Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Formal Title: CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Summary:

Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) agree not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as weapons and means of delivery for such weapons. In addition, the BWC includes provisions for exchange of information on peaceful uses of biological technology, amendment and review, and accession and withdrawal. The convention is of unlimited duration. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty that sought to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The BWC was opened for signature in April 1972 and entered into force in 1975. During the Third Review Conference on the BWC in 1991, States Parties established an ad hoc group of governmental experts to examine possible scientific and technical verification measures that could accompany the BWC. The report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from the Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) was considered at the Special Conference of States Parties to the Convention in September 1994. The Special Conference highlighted the importance of a gradual approach to improve the verification mechanism of the BWC and established an ad hoc group mandated to draft proposals of legally binding verification measures to be considered by States Parties.

The report of the 1996 BWC Review Conference called for speedy progress on concluding negotiations on a mechanism to strengthen the Convention, specifying that agreement should be reached no later than the next Review Conference in 2001. Between 1996 and 2001, negotiations focused on a Protocol to the Convention that would entail verification and compliance measures. A draft version of a Protocol was presented at the 2001 Conference, but was rejected by the United States, which also created much anger with other States Parties to the BWC by calling on the dissolution of the Ad Hoc Group drafting the Protocol. This suggestion was not accepted, and the Session adjourned until November 2002.

For additional in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the BWC:

Initially, China did not participate in the negotiations on the convention. At the 1972 meeting of the UN General Assembly, China's representative attacked the convention as a "fraud of sham disarmament" concocted by the two superpowers, and criticized it for not prohibiting the use of biological weapons and for not prohibiting chemical weapons.

China did accede to the BWC in 1984, but with the stipulation that it was binding only in regards to relations with other parties, and will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy states whose armed forces or allies do not observe the Convention's provisions. China supports efforts to "establish a fair, reasonable, appropriate and feasible verification mechanism," but believes that these efforts should be tempered to prevent the abuse of the verification mechanism and to protect the business interests of the state parties. At that time, China expressed concern that certain countries could repeatedly request on-site verifications of particular countries. China was also concerned that on-site inspections could be used for industrial espionage to transfer proprietary information to competitors.

China has become increasingly involved with international nonproliferation regimes, which has resulted in a more positive attitude toward multilateral treaties, such as the BWC. In its 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated:

"China has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country. In 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and since that date it has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the convention. Since 1987 China has year after year reported to the United Nations on convention-related information and data in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the convention. China supports measures that help strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It will actively join in discussions of the Ad Hoc Group on promoting international cooperation, enhancing trust, strengthening verification, and other issues." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

China provided further details on its position on biological weapons in its July 1998 defense "white paper," stating:

"Having suffered grievously from biological weapons attacks in the past, China supports work that helps comprehensively to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It has actively participated in the work of drawing up a Protocol of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC established in 1994, and has made contributions to the progress of the negotiations on the Protocol. China holds, in view of the complexity of the problems relating to the verification mechanism, that every country should, in a down-to-earth way, seek effective and feasible verification measures, and formulate concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification, and to protect the rightful commercial and security secrets of states parties. China considers that, while improving the convention's verification mechanism, international cooperation and exchanges among states parties in the sphere of bio-technology for peaceful purposes should also be strengthened." [China's National Defense]

During President Clinton's trip to China in June 1998, the United States and China underscored their existing commitment to the BWC by issuing a joint statement which called for more negotiations on a protocol to improve the BWC's verification provisions.

China's white paper, National Defense 2000, further emphasized the need for a verification regime:

"As a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and has, on an annual basis, provided the United Nations with information on confidence building measures in this regard.
"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner. Upon its accession to the BWC, China pointed out the absence of concrete and effective measures for verification. China holds that, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the BWC, a necessary verification mechanism should be established. …At the same time, there should be concrete measures to promote international cooperation and exchanges among State Parties in the field of bio-technology for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. These measures will be conducive to enhancing the universality of the Convention and the future Protocol."

From November 19 through December 7, 2001, the Fifth Review Conference of BWC was held in Geneva, Switzerland. During these proceedings, Ambassador Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese Delegation, made statements praising the overall progress of the BWC. However, these statements were quickly followed by criticisms, regarding the "last five years" and some of the "practices and tendencies" that threaten the continued success of the Convention. These comments were leveled at standards of implementation, the relationship between prevention of proliferation and international cooperation as well as the issue of unilateralism vs. multilateralism:

"The Chinese delegation has always maintained that the conclusion of a balanced and effective protocol through multilateral negotiations is the only feasible way to comprehensively strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. We are glad to note that the overwhelming majority of states parties still stand for maintaining the existing mechanism and mandate of the ad hoc group and support continued negotiations within the multilateral framework in order to formulate measures for strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. My delegation is willing to make joint efforts with the international community to this end."

These comments were aimed specifically at the U.S., which had come to the Review Conference intent on blocking the draft Protocol to the Convention.

Sha Zukang followed these statements by making reference to China's past victimization with biochemical weaponry, its commitment to upholding the BWC, its observation of confidence building measures and its emphasis on multilateral cooperative efforts in both implementation of the Convention and in development and progress within the biological field. [Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, at the 5th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, November 19, 2001]

The subsequent white paper, China's National Defense 2002, reiterated China's overall stance on the BWC, while expressing disappointment that a protocol had not yet been reached:

"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner, and has actively participated in the work of the ad hoc group of the states parties to the Convention set up for the negotiation of a BWC protocol. China regrets that the protocol has not been reached as scheduled and that the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention has had to adjourn. China holds that the conclusion of a protocol with balanced contents and effective measures through multilateral negotiations remains the best way to enhance the effectiveness of the BWC. China is willing, together with all other parties concerned, to continue to explore measures along this line on the basis of the universal participation of all countries and within a multilateral framework."

Chinese compliance with the BWC:

Chinese officials have repeatedly stated in formal documents and official speeches that China has never developed biological weapons and does not currently engage in biological activities with offensive military applications. China stated in 1991:

"Having been caused great harm by biological weapons, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons, and has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents, toxins, or weapons equipment or means of delivery for them". ["Explanation by the Government of the People's Republic of China on its Observance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction," BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.1, 1991.]

However, US reports suggest that China's claims may not be entirely accurate. China may have operated an offensive biological weapons program in the 1980s and some of these efforts may continue. In its 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations." ["Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Treaties," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998.]

In a January 2001 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department agreed with ACDA's earlier statement:

"China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s. China possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents. … China is believed to possess an offensive biological warfare capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984.

"Since 1984, China consistently has claimed that it never researched, produced, or possessed any biological weapons and never would do so. Nevertheless, China's declarations under the voluntary BWC declarations for confidence building purposes are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete, and there are some reports that China may retain elements of its biological warfare program."

In addition, The New York Times reported on April 5, 1999 that a senior Soviet defector, Kanatjan Alibekov (now known as Ken Alibek), former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites had found a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. It was then discovered that two epidemics of hemorrhagic fever swept the region in the late 1980s. Soviet analysts then "concluded that they were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases." [ William J. Broad and Judith Miller. "Soviet Defector Says China Had Accident at a Germ Plant " The New York Times. 5 April 1999. p. A3.]

However, China consistently denied that it had violated the BWC. In an October 1997 speech to the UN First Committee, Ambassador Sha stated: "China has fully implemented its obligations under BWC and is actively participating in the negotiations on enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention." [Statement by H.E. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 October 1997.]

China's Possible BW Exports:

There have been concerns over possible Chinese BW-related transfers to countries such as Iran. The first such statement was made by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in her 8 January 1997 written answers to questions by Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah). Albright's response stated: "We have received reporting regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to Iranian government entities which raise concern," and that the United States has "encouraged China to adopt comprehensive and rigorous export controls" to prevent assistance to Iran's biological weapons program. According to a US intelligence official, China sold Iran dual-use equipment and vaccines with both civilian medical applications and biological weapons applications. For more information on allegations of a Chinese indigenous BW program and BW-related exports, see China and Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Nonproliferation. [Bill Gertz, "Albright concedes 'concern' over China-Iran transfers," Washington Times, 24 January 1997, p. 6.]

The United States acted upon the aforementioned allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. According to statements by US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, these materials are "controlled under (...) the Australia Group." Yet, while the US is a member of the Australia Group and follows these guidelines, both China and Iran are not. The sanctions, placed upon the Liyang Chemical Equipment company, China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company and an individual broker/agent named as Q.C. Chen will have a duration of two years, during which time these Chinese firms will be prohibited from engaging in US government contracts as well as purchasing US defense items. In response to the sanctions, China reiterated its opposition to biochemical weapon development and stated that "The US decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled." [Sources: "US Slaps Sanctions On Chinese Companies For Restricted Export," Washington (AFP), 24 January, 2002; "China Demands Removal of US Sanctions Over Weapons Trade with Iran," Agence France Presse, 26 January 2002; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "China," in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 1, p. 62; "Factfile: Signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention," Arms Control Today, January-February 1997, pp. 28-30; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China May Have Revived Germ Weapons Program, U.S. Officials Say," The Washington Post, 24 February 1993, p. A4.]

In a positive move, China released in October 2002 its Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List. The regulations, which will go into effect on December 1, 2002, contain measures to strengthen export controls to prevent diversion of dual-use biological agents, related equipment, and technologies toward production of biological weapons. Domestic measures include an export licensing system, application process, and criminal prosecution for violations. The regulations also cover the receiving party and require guarantees that biological materials will not be diverted toward weapon production and unapproved third parties. The export control list provides an extensive and well-defined list of pathogens and toxins covered by the new set of export control regulations, and puts China fully in-line with Australia Group control lists.

[TEXT OF BWC]

Key statements/documents related to China and the BWC:

For more on China and biological weapons nonproliferation, see:

[CHRONOLOGY OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA AND CBW NONPROLIFERATION]

[CHINA'S CBW-RELATED EXPORTS TO IRAN]

For other international agreements related to biological weapons, see:

[CHINA AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL]

[CHINA AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.