China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to the Middle East

China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to the Middle East

The Middle East is the region which has received the majority of China's nuclear assistance. With the exception of China's nuclear trade and cooperation with Pakistan, most of China's nuclear transfers of concern have been in the Middle East. China has provided reactors to a number of countries in the region, including Algeria, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and may also pursue future nuclear cooperation with Egypt. China reportedly turned down an offer from Libya to sell it nuclear weapons in the 1970s, but recent events have revealed Chinese nuclear weapons designs in Libyan possession (reportedly as a result of Pakistani proliferation). China insists that its nuclear exports are solely for peaceful purposes and are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and China's responsibilities as a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some of China's proposed nuclear technology transfers have aroused concern in the West, especially transfers of potential nuclear weapons technology to so-called rogue states. In the early 1990s, the US pressured China to place a reactor it was secretly constructing in Algeria under safeguards. However, the greatest source of US concern is China's nuclear relationship with Iran; the US maintains that Iran has a secret nuclear weapon development program and that any Chinese technology assistance, regardless of how small, would assist Iran's intentions. In 1992 the US pressured China to halt the sale of a 20MWt research reactor to Iran, and in 1997, following the US-China summit meeting, China agreed to cancel all future nuclear cooperation with Iran. This pledge included the cancellation of two projects: the provision of two 300MWe reactors and a uranium hexaflouride production facility.

Concerns about Chinese assistance to Iran continue despite such measures. A classified March 1999 Pentagon report reportedly revealed that China had renewed negotiations on the construction of a graphite production facility that would allow Iran to produce 200 tons of nuclear-grade graphite a year and alleged that "the Chinese are proliferating on a consistent basis without technically breaking agreements with the United States." However, an unclassified February 2000 CIA report entitled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999," stated, "China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding."

For additional in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

COUNTRY	REPORTED AREA OF CHINESE NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE
ALGERIA	15 MWe pressurized heavy water research reactor with related nuclear material (LEU fuel) and heavy water (D2O) (supplied under IAEA safeguards--INFCIRC/401); construction began around 1988; placed under safeguards in 1992. Designs for construction of third stage of Algeria's Center for Nuclear Energy Research
EGYPT	Research/power reactors (possible future cooperation)
IRAN	Research Reactors: --27kW subcritical, neutron source reactor; provided in 1985; currently under IAEA safeguards. --zero-power reactor; commercial contract signed in 1991; currently under IAEA safeguards. --HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor, located at Azan University --20 MWt reactor; contract signed in 1992 but deal was canceled due to US pressure. Power Reactors: 2X 300 MWe reactors --Deal suspended in 1995 and canceled in 1997 --CIA has verified project cancellation Calutrons (electromagnetic isotope separators) --for Isfahan (1987) --for Karaj nuclear research facility (not under IAEA safeguards) (commercial contract signed in 1989) Uranium hexaflouride (UF6) production facility [by China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC)] -- Project was canceled in 1997 -- CIA verified in 1998 cancellation of deal -- China possibly provided blueprints for facility construction Uranium mining assistance Zirconium tubing production facilities Tributylphosphate (for reprocessing)
IRAQ	Lithium hydride (7 tons) (1989-1990) --Exported by the China Wanbao Engineering Company (CWEC) for $15 million Low-enriched uranium (LEU) (1970s) Ring magnets (assistance in building samarium-cobalt magnets) (1989-1990) Weapons-grade uranium (December 1980)
LIBYA	Attempted nuclear weapon purchase in 1970s; offer refused by China. In 2004, Chinese nuclear weapons designs were reportedly discovered at Libyan facilities, probably the result of Pakistani proliferation.
MOROCCO	In late 1998, China and Morocco reached an advanced stage of negotiation for the construction of a 10MW nuclear reactor at Tan-Tan on Morocco's Atlantic Coast. The plant would be mainly used to desalinate water for agricultural purposes. Jiang Zemin travelled to Morocco in late October 1999 to further discuss the nuclear-powered desalination plant, at issue were environmental concerns. Construction has been postponed.
SAUDI ARABIA	Chinese offer to sell miniature neutron source reactors (MNSR) (1989)
SYRIA	30 kWt miniature neutron source research reactor (MNSR) and highly-enriched uranium (supplied under IAEA safeguards--INFCIRC/408) (1992)

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN]

[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]

[1985 US-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.