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Statement of the Chinese Delegation on
"Security Assurances for States Parties"
in Working Group II of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee
9 March 1995
Mr. Chairman,
The Chinese delegation proposed in CD/NTB/WP122 on 20 June 1994 the following wording for an article on "Security Assurances for States Parties" in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):
"1. Nuclear-weapon States Parties undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.
"2. Nuclear-weapon States Parties undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against other States Parties.
"3. Each State Party undertakes to provide, through the United Nations Security Council, necessary assistance to any State Party that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and to impose strict, effective sanctions on the attacking State."
Mr. Chairman,
These three paragraphs are simple and clear. In essence, China seeks a legally binding solution, within the context of CTBT, to the issues of no first use of nuclear weapons among the nuclear-weapon States Parties, no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by these States Parties against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and the so-called Positive Security Assurances (PSA) among all States Parties.
Mr. Chairman,
Why does China advocate the inclusion in CTBT of such an article on "Security Assurances for States Parties"? The reason is that, first and foremost, CTBT should be a security treaty which will safeguard and enhance peace and security of its States Parties, thus contributing to the maintenance of peace and security of the world at large. Like other arms control and disarmament treaties, it should enhance rather than undermining the security of its States Parties. Its role should not be confined only to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, we believe that it is most appropriate, and indeed highly necessary, to include in the Treaty an article on "Security Assurances for States Parties". As a matter of fact, such an article will be of great significance for ensuring the effectiveness and universality of the Treaty.
Mr. Chairman,
All of us here must have noted that there is a footnote in the present Rolling Text, stating that "several delegations" oppose the inclusion in the Treaty of any article on security assurances, on the grounds that such an article is "beyond the scope of the Treaty and the mandate for its negotiation".
We cannot agree to such an argument. Security assurance for States Parties is obviously an important issue involving national security interests of the States Parties. How can such an issue be stalled off simply by alleging arbitrarily that it is beyond the scope of the Treaty and the mandate for its negotiation? We wonder if these "several delegations" also regard Article VI on nuclear disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as beyond the NPT's scope and mandate? Or are they also of the view that Article X on "Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons" in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is beyond the scope and mandate of the CWC?
Last year, eleven Non-aligned and other developing countries formally proposed a draft protocol for the NPT that deals with Negative Security Assurance (NSA) and PSA. China fully supports this proposal as it is closely linked with the purpose of the NPT. We wonder if these "several delegations" also consider the proposal of the eleven States as beyond the scope and mandate of the NPT? Surely, the inclusion in CTBT of an article on "Security Assurances for States Parties" involves no question of the Treaty's scope and the mandate of its negotiation. The real issue, Mr. Chairman, is the substance of this proposal.
As far as nuclear-weapon States are concerned, they have joined the NPT and are now engaged in the negotiation for a CTBT and are expected to become its states parties after its conclusion. They are also expected to join a Cut-off Convention, and to commit themselves to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. These are justified demands of the international community. If, in this process, each nuclear-weapon State can be assured of no first use of nuclear weapons from other nuclear-weapon States, then will that not contribute to their own security and hence facilitate their participation in the process of nuclear disarmament? Or conversely, if a nuclear-weapon State, especially one whose nuclear weapons are inferior to others both in terms of quantity and quality, lives under the constant threat of the first use of nuclear weapons by the major nuclear-weapon powers, even after the former itself has unilaterally and unconditionally undertaken the solemn commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, could such a situation be conducive to the participation of such a State in the process of nuclear disarmament? In other words, how could the security of such a nuclear-weapon State not to be compromised, if, on the one hand, it committed itself to a nuclear-weapon test ban, to the cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, and to the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the other hand, it is under the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons by other countries?
For non-nuclear-weapon States, over the years, these States have been asked to join the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the NPT. Tomorrow, they will be asked to join the CTBT and a Cut-off Convention. In other words, these countries have been asked again and again to undertake in a legally- binding form the obligation not to proliferate nuclear weapons. In fact, most of them have done so by joining one after another the international legal instruments on non-proliferation.
However, for all that they have done, have they got anything in turn from the nuclear weapon states that resembles an international legal instrument, such as an international treaty, a convention or a protocol on the assurance of no use of nuclear weapons against them? Are they not entitled to such a security assurance? Or, are they only in a position to undertake obligations on non-proliferation but must never claim any right on security assurance?
Mr. Chairman,
We consider all States as equal, with or without nuclear weapons. They all have the right to safeguard their legitimate security interests. Therefore, it is unfair, to say the least, for the nuclear-weapon States to seek absolute security for themselves, while at the same time putting the legitimate security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States in total disregard.
Among the nuclear-weapon States, China was forced to develop a small amount of nuclear weapons purely for the purpose of self-defense. As a nuclear-weapon State, ever since the very first day when it came into the possession of nuclear weapons, China has solemnly undertaken that it will not, at any time and under any circumstance, be the first to use nuclear weapons, and will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have constantly called for the conclusion of international legal instruments on "no first use" and NSA, and yet, over the years, these requests, which, I might add, are also the requests of a vast number of non-nuclear weapon States, have always been refused by certain countries. Even today, on the eve of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, these requests, including the proposal for an NPT protocol on security assurances, as put forward by 11 non-aligned States, are being arbitrarily turned down
Under such circumstances, we have no choice but to insist on the solution to "no first use", NSA and PSA within the context of CTBT. Since CTBT is expected to enjoy universal adherence, a solution of these issues among the States Parties of CTBT will be tantamount to a global solution.
Mr. Chairman,
Above is the consideration and rationale behind our proposal for the inclusion in the Treaty an article on "Security Assurances for States Parties". In short, we hope the article would enable all States, with nuclear-weapon or without, having joined NPT or not, all to join the CTBT with a sense of safety that their own security will only be enhanced through the Treaty. This will help ensure the universality and effectiveness of CTBT.
In addition, I wish to point out that China does not insist that CTBT is the only place to solve the issues of "no first use" and NSA. In fact, that all States, nuclear-weapon States in particular, conclude through negotiation an independent international legal instrument on "no first use" and NSA is an idea China fully agrees to. Indeed, it is what we have been consistently striving for throughout the years. Naturally if that is achieved, we do not need to deal with these issues within CTBT However, since that approach has always been rejected by certain States, we find it appropriate and necessary to insist upon a solution of these issues within CTBT.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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