cruise missile production technologies as well. On 20 January 1998, US Defense Secretary William Cohen had received personal assurances from Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Defense Minister Chi Haotian that China has halted all transfers of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, and that Beijing would not assist Iran in upgrading its current cruise missile inventory. Cohen stated that "It was the very clear message that no sales will go forward, no transfers--period--to Iran. That would include those missiles that have been contracted for before." Cohen stated that Defense Minister Chi had reiterated assurances that cruise missile sales to Iran had ceased, saying, "I believe that we have assurances that such sales will not continue in the future...I am satisfied that there will not be a contribution to the kind of conventional weaponry that would jeopardize American ships in the [Persian] Gulf."7 In 2002, China published a comprehensive set of export controls, for the most part coinciding with the MTCR. The Bush administration welcomed this development, but chose to take a 'wait and see' approach about China's compliance with nonproliferation pledges. Since the publishing of these export controls, Chinese companies have been sanctioned three times for missile related sales to Iran. Although official US statements on these sanctions have been short on detail, the items in question appeared to be dual-use items not covered by the MTCR.
Chinese assistance has played a key role in the Iran's missile development, with Chinese exports and assistance dating back twenty years. For the United States, missile proliferation to Iran undermines international nonproliferation efforts, heightens regional tension, especially in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, and directly threatens US access to oil supplies, and potentially threatens regional allies such as Israel. The US has identified Iran as one of the most active rogue states engaging in the acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In 2002, George W. Bush included Iran in the "Axis of Evil." Given US security interests, preventing Iran from obtaining items, technologies, and assistance for its WMD and missile development programs has been a top priority to US policy makers. In the US-China context, these issues also demonstrate continued differences between Washington and Beijing on missile threats and the MTCR regime. Recent moves by Beijing indicate that China increasingly recognizes the proliferation of WMD and missile technology as a direct threat to its own national security. However many in Washington are still concerned that Beijing is not consistently implementing its nonproliferation policies. According to a statement in 2003 by Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter: "Chinese officials at every level have said both publicly and privately to us that China recognizes the importance of this issue," however the United States government continues "to see problems in the proliferant behavior of certain Chinese entities and remain deeply concerned about the Chinese government's often narrow interpretation of nonproliferation commitments and lack of enforcement of nonproliferation regulations."
China's Concerns
China has its own security concerns regarding the various nonproliferation regimes, which are reflected in Beijing's positions on MTCR compliance and missile transfer issues. China has primarily expressed concern about three critical issues. First is the regime's discriminatory nature regarding controlled items and its failure to address the demand side of missile proliferation. Beijing argued in the past that ballistic missiles per se are not weapons of mass destruction, but rather delivery vehicles just like high-performance fighter aircraft, which are also capable of carrying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Indeed, the Chinese have not consider missiles with conventional warheads as inherently destabilizing, as they are not as effective as high-performance strike aircraft (in terms of accuracy, ability to hit mobile targets, etc). Chinese officials had suggested previously that the MTCR be revised to cover the latter as well. Second, China has been critical of a double standard in MTCR implementation, arguing that the regime did not prohibit missile proliferation between member states. US missile defense plans have only reinforced Beijing's views in this regard. Beijing views Washington's intention to incorporate Japan and Taiwan into its missile defense system as a form of missile proliferation since it is difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive application of the missile technology. Finally, China's regional security concerns, in particular the opposition to arms sales to Taiwan and missile defenses to Taiwan and Japan, have convinced Beijing's leadership that Washington only cares its own absolute security without consideration of others' interests. Chinese officials have previously complained that Beijing has already made a number of concessions, such as suspending nuclear cooperation with Iran and stopping delivery of C-802 cruise missiles, yet claim that China has received little in return from the United States.
Iran and North Korea reportedly worked together to improve the accuracy of the Chinese C-802, an anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 80 miles that Iran bought from China from the mid-1990s.8 Tehran is believed to have taken delivery of about 150 C-802 missiles. China suspended the C-802 sale under US pressure. In another development, The Washington Times reported that China signed a $11-million contract with Iran to upgrade the latter's FL-10 anti-ship missile.9 The US government's response at the time was cautious and officials voiced concern. However, both the US and Chinese officials agreed that the FL-10 export did not constitute a breach of China's 1997 pledge not to export cruise missiles to Iran since that pledge covers exports of C-801 and C-802 missiles only.
On 21 November 2000, the State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan. The sanctions were imposed in 1992 for exports which violated the 1990 Missile Control Act. The transfers in questions were for the exports of both MTCR category I and category II items. The US also pledged to resume discussions with China as soon as possible on extending the 1995 US-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Under this accord, US companies can export satellites to China for launch on Chinese rocket boosters.10 [State Department Statement on Chinese Missile Sanctions, November 2000] In response to the lifting of these sanctions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued an unprecedented policy statement on missile nonproliferation:
"China is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...China has no intention of assisting, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 km.)" [Full Chinese Statement on Missile Nonproliferation, November 2000]
This statement appeared to build on China's past commitment in the 1998 US-China Joint Statement on South Asia not to provide missile technologies to Pakistan or India. As part of that commitment, the Chinese government promised to issue export control laws covering missile technologies, and pledged that the new laws would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. The Chinese statement did not, however, specifically reference the MTCR or its control list and the statement did not mention when China would issue the new export control law. The Chinese government also denies that it engaged in illegitimate trade with either Iran or Pakistan. The China Daily reported Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi, refuting US allegations as "rumors with ulterior motives." Sun insisted that China had exercised strict control on the export of missile technologies. In contrast, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Report to Congress stated that in 2000 China continued to provide Iran with technical assistance and material assistance.
In August 2002 Beijing announced new export control regulations and an expanded control list, fulfilling its November 2000 pledge to issue export control laws covering missile technologies. The new regulations included the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. The regulations and control list closely follow the MTCR. Some discrepancies, however, may still allow for the license-free export of some technologies that would be useful for countries to establish indigenous missile programs. The US response to the regulations was cautious, with many in the Bush administration taking a "wait-and-see" approach before making a final judgment as to whether Beijing had fully committed itself to comprehensive implementation of these regulations. According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, "It is an important part to have the regulations in place, it is an equally important part to see that they are enforced."
On 9 May 2003, the US expressed its dissatisfaction with China's implementation of its export control regulations and control lists by imposing sanctions on North China Industries Corporation (Norinco) for allegedly supplying missile technology to Iran. The sanctions barred all exports to the US by Norinco and its subsidiaries, and forbade any contracts between the company and US government agencies. The measure was expected to have more of an impact than previous sanctions; in 2002, Norinco exported an estimated $100 million worth of products to the US. 11
In July 2003, the State Department announced another round of sanctions against Chinese companies (including Norinco) for reportedly supplying WMD related materials to Iran. In this case, the items involved in the transfer appeared not to be on internationally recognized control lists, such as the MTCR. These sanctions, as well as those in May, indicated that the Bush administration were lowering the threshold for transfers that are subject to sanctions. These latest measures were authorized by invoking legal instruments that allow sanctions in the case of transfers of any item that Washington believes could assist with WMD development, regardless of whether or not the item was covered by international control lists. [In September 2003, the State Department placed another set of sanctions against Norinco. The recipient state was not mentioned, but assumed once again to be Iran.]
Following in this trend, in April 2004, despite China's application to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, the State Department sanctioned five Chinese companies, including Norinco and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, for the transfer of cruise and ballistic missile components and technology to Iran. As with the previous round of sanctions, these sanctions were invoked as per the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. In the wake of revelation about the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network in early 2004, Undersecretary of State John Bolton reiterated that destroying the covert network that Iran relies upon for missile assistance through sanctions is "a priority objective of the United States." 12
Notes:
1. John W. Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense
Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma,"
International Security, Vol.15, No.4, Spring 1991,
pp.87-109; Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile
Proliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W.
Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The
New Suppliers' Network
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp.163-180.
2. Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 17 October 1996, p. 5; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
3. Reuters, 12 October 1994; In Executive News Service, 12 October 1994; Defense News, 17-23 October 1994, p. 64; Douglas Waller, et. al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June1992, p. 42-46; "China Deepens Arms Relationship with Iran," Iran Brief, 1 October 1996, p. 2; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
4. Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
5. Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 22 June 1995, pp. A1, A7.
6. The Iran Brief, 1 October 1996, p. 4; and 5 December 1996, p. 6; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 29 August 1996; in FBIS-NES-96-169, 29 August 1996.
7. "China's president assures Cohen on Iran missile sales," Reuter, 20 January 1998; John Pomfret, "Cohen Hails Achievements In China Visit," Washington Post, 20 January 1998, p. A11; Bill Gertz, "China to halt missile sales to Iran," Washington Times, 20 January 1998, p. 1; Department of Defense News Briefing, 20 January 1998.
8. Michael Evans, "Tehran Upgrades Chinese Missile," The Times (London), 11 January 2000.
9. Bill Gertz, "China Agrees to Deal With Iran on Missiles," The Washington Times, 19 August 1999. p. 1.
10. "Spokesman Refutes U.S. Allegations over Missiles," The China Daily, 24 November 2000, p.1; "US Welcomes PRC New Commitment," The People's Daily, 22 November 2000, p. 4.
11. Guy Dinmore, "US Imposes New Sanctions on China," Financial Times, 22 May 2003.
12. Judith Miller, "Bush Puts Penalties on Nuclear Suppliers," New York Times, 2 April 2004, http://www.nytimes.com; Department of State, "Public Notice 4680," Federal Register 69:67, 7 April 2004: "Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Thirteen Entities, Including Ban on U.S. Government Procurement."]
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Missile System |
Characteristics |
Areas of Reported Chinese Assistance to Iran |
| Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(1987 sale of cruise missiles to Iran enacted US sanctions against China) |
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| HY-2
(Variations include HY-2A, HY-2B, HY-2G) (Also called Silkworm, Seersucker, C-201, CSSC-3) |
Infrared or active radar guidance |
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| C-801 |
Inertial and active radar guidance |
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| C-802 |
Inertial and active radar guidance |
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| Karus |
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| FL-10 |
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| Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles | ||
| M-7
(Also known as: CSS-8; 8610) |
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| M-9
(Also known as: CSS-6; DF-15) |
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| M-11
(Also known as: CSS-7; DF-11) |
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| Scud-B |
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| Iran-130
(Also known as Mushak-120; Iran currently developing extended range versions Mushak-160 and Mushak-200) |
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| Tondar-68 |
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| Shahab-3 (Iranian version of Nodong) |
|
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Table Notes:
[1] Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 17
October 1996, p. 5; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales --
Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992,
p. 560.
[2] Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
[3] Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
[4] Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, No. 25, September 1997; James Bruce, "Iran's Long-Range Tondar Causes Concern in West," Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 May 1996, p.17.
[5] "More C-802s," Iran Brief, 10 November 1997.
[6] John Mintz, "Track Arms" A Study in Smoke," The Washington Post, 3 April 1999, p.3.
[7] John Mintz, "Track Arms: A Study in Smoke," The Washington Post, 3 April 1999, p.3.
[8] "French Firm Allegedly shipped C-802 Engine Parts," Iran Brief, 5 April 1999.
[9] "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 July 1996, p. 13.
[10] "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 July 1996, p. 13.
[11] "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 July 1996, p.13.
[12] "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 July 1996, p. 13.
[13] Reuters, 12 October 1994; In Executive News Service, 12 October 1994; Defense News, 17-23 October 1994, p. 64; Douglas Waller, et. al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June1992, p. 42-46; "China Deepens Arms Relationship with Iran," Iran Brief, 1 October 1996, p. 2.
[14] "Iran, China Sign Arms Technology Pact," Washington Times, 22 January 1990, p.2; "China Backs Off From Iran - Maybe," Iran Brief, 10 November 1997.
[15] Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 October 1992, p. 18.
[16] "Sino-Iran 'Arms Link,'" Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1992; Eric Chauvistre, Pacific Research, November 1992, p. 17-18.
[17] "Iran Prepares Missile Sites on Abu Musa,” Mednews, 7 December 1992, p. 5; Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May be Tested in Iran This Year," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13.
[18] Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 22 June 1995, p. A1, A7.
[19] Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales -- Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
[20] Duncan Lennox, "Ballistic Missiles Hit New Heights," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 April 1994, p. 24-28.
[21] Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles," Washington Times, 27 March 1998, pg. A10.
[22] "Iran Tests Shahab-3," Iran Brief, 3 August
1998; "Major suppliers to the Shahab-3 Program," Iran Brief, 3
August 1998.
For more in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Missile Abstracts database.
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN - STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST]
[CHINA AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA]
Updated 09/25/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
