Comprehensive Test Ban Organization (CTBT)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Summary:

Members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) agree not to conduct nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions. The treaty would therefore halt the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and constrain the qualitative improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons.

The treaty's verification regime includes international monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections (OSI); and confidence building measures (CBMs). The use of national technical means (NTM) of verification is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The CTBT also provides for enforcement, including sanctions, and for dispute resolution mechanisms. If the Executive Council determines that a case is particularly serious, it can bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations. The CTBT is of unlimited duration. Each member has the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty's subject matter have jeopardized supreme national interests.

The CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996, and adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 1996. The CTBT has not entered into force, although all the five declared nuclear powers are currently observing testing moratoria. In order to bridge the period until the Treaty's entry into force, on 19 November 1996 the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) was established.

[TEXT OF CTBT (ENGLISH)]

[LINK TO CTBTO PREPCOM WEBSITE]

For additional information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the CTBT:

China signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 (the second country to do so after the United States), but has not yet ratified it. China's last nuclear test (its 45th) was conducted on 29 July 1996. After the test, China adhered to the voluntary international moratorium on testing. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, China's joining of the CTBT is the "first instance where [China] sacrificed potential military capabilities for the sake of formal multilateral arms control." [Alastair Iain Johnson, "Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal, January 1996, p. 54.]

Background

As early as 1986, China stated in international forums that it would participate in the work of an ad hoc group on a CTBT, if one were to be created. Yet, in 1990 China abstained from a UN resolution calling for the conclusion of a CTBT. At that time, China's generic position was that it would support a CTBT only in the context of a move toward complete nuclear disarmament and only in exchange for a no-first-use pledge from the other nuclear powers. It was not until 1993 that Beijing dropped these linkages and announced support for for the creation of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for the negotiation of a CTBT. In October 1993, China stated its commitment to the successful completion of a CTBT "no later than 1996."

During negotiations, China voiced two principal concerns. First, China consistently pushed for an exemption allowing peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) under the final treaty. Chinese officials argued that China and other developing nations should not be forced to foreclose the possibility of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that may have economic benefits. On 6 June 1996, China finally dropped its insistence on including PNEs, but stated its intention to revisit the issue at a review conference ten years after the CTBT enters into force.

Second, China objected to the use of national technical means (NTM) such as satellite reconnaissance for CTBT verification. China's opposition to the use of NTM was based on two concerns: (1) the US and Russian dominance in satellites because so few other countries possessed equivalent reconnaissance capabilities, (2) the potential for abuse given the vast differences in capabilities between the US and China. In addition, Chinese negotiators raised concerns about the use of on-site inspections for treaty verification. Chinese officials argued that allowing on-site inspections on the basis of human intelligence would amount to "legitimizing espionage" which "infringes on China's national sovereignty." However, China finally agreed to allow on-site inspections as part of the CTBT. US and Chinese officials then differed over the triggers for such on-site inspections. The US wanted a "red light" procedure whereas China wanted a "green light" procedure. The US and China finally agreed to a "green light" procedure requiring 30 votes. Although China eventually signed the CTBT that contained provisions for on-site inspections, it also submitted a declaration along with its signature which stressed China's opposition to "the abuse of verification rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human intelligence to infringe on the sovereignty of China."

Following China's signature of the treaty in 1996, its has repeatedly endorsed the treaty in public statements. During the the October 1997 US-China summit, the two countries issued a joint statement noting that: "The United States and China agree to work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force at the earliest possible date." [Joint US-China Statement, 29 October 1997.] China's President Jiang Zemin gave an important endorsement of the treaty in a March 1999 speech before the CD in Geneva. He reiterated China's support for the CTBT and pledged ratification:

"Efforts should be made for early entry into force of the CTBT according to the CTBT provisions. The recent nuclear tests have made the early entry into force of the treaty a more pressing task. As one of the first countries to have signed the treaty, China will continue to work for the early entry into force of the treaty. The Chinese Government will soon officially submit the treaty to the National People's Congress for ratification." [Jiang Zemin Address at the Conference on Disarmament, "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security." 26 March 1999.]

Recent Developments

Chinese officials have already begun the ratification process. The Foreign Ministry forwarded the CTBT to the State Council for review and on 1 March 2000 announced that it had forwarded the CTBT to the National People's Congress (NPC) for hearings and ratification. When the CTBT would be sent to the NPC had been an open question. Opposition in China to the CTBT has grown in the last few years. Many Chinese officials and military officers fear that China's security environment has worsened. They view the nuclear tests in South Asia, recent changes to the US-Japan defense guidelines, US missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan, and US actions in Kosovo as signs that security threats to China are growing, not declining. However, the fact that the Chinese government has forwarded the CTBT to the NPC suggests that these concerns have been overcome. Still, CTBT hearings will likely be contentious and ratification is not assured. ["China Submits N-Test Ban Treaty To Parliament," Reuters, 1 March 2000.]

However, China's future ratification of the CTBT has been complicated by the US Senate's rejection and the Russian Duma's ratification of the treaty. China now risks attracting attention to itself as the only nuclear weapon state, besides the US, to have not ratified the CTBT. In response to the US Senate's vote not to ratify the CTBT, China's Foreign Ministry stated, "The USA is a big nuclear country that has made the most nuclear tests. America's ratification of the agreement will have a great influence on the future of the agreement. (China) hopes the US will respond to the call of the last declaration set by the conference of the first group of countries who ratified this agreement and finish the ratification procedures as soon as possible." Furthermore, "there is no change at all in China's stand on this treaty." China has also stated that it welcomes the "approval of the CTBT by the Russian Duma" and that the NPC "will speed the process of approving the treaty." Yet, with both announcements China did not set a timetable for ratification. ["China Calls on U.S. to Finish Ratification Process," AFP, 14 October 1999; Spokesman Expresses 'Deep Regret' on US CTBT Rejection," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 14 October 1999 in FBIS-China FTS19991014000860; China to Speed Approval of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Reuters, 26 April 2000.]

In a November, 2001 speech at the UN, Ambassador Shen Guofang maintained that the CTBT is essential to countering vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation, while expressing pessimism about prospects for the CTBT entering into force. He asserted that China would "honor her commitment to pursue a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and continue to actively support and participate in the preparation work for the CTBTO."[Ambassador Shen Guofang, at the 2nd Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 12 Nov 2001.]

On November 14, 2002, at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Liu Jieyi, of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responding to the question of whether China was waiting for other states to ratify the CTBT before taking action itself, repeated the government's official view that the National People's Congress will independently consider and decide on the ratification of the treaty. [Remarks by Liu Jieyi, Director-General of the PRC Foreign Ministry's Dept. of Arms Control and Disarmament, at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, 14 November 2002. Federal News Service, Inc.]

More recently, although China has yet to ratify the CTBT, it has stated its continued support for the treaty as part of broader efforts to combat nuclear proliferation. Ambassador Sha Zukang reaffirmed this attitude in a speech in December, 2002, in which he stated, "In a nutshell, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons lies in the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Prior to this end, all countries should strictly comply with existing nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation treaty obligations, and negotiate and conclude new treaties..."[Ambassador Sha Zukang, "Reinforcing Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation: China's Perspective", Speech at the Wilton Park Conference, 17 Dec 2002.]

Key Statements and Documents Related to China and the CTBT:

For more on China's nuclear testing program, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM]

[CHRONOLOGY OF TESTING-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION AND TESTING](See especially [CHINA'S NUCLEAR WARHEAD MODERNIZATION])

[CHINA AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNEs)

Other international nuclear testing agreements:

[CHINA AND THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY (PTBT)]

[CHINA AND THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)]

[CHINA AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET)]

Updated 02/21/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.