A Collar on Brazil's Bomb?

By Cameron Binkley & Gary Gardner

In precedent-setting fashion, Brazil's new civilian government revealed last month that it had uncovered a secret 15-year-long program by the Brazilian military to develop a nuclear bomb. President Fernando Collor de Mello also admitted that Brazil had clandestinely assisted Iraq's nuclear and missile programs.

Although Collor's revelations only confirm what many analysts had long suspected, the public acknowledgement of Brazil's nuclear weapons program presents a unique opportunity to bolster the nonproliferation regime. It also provides the United States with the occasion to strengthen its relations with Brazil and simultaneously to reinforce the Brazilian leadership's new nonproliferation restraint.

Relationship to the FRG

Since the mid-1970s, Brazil's nuclear policy has been characterized by a drive toward development of an independent export capability and ambivalence regarding the use of nuclear power for military purposes. In 1975, Brazil's military-led government entered into the so-called "deal of the century" with the Federal Republic of Germany. That agreement entailed the transfer of eight nuclear reactors, a uranium enrichment plant, a fuel reprocessing plant, and training services. Although the agreement also provided for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, no provision was made for more comprehensive, "full-scope" safeguards. The deal was intended to help pave the way for eventual Brazilian export of uranium, power plant components, and nuclear engineering services. Nuclear exports were seen as assuring Brazil of increased international prestige, as well as providing it with foreign exchange to help service the country's increasingly burdensome foreign debt.

Beginning in 1979, German-trained Brazilian technicians and scientists were transferred from Brazil's civilian nuclear projects to a secret "parallel" nuclear program run by the military. Activities under the parallel program included uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, which yield materials essential for construction of a nuclear bomb. These activities were not subject to safeguards of any kind, since the military facilities were built without direct foreign assistance. Much of the success of the country's indigenous attempts to enrich uranium (and the very foundation of its military nuclear program) results from the general transfer of knowledge, training, and infrastructure established by the 1975 accord with Germany.

Thus, with the conclusion of its deal with Germany, Brazil was transformed from an insignificant player in the nuclear market to a potential exporter of nuclear materials --and a potential builder of nuclear bombs. Brazil refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to waive the entry-into-force provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which attempts to preserve Latin America as a nuclear weapons free zone). Brazil was in a position to receive and export technology spanning the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including the sensitive capabilities of enrichment and reprocessing. Because of its secret and unsafeguarded program, it was able to aid Iraq's clandestine nuclear efforts with relative ease.

Relationship to Iraq

Brazil's nuclear trade with Iraq began as early as 1975 with the country's decision to supply low-enriched uranium and safety technology. In 1980, however, shortly after Saddam Hussein came to power, a formal 10- year-long cooperation agreement was concluded. During this period, Brazil exported to Iraq natural uranium, uranium prospecting services, and plans to build a facility for the conversion of yellowcake (uranium concentrate) into uranium dioxide. In addition, Iraqi experts were apparently allowed access to Brazil's secret ultracentrifuge facility at Ipero, where the Brazilian navy is currently able to produce 20 percent enriched uranium for its nuclear propulsion program. Reports indicate that Brazil was also either prepared to assist in Iraq's operation of its nuclear plant or even to help it build a nuclear reactor. Such projects, however, ended with Israel's bombing of the French-built Osiraq reactor in 1981.

Brazilians working in Iraq have also reportedly passed on sensitive uranium enrichment and missile-related technology. Retired Air Force General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, who organized a team of engineers to work in Iraq on an air-to-air missile project since at least November 1989, is the prime example. Some reports suggest that these Brazilian specialists, or others, may have assisted Iraqi attempts both to build a surface-to-air missile system and to increase the range and payload of Iraq's Soviet- supplied Scud missiles.

The Policy Change

According to top Brazilian officials, Collor is now preparing to impose tough new controls on the country's domestic nuclear programs. Although "nuclear transparency" has been the stated goal for both the civilian and military efforts, it does not appear that international inspections will soon be expanded to additional Brazilian nuclear facilities. This leaves open the possibility of fissile materials diversion, especially from Brazil's program to design a nuclear-powered submarine. However, after Collor's highly publicized closing of an 1,050- foot-deep shaft in the Amazon jungle this September, admitted by the Brazilian government to be a nuclear weapons test site, he announced that civilian control and domestic safeguards would be applied to the country's military nuclear facilities and that new curbs would be applied to sensitive military technology exports. Further restrictions are intended to limit the use former government officials can make of technical information acquired during their involvement with classified projects. Collor has also halted the military's plan to build six, small, unsafeguarded nuclear reactors.

Sources of Policy Change

Several reasons lie behind Brazil's new attitude toward both its own nuclear sector and its nuclear exports:

• Brazil's new president has sought to reduce the military's control over the civilian government, decreasing the influence and resources provided by the secret military nuclear program. Some analysts believe that the very timing of Brazil's announcement of its bomb program may be related to revelations concerning the military's embarrassing relationship with Iraq. These ties have damaged the country's image in both the United States and Europe. Cancellation of the bomb program is a message to the military saying, "you've gone too far."
• Brazil is attempting to become more internationalist in its foreign policy while moving away from a nationalist orientation. This attitude encompasses Brazil's desire to gain access to world markets in such advanced non-nuclear products as supercomputers and aerospace technology.
• Brazil would like to gain the goodwill of its regional neighbors, especially Argentina. Announcement of the cancellation of its bomb program should enhance its regional image.
• Brazil is desperate to restructure the payments on its massive foreign debt in order to ease the burdens imposed by its current austerity program. Appeasement of the United States on the nuclear issue might help secure U.S. support on the debt and other problems.
• Brazil must respond to Germany's new policy requiring full- scope safeguards by 1995 on all of its nuclear exports. Although Brazil's acceptance of such comprehensive safeguards is likely to be resisted, the country will be required to open most of its unsafeguarded facilities to IAEA inspections if it expects to maintain a nuclear trading relationship with Germany after 1995. German support of Brazil's drive toward an independent nuclear export capability has, ironically, created a level of technological dependency that Brazilian policy-makers will find difficult to ignore.

Implications & Limitations of Policy Change

Brazil's new nuclear policy has great nonproliferation significance. If Brazil agrees to a much wider range of domestic safeguards, it will help to bring the parallel nuclear program into the open. This occurrence will make the construction of nuclear weapons far less likely while improving the country's standing in the international nuclear community. This step could also have a positive effect on other emerging nuclear suppliers, particularly Brazil's neighbor and nuclear rival, Argentina. It might also provide a catalyst for bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

President Collor's pledge to pursue a more responsible export policy also has significant implications for the nuclear marketplace. Brazil has the potential to emerge as a major independent producer and supplier of nuclear equipment and materials. If the more restrictive export policy promised by Brazil is implemented, Brazil may be welcomed by the traditional nuclear exporters into an enlarged suppliers' club.

At the same time, however, there is reason to be cautious in assessing the modifications in Brazil's nuclear position. Some Brazilian scientists have charged that the policy changes are only cosmetic. For example, while the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) was removed from the jurisdiction of the military-dominated National Security Council, it retains its strategic character in its new home in the Office of the Presidency. The executive branch may also retain control of the domestic safeguards regime, which might impede legislative oversight. Furthermore, there is no indication of a change in policy toward acceptance of additional IAEA or other international inspections of Brazil's nuclear facilities.

More worrisome still is Brazil's nuclear propulsion program. Even acceptance of full-scope safeguards would not guarantee international inspection, as such systems are currently exempted from the coverage of IAEA safeguards. The Brazilian navy has a strong interest in nuclear submarines probably more for prestige than for any strategic rationale. Another incentive for Brazil to maintain its propulsion efforts may be a perceived export market for nuclear submarines early in the next century. Whether or not Brazil is sufficiently competent to construct such vessels, the nonproliferation concern is that it could take advantage of such a program to maintain access to unsafeguarded sensitive material. Brazil's activity regarding nuclear propulsion will thus require careful monitoring.

Policy Options

There are several steps the United States could take to reinforce Brazil's change in nuclear declaratory policy:

• The United States could seek to encourage Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to work toward bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect for the entire region. Brazil has consistently declared that it will not abide by the NPT, which it views suspiciously as an instrument to divide the nuclear "haves" from the "have-nots." Persistent U.S. badgering of Brazil on this point, therefore, is counterproductive. Were Tlatelolco to enter into force, however, Brazil would be bound by the same IAEA inspection and safeguards requirements as it would under the NPT. Argentina, according to informed sources, has already said off-the-record that it is willing to ratify the treaty, making Cuba the conspicuous holdout.
• The United States could offer Brazil assistance in the fields of nuclear safety, space science, satellite technology, or environmental monitoring in exchange for the acceptance of international safeguards on its nuclear program and restraint in its export of missiles and missile-related technology. For example, The United States could demonstrate greater flexibility in the transfer of space technology to Brazil, which is currently stalled by a U.S.-inspired control regime designed to slow the export of missile-related technology. Unfortunately, that effort has had the effect of disabling Brazil's legitimate space program. Space-related restrictions could gradually be relaxed over time and gauged to the demonstrated level of Brazil's nonproliferation commitment.
• The United States could invite Brazil to participate in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (an association of major nuclear exporters who pledge to exercise restraint in the export of certain sensitive nuclear technologies). Recognition of its "graduation" to the suppliers' club might appeal to Brazil, which has long felt itself discriminated against by developed nations. By the same logic, such a gesture might also encourage other emerging nuclear suppliers like Argentina to adopt more prudent export policies.
• The United States could push more forcefully for other "traditional" suppliers to adopt full-scope safeguards on nuclear exports. Believing that such safeguards put their industries at a competitive disadvantage, states like France, Belgium, and Italy have failed to support such measures. The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have also been reluctant to adopt full-scope safeguard requirements. Germany's new safeguards requirement, however, should help strengthen international norms regarding safeguards acceptance and application. Germany can also be expected to support efforts to expand adherence to full-scope safeguards among major nuclear exporters. The United States should encourage this German initiative and continued German efforts to persuade Brazil to allow international inspections of all of its fissile materials.

Conclusion

Brazil's change in nuclear policy is likely to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. While the recent 1990 NPT Review Conference ended without a final document, creating doubt as to the outcome of the critical 1995 conference, Brazil's turn-about in policy may well establish a regional benchmark for the policies of other developing states. Its decision to forego the military's nuclear weapons option and its attempt to control the export of nuclear and missile-related technology to countries like Iraq are significant developments.

By accepting a greater range of national and international safeguards on its nuclear installations and by working to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Brazil could demonstrate that its important new policy initiatives are permanently rooted. The United States, for its part, can encourage Brazil's move away from bomb-building and toward a greater accountability in the conduct of nuclear trade by rewarding Brazil's positive nonproliferation actions.

Useful additional information is available in:

• Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project. Eye on Supply, No. 1 (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Summer, 1990).
• Poneman, Daniel. "Latin America," in The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation, edited by Rodney Jones et al. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 175-185.
• Poneman, Daniel. Nuclear Power in the Developing World (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).
• Redick, John R. Argentina and Brazil: An Evolving Nuclear Relationship. PPNN Occasional Paper No. 7 (University of Southampton: Centre for International Policy Studies, July 1990).
• Solingen, Etel. "Brazil: Technology, Countertrade, and Nuclear Exports," in William C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenge of the Emerging Suppliers (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 111-152.
• Spector, Leonard. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989- 1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 242-263.