Features

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
China
Arms Control/Nonproliferation Diplomacy  
Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Missile Nonproliferation
Other Arms Control/Nonproliferation
Reference
Index
Search
Glossaries

Statement by Mr. Gu Ziping, Deputy Director-General of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, In the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention


10 July 2000, Geneva   

 

Mr. Chairman,

First of all, please allow me, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, to welcome you back to Geneva to preside over the work of the Ad Hoc Group on the negotiation of a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. I am convinced that with your rich experience and outstanding talent in diplomacy and disarmament, you will surely lead the Group to achieve positive results during this session.

Mr. Chairman,

This year is a year of special significance. At the last session of the Ad Hoc Group, we commemorated the 25th anniversary of entry into force of the Convention. A quarter of a century ago, the entry into force of the Convention marked a historical step towards the complete prohibition of biological weapons in the world. Since then, the Convention has played an undeniable role in maintaining international peace and security. For various reasons, the Convention has not succeeded in eliminating the danger of proliferation of biological weapons and the threat of biological warfare. In recent years, the vigorous development of modern bio-technology, particularly the genetic technology, has brought about good news to humanity on one hand, but new complicated elements to biological disarmament on the other. We should make further efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention in a comprehensive and practical manner, so that the humanity can be free of the threat of biological warfare.

China has been a victim of biological weapons. The big disaster caused by biological weapons remains fresh on the mind of the Chinese people. Complete elimination of the threat of biological weapons is of special historical and realistic significance to the Chinese people, which has also been their long aspiration. The Chinese government always supports the purposes and principles of the Convention as well as the efforts in comprehensively strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, and has made unswerving efforts in its active participation in the work of formulating the Protocol to the Convention.

Mr. Chairman,

The Chinese delegation is of the view that the Group should, in the principled pragmatic, comprehensive and balanced way, continue its work as mandated by the Special Conference to work out a fair and rational Protocol acceptable to all.

We are pleased to see that steady progress has been made in the negotiation since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group, particularly after the completion of the ¡°rolling text¡±. The current overall situation of the negotiation is positive under which the text itself is being well developed and a series of major issues clearly identified. Our first priority is to maintain the good momentum emerged from the negotiation and to deal with concrete issues in an earnest manner through consultations.

However, a tendency has occurred in the current negotiation. Certain countries, while taking an evasive approach to facilities with high risk and closely related to the Convention, such as bio-defense facilities and high containment facilities, are over enthusiastic about facilities not so relevant to the Convention, such as vaccine production facilities and other production facilities. We believe such tendency will lead the Protocol negotiation in the wrong direction. In the final analysis, the Protocol is a military and security treaty. Declaration and verification measures shall be commensurate to the purpose of the Convention. Declaration and verification requirements for the most relevant facilities should be more stringent. A verification regime with no focus or with misplaced focus can never help strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.

On the issue of visits, we hold that any visit regime to be established should be aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. Implementation of other disarmament agreements has shown that random visits conducted to certain facilities with certain degree of intensity are fair, effective and feasible. Although the concept of clarification visit has been put forward for some time, we are still not convinced that it should be incorporated in the Protocol. After serious consideration, we think the purpose of clarification visit can be fully achieved through other measures contained in the Protocol. There is no need for clarification visit. Furthermore, clarification visit has inherent problems, such as discriminatory effect on different States Parties and high risk of abuse. Transparency visit is another new concept. According to the current text, it looks nothing more than a mere formality. With vague purpose, poor feasibility and huge financial waste, such visit makes little contribution to the strengthening of the effectiveness of the Convention.

On the issue of investigation, we should keep balance between the following two aspects: building up rigorous and effective investigation regime aimed at preventing and punishing non-compliance, thereby genuinely strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, and preventing the abuse of the right of requesting an investigation with a view to protecting the rightful security and commercial interests of States Parties. Therefore, concrete provisions should be formulated accordingly in the following links of the investigation mechanism: request of investigation, approval by the Executive Council, conclusion on investigation and punishment of abuse.

The history of international disarmament treaties negotiation remind us that some countries always stood in the forefront in the negotiation process, but took an evasive attitude to their treaty obligations under various pretext after the conclusion of the treaties. Due attention should be paid in the protocol negotiation to forestall such unhealthy tendency.

Mr. Chairman,

To promote the exchange and cooperation among States Parties for peaceful purposes in the biological field is one of the four mandates of the Ad Hoc Group. As Chinese President Mr. Jiang Zemin pointed out at the Conference on Disarmament in March 1999, "one of the criteria to judge a disarmament treaty is to see whether it facilitates economic growth of various countries, especially that of developing countries, and whether it helps to strengthen international cooperation in science and technology." China strongly supports the position of developing countries regarding promotion of the peaceful cooperation and exchange in the biological field. We call on the countries concerned, while emphasizing the non-proliferation aspect, to adopt the same positive attitude towards peaceful exchanges and cooperation in the biological field.

Mr. Chairman,

Since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group five years ago, steady progress has been made in the negotiation and the framework of the text has gradually come into shape. However, negotiation of disarmament agreement is never carried out in vacuum. The Protocol is no exception. Maintaining international security and mutual trust in the world will push the negotiation forward. Whether the Protocol can be completed in time finally depends on whether the legitimate concerns of States Parties can be properly addressed.

China stands for the early conclusion of a good Protocol acceptable to all. We believe that it is certainly possible to complete the Protocol in a smooth manner, as long as all parties demonstrate sufficient political will, create a healthy atmosphere and take into due consideration of others' concerns. The Chinese delegation will continue to participate into the negotiation in an active and constructive way and cooperate fully with you and other delegations so as to achieve an early conclusion of the Protocol.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

Get the factsGet informedGet involved