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Conventional Weapons-Related
Statements and Developments
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This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China's conventional weapons capabilities and policies on conventional weapons nonproliferation, including the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC), an anti-personnel landmine (APL) ban, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the Wassenaar Arrangement, arms control in the Middle East (ACME) talks, transparency in armaments (TIA), and other conventional weapon-related issues.
12/22/2003: Mass production of the PLA's J-10 fighter aircraft is expected to begin in January 2004, with a particular emphasis on achieving air dominance over the Taiwan Straits by 2005, instead of the previously predicted 2010 timeframe. However, Chengdu Aircraft Co will only be able to deliver two J-10's per month because only one production line exists for this aircraft. Chengdu Aircraft has applied for additional funding to open a second production line, with a decision expected in 2004. Current J-10 models make heavy use of foreign components including Russian engines and fire control radar, but a J-10A model is planned, featured with primarily indigenous Chinese components. In addition a twin-engine, twin-seat model of the J-10 is under development, to increase the air combat and ground attack capability of the PLA Navy. An optimistic projection is that four squadrons of J-10s will be in service by 2005, providing a significant boost for China's air combat capabilities in the Taiwan theater. ["China to Begin Mass Production of 'Qian-10' Fighters in Jan 2004," Hong Kong Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, 22 December 2003 in FBIS CPP20031222000023.]
12/01/2003: Hong Kong Ching Pao has published a detailed report on China's No 170 destroyer equipped with what Western military experts have referred to as the "China Magic Shield" (zhong hua shen dun) naval missile combat system. The China Magic Shield system is physically similar to the US Aegis system, with four planar phased arrays mounted separately around the bridge. Foreign military experts have speculated that the system's performance exceeded that of the early models of the Aegis system. The China Magic Shield system represented a technological leap over previous Chinese warship designs and it resolved the PLA Navy's deficiency in fleet air defense. No 170 represents the first step in China's naval modernization and transformation into a blue water navy. ["PRC Launches First Destroyer with Aegis-Like 'China Magic Shield' System," Hong Kong Ching Pao, 01 December 2003 in FBIS CPP20031205000085.]
11/25/2003: In what appeared to be an exercise to demonstrate China's ability to penetrate US-Japanese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defense systems, a Chinese Ming class submarine sailed undetected to within 25 miles of Japan's southern Kyushu Island. Ming class submarines are diesel-powered and displace 2,113 tons. The Ming submarine was not discovered by a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C ASW aircraft until after the submarine surfaced and had raised the Chinese national flag. The P-3C is considered one of the most advanced ASW aircraft in the world, and the exercise was interpreted as a move to humiliate Japan and to send a warning to Taiwan. According to Taiwan's International Defense Review, the Ming belonged to the East Sea Fleet, most likely out of the Zhoushan naval base located at the mouth of the Hangzhou Bay, Zhejiang Province. The East Sea Fleet's primary mission is all Taiwan-related, either for attack or blockade purposes. ["China's navy floats a warning to Taiwan," Asia Times, 25 November 2003, http://www.atimes.com.]
11/03/2003: China's People Liberation Navy (PLAN) launched its second Type 052C guided-missile destroyer, No 171, from Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. Its sister ship, No 170, is currently being outfitted in Shanghai. Although it shared the same hull as the Type 052B destroyers, the air defense system on the Type 052C has been upgraded to vertical launch systems associated with the HQ-9 theatre air-defense missile system. In an earlier Jane's article, it was reported that the Type 052C destroyers would be equipped with a phased-array radar and extended-range air-defense missiles such as the Russian-made 48N6E or the FT2000. Features of the destroyer include “installation of two Type 730 close-in weapon systems and a single 100 mm gun with a low radar cross-section turret mounted forward. There is also a new anti-ship missile launcher cradle positioned amidships: its configuration appears to indicate a new cylindrical missile canister rather than the box launchers used previously.” In addition, the first Type 054 frigate, the Ma An Shan, was launched from the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai in September. The Type 054 is intended to replace more than 20 Jianghu-class frigates, some of which are 30 years old. With a displacement of 3400 tons, the Type 054 design is based off the French Navy's Lafayette class frigates and the Russian Project 1135.6 Talwar-class frigates delivered to the Indian Navy. The Type 054 is a new generation multi-purpose frigate that is expected to be built in significant numbers. ["China launches second guided-missile destroyer," Jane's Navy International, 03 November 2003; “New Chinese Destroyer Launched,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 May 2003.]
10/01/2003: In the bimonthly publication of the Chinese Ordnance Society, Binqi Zhishi, the PLA's new helicopter-launched TY-90 air-to-air missile was discussed in detail. The TY-90 is a short range dogfight missile, with a maximum speed of Mach 2 and a maximum range of 4,000 meters. The guidance system consisted of a passive infrared detector, equipped with an advanced aspherical optical reflection lens. The missile is capable of both post-launch automatic guidance and off-axis launch capabilities. ["New TY-90 Air to Air Missile for Helicopter Gunship," Binqi Zhishi (Beijing), 01 October 2003 in FBIS CPP20031209000166.]
07/09/2003: Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation (CAIC) unveiled their new fighter plane the ‘Super-7’ or Chao Qi to the public. The plane will carry two guided missiles on its first test flight sometime later this year. The new Super-7 is “an all-purpose light fighter, required to have all-weather operation capabilities, be capable of performing the dual tasks of dogfight and air-to-ground attack, and have the ability to launch medium-range missiles.” According to Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), an enterprise under CAIC, if the test flight is successful they will immediately start production. However, mass production of the fighter will not begin until two and a half years of research are completed. The plane is being produced to be sold abroad to developing nations. According to Hong Kong press, China already has received orders from Iran and some African countries. Lou Ronghuai, general manager of CAC confirmed that several foreign countries have already placed orders for the new Super-7 but would not provide details. The Super-7 has the same engine as the Russian-made MIG-29. [“New Fighter Plane “Super-7” to Carry Two Missiles on First Flight,” Guangzhou Ribao, 10 July 2003; PRC’s Super-7 Aircraft to Make Maiden Flight ‘This Year’; Export Prospects ‘Good’,” Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 9 July 2003; "HK ZTS Describes PRC-Made Super-7 Combat Plane for Export Market," Hong Kong Zhongguo Tongxun She, 2 September 2002.]
05/02/2003:
The Chinese government confirmed that a Ming-class submarine, No 361, had a
mechanical failure on 16 April causing the deaths of all 70 crewmen and officers
aboard. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is conducting a thirty-man
investigation led by Vice-Chairman Guo Boxiong at North Sea Fleet headquarters
located in Qingdao, port of No. 361. At the time of the accident No. 361
had been on a silent, no contact drill. Since no communications were
expected from the submarine while it was on maneuvers, No. 361 was left drifting
for ten days until it was found by a fishing boat on 25 April.
Explanations to how the accident occurred are varied, but navy analysts have
proposed two theories. The first theory centers around a recharging
malfunction. In order to recharge the electrical batteries the submarine
needs to surface in order to intake large quantities of oxygen, which it then
burns to power the diesel engines. The deaths could have occurred when the
air-taking valves malfunctioned causing carbon dioxide to fill the ship killing
all those inside within two minutes. The second theory points to a
mechanical malfunction in which poisonous gas escaped rapidly throughout the
ship, which could have been released if acid from the batteries on board had
become mixed with sea water, creating chlorine causing suffocation.
The Ming-class submarine is based on the German U-boat design from the 1940's.
According to a retired submarine expert, Lieutenant Commander Bill Murry,
"the PLA keeps a 'big but old' submarine force, including 30 active Romeo-class
submarines and 30 ones in reserve, which have the technology as old as the U.S.
submarines in the 1950s.”
In the past China has kept its military obstacles a state secret. However,
the Chinese government went public early with the details of this
incident. Many analysts believed that this could indicate a change within
the Chinese defense establishment. According to Michael Swaine, an expert
on the Chinese military, this incident "indicated a general trend of more
openness and transparency of the Chinese military." Six weeks after the
incident the commander of the navy and the navy's political commissar were fired
as well as two top officers of China's North Sea Fleet and eight others demoted
or dismissed. According to Xinhua they were removed due to "improper
command and action in relation to the accident". The Chinese
government has yet to issue a statement on how the accident occurred.
[“Ming-class Submarine Incident Won’t Stop Chinese Navy from ‘Going Blue’,”
Washington Profile Chinese Edition, Issue 18 (#34); "Suffocation killed 70 on
Sub," South China Morning Post," 5 May 2003; "China Sacks Top Naval
Officers," The Economic Times, 17 June 2003; "Top Brass Sacked Over Sub
Disaster," South China Morning Post, 14 June 2003.]
01/03/2003: China declared that 'other countries' had no right to
interfere in its arms trade with Israel. The statement followed a report in
Israel's Haaretz daily which claimed that Israel had frozen all contacts on arms
exports to China. "It is China's consistent position that the development of
normal military trade cooperation with Israel is a matter between the two
countries, a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement said. "Other countries have no
right to interfere in this."
["PRC Statement Warns 'Other Countries' Not To Meddle in Israel
Arms Trade," Hong Kong AFP in English, 3 January, 2003]
12/11/2002: According to a report by Jane's Defense Weekly, the Shenyang Aircraft Company has been selected as the lead company on research and development of the PLA's new heavyweight fighter. Development of the engines and weapon subsystems have been underway for some time, with wind tunnel tests of two possible design concepts about to start. The design concepts shown publicly are of a twin-engine aircraft sharing some characteristics with the US Air Force's F/A-22 multi-role fighter. However, the Chinese designs appear to retain a more conventional wing shape and use only a single vertical fin. The new design has been tentatively dubbed the J-X, with a possible designation of J-13A. The WS10A is slated for service in the J-10A and the J-X when it comes into service with the PLA. It has been tested on a SU-27 airframe earlier this year. Additionally, research has been conducted into advanced thrust vectoring technology for the WS10A, with drastic improvements reported to aircraft maneuverability. Indigenous and foreign multi-function fire control radar systems are being tested for possible deployment on the J-X, with the indigenous Type 1473, the Russian Zhemchung and Pero systems included as candidates. The expected debut of the J-X is at the end of the decade, if the project matches the development period of the J-10A. ["China launches new stealth fighter project," Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 December 2002.]
12/09/2002: China signed the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, otherwise known as the "Firearms Protocol." Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya wrote on the importance of the Protocol to China:
"China has a large population and vast land. In recent years, there have been some cases of firearms-related crimes, such as illicit firearms manufacturing and trafficking. A rigorous control of the manufacturing and transfer of firearms and small arms is very important for law and order in the country. Such endeavour has become all the more important as we step up the fight against “East Turkistan” terrorists."
"Given the transnational nature of illicit firearms-related crimes, it is essential and important to combat those illegal activities through international cooperation. China fully supports and actively participates in all international efforts to address the issue of illicit small arms." [Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya, "Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya Wrote on Small Arms Issues," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 10 December, 2002]
11/20/2002: China reportedly test-fired a new anti-ship cruise missile with twice the range previously estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies. The YJ-83 missile was fired from a JH-7 fighter-bomber over Bohai Bay, off northern China. According to this report, its range was 155 miles (250 km) rather than the anticipated 75 miles. [Bill Gertz, "Chinese Missile Has Twice The Range U.S. Anticipated," The Washington Times, 20 November, 2002]
11/11/2002: Chengdu Aircraft began final assembly of the prototype FC-1/Super 7 light fighter, a joint Chinese-Pakistani project design. The prototype was powered by a version of the MiG-29's RD-33 turbofan engine. Pakistan has said that it would purchase 150 of the type, although it remained unclear whether or not the PLA would also purchase the aircraft. Flight testing is expected to begin in June 2003. ["FC-1 Assembly Begins, With 2003 Flight Target," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 November 2002, pg. 36.]
11/04/2002: The PLA's indigenously developed fourth-generation fighter, the J-10 did not make its expected airshow debut at the Air Show China 2002 display in Zhuhai. The J-10 was developed with assistance from Israel and its basic design was inherited from the defunct-Lavi fighter project of the mid-1980s. Half a dozen J-10s are believed to have been manufactured and used for development and evaluation, with series production by Chengdu expected. Along with the SU-27 and SU-30MKK aircraft China has acquired from Russia, the J-10 provides the core of the PLA's defense, offensive air and tactical strike capabilities. The J-10 could enter squadron service around 2005-07. The J-10 is powered by a Russian Saturn Lyulka AL-31, but the powerplant for the production model has not yet been determined due to technical difficulties encountered in indigenously designing and manufacturing high-bypass ratio military turbofans.
The radar system of the J-10 remained conjectural, with possibilities that included the Israeli Elta EL-2035, and the Russian Phazotron Zhemchoug, a derivative of the N-010 Zhuk developed for the MiG-29M. In addition, Chinese engineers have attempted to reverse engineer the Zhuk as the JL-10A planar array system, but so far Chinese efforts had not resulted in success. The SU-30MKK aircraft that China procured from Russia had initially been fitted with the N-010 Zhuk, but Phazotron has tested the Zhuk-MS improved variant for deployment in the Chinese SU-30MKK model. ["Chinese Air Force in Throes of Cultural Revolution," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 04 November 2002, pg. 55-57.]
11/04/2002: Chinese efforts to acquire an active radar-guided beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missile capability hinged on two programs: the Russian R-77 (AA-12 Adder) and the indigenously developed SD-10 (PL-12). The R-77 has been supplied as part of the SU-30MKK package deal, with test firing carried out in mid-2002. The SD-10 represented the latest attempt by China to manufacturing BVR missiles domestically, with previous attempts centered on reported reverse engineering of the US AIM-7 Sparrow and license production of the Italian Aspide. Both attempts met with only limited success. The SD-10 is expected to provide the primary BVR armament for the J-10 fighter platform and for the Sino-Pakistani FC-1/Super 7 light strike fighter. ["Chinese Weapon Upgrades Reflect Russian Expertise," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 04 November 2002, pg. 58.]
07/01/2002: PLA Air Force SU-30 fighters reportedly test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles recently purchased from Russia. The test raised questions as to whether China has already deployed the missiles, which would meet one of the conditions required for the U.S. to carry out delivery of AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles to Taiwan. [Bill Gertz, "China Test-Fires New Missile," The Washington Times, 1 July, 2002]
06/25/2002: China has begun negotiations with Russia on the purchase of eight Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines. The ships, which would be armed with Klub long-range anti-ship missile systems, are part of a $4 billion weapons package Russia has agreed to provide China over the next four to five years. In addition to the submarines, the package includes 40 SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, a batch of S300 PMU2 anti-aircraft missiles, and two Sovremennyy-class destroyers to add to the two that China has already received. [John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post Foreign Service, 25 June, 2002]
03/27/2002: Jane's Defense Weekly reported that the Xian Aircraft Company completed the development stage of the JH-7A fighter in 2001 and had planned series of test flights for 2002. The JH-7A aircraft is expected to enter service with the PLA in 2004. The JH-7A is powered by the same Rolls-Royce Spey Mk. 202 turbofan engines as the JH-7, offering reduced costs through maintenance commonality. The JH-7A featured a greater reliance on Russian subsystems than the JH-7, in particular with regard to its weapons systems. China acquired a license to manufacture and use the X-31P (AS-17 Krypton) anti-radiation missile and the 350kg KAB-500 laser guided bomb for use on the JH-7A. Externally, two winglets have been removed from the JH-7A airframe and the weapon stations increased to 11, as compared to 7 on the JH-7 aircraft. The control system has possibly been enhanced from a triple to a quadruple fly-by-wire system, and the radar changed to a JL-10A "Shen Ying" pulse-Doppler radar equipped with a Russian planar array. ["China completes JH-7A development," Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 March 2002.]
01/03/2002: China signed a contract to buy two Sovremennyy-class destroyers from Russia. The ships are estimated to be worth more than $1 billion, and are expected to be delivered within four years. Sovremennyy-class destroyers are equipped to fire the SS-N-22 "Sunburn," a supersonic anti-ship missile that can be armed with a nuclear warhead. ["China Purchases More Russian Destroyers," Arms Control Today, January/February 2002]
09/16/2001: The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) released its annual Landmine Monitor Report, in which it singled out China as the country with the largest arsenal of antipersonnel landmines. The report estimated that China has 110 million such APLs. [David Steiner, "Landmine Monitor Report 2001: Toward a Mine-Free World," IANSA, 16 September, 2001]
07/19/2001: China signed a contract with a Russian aircraft manufacturer for the purchase of more than $2 billion worth of SU-30MKK ground-attack fighters. [John Pomfret, "China Signs $2 Billion Deal for Russian Fighter Jets," Washington Post Foreign Service, 20 July, 2001]
01/09/2001: In a report by Jane's Defense Weekly, China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CNPMIEC) upgraded existing KS-1 surface-to-air (SAM) systems to KS-1A standards. The KS-1 is a low-to-high altitude SAM system developed to supplement the older HQ-2 SAM that entered service in 1967 and was based off the Russian SA-2 Guideline family. The new KS-1A system featured a trailer mounted phased array radar system, similar to the one used by the US Patriot SAM system. The new radar is claimed by CNPMIEC to enable the KS-1A to engage three targets simultaneously. The KS-1A missile's dual thrust solid propellant motor has been upgraded, increasing its maximum range and altitude to 50km and 88,560 feet. Speculation about the source of the technology upgrades centered on Israel and Russia, both of which have defense cooperation programs and arms sales with China. ["Upgraded Chinese KS-1 SAM revealed," Jane's Defense Weekly, 09 January 2001.]
07/2001: Israel cancelled a planned sale to China of its highly sophisticated Phalcon radar system. The sale, which had been stalled since July 2000, would have given China its first advanced airborne early-warning capability. However, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was under intense U.S. pressure to cancel deal. Israel plans to negotiate with China over compensation for the cancelled contract. ["Israel Cancels Radar Deal with China," Arms Control Association, September, 2001]
10/13/2000: The Washington Times reports the Chinese military is preparing to conduct a flight test of the SS-N-22 Sunburn in waters off southern China. [Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times, 13 October 2000.]
10/12/2000: The Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian requesting a cessation of Russia's arms sales to China. Chen told Oleg Ivanovich Lobov, chairman of the Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural Coordination Committee, "We hope Russia can control the quality and quantity of the arms it sells to Communist China." ["Taiwan Asks Russia to Curtail Arms Sales to China," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 October 2000.]
10/10/2000: The South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is reported by Cape Town ETV as stating South Africa is ready to sell arms, and/or develop arms jointly with China, regardless of opinion in the West. ['ForMin Says RSA 'Ready' to Sell Arms to China 'Regardless of Opinion in West'," Cape Town ETV 10 October 2000, in FBIS AFP20001010000022.]
10/05/2000: The US House of Representatives passed the Russian Anti-Ship Missile Nonproliferation Act. The act blocks any rescheduling of unpaid debts owed Washington by Moscow until the president certifies to Congress that all transfers of the SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles are permanently halted. Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican stated, "The Russians cannot continue to send deadly weapons and technology that is designed to kill American military personnel to our potential enemies and expect that we're going to do them any favors when it comes to debt restructuring." Representative Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat supported the legislation saying, "Russian sales of Moskit anti-ship missiles to the [People's Republic of China] pose a great threat to the security of Taiwan and to our country." Brown further commented by saying, "These missiles arrived in China at a time when the mainland has enormously increased the number of other types of missiles on China's coast facing Taiwan. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and a key economic player in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is unacceptable that the PRC continues to boast to the world about its missile threat to Taiwan and, by extension, of the United States." The White House rebuttal to the legislation was that it "does not believe [the measure] would be effective in accomplishing its aim of dissuading Russian arms sales to China." [Bill Gertz, "House Passes Bill to Punish Russia for Arms Sales to China," The Washington Times, 5 October 2000, p. 3.]
08/30/2000: The Agence France Presse reports that Aerospatiale Matra Missile, a division of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space company won a contract worth about $700m to supply an undisclosed Asian country with a number of missiles, including sea-to-sea missiles. ["French Firm Confirms Missile Contract with Unspecified Asian Country," Paris Agence France Presse, 30 August 2000, in FBIS EUP20000830000173.]
08/17/2000: The Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao cites an unknown Chinese source as saying that China's senior hierarchy will permit the military to export advanced weapons under the principle of "relying on the armed forces to support themselves." This principle is designed to encourage weapons development and export to acquire foreign currency to invest in the development of hi-tech weapons. China will export the latest version of its indigenously produced Jian-7 fighter-bomber, the first time an advanced weapons system has been approved for export. In order to facilitate weapons development, management of production will be centralized, replacing the current decentralized production model. [Sources: Mai Shi-lung, "S&T Research Units Put Under PLA for Development of New Arms Against Taiwan," Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao in Chinese 17 August 2000, in FBIS CPP20000817000061; "HK Paper Views PRC Arms Sales," Hong Kong iMail in English, 18 August 2000, in FBIS CPP20000818000016.]
06/06/2000: Xinhua reported that the China had completed its two demining campaigns in Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region six months earlier. The campaigns removed 1.88 million landmines and 320,000 pieces of other explosives, clearing 60,000 hectares of farm land and forests. ["China's Army Reports and mines Cleared in Guangxi, Yunnan," Xinhua, in FBIS CPP20000606000050, 6 June 2000.]
10/13/1999: Shen Guofang, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, spoke at the UN about China's strong support for international demining efforts. Shen stated:
"China is of the view that, in addition to improving international laws and imposing strict restrictions on the use and transfer of landmines, the most pressing task before us now is to assist mine affected countries to clear abandoned mines that are threatening the life of the civilians. With this in view, China has contributed funds, earmarked for demining activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Actions. In addition, the first demining training workshop co-sponsored by UN and China has just been held in China' s Nanjing with trainees from Cambodia, Namibia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and other mine-affected countries. These trainees will, upon completion of their training, be able to contribute to the cleaning-up of their land and the livelihood of their fellow countrymen." [Full Speech Text]
Shen Guofang also reiterated China's strong support for efforts to control small arms proliferation:
"The small arms has become an issue increasingly concerned by the international community. China, likewise, has also attached importance to it. The small arms is a problem involving factors across a wide spectrum from disarmament, security to social and economic development, thus calling for a comprehensive and integrated approach through concerted efforts by the international community and effective measures at international, regional and sub-regional levels in accordance with specific situations of different countries and regions. Such measures could include, for instance, the prohibition of illegal manufacturing and transfer of small arms, the strengthening of control over the legal manufacturing and transfer and the collection of weapons in post-conflict regions. Last July, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms concluded its report with many useful suggestions. China, as a member on the Group, has actively participated in the discussion. We believe that the report will provide useful ideas for the international community to handle the problem of small arms in the future." [Full Speech Text]
02/11/1999: In a speech given at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Li Changhe, outlined the extent of China's support for mine clearing activities. He said:
- "The Chinese Government also attaches great importance to mine clearance and
has supported and actively participated in international demining
activities. China has contributed to the international fund for mine
clearance and assisted relevant countries and international
organizations by providing training as well as relevant technologies and
equipment. The Chinese Delegation agrees to appointing a special
coordinator on the issue of anti-personnel landmines to build upon the work
of last year. [Speech given by
Li Changhe, China's Ambassador Disarmament Affairs, to the Plenary Meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament, 11 February 1999]
11/04/1998: China ratified agreements to the 1983 Inhumane Weapons Convention restricting the use of landmines and banning the use of blinding laser weapons. PRC UN representative Qin Hua Sun said that China "stands for proper and appropriate control over the use of landmines" but added that "it is of the view [of China] that the control of landmines should not in any way undermine the legitimate right of self-defense and security of countries." ["China Ratifies Accords on Landmines, Laser Weapons," Reuters, 4 November 1998.]
08/1998: For the first time since the creation of the UN Register on Conventional Arms, China failed to submit to the UN its voluntary declaration of arms imports and exports for 1997. China likely took this move to protest the US's inclusion of its exports to Taiwan in its declaration to the UNROCA. It protested the US listing its arms exports to Taiwan in its 1996 submission to the UN.
07/27/1998: China devoted an entire subsection of its July 1998 defense white paper, China's National Defense, to the government's position on anti-personnel landmines. The document stated:
- "China has all along attached great importance to the problem of threat to
innocent people caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines
(APLs). It is in favor of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the
use and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of
comprehensive prohibition of such landmines through a phased approach. In
the meantime, the Chinese government maintains that, in addressing the
problem of APLs, consideration should be given to both humanitarian concern
and the legitimate defense requirements of sovereign states. To safeguard
the safety of their people by sovereign states through legitimate military
means, including the use of APLs in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations itself is part and parcel of
humanitarianism.
As a country with long land borders, China has to reserve the right to use APLs on its territory pending an alternative solution is found and its requirements in security and defense capability are catered for. China's use of APLs under legitimate circumstances is entirely aimed at preventing foreign military interference and aggression so as to maintain national unity and territorial integrity and safeguard its people's well-being. This not only represents China's legitimate national security and defense requirements, but also accords with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the right to self-defense.
The PLA has always exercised strict control over the use of APLs and prohibited the indiscriminate use and laying of such landmines while actively studying the possible alternatives to APLs. China has also actively participated in the revision of the Landmine Protocol (Protocol II) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the discussions on the question of APLs at the UN Conference on Disarmament.
The Chinese government has all along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward landmine export. In December 1994, China joined in the UN General Assembly's consultation on its resolution concerning the moratorium on the export of APLs. In April 1996, the Chinese government solemnly declared its suspension of export of APLs that are not compatible with those APLs provided for in the Amended Landmine Protocol to the CCW.
- The Chinese government is of the view that the clearance of APLs is part and
parcel of the overall efforts in eliminating the threat to innocent
civilians resulting from the indiscriminate use of such landmines. It has
consistently adopted a responsible attitude toward post-war demining
question and has done considerable fruitful work in this regard. From the
beginning of 1992 to the end of 1994, the PLA conducted its first
large-scale demining operation in the border areas of Yunnan Province and
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, cleared a total of over one million
landmines and explosive devices and destroyed nearly 200 tons of disused or
de-activated ammunitions and explosive devices, covering an area of 108
square kilometers with over 170 border trade passes and ports re-opened, and
over 30,000 hectares of farmland, pasture and mountain forests restored. At
the end of 1997, the Chinese government decided to conduct its second
large-scale demining operation in the above areas starting from November
1997 up to December 1999.
The Chinese government has always done its utmost to assist APL-affected countries. It furnished Cambodia and some other mine-affected countries with mine-detection/clearance equipment, and also helped train demining personnel for these countries, thus contributing to their smooth post-war rehabilitation. In November 1997, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that China would continue to actively support international demining efforts and cooperation, including donation and provision of assistance in the fields of demining training, technology and equipment through the relevant international demining funds. The Chinese government also sent observers to participate in the Signing Ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and the international demining roundtable (Mine Action Forum) held from 2 to 4 December 1997 in Ottawa." [See China's National Defense]
China, in its defense white paper, also reiterated its stand on the export of conventional military equipment and it provided data on its conventional military exports since 1992, stating:
- "China practices strict control of the
transfer of conventional military equipment and related technologies, and
observes the following principles: The export of weapons must help the
recipient nation enhance its capability for legitimate self-defense; it must
not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region and the
world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient
state's internal affairs. Since 1992 China has participated in the United
Nations' register of conventional arms transfers (Tables 5 and 6)."
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| Naval vessels |
|
|
|
|
|
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| Missiles and launchers |
|
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Table 6 Data of China's
Participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Transfers in
1992-1996 (Imports)
| Item |
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| Combat tanks |
|
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|
|
|
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| Armored cars |
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Attack helicopters |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Naval vessels |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Missiles and launchers |
|
|
|
|
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|
06/27/1998: During the summit meeting in Beijing, China and the U.S. issued a Joint Statement on anti-personnel landmines which reaffirmed the two countries' commitment to end the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines.
03/13/1998: In his first speech to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the new Chinese Disarmament Ambassador, Mr. Li Changhe, stated:
- "Land-mines remain an indispensable defensive weapon for many countries.
China cannot but reserve its legitimate right to use anti-personnel
landmines on its own territories to establish defensive capabilities before
alternative means can be found. China understands and respects the sovereign
choice of those countries which have signed the Ottawa Convention on the
Prohibition of Landmines. However, it is neither realistic nor
possible to compel the non-signatoires of the Ottawa Convention to accept it
here in the CD."
["China Rejects Proposal Banning Land-Mine Exports," Inside
China Today, 12 March 1998.]
10/14/1997: In a speech to the UN First Committee, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador stated:
- "China has taken a constructive and realistic attitude in the negotiation
and conclusion of the amendment to the Landmines Protocol, and is positively
considering ratifying the Protocol at an early date. In April last year,
China undertook to implement a moratorium on its export of APLs which are
not in conformity with the technical criteria contained in the amended
protocol before its entry into force. China has also done a lot of work in
mine-clearance and providing demining assistance to other developing
countries."
"The Chinese Delegation holds that APL is a weapon of pure defensive nature, and that the humanitarian concern caused by it is exclusively due to two reasons: the shortcomings of old-type APLs and their indiscriminate use; and inadequate post-conflict demining efforts. The elimination of civilian casualties should be our sole objective. The fundamental way to achieve that objective should be to clear the old-type APLs left over from the past, while overcoming their shortcomings to ban the further use of such types of APLs."
"China is in favor of imposing strict and feasible restrictions on APLs and their use, with a view to achieving the objective of an ultimate ban in a step-by-step manner. In order to meet its legitimate defense requirements, China can not but reserve its legitimate right to use APLs on its own territories before alternative means are found and defensive capabilities established. China can only accept an international APLs agreement that fully accommodates its above-mentioned security concerns. China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace. It has never engaged in overseas aggression, nor does it have any intention to use landmines in other countries. Should China use APLs under legitimate circumstances, it would be entirely for the purpose of defending against foreign military intervention and aggression, safeguarding its national unification and territorial integrity and ensuring a peaceful life for its own people."
"We noticed that some countries have concluded a convention on total ban of APLs in Oslo recently. China respects their sovereign choice and understands their humanitarian concern. Meanwhile, China maintains that in addressing the APLs issue, both aspects of humanitarian concerns and legitimate security requirements of the countries concerned have to be taken into account. In the final analysis, security itself is an important aspect of humanitarian concerns." [Statement by H.E. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 October 1997.]
08/11/1997: In its voluntary declaration to the UN Register on Conventional Weapons, China included a "note verbale" that protested the US inclusion of its exports to Taiwan in the US submission to the Register. The note verbale stated:
"The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations takes note with regret that the United States has included its arms transfers to Taiwan, a province of the People's Republic of China, in the footnote of its annual reports provided to the Register for the calendar year 1995 and 1996 and reaffirms China's position on the issue as follows. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is the register of legitimate transfers of certain categories of conventional arms between sovereign states. Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China, not a sovereign state. The arms transfers from the United States to Taiwan are neither legitimate nor transfers between sovereign states. The People's Republic of China does not accept any reference in whatever form to the arms transfers to Taiwan in the Register.The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations hopes that the Secretary General of the United Nations will take appropriate steps to delete the above-mentioned reference from his Report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to make sure that no reference whatsoever to the arms transfers to Taiwan appear in future Reports on the Register, in order to safeguard the authority of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the seriousness of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms."
06/27/1997: In remarks to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), China stated:
06/26/1997: Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated to the Conference on Disarmament (CD):
12/09/1996: During talks between U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian, Perry said that "even legal arms sales to Iran threaten U.S. interests, but could also threaten China's because of China's increased dependence on oil from the Gulf...It could backfire on China" if there is conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Chi said that he "would consider this point," and that China "would always refrain from doing things that are detrimental to peace and stability." [Warren P. Strobel and Bill Gertz, "Chinese General Hits Arms Reports," Washington Times, 10 December 1996; "Perry Tells Chinese That Sales Of Arms To Iran Could Backfire," Associated Press, 10 December 1996; "Chi Says Chinese Arms Proliferation 'Exaggerated,'" Reuters, 9 December 1996; in Executive News Service, 9 December 1996.]
11/12/1996: Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated at the United Nations First Committee (UNFC) that China is opposed to a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. Sha stated, however, that China would support appropriate, practical restrictions on APLs and humanitarian efforts to help the civilian victims of the mines. Sha stated that the issue of landmines should be addressed with a balanced approach, keeping in mind both humanitarian concerns and self-defense requirements. Sha stated: "The legitimate means of self-defense for many countries gave them the right, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to use landmines for their security...To protect against interference or encroachment upon the sovereignty of a country, including those countries that have less developed military technologies, landmines are still a legitimate means of military defense." Sha argued that a comprehensive ban on APLs was a violation of the internationally-recognized principle that arms control measures should not lessen a country's security.
Sha stated China's support for a newly amended landmines protocol of the IWC, saying that the international community should gain universality and observance of the protocol. ["China Opposes Total Landmine Ban," China Daily, 16 November 1996.]
1996: At the 1996 Review Conference, the CCW parties added a new revised landmine protocol which places new restrictions on the use, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The new protocol requires parties to convert the mines they produce to incorporate self-destruct and self-deactivation features within nine years. These restrictions apply to mines used outside of marked and monitored areas or those which are remotely-delivered. Producing countries must also include materials or devices in all anti-personnel landmines manufactured after 1 January 1997 which make them more detectable. A global ban on anti-personnel mines was not pursued during the Conference due to the strong opposition by many countries, including China, to such a ban.
11/1995: In its white paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated, with regard to its arms exports:
"For many years until the early 1980s, China did not engage in weapons export trade, and since then the volume of such exports has been very limited. In accordance with a resolution by the UN General Assembly, China participates in the United Nations register of conventional arms transfers, which clearly shows that China's exports of conventional weapons constitute only a very small portion as compared with the United States, Russia, Britain, France or Germany."
"China consistently adheres to a series of principles on conventional weapons transfers. The export of such weapons should help the recipient nation increase its appropriate defence capacity. The transfer must not impair peace, safety or stability regionally or globally. China does not use trade in weaponry to interfere in sovereign states' internal affairs."
"China exercises a strict control over the transfer of military equipment and related technologies and has established an appropriate administrative organization and operating mechanism to this end. The State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under the guidance of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, is responsible for the centralized control of transfers of military equipment and related technologies. Its main function is drafting laws and policies governing such transfers. It is mainly comprised of leading personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Headquarters of the General Staff, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, MOFTEC and other relevant departments. As the administrative arm of the SACMPT, the State Bureau of Military Products Trade is responsible for handling day-to-day affairs."
"Government departments and companies engaged in transfers of military equipment and technologies must be authorized, registered and approved by the government. Their activities must remain strictly within the business scope approved. Contracts for transfers of military equipment and technologies require approval before going into effect. Major transfer items and contracts must be examined by the SACMPT and approved by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Stern legal sanctions shall be taken against any company or individual who transfers military equipment and technologies without proper government examination and approval."
"The principles and measures to prevent the proliferation of weaponry and unwarranted transfers of military equipment that China has consistently upheld have helped safeguard world peace and regional stability and promote the healthy development of international arms control and disarmament." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]
09/1992: China suspended its participation in the arms control in the Middle East (ACME) Permanent-5 talks after the 2 September 1992 US decision to transfer 150 F-16 A/B combat aircraft to Taiwan. China has argued that the sale violates the 17 August 1982 US-China Joint Communiqué. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 February 1996, p. 14; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 10; Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy And Regulations," Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 5.]
09/10/1992: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin stated that "China always adopts a prudent and responsible attitude toward its arms exports."
06/05/1992: China opposed the addition of missiles to the Permanent-5 limits on arms sales. The greatest complication in the discussions was China's assertion that missiles should not be included as "weapons of mass destruction" unless other systems such as aircraft and certain ships were as well. An anonymous Chinese embassy official stated: "We feel that if you include missiles in this category, some conventional weapons that are even bigger in their scale of destruction should be included too." ["Missile Definition Clouds Defense Trade Talks," Defense News, 8 June 1992, p. 33.]
06/03/1992: The US State Department's Center for Defense Trade director Charles Duelfer said: "I think we made a good start on weapons of mass destruction." The US, Russian, and French delegations to the Permanent-5 talks exchanged information on their countries' 1991 weapons deliveries; China and Britain declined because they felt this would violate bilateral sale agreements. The United States was pushing for prior notification on weapons sales by all five of the nations. ["Missile Definition Clouds Defense Trade Talks," Defense News, 8 June 1992, p. 33.]
05/28/1992-05/29/1992: Representatives of the five major arms exporting countries--the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia--met in Washington, DC to discuss plans to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They reached an interim agreement restricting exports of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related technologies. Each country agreed not to assist in the acquisition and development of such weapons, and to exercise restraint in sales related to those weapons systems. However, no agreement was reached on a more ambitious proposal to exchange information on exports of conventional weapons to countries in the Middle East prior to their delivery. The proposal was stalled, not only on the principle of prior notification, but also on the issue of which countries are to be covered by the information exchange. ["Missile Definition Clouds Defense Trade Talks," Defense News, 8 June 1992, p. 33.]
10/17/1991-10/18/1991: At the 17-18 October 1991 Permanent-5 meeting in London, the five powers agreed to common guidelines, with global applications, for the export of conventional weapons.
07/1991: In spite of arms trade control statements made by British Prime Minister John Major on 24 April 1991, US President Bush on 29 May 1991, and France's Francois Mitterrand on 6 June 1991, the Paris meeting of July 1991 between the five major arms suppliers (United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, and China) made little progress towards establishing joint guidelines for nuclear weapons and missile exports. Some progress was made and further talks were planned in London on October 1991. ["'Big 5' Exporters Fail To Gain Solid Results," Defense News, 15 July 1991, p. 4.]
05/30/1991: US President George Bush called for a halt to missile sales and production in the Middle East stating, "Nowhere are the dangers of proliferation more urgent than in the Middle East." Several nations reacted to President Bush's proposal to limit ballistic missiles and non-conventional weapons in the Middle East. The Soviet Union and China remained noncommittal, with China defending its own weapons export policy. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the Bush initiative "serious, responsible and prudent" while Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh said that the plan deserves serious study. ["Iran Now Top Threat In Region," Washington Times, 30 May 1991, pp. A1, A11; "Mideast Arms Plan Draws Questions," Washington Post, 31 May 1991, p. A26.]
05/29/1991: President Bush proposed an initiative among the five leading arms-exporting countries to the Middle East region (China, France, UK, US, and USSR/Russia) to seek effective guidelines for restraint in supplying the countries of the region with conventional weapons.
03/1991: US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon requested that China participate in creating international controls for exporting missile technology to the Middle East. Solomon stated that for China, "sales abroad help to subsidize the domestic arms industry...but were in a phase where we can't allow that dynamic to drive international arms sales." China has complained that "it is being singled out while other countries continue to sell weapons to the third world." Defending Chinese policy, a senior fellow at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Wu Zhan, stated that "arms exports were necessary to raise hard currency to finance China's conversion from military to civilian production." ["China Markets Missile To Middle East Buyers," Defense News, 8 April 1991, pp. 1, 29.]
04/07/1982: China ratified the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC).
09/14/1981: China signed the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) with the following statement:
"2. The Government of the People's Republic of China deems that the basic spirit of the Convention reflects the reasonable demand and good intention of numerous countries and peoples of the world regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which are excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects. The basic spirit conforms to China's consistent position and serves the interest of opposing aggression and maintaining peace."
"3. However, it should be pointed out that the Convention fails to provide for supervision or verification of any violation of its clauses, thus weakening its binding force. The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices fails to lay down strict restrictions on the use of such weapons by the aggressor on the territory of his victim and to provide adequately for the right of a State victim of an aggression to defend itself by all necessary means. The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons does not stipulate restrictions on the use of such weapons against combat personnel. Furthermore, the Chinese texts of the Convention and Protocols are not accurate or satisfactory enough. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that these inadequacies can be remedied in due course."
1980: China's Ministry of Ordnance (the then-Fifth Ministry of Machine-Building Industry) was authorized to conduct arms exports with the signing of Ratification Circular No. 55 by the CMC and the State Council. NORINCO was authorized to oversee the sales. [Yan Kong, "China's Arms Trade Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 80.]
[CHINA AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION]
[CHINA AND THE ACME/P-5 TALKS]
[CHINA AND THE INHUMANE WEAPONS CONVENTION (IWC)]
[CHINA AND AN ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINE (APL) BAN]
[CHINA AND THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS (UNROCA)]
[CHINA AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT]
[WHITE PAPER - CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE]
Updated 01/31/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
