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6 August 1981
(CD/207)
I. China's position on the question of providing security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States has been time and again explained at various meetings of the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc working group. Allow me here to briefly recall our consistent position on this question.
As early as 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement proposing the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.
In order to break the nuclear monopoly, China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964. On the day the test succeeded, the Chinese Government reiterated the above position and declared that China would never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor would it use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones.
In his statement on 29 May 1978, at the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, Mr. Huang Hua, the Foreign Minister of China, stated that, in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war to small and medium-sized countries, a measure of urgency is for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones.
At the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 5 February 1980, Mr. Zhang Wenjing, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, pointed out that the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threat. We are aware that its realization is no easy matter. This being the case, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
From this recapitulation it can be clearly seen that, on its own initiative and unilaterally, the Chinese Governmetn declared long ago that it would unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
In August 1973, China signed the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, thereby undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the non-nuclear-weapon States of Latin America.
II. According to the above position, the Chinese delegation holds that it is legitimate and reasonable for the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States to oppose nuclear threats and to require that security assurances be provided by nuclear-weapon States and that all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.
It has been our consistent view that the fundamental security guarantees to be provided by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. However, as the nuclear-weapon States have hitherto failed to provide such guarantees, they should at least give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances, that is, the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.
Should the nuclear-weapon States, in providing such negative assurances, impose various requirements and conditions on the non-nuclear-weapon States, would this not be tantamount to demanding security assurances from then non-nuclear-weapon States?
In fact, it is the two superpowers with their enormous nuclear arsenals that pose a serious threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-nuclear-weapon States lack adquate defence capabilities, therefore, the nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances. This obligation cannot be shirked under any pretext whatsoever. Pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, this should be the least the nuclear-weapon States undertake to do towards the non-nuclear-weapon States.
III. Except for a few States, the overwhelming majority of States have, in one way or another, assumed the obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Although some States have reached the necessary scientific and technological levels to manufacture nuclear weapons, they still abide by such obligations. Some nuclear-weapon States, while totally disregarding their own vertical nuclear proliferation and continuously expanding their own nuclear arsenals, clamour to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States, and even attempt to deprive them of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy or seek to restrict such a right. This is obviously unfair and is an infringement on the sovereign rights of States. As the superpowers are constantly expanding their nuclear arsenals and carrying out nuclear threats, it is only by halting vertical nuclear proliferation that horizontal nuclear proliferation can be prevented. This is self-evident.
China is opposed to major power nuclear monopoly. Like many other peace-loving countries. China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. And we are emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel.
To sum up, negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States are only a transitional measure to be adopted pending nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should recognize the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States find themselves menaced by the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threat, and that is the strong demand of the peoples of the world that the superpowers halt the arms race and carry out nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay and, at the same time, they should take effective measures to carry out nuclear disarmament until the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved.
Finally, the Chinese delegation reiterates that China has unilaterally undertaken the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and suggests that, when an international convention on security assurances is elaborated, the inclusion of such commitments should be taken into consideration. We are also prepared to work together with other delegates in the CD in a continued effort to search for a common formula of security assurances which will conform to the requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States and will be acceptable to all the nuclear-weapon States.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
