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The Challenge of China - Lisa Bronson Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, United States - China Commission U.S. Export Control Policy Toward China Prepared Statement
17 January 2002
Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I am honored to join you today with
colleagues from the Departments of Commerce and State to discuss United States
export controls and China.
The President has said that we seek a candid, constructive, and cooperative
relationship with China. China is a partner on some issues and a competitor on
others. American interests could be served by a China that is developing
economically and politically. Still, we do not ignore the fact that China has
embarked on an ambitious program of military modernization, including nuclear
modernization. This modernization, combined with China's poor record on
proliferation leaves us with many questions about the future direction of
China's foreign and security policies.
One of the challenges China presents is its current and growing inventory of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and associated delivery systems. A
review of DoD's recent publication "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (January
2001) is instructive. China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads and is
increasing the size, accuracy and survivability of its nuclear missile force.
Given some 20 CSS-4 ICBMs of over a 13,000 km range, China is already one of the
few countries that can threaten the continental United States. We expect China
will continue to modernize its strategic missile force over the next generation,
improving the survivability, reliability and accuracy of this force.
China continues to maintain elements of an offensive biological warfare program.
Technology for production and weaponization of biological agents developed prior
to Beijing's accession to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 is
believed to provide the basis for current capabilities. In addition, China is
believed to have made incomplete and inaccurate declarations under BWC
protocols.
Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program, including
research and development, production and weaponization capabilities. Chinese
industry produces the necessary precursors for traditional agents, and its
forces have a variety of delivery options. In the past, Beijing has not
acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program despite its
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
A vital aspect of China's overall military modernization includes pursuit of a
viable indigenous space force. China is paying particular attention to the
development of small boosters able to launch satellites at a moment's notice in
a contingency.
Recognized experts observe that China's modernization program appears to be
focusing on "pockets of excellence," where advances in select technologies can
be leveraged for disproportionate benefit in a potential conflict. Several such
"pockets" include: preemptive long-range precision strike capabilities;
information dominance; command and control; and integrated air defense. In
support of these efforts, Beijing has identified the development of an
indigenous microelectronics industry as one of its highest priorities. A
cutting-edge domestic microelectronics sector will support both military and
commercial modernization in China. China's increasing emphasis on development of
very large-scale integrated circuits will have direct application in future
military systems, for example, advanced phased-array radars.
China continues to be one of [the] world's key sources for missile and
WMD-related technology, including to some terrorist sponsoring states. Chinese
firms have provided some important missile related items and assistance to
countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Additionally, Chinese entities have
provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and have supported some nuclear and chemical programs in rogue
states.
How Does Our Export Control System Deal With China?
The United States has a variety of tools to protect sensitive technologies from
inappropriate Chinese exploitation, as well as multilateral means to encourage
similar approaches among allies.
My colleagues from the Departments of Commerce and State address our dual-use
and munitions regulatory systems in detail in their prepared statements. I want
to reiterate that the number of Munitions List exports to China has been
extremely small over the past several years. In the dual-use area, the export
licensing system provides the U.S. government with a useful set of procedures
for controlling dual-use commodities that could be used for military purposes.
The dual-use control system under the Export Administration Regulations
addresses commodities falling within four areas of special military sensitivity:
national security, nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology and chemical and
biological weapons. The regulatory scheme assumes a policy of license denial for
these commodities if they make a "direct and significant," or "material"
contribution, depending on the area, to Chinese capabilities. Examples under the
"national security" area of sensitivity include electronic and anti-submarine
warfare, intelligence gathering, power projection and air superiority.
Another means of regulating the flow of technology to China is the Commerce
Department "Entity List." This list identifies foreign entities that are
believed to pose proliferation risks; there are currently 19 Chinese entities on
the list. Other tools include the various multilateral nonproliferation regimes:
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. A particularly important element of these regimes is a "no
undercut" policy, which remains to be adopted in a fourth multilateral regime,
the Wassenaar Arrangement.
DOD's Role in the Licensing Process
The Department of Defense is a full partner in the interagency export license
process, reviewing all sensitive munitions and dual-use license applications
referred by the Departments of State and Commerce. Moreover, we are actively
engaged in fashioning the conditions and provisos that address any national
security concerns posed by export licensing applications. DoD's export licensing
functions are executed by the nearly 200 military and career civilian personnel
of the Defense Technology Security Administration. This cadre includes a
tremendous depth of expertise in the "hard" sciences, engineering and
manufacturing techniques. These technology specialists support licensing
officers who review individual licenses referred to DoD under provisions of the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), administered by the Departments of Commerce and State,
respectively. We have a dedicated space launch monitoring division that is
tasked specifically with reviewing licenses and then developing and implementing
the technology safeguard programs for space launches of U.S.-made equipment on
foreign launch vehicles. In addition, the space launch division implements
technology safeguards for U.S. launches of U.S.-built satellites of certain
foreign ownership. Members of our space launch division combine both scientific
and licensing expertise to provide "cradle to grave" supervision of space launch
technology safeguard programs. There have been no waivers of "Tiananmen
sanctions" to permit any launch of U.S. equipment from China since 1998.
However, DTSA's space launch division is ready to resume monitoring immediately,
if a policy decision to issue such a waiver is made.
Whether in the space launch division, dual-use or munitions licensing, DTSA
personnel review each license application individually with input as necessary
from the military services, the Joint Staff, and, as necessary, any other DoD
component. It is a process that is time-consuming, with some 24,000 licenses
processed in calendar year 2001 (about 14,000 munitions licenses and 10,00
dual-use licenses). The DoD dual-use license review process also includes
reviews of the end-user to minimize the risk of diversion. DTSA realigned its
end-user reviews to create an assessment unit that provides more comprehensive
checks on end-users identified in all dual-use license applications. This unit
also assists reviews of munitions licenses. This unit is augmented by a cadre of
reserve intelligence specialists who provide regular support for the end-user
checks.
Despite the overall volume of licenses, I am pleased that there has been
consistent improvement in processing times for munitions -- down from an average
of 38 days in 1999 to approximately 20 days today. On the dual-use side of our
operation, processing timelines have declined from an average of 12 to 11 days
over the past two years, though the complexity of dual-use licenses has
increased significantly. I believe we have struck an appropriate balance between
taking the time to protect national security without unnecessarily delaying
action on industry's license applications.
Where Do We Go From Here?
China is both a problematic proliferator and the largest potential future market
for the U.S. It must be dealt with as part of the larger national security and
foreign policy agenda set by the President, who has said that "America's next
priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them." This poses a
significant policy challenge with respect to China.
The challenge of China is striking the balance between the desire to
successfully compete in a vast untapped commercial market and the need to
protect national security, including through effective nonproliferation. Our
policies and practices must strive to minimize transfers of technologies that
could contribute to potentially threatening modernization efforts. Our focus is
already on the areas Beijing has identified as its "pockets of excellence," but
we need to continually be vigilant in the licensing process for new areas where
our high technology might be exploited to our detriment. Our policies and
practices must ensure that U.S. companies can compete for legitimate commercial
sales on equal footing with their foreign competitors. We are ready and willing
to hear an exporter's case that a commodity is already widely available in the
international market. For if a commodity is widely available, and not amenable
to multilateral controls, then export controls may not be the best tool for
addressing a national security or proliferation concern.
Specific Steps
In August 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense reestablished the Defense
Technology Security Administration as an organization under the Under Secretary
for Policy. This move reunited the technology security, counterproliferation and
non-proliferation functions under a single under secretary. The Under Secretary
for Policy has directed a more integrated approach than has been taken in the
past. In this regard, my responsibilities include not merely export licensing
and technology security policy, but counterproliferation policy as well.
Counterproliferation refers to the range of military preparations and activities
to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems. It is distinguished from nonproliferation, which includes the range of
political, economic and diplomatic tools to prevent, constrain or reverse the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Thus,
my office is now responsible for preventing potential adversaries from
leveraging controllable, sensitive technologies, as well as policies for dealing
with adversaries who may have already obtained such technologies.
By putting both our technology security and counterproliferation offices under
one organic management structure, we hope to give DoD a more comprehensive
approach to the interagency export control process, and to the development of a
U.S. strategy for managing technology security and countering proliferation.
The realignment of technology security functions at DoD will pay dividends
across the board. But we are paying special attention to China and its
modernization and proliferation challenges in several areas:
We oversee the DoD contribution to the ongoing review and revision of the United
States Munitions List. This review is informed by our knowledge of China's key
modernization priorities.
In particular, our review of microelectronics dual-use licenses is colored by
our evolving understanding of what China wants.
DoD licensing officers work with Commerce to fashion license conditions designed
to deny critical dual-use manufacturing technology to Beijing but at the same
time allow U.S. industry to compete where end items are widely available from
foreign suppliers.
If and when a decision is made to resume space launch licensing for China,
DTSA's license review, technology security planning and monitoring
infrastructure is prepared to protect U.S. technology.
We are exploring ways to strengthen multilateral regimes such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
Conclusion
September 11 was a grim reminder that government needs to better integrate all
elements of national power - military, law enforcement, regulations, and
intelligence - into a successful national security strategy. Technology security
is one of those elements. It has implications for our troops deployed abroad as
well as for "homeland defense" within our borders.
The pursuit of a necessary balance between free markets and national security is
affected by many factors. Striking the right balance with respect to China is
especially difficult, and questions of Chinese intentions, capabilities, and
conduct weigh very heavily. In confronting the challenges posed by China, I
expect that the work of this Commission will offer us very important insights.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission and
look forward to our discussions.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
