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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003
November 23, 2004
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which states:"
(a) Reports
The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an annual report
on -
(1) The acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of
dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of
weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and
biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) Trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."
(b) Submittal dates
(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted
each year to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
leadership on an annual basis on the dates provided in section 415b of this
title.
(2) In this subsection:
(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given that
term in section 401a of this title.
(B) The term "congressional leadership" means the Speaker and the minority
leader of the House of Representative and the majority leader and the minority
leader of the Senate.
(c) Form of reports
Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex."
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms
Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the
Intelligence Community (IC). As directed by Section 721, subsection (c) of the
Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the
IC's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings
for the Congress.
Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations,
negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through
31 December 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD
and ACW programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition
activity of concern.
Iran
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also working to improve delivery
systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials,
training, equipment, and know-how. During the reporting period, Iran still
focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe.
Iran's nuclear program received significant assistance in the past from the
proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a
clandestine nuclear weapons program, in contradiction to its obligations as a
party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). During 2003, Iran continued
to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but
with clear weapons potential. International scrutiny and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran
from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as
long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT. However, Iran could use the same
technology at other, covert locations for military applications.
Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts
to establish domestically or otherwise acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
Iran claims that this fuel cycle would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power
reactors, such as the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor that Russia is
continuing to build at the southern port city of Bushehr. However, Iran does not
need to produce its own fuel for this reactor because Russia has pledged to
provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and is
negotiating with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel. An Iranian
opposition group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several previously
undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking numerous IAEA inspections since
February 2003. Subsequent reports by the IAEA Director General revealed numerous
failures by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, which run contrary to
its IAEA safeguards obligations. Before the reporting period, the A. Q. Khan
network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as
designs for more advanced and efficient models, and components.
The November 2003 report of the IAEA Director General (DG) to the Board of
Governors describes a pattern of Iranian safeguards breaches, including the
failure to: report the import and chemical conversion of uranium compounds,
report the separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium targets, report the
enrichment of uranium using both centrifuges and lasers, and provide design
information for numerous fuel cycle facilities. In October 2003, Iran sent a
report to the DG providing additional detail on its nuclear program and signed
an agreement with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany that included an
Iranian promise to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing efforts. On 18
December 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to its IAEA Safeguards
Agreement but took no steps to ratify the Protocol during this reporting period.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the
former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move
toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. Such assistance during 2003 continued to include equipment,
technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the
largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs)-including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and
Tondar-69 (CSS-8)-as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already
producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the
Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran
publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It
originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic
missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch
vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing longer-range
ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production
technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further
Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents.
Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve
agents-and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them-which it previously
had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),
Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek
dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in
Tehran's BW program. Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small
quantities of BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional
weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North
Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components
and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal
governmental channels.
Iraq
In March of 2003, coalition forces took action under Operation Iraqi Freedom to
remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq. A large-scale effort has
been under way to find the answers to the many outstanding questions about
Iraq's WMD and delivery systems. We are not yet at the point where we can draw
comprehensive or final conclusions about the extent of Iraq's prewar WMD
program.
Libya
In March 2003, Libya approached the United Kingdom and United States expressing
interest in coming clean about its WMD programs. In the course of discussions
and visits, the Libyans made significant disclosures about their nuclear,
chemical, and missile-related activities and minor disclosures about
biological-related activities. A team of US and UK experts traveled to Libya in
October and early December to receive detailed presentations and to visit a
number of Libyan facilities. After extensive discussion during the three weeks
of meetings, our experts were shown covert facilities and equipment and were
told of years of Libyan efforts to develop weapons capabilities. In late
December, the Libyan Government announced its intention to eliminate its nuclear
and chemical weapons programs and MTCR class missiles as part of an effort to
rejoin the community of nations.
Progress with the Libyans was made in four strategic areas:
Nuclear. Libya admitted to nuclear fuel cycle projects that were ultimately
intended to support a nuclear weapons program, including uranium processing and
enrichment. The team was given access to more than 10 sites connected to Libya's
nuclear activities and examined a large amount of specialized nuclear equipment.
Libya pledged to voluntarily eliminate its nuclear weapons program, abide by its
IAEA safeguards agreement, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), and to act as though the Additional Protocol was in force, which requires
adherents to provide information about, and the right of access to, all aspects
of a Member State's nuclear fuel cycle activities and facilities. Libya's
disclosures revealed that the A. Q. Khan network had provided Libya with designs
for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and
efficient models, and components.
Chemical. The Libyans showed us a significant quantity of sulfur mustard that
was produced at the Pharma 150 plant near Rabta more than a decade ago, as well
as aerial bombs designed to be filled with sulfur mustard agent. Libya also
showed us equipment in storage that could be used to outfit a second CW
production facility and dual-use chemical precursors that could be used to
produce mustard and nerve agent. Libya reiterated its commitment to complete its
accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and requested assistance in
destroying chemical warfare stockpiles.
Biological. Libya disclosed past intentions to acquire equipment and develop
capabilities related to biological warfare, but it remains unclear if these
activities were offensive or defensive in nature. At the team's request, Libya
took us to a number of civilian medical-, biotechnical- and agricultural-
related research centers that have a "dual-use" potential to support BW-related
work. The team was given access to scientists at these facilities.
Ballistic Missile. Libya provided extensive information on its Scud missile
inventory, its efforts to develop longer-range missiles, and the assistance it
obtained from North Korea and other sources.
North Korea
Nuclear. After announcing in early 2003 its withdrawal from the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty) and its intention to
resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under
the terms of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, North Korea announced in
early October 2003 that at the end of June it had completed reprocessing all of
the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously under IAEA safeguards. They also said that
all the plutonium derived from that reprocessing (an estimated 25 to 30
kilograms) was being used for increasing the size of its nuclear deterrent
force. After announcing in early 2003 that the 5 Mwe reactor at Yongbyon had
resumed operation, in October 2003 the North said that future spent fuel from
the reactor will be reprocessed.
In late April 2003 during the Six Party Talks in Beijing, North Korea privately
threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its nuclear weapons. North Korea
repeated these threats at the Six Party Talks in August 2003. In December 2003,
North Korea proposed freezing its nuclear activities, including not exporting
nuclear weapons, in exchange for rewards. We continued to monitor and assess
North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts amidst diplomatic efforts to arrange a
second round of Six Party Talks.
Ballistic Missile. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and
producing ballistic missiles and continues to procure needed raw materials and
components from various foreign sources. In the second half of 2003, North Korea
continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998
but announced it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to continue the
moratorium beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2- potentially capable of
reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload-may be
ready for flight-testing. North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to sell
complete ballistic missile systems and components that have enabled other states
to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been
possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.
Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals
that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing CW program.
North Korea's CW capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of
nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent, using its sizable, although aging,
chemical industry. North Korea may possess a stockpile of unknown size of these
agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means.
Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention but nonetheless has pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s.
Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that
could be used to support North Korea's BW program. North Korea is believed to
possess a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to
weaponize BW agents and may have some such weapons available for use.
Syria
Nuclear. Syria-an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards-has a nuclear
research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their
long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although
specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign
expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities, and we
are monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions with concern.
Ballistic Missile. During 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to
establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability.
Syria's liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential
foreign equipment and assistance-primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus
also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition,
Syria was developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud D, and
possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related technology from
foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile
of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently has tried to develop more toxic and
persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key
elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production
equipment. Syria probably also continued to develop a BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and
inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the
large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons
inventory.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist
organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in
using CBRN; however, most attacks probably will be small-scale, incorporating
improvised delivery means and easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or
radiological substances. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to
favor long-proven conventional tactics, such as bombings and shootings, the
arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that international
mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and biological
attacks.
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11
attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to
CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt
unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin publicly
declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty." In 2003,
an extremist cleric who supports al-Qa'ida issued a fatwa that purports to
provide a religious justification for the use of WMD against the United
States.Al-Qa'ida and associated extremist groups have a wide variety of
potential agents and delivery means to choose from for CBRN attacks. The success
of any al-Qa'ida attacks and the number of ensuing casualties would depend on
many factors, including the technical expertise of those involved, but most
scenarios could cause panic and disruption.
Several groups of mujahidin associated with al-Qa'ida have planned "poison plot"
attacks in Europe with easily produced chemicals and toxins best suited to
assassination and small-scale scenarios. These agents could cause hundreds of
casualties and widespread panic if used in multiple simultaneous attacks.
Analysis of an al-Qa'ida document recovered in Afghanistan in the summer of 2002
indicates the group has crude procedures for making mustard agent, sarin, and VX.
Both 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and Zacharias Moussaoui-arrested
by the FBI before the 11 September attacks-expressed interest in crop dusters,
raising our concern that al-Qa'ida has considered using aircraft to disseminate
BW agents.
Al-Qa'ida is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or "dirty
bombs." Construction of an RDD is well within its capabilities as radiological
materials are relatively easy to acquire from industrial or medical sources.
Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in Afghanistan show
that al-Qa'ida had conducted research on biological agents. We believe al-Qa'ida's
BW program is primarily focused on anthrax for mass casualty attacks, although
the group most likely will pursue opportunities to produce and use other
biological agents in smaller-scale attacks.
Information from 2003 details the construction of a terrorist cyanide-based
chemical weapon that can be made with easily available items, requiring little
or no training to assemble and deploy. The plans are widely available to any
terrorist. Such a device could produce a lethal concentration of poisonous gases
in an enclosed area.
Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qa'ida leaders have stated that al-Qa'ida has a
religious duty to acquire nuclear weapons. Documents recovered in Afghanistan
during Operation Enduring Freedom show that al-Qa'ida was engaged in rudimentary
nuclear research, although the extent of its indigenous program is unclear.
Outside experts, such as Pakistani nuclear engineer Bashir al-Din Mahmood may
have provided some assistance to al-Qa'ida's program. Bashir, who reportedly met
with Bin Ladin, discussed information concerning nuclear weapons. Al-Qa'ida has
been seeking nuclear material since the early 1990s, according to the testimony
of a government witness-Jamal Ahmad Fadl-during the 2001 trail on the al-Qa'ida
bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Fadl claimed that al-Qa'ida
pursued the sale of what they believed was enriched uranium in Sudan in the
early 1990s. This effort may have been a "scam" operation, and there is no
credible evidence al-Qa'ida actually acquired the uranium. Al-Qa'ida has been
the victim of other nuclear "scams" in the past, but it probably has become
sensitized to such operations in recent years, in part due to media coverage of
nuclear smuggling and scam operations.
In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa'ida or other
terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the
chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause
panic and economic disruption. In a video aired by Al-Jazirah in September 2002,
senior al-Qa'ida members said they had contemplated striking nuclear power
plants early in their decision making on targets but dropped the idea for fear
it would "get out of control."
Key Suppliers:
Russia
During 2003, Russia's struggling defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace,
and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and
transfers. Some Russian universities and scientific institutes also showed a
willingness to earn funds by providing WMD or missile-related teaching and
training for foreign students. The Russian Government's efforts to stem
proliferation remained an important element of US bilateral dialogue with
Russia.
Nuclear. Russia continues to play a key role in constructing light-water nuclear
power reactors in Iran, China, and India. Moscow has pledged to supply fuel to
the Bushehr reactor in Iran for the life of the reactor and is negotiating with
Iran to sign an agreement on the return of the irradiated spent fuel to Russia.
Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period continued to
supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to
countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining
technology and materials from Russian entities helped accelerate Iranian
development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has
supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's
self-sufficiency in missile production.
Chemical and Biological. During the second half of 2003, Russian entities
remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals, and
related expertise for countries of concern with active CBW programs. Russia's
well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for
countries seeking assistance in areas with CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of
conventional arms. In 2003, Russia was an important source of ACW for China,
Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and India. Russia continued to be the main supplier of
technology and equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion
programs. Moscow continued negotiations with New Delhi for a package deal, which
includes a refurbished aircraft carrier with a MiG-29K air wing, as well as a
lease of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and at least one Akula-class nuclear attack
submarine. During 2003, Russia continued work with India on the PJ-10
antiship/land-attack cruise missile.
Export Controls. Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework
for Russia's export controls, lax enforcement remains a serious concern. To
reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and
expertise, top Russian officials must make a sustained effort to convince
exporting entities-as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee
them-that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law
will be prosecuted.
North Korea
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during trilateral talks in Beijing, North Korea
privately threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its nuclear weapons. It
repeated these threats in August 2003 at the Six Party Talks. In December 2003,
North Korea proposed to "freeze" its nuclear activities, including not
transferring nuclear weapons, in exchange for rewards.
Ballistic Missile. Throughout the second half of 2003, North Korea continued to
export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials,
and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.
Pyongyang attached high priority to the development and sale of ballistic
missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and
related technology were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which
supported ongoing missile development and production.
China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture
through commitments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes, promulgation of
expanded export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the
proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.
Nuclear. China has taken some positive steps during the reporting period. In
September 2003, China stopped at the China-North Korea border a shipment of
chemicals that could have been used in North Korea's nuclear program. China also
decided in late 2003 that it would apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), indicating that it intends to embrace the policy of full scope
safeguards (FSS)-which is required for NSG membership-as a condition of nuclear
supply to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Ballistic Missile. China is not a member of the MTCR, but in October 1994 it
pledged not to sell MTCR Category I ground-to-ground missiles.Although Beijing
continues to take some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new
missile-related export regulations - offering an export control seminar in
September 2003 for officials and companies from China and other countries -
Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-reated
projects during the second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped
Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and
has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Chinese-entity
ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of
becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In addition,
firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or
assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern-such as Iran,
Libya, and North Korea. The United States imposed sanctions on a number of
Chinese entities during the reporting period, including the China North
Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export
Corporation (CPMIEC).
Chemical. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build frigates for Pakistan's Navy and to cooperate in developing the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities in Western
Europe, South Asia, and the United States to provide needed acquisitions for
their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and associated networks continued
to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available
materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although West European
countries strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to
successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In addition,
several West European countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to
India, Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense
industries. North Korea approached Western European entities to obtain
acquisitions for its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum
tubing-enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes-was halted by German authorities. Some
West European entities remained an important source for the proliferation of WMD-
and missile-related information and training. The relatively advanced research
of European institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and
information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the
availability of dual-use training and education may have shortened development
time for some WMD and missile programs.
Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies
continued to be more available around the world, new sources of supply have
emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even
more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies
have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be
able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to
weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical industries into
pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare
capability. Likewise, additional nonstate actors became more interested in the
potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict
serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile
designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing
longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.In this
context, there was a growing concern that additional states, that have
traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology, might have
followed North Korea's practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and
expertise to other countries or by going one step further to supply such
expertise to nonstate actors. Even in cases where states took action to stem
such transfers, knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and
missile-related materials and technology could act outside government
constraints. The exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and its role in supplying
nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one form of this
threat, but commercial purveyors of dual-use technologies who routinely seek to
circumvent international export control regimes to deliver WMD-related equipment
and material to WMD-aspirant countries are of grave concern as well.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
