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China and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APLs)

China's APL Production, Stockpiling and Domestic Use
Summary of the APL Ban
Chinese Views on the APL Ban
Full Chinese Statements on the APL Ban

Background Information:

APL Production and Proliferation
China is reportedly the largest producer of APLs in the world.  Chinese factories linked to the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) produce most APLs; the Technical Equipment Research Institute of Wuxi serves as the center for APL research and development.  In accordance with the revised Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), China should have already halted the production and export of its most heavily produced APL called Type 72. By 2007, China must completely cease to use the Type 72. Currently, China's Type 72 is one of the cheapest in the world, costing only US$3 per landmine.  In addition to the Type 72, China has independently produced 22 types of APLs.  Aside from a few APLs of Russian design, China has designed  most of the APLs it produces.  Some of these APLs include the PPM-2 blast mine, POMZ-2 and –2M fragmentation stake mines, Type 58 fragmentation stake mine, Type 59 wooden box mine, Type 68 and Type 69 bounding fragmentation mines, and Type 66 Claymore-type directed fragmentation mine. China also produces remotely delivered APLs such as the GLD 112 and three similar unnamed models.  The latter four types of APLs were initially developed in the 1970s to be dropped by parachute, rocket, ground vehicle and several types of aircraft.

Chinese mines have been used in parts of South Asia, the Middle East and as far as Africa.  In particular, the Type 72 has been used in Iraq, Kuwait, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Angola, Rwanda, Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa and Mozambique and the Type 69 has been uncovered in Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and South Africa. At the CCW Review Conference on the 22nd of April, 1996 representative Wong Jon indicated that China would cease exports of the Type 72 APL and all "scatterable" APLs without self-deactivating mechanisms.  However, despite these concessions, the Chinese delegation made no statement on the export of detectable APLs without self-deactivating mechanisms.  According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2003, there has been no evidence of Chinese APL exports since China's 1996 pledge.

Stockpiling
Estimates of China's inventory of APLs indicate that China has 110 million APLs, 100 million of which are Type 72.  Since China may not use the latter after 2007, the stock of Type 72 APLs must either by replaced, destroyed or re-constructed to meet CCW specifications.  China has not indicated its planned course of action.

Domestic Use and Cleanup
China has used APLs along its borders in clashes with Russia, India and Vietnam.  Estimates indicate that over 10 million APLs line China's borders with the latter three nations.  China's greatest APL problem lies in Yunnan province and the Guangxi National Autonomous Region.  It was in these areas, during China's confrontations with Vietnam in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that over 800,000 APLs were laid, covering over 270 square kilometers.  Known as "the region of death", the Chinese government admits that there is a threat to civilians in the two regions.  Though the Chinese government has not shared landmine casualty data it may be collecting, surveys carried out by Landmine Monitor researchers in 2001 revealed that in several counties of Yunnan and Guangxi provinces most casualties occurred in the late 1970s to early 1980s.  The researchers found that survivor treatment and rehabilitation services are often lacking due to excessive distances to adequate facilities.

The PLA undertook its first large-scale demining effort in 1992 and 1994, resulting in the clearing of 108 square kilometers.  The second demining effort, initiated in 1997 and continuing into 1999, is intended to clear an additional 100 square kilometers and permanently seal off more than 50 square kilometers in an effort to protect civilians from danger.  The UN commented that the PLA demining operations were exceptionally executed. Xinhua reported in August 1999 that Chinese officials reported that the mine threat was mostly eliminated from its 2,000 km border with Vietnam. This demining effort reportedly cost China 200 million yuan and required 2,000 soldiers, but generated a significant economic gain for the  provinces involved. The revenues from seven border counties in Guangxi Province increased from 200 million yuan to 500 million yuan between 1993 and 1999. ["Further on Clearing Last Landmines on Vietnamese Border," Xinhua, 11 August 1999.]  New mine clearance activities reportedly began in December 2002, after China and Vietnam pledged to complete, by 2005,  surveys of mined zones along their borders.

Recently, the Beijing Xinhua reported that Chinese scientists have developed, after ten years of research, a new mine detector that can be utilized in a variety of climates and terrain and will detect even the smallest quantities of metal.  The PLA has used the new mine detector to successfully clear a 2000 sq km area.

[Sources: Landmine Monitor Report 1999,  International Campaign to Ban Landmines, (New York, NY:  Human Rights Watch,) 1999.  Landmine Monitor Report 2002,  International Campaign to Ban Landmines, (New York, NY:  Human Rights Watch,) 2002, <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2002/china.html>, and Landmine Monitor Report 2003.]

Summary of the Anti-Personnel Landmine (APL) Ban:

The international anti-personnel landmine (APL) ban prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of APLs.

Efforts toward an APL ban have been pursued in three main forums: (1) the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), (2) as part of the review process of the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC)/Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) (1980 landmine protocol and revised version), and (3) as part of the so-called "Ottawa Process"--1997 multilateral negotiations on a total APL ban taking place in Oslo, Sweden.

The more than 90 countries that participated in the 1997 Ottawa Process accepted a final APL ban treaty text on 18 September 1997--the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction."  The treaty was open for signature at Ottawa starting in December 1997.  As of October 2003, 136 countries were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and 11 had signed but not yet ratified.  This total constitutes some three-fourths of the world's nations.

For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the APL Ban:

China opposes a total ban on APLs, arguing that landmines are a legitimate means of self-defense for many countries and that a total ban on APLs would violate the basic principle that arms control should not decrease a country's security. China's position is governed by such issues as its long land border, its status as a major mine producer and exporter, and its large stocks of APLs. In particular, the Chinese military sees landmines as key to China's national security given its large and highly contested land borders with countries such as India, Vietnam and Russia.

China reiterated its position on anti-personnel landmines in its July 1998 white paper called "China's National Defense", stating:

In March 1998, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Li Changhe stated similar policy goals:

Elaborating Li Changhe's statements, Mr. Song Rong Hua, the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, submitted a statement at the 3rd NGO Conference on AP mines explaining China's limitations as a developing nation.  Until China develops the technology to produce a feasible alternative, China is dependent upon landmines for the protection of its national security, especially along the borders.

China has stated that it will support practical restrictions on APLs and humanitarian efforts to help civilian victims of landmines.

China has also supported a "phased" ban, but it cannot agree to an immediate and total ban of APLs, saying:

"China is not opposed to the objective of prohibition of APLs realized in a phased approach, but cannot agree to an immediate total ban. In order to meet its legitimate territorial defense requirements, China cannot but reserve its legitimate right to use APLs on its own territories before alternative means are found and defensive capabilities established. China can only accept an international APL agreement that fully accommodates its above-mentioned security concerns. China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace and never engaged in overseas aggression. We have no intention of using landmines in other countries. Should China use APLs in legitimate circumstances, it would be for the purpose of defense against foreign military intervention or aggression, safeguarding its national unification and territorial integrity and ensuring a peaceful life for its own people."

[Statement by Sha Zukang, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament, on an APL ban, 26 June 1997.]

China prefers that the APL issue be addressed in the context of the the IWC/CCW and its protocols, stating that its "prefers achieving the ultimate total prohibition of APLs in a phased approach within the CCW framework." [Statement by Sha Zukang, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament, on an APL ban, 26 June 1997.] China participated in the negotiation of the new landmine protocol to the IWC/CCW and signed it. China has instituted a moratorium on exports of APLs that do not comply with the requirements of the protocol.

China is not against the APL issue being addressed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), but prefers that the CD "concentrate on arms control and disarmament issues that have a significant impact on international security and stability." China refused to endorse or take part in the "Ottawa Process," stating that the process "focuses solely on humanitarian concerns while neglecting or not adequately taking into account many countries' legitimate military requirements for the use of APLs in defending their territories." China has not signed the Convention that resulted from the Ottawa Process. China did, however, send a delegation to the December 1997 signing conference of the Ottawa Treaty--the delegation participated in round-table discussions on mine removal and the provision of aid to mine victims.

In October 1997, China elaborated its position on APLs:

China's restated its position on APLs in the July 1998 defense "white paper" called China's National Defense. The document devoted an entire sub-section to articulating Beijing's current position on APLs.  In particular the "white paper" provided new details about China's own demining efforts and its assistance to other countries to de-mine their territories. The document stated:

Furthermore, as part of China's continual support for international mine clearing operations, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Li Changhe outlined the extent of Chinese assistance for demining efforts in a 1999 speech before the UN's Conference on Disarmament. He noted:

 

[TEXT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION, AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION]

Full Chinese Statements on an APL ban:

For more on China and conventional weapons issues, see:

[CHINA AND THE INHUMANE WEAPONS CONVENTION (IWC)]

[CHINA AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION]

[CHRONOLOGY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
 


Updated 10/24/2003

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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