Australia Group (AG)

Summary:

Chaired by Australia, the Australia Group (AG) is an informal annual forum of states whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on precursor chemicals and toxins, sharing information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CBW.

The Group was formed in 1984, and its actions are viewed as complementary measures in support of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Group has no charter or constitution, and operates by consensus.

The Group has established common export controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation purposes. For chemical weapons (CW), members of the AG control a list of 54 chemical precursors and a list of CW-related production equipment. For biological weapons (BW), members have established export controls on certain microorganisms, toxins and equipment that could be used in a BW program. In tandem with export controls, the AG has periodically used warning mechanisms to sensitize its public to CBW proliferation.

For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the Australia Group

China is not a member of the Australia Group. The United States invited China to join the Group in late May 1997, but China declined the invitation. However, in June 1998, China announced that it had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules. China has consistently opposed the existence of the Australia Group, holding that the membership is not universal and the trade restrictions that it imposes are discriminatory and in violation of the CWC. Additionally, a significant problem China has with joining the Australia Group, is that China had no control over which items were included on the AG's list of chemical precursors and CW-related production equipment.

China's official policy regarding the Australia Group, as stated on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website is:

"China holds that the Chemical Weapons Convention which has entered into force should constitute the sole legal basis for governing the international chemical trade. Those export control regimes incompatible with the convention should be transformed or abolished. China strongly opposes the actions by the member states of the Australia Group in obstructing the normal chemical trade between States Parties to the convention under the pretext of non-proliferation.” [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “The Australia Group,” 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5254.html]

Following the entry into force of the provision of the CWC prohibiting the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not party to the Convention in April 2000, Ambassador Sha Zukang, a top Chinese arms control expert, reiterated the Chinese disapproval of the existence of the AG:

“The entry into force of [these] provisions will further highlight the conflicts between the relevant provisions of the Convention and those of the ‘Australia Group’. Although the regulation … naturally aims first and foremost at preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it also aims to ensure that all States Parties have equal rights where international exchanges and cooperation in the field of chemistry are concerned. However, if this is to be possible, a set of universally applicable rules is essential. The existence of the ‘Australia Group’ means that, at this moment, there are two parallel export control mechanisms in the field of chemical trade. This inevitably causes confusion and disputes in what would otherwise be normal trade activities, results in a de facto imbalance in the rights enjoyed by individual States Parties, undercuts the authority of the Convention, discourages the participation of more countries in the Convention's regime, and compromises its universality.” [Ambassador Sha Zukang, “Next Steps,” OPCW Synthesis, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, May 2000.]

[TEXT OF AUSTRALIA GROUP CONTROL LISTS]

[NEXT STEPS: AN ARTICLE BY AMBASSADOR SHA ZUKANG FOR THE OPCW SYNTHESIS, 2000]

For more on China and multilateral export control regimes, see:

[CHINA AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES]

For more on China's export controls, see:

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S CHEMICAL EXPORT CONTROLS]

For more on China and CBW, see:

[CHINA AND CBW NONPROLIFERATION]

[CHINA'S CBW-RELATED EXPORTS TO IRAN]

[CHRONOLOGY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHRONOLOGY OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

For information on other international CBW agreements, see:

[CHINA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)]

[CHINA AND THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)]

[CHINA AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.