China's Chemical Export Controls

China's Chemical Export Controls

China's chemical current export controls consists of four main components: (1) December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (with a Schedule of Chemicals based on the regulations and three schedules of chemicals contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); (2) March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC; (3) August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls; and (4) October 2002 Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies (with an accompanying Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List). According to the regulations, only State Council-designated entities can export Schedule 1-3 chemicals. In June 1998, China adopted a decree which expanded the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group (AG). In a 1995 White Paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated:

"China has a massive civilian chemical industry. It is, however, very cautious and responsible regards the export of chemicals that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons and related technologies and equipment, refusing such exports if they are to be used for the purpose of manufacturing chemical weapons. In order to ensure these items if exported not to be used in the production of chemical weapons, the Chinese government has drafted regulations and measures for the control of their exportation. A detailed list of chemicals subject to export control has been drawn up in accordance with the Verification Annex of the convention. Import and export of chemicals on this list and technologies and equipment used in their manufacture are under the centralized management of the Ministry of Chemical Industry (MCI). Business related to such imports and exports is handled by specialized enterprises designated by MCI and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MCI, MOFTEC and the General Administration of Customs (GAC) take joint responsibility for examining and approving imports and exports, issuing licenses and making inspections. China insists that the governments of importing countries provide assurances that the relevant goods imported from China not be used to manufacture chemical weapons or retransferred to a third country." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," November 1995.]

In the 1998 White Paper on National Defense, further clarification of China's position on chemical export controls is given:

"China has always been cautious and responsible regarding the exports administration of chemicals. It does not export chemicals that can be used to manufacture chemical weapons, nor does it export related technologies and equipment. It supports normal international cooperation in chemical industry and exchanges of related scientific and technological materials in accordance with the CWC, and opposes any export control mechanism conflicting with the purpose of the convention." "In September 1990, the Chinese government drafted measures for strict control of the export of chemicals and their production technologies and equipment. In December 1995, it issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision and Control of Chemicals, and, in accordance with these regulations, issued the List of Chemicals Subject to Supervision and Control and the Bylaws for the Implementation of the Regulations in June 1996, stipulating that import and export of related chemicals are under the centralized management of the competent departments of the chemical industry under the State Council and operated by special companies designated by such departments."

China reiterated this stance in its 2002 White Paper on National Defense, while emphasizing the steps it had taken towards strengthening export controls:

"To ensure that exports of such material from China are not used for manufacturing chemical or biological weapons, the Chinese government has promulgated and implemented the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, and the detailed rules for its implementation, thereby placing the export of related material under stringent control. The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC promulgated in December 2001 designates as criminal offenses such acts of endangering public security as using, illegally manufacturing, trafficking, transporting and stockpiling radioactive substances, toxic materials or infectious disease pathogens, and stipulates corresponding penalties for these acts. In order to further strengthen the export control of the chemicals and dual-use biological products and related technologies and equipment, the Chinese government promulgated in October 2002 the Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies (including its control list), the Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies (including its control list), and the newly revised Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Arms Export."

Despite China's assurances, the US government has remained concerned that chemicals used in making chemical weapons have leaked out of China. On October 30, 1997, in response to a question concerning the reported Chinese transfer of a chemical factory to Iran, US Department of State briefer James Rubin stated:

"For several years now, the United States has made clear its concerns about the inadequacies in China's system for controlling chemical-related exports. Moreover, we have long made clear our concern that these inadequacies have been exploited by Iran to obtain equipment and technology for its chemical weapons program. Indeed, in May 1997, the US imposed trade sanctions on seven Chinese entities, including one mentioned in today's story, for assisting Iran's chemical weapons program by providing precursor chemicals and chemical production equipment and technology."

"These activities predated China's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which obligates China not to assist anyone in any way with chemical weapons activities. Since acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China has made some improvements to its chemical export controls. But we still believe it needs to do more. We have urged China to make such improvements, and will continue to do so."

"The point is that the company involved is one that we were very concerned about, and we have now received additional assurances from the Chinese that that company's activities will be monitored much more closely and therefore, some of the concern that may have led some people to worry about this particular issue should be ameliorated." [US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 30 October 1997.]

Both China and the US have worked to improve the controls on exports of dangerous chemicals. Following the October 1997 summit in the US, a White House Fact Sheet noted that China has "tightened controls of the export of chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons programs." [The White House, "Fact Sheet: Accomplishments of US-China Summit," 29 October 1997.] In addition, during a background briefing, a senior administration official stated that "recently we learned that the government of China instituted some new procedures on requiring governmental review and approval of chemical-related trade so as to avoid these kinds of problems [chemical sales which led to US sanctions]." [The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," 29 October 1997.] And in US-China joint statement issued during the summit the two countries stated that: "Both countries agree on the importance of government oversight of chemical-related exports." [Joint US-China Statement, 29 October 1997.]

Problems with Implementation

In April 1997 testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn stated that the US government welcomed China's adoption of new chemical export controls but was still concerned by reports that Chinese entities transferred chemical precursors, and production equipment to Iran. He continued that “These dual-use chemical-related transfers to Iran's CW program indicate that, at a minimum, China's chemical export controls are not operating effectively enough to ensure compliance with China's prospective CWC obligation not to assist anyone in any way to acquire chemical weapons." [Testimony by Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997.]

October 2002 Measures on Chemical Export Controls and Export Control List

In October 2002, China promulgated the Measures and Control List as supplements to the 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals, with the stated intention of further strengthening control over the export of dual-use chemicals and their related equipment and technologies. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) spokeswoman Gao Yan:

"As an important component of China's export control legal system, the measures are significant to implementing the country's nonproliferation policy, to fulfilling its international obligations, to safeguarding its national security as well as social and public interests, to standardizing its export control of sensitive items, and to maintaining the normal order of foreign trade." ["PRC FM Spokeswoman on Measures on Export Controls of Chemicals," Beijing Xinhua in English, 19 October, 2002, CPP20021019000058.]

August 1997 Circular on Chemical Export Controls:

In December 1997, China's Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), and the General Administration of Customs (GAC) jointly issued a circular strengthening controls of chemical-related exports. The circular stated that chemical-related imports and exports must only be handled by corporations authorized by the Ministry of Chemical Industry and MOFTEC. Such corporations must obtain a license to import or export chemical materials, technologies, and equipment. In addition, authorized corporations must obtain special approval from the Ministry of Chemical Industry to export chemical materials to countries that are not signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). ["Rules tightened in wake of chemical weapon claims," Hong Kong Standard, 18 December 1997 (online version).]

December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals:

According to the Regulations, the recipient country must provide a written assurance that the chemicals will only be used for research, pharmaceutical, medical, or protective purposes; that they will not be used for chemical weapons; and that they will not be re-transferred to third countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry official Fu Cong stated regarding the Regulations:

"In December 1995, China's State Council promulgated the Regulations on Controlled Chemicals, and soon afterwards, the Ministry of Chemical Industry issued a Schedule of Chemicals based on the Regulations and the Schedules of chemicals contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Regulations laid down strict controls on the production and transfer of the chemicals listed on the Schedule. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Regulations have also been promulgated. This has been a concrete step China has taken to implement the provisions of Chemical Weapons Convention. In pursuance of the Treaty, the Regulations divide the controlled chemicals into four categories: (a) chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons; (b) chemicals that can be used as precursors in the production of chemical weapons; (c) chemicals that can be used as main raw materials in the production of chemical weapons; and (d) discrete organic chemicals excluding explosives and hydrocarbons. According to the Regulations, only companies designated by the Government can engaged in the import and export of schedule I chemicals, and the import and export of schedules II and III chemicals and their production technologies and equipment. For an export of schedule I chemicals, a written assurance must be given by the recipient government that the imported chemicals will be used only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes and will not be transferred to a third country. For an export of schedules II and III chemicals or their production technologies or equipment, the recipient government should guarantee in writing that the imported items will not be used for the production of chemical weapons or transferred to a third country." ["An Introduction of China's Export Control System," statement by by Mr. Fu Cong, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at Tokyo Workshop on Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, 11-12 December 1997.]

Key statements/documents related to China's chemical export controls:

Updated 6/6/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.