China and Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Nonproliferation

This section covers issues related to China and chemical and biological weapons (CBW), including China's stated position on CBW, allegations of Chinese CBW programs, CBW related exports, abandoned chemical weapons in China, and chemical and biological export controls.
 

China's Positions on Chemical and Biological Weapons

China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating chemical and biological weapons, including the Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  China is not a member of the Australia Group (AG) on CBW export controls.

Officially, China supports the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. In November 1995, the White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament stated that China supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons).” The document also stated that China “has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons,” and that “it does not produce or possess chemical weapons.” “China officially opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country.” [“China: Arms Control And Disarmament,” Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

In 1998, China further clarified its positions and reiterated its previous positions concerning CBW in its White Paper entitled China's National Defense. This document states:

“China signed the CWC in January 1993, ratified the convention in December 1996 and deposited instruments of ratification on April 25, 1997, thus becoming an original signatory state to the CWC. . . China holds that the convention should promote international economic, trade, scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemical industry, ensuring that chemical industry technology truly benefits mankind...

“In November 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC).  As a state party to the BWC, China has, year after year, reported to the United Nations on convention related information and data concerning confidence building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the BWC.”

“It is the view of the Chinese government that the implementation of the (CWC) has been, on the whole, satisfactory, since it entered into force three years ago. However, there are problems which should not be ignored: The universality of the Convention leaves a lot to be desired; a certain State Party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of the Convention in the form of domestic legislation; and some State Parties have been very slow destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. These problems should be put right as soon as possible.”

From November 19 through December 7, 2001, the Fifth Review Conference of BWC was held in Geneva, Switzerland.  During these proceedings, Sha Zukang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, made statements praising the overall progress of the BWC.  However, these statements were quickly followed by criticisms, regarding the "last five years" and some of the "practices and tendencies" that threaten the continued success of the Convention.  These comments were leveled at standards of implementation, the relationship between prevention of proliferation and international cooperation as well as the issue of unilateralism vs. multilateralism. 

"The Chinese delegation has always maintained that the conclusion of a balanced and effective protocol through multilateral negotiations is the only feasible way to comprehensively strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. We are glad to note that the overwhelming majority of states parties still stand for maintaining the existing mechanism and mandate of the ad hoc group and support continued negotiations within the multilateral framework in order to formulate measures for strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. My delegation is willing to make joint efforts with the international community to this end." [Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, November 19, 2001]

The subsequent white paper, China's National Defense 2002, restated China's overall stance on the BWC, while expressing disappointment that a protocol had not yet been reached:

"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner, and has actively participated in the work of the ad hoc group of the states parties to the Convention set up for the negotiation of a BWC protocol. China regrets that the protocol has not been reached as scheduled and that the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention has had to adjourn. China holds that the conclusion of a protocol with balanced contents and effective measures through multilateral negotiations remains the best way to enhance the effectiveness of the BWC. China is willing, together with all other parties concerned, to continue to explore measures along this line on the basis of the universal participation of all countries and within a multilateral framework."

US Suspicions Concerning China's CBW Programs

As part of its CWC obligations, China reportedly declared it possessed small scale chemical agent production facilities for offensive purposes, which have since been destroyed.  These declarations have been verified by the OPCW.  China has also declared that it has maintained a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in conflict with the CWC. In 1950, China established an anti-chemical warfare school, and in 1956, established the Anti-Chemical Warfare Department with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Currently, China conducts research on chemical weapon defense at its Research Institute of Chemical Defense and has two schools for its anti chemical warfare corps. [Zhongguo Xinwen (Beijing), 13 July 1996, in FBIS-CHI-97-197, 16 July 1996.]

Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical and biological weapons programs, in violation of its CWC and BWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have not yet led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)

In its January 2001 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:
 

"Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. China's chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results.

"While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents. … Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program."

Similar concerns about China's offensive BW program exist. In its 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

“The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations.” [“Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements,” US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998.]

 

China's CBW-Related Exports and Export Controls

China's current chemical export controls consist of five main components: (1) December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (based on the regulations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention); (2) March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC; (3) August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls; (4) June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of which China is not a member; and (5) October 2002 regulations, with corresponding control lists, on chemical and biological agent related exports, which includes extensive licensing and registration procedures for CBW-related materials, equipment and technologies.  With the 2002 regulations, China's export controls now fully cover requirements under the CWC, as well as the control lists of the Australia Group.

Since the early 1990's, China was repeatedly accused, primarily by the US, of exporting dual-use chemical weapons-related materials and technology, such as dual-use chemical precursors, vaccines and production equipment, to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran, Libya and Iraq. Chinese chemical and biological weapon-related exports to Iran raised particular concerns.

One of the earliest and most controversial incidents involved the 1993 search of the Chinese ship, Yinhe (“Galaxy”). The search came as a result of US intelligence reports, which charged that the ship was carrying chemical precursors to Iran. The search of the ship, however, revealed no such items. Following the Yinhe incident, the Chinese government stated:

“As a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China is very serious about its international obligations thereunder. Despite the fact that the Convention has yet to take effect, China has committed itself publicly not to produce or possess chemical weapons, nor does it export chemical products that may be used for the purpose of making chemical weapons. In order to ensure that the chemicals it exports will not be used for chemical weapons, the Chinese Government has formulated extremely stringent measures to control its chemical export. As to the two chemicals referred to by the U.S. side, the Chinese Government has clear-cut orders against their export to certain regions. The Chinese Government will, as always, strictly observe its international obligations and make its contribution to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting normal economic and trade exchanges among countries.” [Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Yinhe incident, 4 September 1993.]

During World War II, between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese army left chemical weapons in China after using and deploying them during their invasion. Japanese officials have estimated that there are currently about 700,000 abandoned chemical weapons of Japanese origin left in China.  China continues to argue that the number is much larger.  As of May 2000, OPCW staff had reportedly carried out nine inspections of Abandoned CW sites. [“Japan Held Responsible for Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China.” Xinhua News Agency, 3 May 2000.] Based on provisions of the CWC, the Japanese government is responsible for the removal and disposal of chemical weapons still in China, and China and Japan must negotiate arrangements for the destruction of these weapons. Originally, China sought a deadline of 2007 for completion of disposal, but since the operation is so large in scale, the Japanese feel that this deadline is unrealistic. In July 1999 the Chinese and Japanese governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding where the Japanese formally committed to destroying the abandoned munitions in line with CWC obligations.  Under the agreement, Japan is to provide the necessary facilities, experts and expertise and funds to complete the destruction of the munitions.  The clean-up commenced in 2000, but no deadline was specified.  [The CBW Conventions Bulletin, September 1999, pg. 18, http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb45.pdf]

Japan estimates project the clean-up costs will be around US $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen).  However, this figure is based upon the Japanese estimate of 700,000 abandoned shells and not the Chinese estimate of 2 million abandoned shells.  In February 2000, over 17,600 chemical weapons were discovered in Nanjing, and they were of Japanese origin.  Japan has sent investigators to China in attempts to find a way to destroy the weapons. Later, in September of that year, more ACW was unearthed by a Japanese government team in  Heilongjiang Province. ["Japanese Mission Unearths Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China," Xinhua News Agency, 1 October 2000, from BBC Monitoring, 2 October 2000;  “Chemical Weapons Left By Japanese Troops Found in Nanjing,” Xinhua General News Service, 21 June 2000.]

During September 2000, in Bei'an China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the "first large scale joint operation" for the excavation and recovery of ACW's.  Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment.  In addition to major strides in cooperation, the beginning of 2001 ushered in the introduction of management consultants engaged in experimentation and evaluation of weapon destruction devices.  Furthermore, plans are currently underway for a program of weapon removal at Haerbaling, where the majority of buried ACW's are located.  The eradication of these stockpiles will mark a significant step in eliminating ACW's on Chinese soil.  While still regarded as a difficult deadline to meet, April 2007 is still set as the target date for completion of ACW destruction.  For more details on these new developments please see "The Destruction of ACW in China." [Koijima, Seiji, "The Destruction of ACW in China," Office for ACW, Cabinet Office, Tokyo, Japan, 2001.]

Collaborative efforts occurred in March 2001, when a joint Chinese-Japanese investigation team discovered a new chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF) in Henan Province. [The CBW Convention Bulletin, Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, No. 52, June 2001; and “Japanese Poison Gas Shells Found in Henan, China,” Kyodo News Service, 10 April 2001 in FBIS JPP20010410000138.]

Efforts continued in September 2002 in Heilongjiang Province, where a Japanese government team excavated and retrieved 193 chemical shells, 154 toxic canisters, and four barrels of chemical toxicant. ["China: Japanese Team Retrieves Chemical Weapons Abandoned during War in Heilongjiang", Xinhua, 27 September 2002 in FBIS CPP20020927000118.]

In September 2003, Tokyo District Court ruled in favor of a group of Chinese plaintiffs whose relatives were killed or who themselves were injured by Japanese chemical weapons abandoned in China. The ruling ordered the Japanese government to pay a total of 190 million yen (1.7 million dollars) to the thirteen plaintiffs. The case, which was first brought before the court in 1996, covered injuries that occurred between 1974 and 1995. ["Japan Ordered to Compensate Chinese Killed, Injured by Dumped Weapons," Hong Kong AFP in English, 29 September 2003].

For additional in-depth information on open source reports of China's position on chemical and biological weapons,  please consult the CNS Abstracts database.

Key statements and documents related to China and CBW:

• Japan, Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference: Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China, 25 April 2003
• Report on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in China, 9 May 2003
• Statement by Ambassador Zhu Zushou, Permanent Representative to the OPCW and Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 April 2003
• CIA: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 7 January 2003
• Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies, 19 October 2002
• Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, 19 October 2002
• Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, 14 October 2002
• Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, 14 October 2002
• CIA: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 30 January 2002
• CIA: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,7 February 2001
• "The Destruction of ACW in China" Article by Seiji Kojima, Director General, Office for ACW, Tokyo, Japan, 2001
• "China's National Defense in 2000," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, October 2000
• "Next Steps," An Article by Ambassador Sha Zukang for the OPCW Synthesis, May 2000
• Memorandum of Understanding on the Destruction of Abandoned CW in China, 30 July 1999
• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997 (online version)
• "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1997
• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996
• "China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995
• Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Yinhe incident, 4 September 1993
• Statement by the United States government on the Yinhe incident, 29 September 1993
• Letter by the Iranian government on the Yinhe incident, 23 September 1993
• Statement by the Chinese government upon signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 13 January 1993
• "Some information on discovered chemical weapons abandoned in China by a foreign State," Chinese working paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, 18 February 1992
• "Explanation by the Government of the People's Republic of China on its Observance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction," BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.1, 1991
• China's Working Paper "Position of principle of the Chinese delegation on the Biological Weapons Convention and its third review conference" (BWC/CONF.III/18), 20 September 1991
• Letter from Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian to US Secretary of State George Shultz on China's accession to the BWC, 16 November 1984
• Chinese working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on proposals on major elements of a CWC, 5 March 1984
• Chinese working paper on the prohibition regime of the future convention banning chemical weapons, to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons at the Conference on Disarmament, 21 April 1983
• Chinese working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on the definition of chemical warfare agents, 27 March 1981
• Chinese working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on proposals on the main contents of a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 18 June 1980
• Statement by Lin Fang, Adviser to the Chinese Delegation at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 21 November 1972

[CHRONOLOGY OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHRONOLOGY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)]

[CHINA AND THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)]

[CHINA AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL]

[CHINA AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)]

[ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CHINA]

[CHINA'S CHEMICAL EXPORT CONTROLS]
 

Updated: 06/06/2003