Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Formal Title: CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING, AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Summary:

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons. It also prohibits the use or preparation for use of chemical weapons (CW) and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of anyone else to engage in activities prohibited by the CWC. The CWC specifically allows member states to maintain chemical weapons defensive programs and does not constrain non-CW military responses to a chemical weapons attack.

In addition, each member to the CWC must destroy the chemical weapons it possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction; destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another member state; and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it possesses or that are located in any place under its control.

The CWC penalizes countries that do not join, through rules that inhibit the access of non-participating states to certain treaty-controlled chemicals. Additionally, a State Party to the Convention cannot restrict or impede the chemical trade between other States Parties.

Signed by 130 countries in Paris on January 13, 1993, the CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days after the 65^th ratification. As of March 2003, 152 countries are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Countries of note who have not signed the CWC are Egypt, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and Syria. [States Parties to the CWC, OPCW Home Page]

For additional in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/index.htm.

China and the CWC:

China's Participation and Compliance

China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993. In December 1996, the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress approved ratification of the CWC, and deposited its instrument of ratification to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 25 April 1997. (The delay between NPC ratification and deposit to the UN was due to the uncertainty regarding US ratification.) China was a founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and remains a member of the OPCW's Executive Council, which directs the CWC's verification regime and has access to the confidential information on the world's chemical weapons stockpiles. [Xinhua (Beijing), 30 December 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-251, 30 December 1996; "Chemical Arms Pact Takes Effect, With China Joining In," International Herald Tribune, 29 April 1997, p. 4.]

Chinese delegates attended the First Review Conference of the CWC, which was held in The Hague from 28 April to 9 May 2003. Ambassador Zhu Zushou, Permanent Representative to the OPCW and head of the Chinese delegation, gave a statement presenting China's position on the CWC. China also released a Report on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in China, detailing the progress it has made in conforming to CWC regulations, while urging Japan to step up its efforts to unearth and destroy abandoned chemical weapons left on Chinese soil.

China's official policy favors the prohibition and complete destruction of all chemical weapons. It has repeatedly stated that it does not possess chemical weapons, and does not transfer CWC controlled chemicals or equipment non-CWC States Parties.. The July 1998 White Paper on National Defense stated China's position as:

"China has been active and conscientious in fulfilling the obligations stipulated in the CWC. It delivered the initial declaration and annual declaration in time and in their entirety and has accepted inspections by the convention. It has also participated in every one of the convention's executive council meetings and the two conferences of states parties."

The 2000 White Paper on China's National Defense reiterated the policies and added:

"It is the view of the Chinese government that the implementation of the (CWC) has been, on the whole, satisfactory, since it entered into force three years ago. However, there are problems which should not be ignored: The universality of the Convention leaves a lot to be desired; a certain State Party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of the Convention in the form of domestic legislation; and some State Parties have been very slow destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. These problems should be put right as soon as possible."

As part of its CWC obligations, China reportedly declared small-scale chemical agent production facilities for offensive purposes, which have since been destroyed. China also declared that it maintains a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in conflict with the CWC. It is not known publicly whether China declared a chemical weapons stockpile. Since entry into force, China has had over 30 on-site inspections by OPCW personnel to verify submitted declarations. ["China Earnest in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention," People's Daily, 17 January 2001]

At the end of World War II, the Japanese army abandoned a large amount chemical weapons on Chinese territory. China estimates the number of shells to be disposed of at 2 million, while Japan estimates the number to be about 700,000. Under the CWC, Japan is responsible for the proper destruction of these abandoned munitions, and both China and Japan were tasked with negotiating the arrangements for destruction. After many years of negotiation, the two government signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a "basic framework of the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)." According to CWC guidelines, the clean-up should be completed by 2007 (ten years after the convention's entry into force.) However, Japan feels this date is unrealistic given the scale of the operation and they are expected to seek a five-year extension, which, according to the CWC, can be granted with China's consent. ["Japan, China agreed on Abandoned Chemical Weapons, not setting deadline", Asahi Shimbun , 7 May 1999]

In its 2002 White Paper on National Defense, China expressed its dissatisfaction with the pace of Japanese efforts to recover and destroy ACWs:

"Today, large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese invaders still remain on Chinese soil. China urges Japan to earnestly implement the obligations under the CWC for the destruction of these weapons, and expedite the pace of the relevant work in accordance with the Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China between the governments of China and Japan, so as to commence as soon as possible the substantive part of the destruction process."

US Concerns About An Active CW Program

Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing a chemical weapon program, in violation of its CWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have never led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)

In its January 2001 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:

"Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. ... While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents. … Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program."

Chinese Export Control Issues

Prior to the release of new regulations in 2002, China's chemical export controls had consisted of four main components: (1) December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (with a Schedule of Chemicals based on the regulations and three schedules of chemicals contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)); (2) March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC; (3) August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls; and (4) June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of which China is not a member. However, the October 2002 Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies (with an accompanying Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and technologies Export Control List) enhanced existing regulations with extensive licensing and registration procedures for the export of certain chemicals and related equipment and technologies.

Over the last decade, there have been allegations, mainly by the United States, that China has transferred chemical weapon equipment, materials and technology to countries of proliferation concern, including Libya and Iran. One of the most significant incidents involving Chinese chemical transfers occurred in 1993 when the US forced the inspection of a Chinese ship called the Yinhe (Galaxy) after US intelligence agencies assessed that chemical precursors were loaded aboard the vessel. However, the final inspection of the ship at a port in Abu Dhabi determined that no chemical precursors were aboard. The items are believed never to have made it on board the vessel.

China's chemical industry is large and diffuse, and seen as one of the core industries involved China's overall economic development. This, combined with the fact that export control laws have only come into force in the last few years, has made domestic enforcement of these laws difficult, resulting in inconsistent implementation. In Proliferation: Threat and Response (January 2001), DOD claimed that:

"China's chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results."

The Chinese government has consistently insisted that it has never violated the CWC, and points out that that the convention explicitly allows for normal trade and cooperation between State Parties (of which Iran is one) in the chemical industrial field.

On January 16, 2002, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. According to statements by US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, these materials are "controlled under (...) the Australia Group." Yet, while the US is a member of the Australia Group and follows these guidelines, both China and Iran are not. The sanctions, placed upon the Liyang Chemical Equipment company, China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company and an individual broker/agent named as Q.C. Chen will have a duration of two years, during which time these Chinese firms will be prohibited from engaging in US government contracts as well as purchasing US defense items. In response to the sanctions, China reiterated its opposition to chemical weapon development stating that "China is opposed to any country developing chemical weapons, and furthermore does not help any country develop chemical weapons." Furthermore, "The US decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled." [Sources: "US Slaps Sanctions On Chinese Companies For Restricted Export," Washington (AFP), 24 January, 2002; "China Demands Removal of US Sanctions Over Weapons Trade with Iran," Agence France Presse, 26 January 2002]

On October 19, 2002, China released its Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies and Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, with the stated intention of further strengthening control over the export of dual-use chemicals and their related equipment and technologies. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) spokeswoman Gao Yan stated:

"As an important component of China's export control legal system, the measures are significant to implementing the country's nonproliferation policy, to fulfilling its international obligations, to safeguarding its national security as well as social and public interests, to standardizing its export control of sensitive items, and to maintaining the normal order of foreign trade." ["PRC FM Spokeswoman on Measures on Export Controls of Chemicals," Beijing Xinhua in English, 19 October, 2002, CPP20021019000058.]

Key statements/documents related to China and the CWC:

For more on CW nonproliferation, see:

[CHRONOLOGY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA AND CBW NONPROLIFERATION]

[CHINA'S CBW-RELATED EXPORTS TO IRAN]

[ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CHINA]

[CHINA'S CHEMICAL EXPORT CONTROLS]

Other international agreements related to CW nonproliferation:

[CHINA AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL]

[CHINA AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)]

Updated 6/6/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.