Features

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
China
Arms Control/Nonproliferation Diplomacy  
Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Missile Nonproliferation
Other Arms Control/Nonproliferation
Reference
Index
Search
Glossaries

Letter to President Clinton from Members of the U.S. Senate in Support of Implementing the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

21 October 1997

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President
1600 Pennsylvania, Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to state our support for your Administration's efforts to implement the1985 U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, thereby normalizing U.S.-China trade relations in the area of civilian nuclear power generation equipment and technology.

We understand your administration has been in close consultation with the Chinese Government regarding its commitment to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. We further understand that significant progress has been made in this area. China has agreed to terminate certain international activities which the U.S. found objectionable. China has also agreed to promulgate a clear and comprehensive export control regime for nuclear equipment services and technology.

If, based on the assurances received from, and the actions taken by the Chinese Government, you can make the certifications required under the 1985 Joint Resolution of Congress, then we believe it is appropriate that the United States implement the 1985 Agreement. Such an initiative, based on solid progress on the negotiating front, could prove a useful example of the mutual benefits which could be derived from further cooperation on the troubling issues of chemical and missile proliferation.

We note that China is already an internationally recognized nuclear weapons state. It runs military reactors for the production of plutonium, as do other weapons states. China has no requirement or motivation to divert materials from a civilian light water reactor program. Moreover, the light water reactors offered by U.S. vendors are widely recognized as proliferation resistant

We also advocate action on this issue to address environmental and safety considerations. China's energy needs are massive -- 125 million Chinese have no access to electricity -- and demand is rising as the economy expands. Currently, most new demand is being met by conventional plants burning China's low quality coal. This trend has greatly increased China's CO2 emissions and its contribution to potential climate change.

China already has decided that it must expand its nuclear sector to meet energy demand. The question now facing the United States is whether we will allow China access to the safest nuclear plant equipment -- U.S. equipment -- to implement this much needed program? Having insisted on greater participation by developing countries in efforts to reduce global CO2 emissions, will we have credibility at the December climate change negotiations in Kyoto if we continue to bar U.S. companies from providing technologies to sharply restrain China's serious and escalating emissions?

The commercial implications of implementing the 1985 Agreement are also enormous. China's market for civilian nuclear power equipment, technology and services is estimated to be at least $60 billion over the next 25 years. French, Canadian and Russian vendors already arc participating in that market, to their immense financial advantage. China makes no secret of its preference for U.S. supplied equipment and technology. It is clear that, if the United States is to confront its trade deficit with China, it cannot turn away from such massive commercial openings. Certainly the recent large sales by French, Canadian and Russian companies demonstrate that our trade rivals have no intention of doing so.

We recognize that many differences remain between the United States and China, particularly in the areas of security, trade and social policy. We also recognize, however, that in those areas where progress can and has been made, it is important to seize the initiative and build upon that progress. We encourage you to build upon the progress which your administration has made in the civilian nuclear area by sending to Congress the necessary certifications which will enable you to implement the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

Get the factsGet informedGet involved