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Arms Control in the Middle East (ACME)/Permanent-5 Talks
Summary:
On 29 May 1991, President Bush proposed an arms control initiative in which he called on the five leading arms exporters to the Middle East -- also the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, UK, US, and USSR/Russia) to refrain from destabilizing arms transfers to the region, conduct regular consultation, and establish a notification mechanism, with exchanges of annual reports on sales. What the proposal sought was to introduce effective global guidelines for conventional arms transfers. This set the agenda for the subsequent meetings of the P5. The talks were also intended to develop restraints on the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems.
In response to this initiative, and also to proposals from other countries, representatives of the Permanent-5 (P-5) held three rounds of senior-level meetings from 1991-1992, beginning in July 1991. At the 17-18 October 1991 meeting in London, the five agreed to common guidelines, with global applications, for the export of conventional weapons. In May 1992, further progress was made with a set of guidelines relating to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. However, no agreement was reached on a more ambitious proposal to exchange information on exports of conventional weapons to countries in the Middle East prior to their delivery. The proposal was stalled, not only on the principle of prior notification, but also on the issue of which countries are to be covered by the information exchange.
China and the ACME Talks:
China joined the ACME/P-5 Talks, but had reservations throughout the meetings about the proposal for prior notification of arms transfers to the Middle East. China also opposed the addition of missiles to the category of "weapons of mass destruction" to be controlled unless combat aircraft and certain ships were covered as well. At the third ACME meeting in May 1992, China opposed the inclusion of missiles and missile technology in the guidelines on weapons of mass destruction.
In response to the September 1992 US decision to sell 150 F-16 A/B aircraft to Taiwan, China announced the same month that it would not participate in subsequent rounds of P-5 talks. Some speculated that China had long had reservations about the ACME/P-5 process, and that the F-16 sale provided a convenient excuse to back out of the discussions. The talks have effectively been suspended since late 1992.
While China's withdrawal can be attributed in part to its reluctance to fully endorse the ACME initiative, the lack of US leadership may actually constitute a more substantial barrier to any meaningful multilateral controls on conventional arms transfers. A major issue was and remains the massive US exports since the end of the Gulf War. The fact that the US now is far and away the leading arms exporter certainly must raise questions about Washington's sincerity and credibility in its efforts to persuade others to restrain their sales. Speaking to the UN's First Committee on 22 October 1993, Chinese Ambassador on Disarmament Hou Zhitong said, "We oppose the all too frequent arbitrary use of sanctions by one country to exert pressure on another under the pretext of controlling arms transfers while engaging in massive arms sales of one's own which jeopardize the sovereignty and security of the country concerned."
In 2004, it was discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through Pakistan's A.Q. Khan were of Chinese origin. This was seen by nuclear experts as further evidence of China's pivotal role in Pakistan's early nuclear weapons program, although it appears unlikely that China provided any direct assistance to the Libyan designs.
[Sources: Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 February 1996, p. 14; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 11; Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy And Regulations," Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 5; Natalie J. goldring, "UN Register Released: Response Favourable, But Questions Remains," BASIC Report 34 (1 November 1993), p.1.; Joby Warrick and Peter Sleven, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," Washington Post, 15 February 2004, pg 1.]
For other related pages, see:
[CHRONOLOGY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
[CHINA AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION]
[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS] (See especially [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST])
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
