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Summary:
During the June 1998 Sino-U.S. summit in China, Beijing and Washington agreed not to target nuclear weapons at each other. The accord was called a "non-targeting" agreement, not a detargeting agreement. This difference in name was likely due to the fact that neither China nor the U.S. currently have nuclear weapons targeted at each other, although the US could change its targeting codes within minutes. China is known to store its warheads separately from its ICBMs and to store its ICBMs unfueled; thus China could only input its targeting codes during launch preparations and not before. In explaining the agreement, President Clinton said the non-targeting accord "would completely eliminate" the risk of an accidental nuclear launch, demonstrate "mutual confidence and trust," and would serve as "a helpful counterweight" to the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. In response to questions about whether the US had made concessions to get the agreement, Clinton said "...we have not changed our position [on no first use], nor are we prepared to do that."
The U.S. has sought such an agreement from China for years but Beijing always resisted. Washington wanted an agreement solely on detargeting (similar to the US-Russian accord) whereas Beijing wanted a detargeting agreement as part of a US-China agreement on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons. It is unclear why China dropped its linkage to a no-first-use pledge during the June 1998 summit. Some analysts speculated that Chinese leaders recognized the political impossibility of getting a no-first-use commitment from the U.S. and that China traded the non-targeting agreement for a public restatement by President Clinton of the "three no's policy" on Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts have suggested that the delinking of no-first-use from detargeting was made by senior political officials in China and was opposed by working level officials in China's arms control community.
Statements and Developments:
1/26/99: According to Washington Times, a classified US Defense Intelligence Agency report states that China practiced launching CSS-5 (DF-4) and CSS-2 (DF-3) missiles at Taiwan and US bases in Okinawa and South Korea during an exercise in late November 1998. The report also questions whether this activity is consistent with the non-targeting agreement signed at the US-China summit meeting in Beijing in June 1998.[Bill Gertz, "Chinese Exercises TArgets Taiwan, US Troops, Washington Times, 26 January 1999, p. 1.]
6/27/98: The U.S. and China agreed not to target nuclear weapons at each other during a summit meeting in Beijing. The accord is called a "non-targeting" agreement. China finally dropped its insistence that the U.S. make a no-first-use pledge in exchange for agreeing not to target nuclear weapons at each other. (See above analysis.)
11/96: At the APEC summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen addressed the US-China proposals: "The United States proposed that China and the United States sign an agreement on detargeting of nuclear missiles against each other...We agreed to the proposal but we want to add one more thing, that is mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons...We think that by adding these contents, the agreement will be more complete and will have real content..." ["Christopher in China for Arms Control Discussions," Disarmament Diplomacy, December 1996, p. 41.]
11/28/96: During regularly scheduled press briefings, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai answered the following question:
Question: "Why does China oppose a US proposal which was similar to a Sino-Russian accord on not targeting each other with nuclear weapons?"
Answer: "Chinese and Russian leaders issued a joint statement in September 1994 pledging not to use military force against each other, and especially not to strike first with nuclear weapons. The two countries promised to take steps to ensure that their strategic nuclear weapons are not targeted against each other."
"What should be stressed is that when China and Russia promised not to target each other with nuclear weapons, they also pledged simultaneously to avoid the use of military force, especially the first use of nuclear weapons, against each other."
"China hopes to reach an agreement with the United States on the mutual non-use of military force, especially first-strike use of nuclear weapons. China also hopes that the two sides can at the same time reach an agreement on not targeting each other with strategic nuclear weapons."
"Only by doing so can the two countries contribute to their own security and to the stability of the entire world." ["Foreign Ministry News Briefs," Beijing Review, 16-22 December 1996, p. 6.]
11/25/96: US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord stated: "We would favor a de-targeting agreement with the Chinese, even as we have one with the Russians. It would be primarily symbolic. We're not aiming weapons at each other, but it would be a confirmation. And it would be a useful symbolism. So we favor that. The Chinese prefer to link it with no first use, which we cannot agree to. So it's correct, this issue has come up and we'll keep working at it. We think it would be very useful, indpeed, to do it but we'll have to keep talking to the Chinese about it." [The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by Ambassador John Wolf, Assistant Trade Representative Bob Cassidy, and Ambassador Winston Lord," 25 November 1996; Warren P. Strobel, "China Rejects US Offer On Pact Against Aiming Nukes At Each Other," Washington Times, 26 November 1996, p. A13.]
10/10/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that during talks with the US ACDA Director John Holum on 10/7/96 and 10/8/96, Beijing pushed for a US-China no-first-use agreement similar to that which China signed with Russia. But Shen said the US side only supports the idea of an agreement on detargeting. [Newsletter: Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 23 October 1996.]
10/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated: "China advocated that an agreement on mutually giving up the first-use of nuclear weapons be reached between China and the US. This could also be similar to what China and Russia have done in promising not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to target strategic nuclear weapons at each other". ["US and China Discuss Arms Control and Non-Proliferation," Disarmament Diplomacy, October 1996, p. 49.]
10/96: Before a visit by a US delegation headed by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director John Holum to Beijing, a State Department official stated: "We want to talk to them about a detargeting agreement. The United States and Russia have detargeted; so have China and Russia, so now it's time to come full circle." [Barbara Opall, "US To Press Chinese On Nuclear Targeting," Defense News, 13 October 1996, p. 3.]
10/94: During a visit by US Defense Secretary William Perry to Beijing, China rejected a US offer to conclude a detargeting agreement. [Barbara Opall, "US To Press Chinese On Nuclear Targeting," Defense News, 13 October 1996, p. 3.]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
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