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5 March 1984
(translated from Chinese)
(CD/443)
(CD/CW/WP 68)
Proposals on Major Elements of a Future Convention on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Chemical Weapons
The Chinese Delegation submits this paper in order to give a summarized and over-all picture of its basic position on the prohibition of chemical weapons. During the presentation of this paper, attention and consideration have been given to many constructive views and proposals presented by other countries.
The views contained in this paper do not represent the final position of the Chinese Delegation. Revisions and amendments would be made when necessary in the course of negotiations.
The Chinese Delegation considers that the Preamble should contain a strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons as a means of warfare in wars and armed conflicts, a full recognition of the historical role and the practical significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare concluded in Geneva on 17 June 1925 and an appeal to all States Party to the Protocol to continue their strict observance of its provisions.
It should also be stated in the Preamble that the prohibition of chemical weapons represents a necessary step in disarmament, that such a prohibition should be comprehensive and that all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons should be totally destroyed and production or filling facilities dismantled and destroyed.
A Convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons would contribute to the improvement of the international atmosphere and promote social progress and scientific, technological and economic developments for the good of mankind.
States Parties to the Convention should undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, stockpile, transfer, deploy on the territories of other countries, or use chemical weapons, and undertake to destroy or otherwise dispose of existing stocks of chemical weapons and production or filling facilities for such weapons.
1. The Convention should define "chemical weapons" on the basis of "general-purpose criteria". We propose the following definition:
For the purpose of the Convention, chemical weapons are the type of weapons the casualty capabilities of which are based on the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances. They include:
(1) chemical warfare agents and their key precursors which produce a direct toxic effect on living organisms;
(2) munitions and devices specially designed to be filled with chemical warfare agents or their precursors and to disperse such agents or the reaction products of their precursors in combat state;
(3) equipment specially designed for the purpose of direct use of such munitions and devices.
2. The Convention should include the concept of "chemical warfare agents" and define it on the basis of "general-purpose criteria". We propose the following definition:
Chemical warfare agents are those toxic chemical substances the types and quantities of which accord with hostile purposes of causing injuries of different kinds or death through direct interference with or damage to the normal physiological functions of living organisms resulting from the toxic effects of such substances. Chemical warfare agents can be divided into the following three categories according to toxicity criteria:
(1) Supertoxic lethal agents: having a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation);
(2) Other lethal agents: having a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation);
(3) Other harmful agents: having a median lethal does which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation) and a median effective dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation) but adequate enough to produce other harmful effects of military significance.
In accordance with the above definition, chemical warfare agents should include all known chemical warfare agents, dual-purpose chemical agents designed for use in chemical warfare and all potential chemical warfare agents.
3. Precursors for chemical warfare agents are chemical substances which can be used as reactants in the process of synthesis of chemical warfare agents.
Key precursors for chemical warfare agents are chemical substances which can be used as reactants in the course of synthesis of chemical warfare agents (whether in production facilities or in binary munitions) and have a decisive effect on the properties of the end products and have little peaceful use.
4. Other necessary definitions.
1. Detailed declarations should be made within three months after the entry into force of the Convention or accession to it by a State. Declarations may also be made by stages according to agreed principles.
2. Declarations should be directly related to the Convention, including in the main the following three areas:
(1) items directly related to chemical warfare capabilities and subject to
prohibition:
- the possession or non-possession of chemical-weapon stocks (including key precursors for chemical warfare agents) and their sources of origin, either within a country or outside it;
- the possession or non-possession of chemical-weapon production or filling facilities (including the production facilities for key precursors for chemical warfare agents) either within a country or outside it, either under the control of administrative authorities or military authorities or transnational corporations, and in chemical complexes either for military purposes or civilian purposes;
- the names, quantities, qualities and locations of stocked chemical munitions and chemical warfare agents;
- the types, capacities and locations of production or filling facilities for chemical weapons (including production facilities for key precursors);
- any transfer to or acquisition from other countries of chemical weapons since 1 May 1945, and if any, the names, quantities and the dates of transfer or acquisition;
(2) activities relating to dismantlement and destruction:
- any destruction or diversion of chemical-weapon stocks since 1 May 1945;
- the names, quantities, qualities of the destroyed stocks and the dates and methods of destruction;
- the names, quantities and qualities of the diverted stocks, and the methods, purposes and dates of diversion;
- any conversion or dismantlement of the production or filling facilities for chemical weapons since 1 May 1945;
- the names, types, capacities and locations of the dismantled facilities and the dates of dismantlement;
-the names, types, capacities, locations and uses of the converted facilities, and the dates of conversion;
-plans for destruction or diversion of the existing stocks;
-plans for dismantlement of the existing production or filling facilities;
(3) items permitted under the Convention but subject to control:
- the names, types, capacities and locations of facilities for producing dual-purpose chemicals;
- the names, types, capacities and locations of small-scale production facilities for supertoxic lethal agents for protective purposes.
1. Dismantlement and destruction should be conducted under international on-site inspection in accordance with agreed principles. The host country should provide active coordination and assistance.
2. All chemical-weapon stocks should be totally destroyed except for dual-purpose chemical agents which, as agreed upon, may be diverted for peaceful uses. Destruction should commence at the earliest possible date after entry into force of the Convention and should be completed within 10 years at the latest.
3. In order to eliminate as early as possible the threat to mankind of chemical warfare, States in possession of chemical weapons should in the first place destroy stocks of the most toxic and dangerous types of chemical weapons, e.g. supertoxic lethal agents such as VX, Soman, Sarin, tabun, mustard gas, etc.
4. All production/filling facilities for chemical weapons should be dismantled and destroyed. Dismantlement and destruction should commence as early as possible and should be completed within 10 years. Pending dismantlement, the facilities should be mothballed and subject to the necessary verification to ensure that they are not reused for the purpose of production or filling of chemical weapons.
5. Production or filling facilities for chemical weapons are allowed to be converted into facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. But once destruction is completed, dismantlement and destruction of such facilities should immediately commence and be completed within one year.
1. A Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should include the necessary provisions for verification. The verification measures should be strict and effective to ensure compliance with the Convention and, at the same time, reasonable and appropriate to avoid unnecessary interference with civilian industries.
2. International verification should be the main form of verification and necessary on-site inspection should also be provided in the Convention. On-site inspection should cover destruction of chemical-weapon stocks, dismantlement and destruction of chemical-weapon production or filling facilities, production of supertoxic lethal agents in small quantities for protective purposes, and alleged use of chemical weapons, etc.
3. Different ways, means and procedures should be adopted for different purposes of verification on an agreed basis, such as continuous on-site inspection, routine periodical or random on-site inspection and on-site inspection by challenge.
4. States Parties should give cooperation to international on-site inspection so as to facilitate the implementation of the Convention and help build confidence.
5. Information on the implementation of the Convention acquired by any State Party through national technical means of verification should be made available to the Consultative Committee and other States Parties.
1. An important pre-condition for confidence-building lies in the strict compliance by States Parties with the provisions of the Convention.
2. Necessary international verification, including on-site inspection, constitutes an important guarantee for confidence-building. States Parties should not only subject themselves to routine inspection, but also respond in a positive manner to requests for challenge inspection authorized by the Consultative Committee.
3. International cooperation is an important means of confidence-building. States Parties should be encouraged, through bilateral or multilateral channels, or through the Consultative Committee, to:
- exchange information on the peaceful use of chemical knowledge;
- exchange information and knowledge on chemical protection;
- exchange data on newly-discovered toxic chemical compounds and advances made in the field of toxicology research and register them with the Consultative Committee;
- promote the exchange of visits of personnel working in the field of chemical protection. 4. The Convention should encourage States Parties to take unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions that may contribute to the strengthening of confidence.
All States Parties to the Convention should at the same time undertake to observe the provisions regarding the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons laid down in the Geneva Protocol.
None of the provisions of the Convention shall in any way be interpreted as limiting or diminish the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or as lessening the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol, or as limiting or diminishing the legal effect of any other international treaties or instruments governing armed conflicts.
Immediately upon entry into force of the Convention, a Consultative Committee should be set up in accordance with agreed procedures. The principles of universality and equality of all States, big or small, should be taken into consideration in the composition of the Consultative Committee. For the convenience of its daily work, the Consultative Committee may establish a Standing Committee or Executive Council composed of 15 to 20 members. The Consultative Committee should have the following functions:
1. To decide in accordance with agreed procedures on routine inspection and oversee its implementation;
2. To decide, in accordance with agreed procedures on challenge inspection and oversee its implementation;
3. To review, revise or amend, when new developments in science and technology make this necessary, the technical provisions of the Convention, such as toxicity criteria, methods of measuring toxicity, list of precursors, etc.;
4. To examine and consider complaints of non-compliance with the Convention;
5. To promote the flow of information on implementation of the Convention
6. To report on its work to States Parties and to the Depositary of the Convention;
7. To assume all other functions unanimously agreed upon among the States Parties.
1. Complaints may be lodged by any State Party, upon discovering non-compliance on the part of other States Parties, to the Standing Committee of the Consultative Committee. Such complaints must be supported by explanations and evidence.
2. Upon receiving a complaint, the Standing Committee of the Consultative Committee should first of all encourage the parties concerned to resolve the complaint through bilateral or multilateral channels.
3. If no solution can be reached through bilateral or multilateral consultation, the Standing Committee should, within a period of one month, convene a plenary meeting of the Consultative Committee, to consider the matter.
4. The Consultative Committee, in accordance with agreed principles, may decide on the verification measures to be taken, including international on-site inspection, to ascertain the facts. The outcome of the investigation should be submitted to the States Parties and the Depositary of the Convention.
5. If the Party challenged refuses to subject itself to verification, it should state its reasons and clarify the situations.
6. If the Consultative Committee finds the reasons or clarifications unsatisfactory, the Party challenged shall be obliged to subject itself to verification. In case of dispute, recourse may be had to the appropriate United Nations bodies.
The Convention should also include provisions on signature, procedure for accession, entry into force, depositary, procedure for amendments, review conference, duration of validity, withdrawal, languages used, etc.
This
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