Biological Weapons - Related Statements and Developments

Biological Weapons-Related Statements and Developments

This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China and biological weapons, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Geneva Protocol, allegations of a Chinese biological weapons program and BW-related sales, and Chinese positions on biological weapons.

2002

12/09/02: China released its 2002 White Paper on National Defense, reiterating its support for the BWC, while expressing its disappointment that a protocol had not yet been reached:

"China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984, and has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the Convention. Since 1987, China has, on an annual basis, provided the UN with information on confidence-building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the Convention.

China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner, and has actively participated in the work of the ad hoc group of the states parties to the Convention set up for the negotiation of a BWC protocol. China regrets that the protocol has not been reached as scheduled and that the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention has had to adjourn. China holds that the conclusion of a protocol with balanced contents and effective measures through multilateral negotiations remains the best way to enhance the effectiveness of the BWC. China is willing, together with all other parties concerned, to continue to explore measures along this line on the basis of the universal participation of all countries and within a multilateral framework. "

10/14/02: China released Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies with an accompanying Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, specifying the pathogens, toxins, and dual-use equipment that would be subject to its export control regulations.

01/24/02: The US imposed sanctions on two Chinese companies and one individual for allegedly selling chemical-and-biological weapons related equipment to Iran. The companies sanctioned were Liyang Chemical Equipment and the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company (CPMIEC); the individual sanctioned was Q.C. Chen. The sanctions, which will be in place for two years, bar the companies from doing business with the U.S. government and prevent them from getting any assistance from the United States. ["U.S. Hits China with Sanctions over Arms Sales," The Washington Times, 25 January, 2002.]

2001

5/8/01: Ambassador Hu Xiaodi addressed the 23rd Session of the Ad Hoc Group of the BWC in which he discussed a working paper on export controls submitted by the Chinese delegation. Hu stated that, "regulating and guiding international trade in the biological field by establishing a multilateral export control mechanism is not only conducive to the non-proliferation objective of the Convention and the Protocol, but also beneficial to the promotion of economic and trade cooperation and exchanges for peaceful purposes in the biological field." To this end, Hu outlined the following points for inclusion in the future export mechanism:

· Free transfer of the biological agents and equipment for peaceful purposes among States Parties
· Formulation of a control list (including biological agents, toxins and equipment)
· Declaration of the transfer of listed items
· End-user certificate by the authorities of the recipient countries on the transfer of listed items
· No transfer of the listed items to non-States Parties in principle
· Declaration of the denial of transfers
· Establishment of a regime to solve disputes arising from the denial of transfer

Hu concluded by raising arguments against the following views:

· States have the right to 'take additional export control measures beyond those specified in the Protocol', and that such measures could be supplementary to the Protocol.
· States can 'assess the nonproliferation credentials' of other states.
· Multilateral organizations should not interfere with a States' sovereign right not to transfer biological weapons.
· After the entry into force of the Protocol, the export control arrangement by a group of countries should remain, on the ground that it will be supplementary to the Protocol and consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Convention. ["Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 23rd Session of the BWC Ad Hoc Group," 5/8/01, Geneva.] [Full Text Speech]

4/23/01: Ambassador Hu Xiaodi addressed the 23rd Session of the Ad Hoc Group of the BWC in which he commented on the Chairman's composite text for the convention's protocol. Hu stated that the new text "takes into account concerns of developing countries only as a symbolic gesture and is therefore one-sided". Ambassador Hu voiced additional concerns:

"Although some solutions suggested in the text have certain merits, quite a number of major outstanding issues, such as clarification visit, decision-making mechanism of investigations, declaration triggers and transfers, are not properly addressed at all. Moreover, from the perspective of strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, some parts of the composite text are of discriminatory nature and some so-called compromise proposals deviate from the purposes and objectives of the Convention. Therefore, the composite text is still far from a final agreement. Moreover, from the perspective of strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, some parts of the composite text are of discriminatory nature and some so-called compromise proposals deviate from the purposes and objectives of the Convention. Therefore, the composite text is still far from a final agreement."

Hu called for the remaining contentious issues to be resolved through "serious negotiations by all sides". While Hu urged that the group must move forward based on the agreements they have already made, he cautioned that "the quality of the Protocol is the first priority. The quality should not be compromised by speed". ["Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 23rd Session of the BWC Ad Hoc Group," 4/23/01, Geneva.] [Full Text Speech]

2/12/01: Ambassador Hu Xiaodi delivered a statement to the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in which he laid out China’s vision for the continued negotiations of the convention’s protocol. Hu stressed the Chinese government’s persistent position for the elimination of all biological weapons so that, “biotechnology [can] genuinely and universally benefit all mankind.” The Ambassador stated:

“The negotiation, in our judgment, is now making steady progress. However, great efforts remain to be made in order to complete our negotiation in a timely manner.
Expectations of the future Protocol from different quarters do not coincide completely with one another. In such a situation, it is particularly necessary to clearly define the direction of our future work by reviewing our mandate and measuring our current work thereby. This Group has a clear- cut mandate. We should follow it precisely.
It should never be forgotten that the Protocol is a military and security legal instrument, which shall, in the first place, focus on activities and facilities with high risk to the object and purpose of the Convention. A Protocol with no focus or the misplaced focus can never help strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. To normal economic and trade activities for peaceful purposes the Protocol shall render its active facilitation and full support. After the conclusion and entry into force of the Protocol, any group export control mechanism or arrangements incompatible with the Convention should be abolished.”

Hu recognized the importance of completing the Protocol on time, but stressed that its quality is paramount. He acknowledged that while the remaining political issues require serious negotiations, "vigorous development of modern bio- technology, genetic technology in particular, can not afford to be neglected." ["Statement by H.E. Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention," 2/12/01, Geneva.] [Full Text Speech]

02/12/01: In a speech before the special work group for the Convenant on Banning Biological Weapons in Geneva, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said:

"The protocol is first of all a military security treaty, and should be 'focused' on the activities and facilities posing 'serious risks' for the purpose and objective of the 'Convenant on Banning Biological Weapons.' On the Other hand, the protocol should greatly encourage and support normal economic and trade activities for the peaceful purposes. After the protocol is concluded and takes effect, all bloc export control mechanisms and arrangements not in compliance with the stipulations of the convenant should be abolished." He also stressed: "The arms control and disarmament talks are not held in a vacuum, nor is the protocol talks. Such talks are closely related to the current political and security situation. Maintaining a harmonious and stable international environment of common security and mutual trust will be conducive to promoting the process of the talks on the protocol." ["China's Disarmament Ambassador Urges Banning of Biological Weapons," Beijing Xinhua, 13 February 2001, in FBIS CPP20010213000147.]

1999

10/13/99: Shen Guofang, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, in a speech to the UN 1st Committee discussed the effectiveness of the BWC. Shen stated:

"China supports the efforts to comprehensively strengthen the effectiveness of the Biologic Weapons Conventions (BWC) and to establish a fair, reasonable, appropriate and feasible verification mechanism. To this end, it is imperative that the balance between rights and obligations of states parties be taken into full account so as to prevent the abusive use of verification and to protect the legitimate security and economic interests of all state parties. In the meantime, it is also very important to enhance international cooperation and exchange in the field of biology. It remains our objective to conclude negotiations of the Protocol before the 5th Review Conference of the Convention. The key to progress in negotiations lies in full accommodation of each other's legitimate concerns by all parties. To place undue emphasis on speed and table the so-called 'clean text' prematurely while there are still major disputes among parties can only be counter- productive. China, for its part, wishes to continue its earnest negotiations on the basis of the existing rolling text in a bid to help bring about a good Protocol acceptable to all." [Full Text of Speech]

1998

7/27/98: China further clarified its position on biological weapons in its July 1998 defense "white paper" called China's National Defense. It stated:

Having suffered grievously from biological weapons attacks in the past, China supports work that helps comprehensively to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It has actively participated in the work of drawing up a Protocol of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC established in 1994, and has made contributions to the progress of the negotiations on the Protocol. China holds, in view of the complexity of the problems relating to the verification mechanism, that every country should, in a down-to-earth way, seek effective and feasible verification measures, and formulate concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification, and to protect the rightful commercial and security secrets of states parties. China considers that, while improving the convention's verification mechanism, international cooperation and exchanges among states parties in the sphere of bio-technology for peaceful purposes should also be strengthened."

6/27/98: During Sino-U.S. summit meetings in China, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a Joint Statement on the protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention. It reaffirmed their support for negotiating a Protocol to the BWC "that would establish a practical and effective compliance mechanism" in order to "deter proliferation or violation of the Convention and improve transparency."

3/26/98: At a press conference in Beijing, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency John D. Holum states that China and the US "agreed on the importance of strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention...to help address the threat posed by the proliferation of biological weapons." [Press Conference by John D. Holum, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Beijing, China, 26 March 1998.]

1/27/98: President Clinton announces that the United States would lead the effort to establish provisions for enforcing the BWC by the end of 1998. The protocol to the BWC would include the following tools for verification of compliance: submission of annual declarations, voluntary visits, non-challenge clarifying visits and challenge investigations. [The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: The Biological Weapons Convention," 27 January 1998.]

1997

11/97: In its report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:

[Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997.]

10/14/97: In a speech to the UN First Committee, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador stated: "China has fully implemented its obligations under BWC and is actively participating in the negotiations on enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention." [Statement by H.E. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 October 1997.]

1/8/97: In written answers to questions by Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah), US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated: "We have received reporting regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to Iranian government entities which raise concern," and that the United States has "encouraged China to adopt comprehensive and rigorous export controls" to prevent assistance to Iran's biological weapons program. According to a US intelligence official, China recently sold Iran dual-use equipment and vaccines with both civilian medical applications and biological weapons applications. [Bill Gertz, "Albright concedes 'concern' over China-Iran transfers," Washington Times, 24 January 1997, p. 6.]

1996

8/13/96: In response to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) annual report on arms control compliance, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said the allegations that China may be in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were groundless, stating: "we call on the related US agency to stop this kind of irresponsible action immediately, and do its bit for the promotion of Sino-US ties." ["US Allegation Groundless," Beijing Review, 2-8 September 1996, p. 5.]

8/7/96: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC...The United States believes that based on available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved US concerns about this program and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations." [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," August 1996.]

4/25/96: A Sino-Russian joint statement called for "accelerated progress in further improving the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention." [Beijing Review, 13-19 March 1996, p. 7.]

4/96: In a report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:

"China has a mature chemical warfare capability and may well have maintained the biological warfare program it had prior to acceding to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984. It has funded a chemical warfare program since the 1950s and has produced and weaponized a wide variety of agents. Its biological warfare program included manufacturing infectious micro-organisms and toxins. China has a wide variety of delivery means available, including ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and is continuing to develop systems with upgrade capabilities." [Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996.] 1995

11/95: In its white paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated:

"The ultimate goal of disarmament is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)." China also stated that it "has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

7/18/95: In response to the 1995 annual US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) arms control compliance report alleging a Chinese biological weapons program, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said:

"For years, there have been news reports about US research and manufacture of biological weapons. It is thus groundless and utterly irresponsible for the United States to accuse China of manufacturing biological weapons."

Shen added that "making unwarranted accusations against China on such sensitive issues as biological and chemical weapons, weapons proliferation and nuclear non-proliferation" will only hurt US-China relations. ["News Briefing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 7-13 August 1995, p. 28.]

1995: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to an Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC.

Finding: The United States believes that based on available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations." [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," 1995.]

1994

9/20/94: Hou Zhitong, China's delegation head to the special conference of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) states parties, said that China fully supported the BWC and has faithfully and comprehensively implemented its obligations under the Convention. Hou stated:

"China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and believed that it is the common goal which should be pursued by the whole mankind...China resolutely supports the objective of prohibiting biological weapons by faithfully and comprehensively implementing its obligations under the convention...China is devoted to the strengthening of the universality and effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention and is in favor of adopting appropriate measures to achieve this purpose." [Xinhua, 20 September 1994, in JPRS-TND-94-019, 17 October 1994.] 1993

12/93: Li Daoyu, Chinese ambassador to the United States, stated in an article that:

"China consistently stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of such weapons and upholds the policy of not developing, producing or storing such weapons. In 1984 China acceded to the [BWC]. Since then, China has taken its obligations seriously in all aspects." [Li Daoyu, "Foreign Policy And Arms Control: The View From China," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 10.]

2/24/93: The Washington Post reports that the classified and unclassified versions of a US intelligence report on Chinese noncompliance with the BWC had portions of it deleted for political reasons. US intelligence allegedly had information that China was conducting biological research at two civilian research centers actually run by the Chinese military. The facilities were known to have produced and stored biological weapons. US intelligence became more concerned in 1991 when one of the facilities was enlarged. In Spring of 1992, a US official noted that China had made a "patently false" declaration to the UN that it had never produced biological weapons or engaged in work to bolster its defenses against a biological attack. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied allegations that China has a biological weapon program. [Washington Post, 26 February 1993; in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin No.20, June 1993, p. 13.]

1991

9/91: In a working paper to the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China stated:

"As a non-biological-weapon State that has once suffered from the scourge of bacteriological weapons, China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not developing, producing or stockpiling this type of weapon. China strictly abides by all the provisions of the Convention, and has conscientiously and comprehensively fulfilled all the obligations it has undertaken pursuant to the Convention." ["Position of principle of the Chinese delegation on the Biological Weapons Convention and its third review conference," working paper, BWC/CONF.III/18, 20 September 1991.]

1991: In a working paper to the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China stated that it "has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents, toxins, or weapons equipment or means of delivery for them". ["Explanation by the Government of the PRC on its Observance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction," working paper, BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.1), 1991.]

1989

9/15/89: In an article in Renmin Ribao, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen wrote:

"Our country has resolutely opposed every kind of armaments race and advocated overall prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and outer space weapons, as well as large-scale reductions of regular weapons and military personnel." [Renmin Ribao, 15 September 1989, in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.] 1987

3/23/87: At the UN Regional Conference on the World Disarmament Campaign in Beijing, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"China has consistently opposed the arms race and will never take part in it. We stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and space weapons and for a drastic reduction of conventional weapons." [Beijing Review, 30 March 1987, in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.] 1984

11/16/84: After China's accession to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in a letter to US Secretary of State George Shultz, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian wrote:

"In accordance with the decision of the NPC Standing Committee, PRC President Li Xiannian has approved the entry of the PRC into the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction of Such Weapons which was signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on 10 April 1972."

"The basic spirit of the antibiological weapons convention is in keeping with China's consistent stand and is beneficial to the peace-loving countries and people in opposing aggression and defending world peace. China was one of the victims of biological (bacteriological) weapons. China has never produced and possessed such weapons, nor will it do so in the future. However, the Chinese Government holds that the convention has drawbacks. For instance, it fails to clearly stipulate the prohibition of using biological weapons, fails to define specific and effective measures for supervision and inspection, and lacks effective measures in accusation procedures for dealing with cases of violations of the convention. The Chinese Government hopes that these drawbacks can be compensated for and improved at an appropriate time. The Chinese Government also hopes that a convention on the all-around prohibition and complete destruction of chemical weapons will be formulated as soon as possible." [Xinhua, 16 November 1984, in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

[CHINA AND THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)]

[REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON EXPORT CONTROL OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES]

[DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES EXPORT CONTROL LIST]

[CHINA AND CBW NONPROLIFERATION]

[CHRONOLOGY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)]

[CHINA AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL]

[CHINA AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)]

[WHITE PAPER - CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.