Chinese working paper to the Conference on Disarmament Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 19 June 1980

Working Paper by the Chinese Delegation

to the Conference on Disarmament

19 June 1980

(CD/102)

Chinese Delegation's Proposals on the Main Contents of a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

The use of chemical weapons has long been strongly denounced in the world. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded in Geneva back in 1925, voiced the wishes of the people all over the world. However, because the Protocol only placed restrictions on, without providing for verification of, the use of chemical weapons, all kinds of chemical weapons have, since its conclusion, been developed, produced and stockpiled by some big powers, and were repeatedly used in wars. Particularly in the recent period, there have been numerous reports claiming that chemical weapons were used in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. All this constitutes a grave threat to world peace and security and has aroused increasing concern among the States for a prohibition of chemical weapons. Facts prove that it is an urgent task of the Committee on Disarmament to conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and on their complete destruction.

Paragraph 2 of the operating section of Resolution No. 34/72 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth Session reads: "Urges the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1980 session, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives."

Since taking part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chinese Delegation has studied the draft convention, working papers and concrete proposals submitted by the member States or groups of the Committee and wishes to state its basic position on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as follows:

The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be comprehensive. The scope of prohibited activities in connection with chemical weapons should include their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use; the scope of prohibited chemical weapons should include all chemicals determined by a general purpose criterion, i.e. whose types and quantities fail to justify the claim that they are intended for peaceful purposes, and weapons systems using these chemicals.
The existing stocks of chemical weapons should be completely destroyed, and the existing production facilities dismantled. Shutting down the facilities for the production of chemical weapons or converting them to peaceful production is not the best approach, for this will only increase the work load of verification and make it more difficult.
After entry into force of the convention, the Contracting Parties should, within a specified time, disclose information pertaining to the possession, stockpiling, and facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Any contracting Party having a stockpile and facilities for the production of chemical weapons should disclose their numbers and where these facilities are located as well as give a time table for the thorough destruction of the said weapons and the dismantling of the facilities within the shortest possible time.
There should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production. The organ should also be empowered to investigate charges on the use of chemical weapons and on any other violations of the convention.
Appropriate measures should be spelled out to deal with verified cases of violations of the convention with a view to bringing about their prompt cessation or providing strong assistance to imperiled Contracting Parties.
There should be included a clear understanding that no provision in this convention should be interpreted as limiting or detracting in any way the obligations undertaken by the Contracting Parties in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.