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Summary:
A detargeting agreement is a confidence building measure by a nuclear-weapon state in which it agrees not to target its strategic nuclear missiles another country. To date, a number of detargeting agreements have been signed. In 1994, Russia and the United States reached a bilateral detargeting agreement, as did the UK and Russia. In 1994, China and Russia also concluded a detargeting agreement. China signed a non-targeting agreement with the United States in 1998.
China and Detargeting Agreements:
China signed an agreement on no-first-use and detargeting of nuclear weapons with Russia on 3 September 1994. The United States and Russia signed an agreement on strictly detargeting. For years, China rejected proposals by the United States for an agreement on detargeting, stating that it wants detargeting as part of an agreement on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons with Washington. On this issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated:
- "China hopes to reach an agreement with the United States on the mutual
non-use of military force, especially first-strike use of nuclear weapons.
China also hopes that the two sides can at the same time reach an agreement
on not targeting each other with strategic nuclear weapons. Only by doing so
can the two countries contribute to their own security and to the stability
of the entire world." ["Foreign Ministry News Briefs,"
Beijing Review, 16-22 December 1996, p. 6.]
Chinese officials finally agreed to drop this linkage and during the Sino-US summit in 1998, both sides reached a non-targeting accord.
For more on China and detargeting agreements, see:
[SINO-RUSSIAN DETARGETING AGREEMENT]
[US-CHINA NON-TARGETING AGREEMENT]
[CHRONOLOGY OF DECLARATORY POLICY-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
For other aspects of China's nuclear declaratory policy, see:
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY] (Including [CHINA AND NO-FIRST-USE (NFU)] and [CHINA AND SECURITY ASSURANCES])
[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR DETERRENCE]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
