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Arms Control, Disarmament, Defense and Security Issues of China
A Selected Bibliography:  Volume 2
Journal Articles
1985-2003

Complied by Xiaodong Li (ACDIS Library, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)   [Original Version]

Updated by EANP Staff, 2003
 

INTRODUCTION

This volume contains entries of journal articles published since 1985. Topics covered by the bibliography include arms control, disarmament, security, and defense issues of China with focus on China's weapons proliferation.  Entries on each topic are listed in descending order of year and then alphabetically by the main entry (title or author). The citation of each entry consists of standardized bibliographic descriptions.  The bibliography only covers materials published in the English language.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 

I.  Arms Control and Disarmament

II.  Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

III.  Arms Transfers of Non-nuclear Weapons

IV.  China and Regional Security

V.  PLA and National Defense

I. Arms Control and Disarmament
General Surveys

2003

Medeiros, Evan S., and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign affairs. 82, no. 6, (2003), p. 22 (14 pages).

2001

Chen, Huaifan, "The impact of international arms control on East Asian security," Peace 61, pp. 2-6, December 2001.

2000

Gill, Bates and Medeiros, Evan S., “Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies,” The China quarterly, number 161, p. 66, 2000.

1999

Hu, Weixing, "Nuclear Nonproliferation," in Yong Deng and Fe-Ling Wang (eds.), In the Eyes of the Dragon, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

“Russia, China Take Dim View of US-Backed Theater Missile Defense System for Far East,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, volume 51, number 5 (1999) p. 22.

1997

“China gets Defensive on Missile Cuts,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 160, number 43, 1997 p. 29, 1997.

Jan, Hung-yi, “The PRC's Policies Toward Nonproliferation Regimes,” Issues & Studies, volume 33, number 11, p. 112, 1997.

Mingquan, Zhu. “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Winter 1997).

Naidu, M. V., “China on Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Test: Quotations and Criticisms,” Peace Research, volume 29, number 3, p. 1, August 01, 1997.

1996

Gill, Bates and Mathew Stephenson. “Search for Common Ground: Breaking the Sino-US Non-proliferation Stalemate,” Arms Control Today, (September, 1996).

Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” China Journal, (January, 1996).

Yun, Wu. “China’s Policies Towards Arms Control and Disarmament: From Passive Responding to Active Leading,” Pacific Review, volume 9, number 4, (1996).

1995
“China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Beijing Review volume 38, number 48, (Nov. 27- Dec. 3 1995), p. 10-25.

ABSTRACT: China’s arms control and disarmament operations and modernization program promotes peace and development of mankind. A balanced national defense is to be maintained without the increase of weapons of mass destruction. The People’s Liberation Army of China has decreased the military personnel by one million. Defense technology in China is applied toward national economic development and production of arms within limits. China supports the global policies and agreements on arms control and disarmament.

Chodakewitz, Susan B; Jermano, Jill L, “China: What Kind of Nonproliferation Participant?" Strategic Review, volume 23, Number 2, p. 76, 1995.

Davis, Zachary S, “China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime?” Asian Survey, volume 35, number 6, p. 587, 1995.

Garrett, Banning N. and Bonnie S. Glaser.  “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security, volume 20, number 3, (Winter 1995/1996), p. 43-78.

ABSTRACT: Explores the thinking behind China’s official positions on arms control issues, particularly views on interdependence versus self-help in security matters; based on interviews with Chinese military and civilian analysts and officials. Includes views on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledges, and five-power arms reduction talks.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: the Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, volume 20, (Winter 1995/1996), p. 5-43.

ABSTRACT: Chinese nuclear arms policy remains focused on the preservation of territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy, defense of Communist political power and growth of ‘major power’ status. However, China is leaning towards a new concept of ‘limited deterrence.’ Unfortunately, the country does not yet have the necessary operational capabilities to implement the concept.

1994

“China Calls for a Nukes-free World,”  Beijing Review, volume 37, number 45, (7 November, 1994), p. 4.

ABSTRACT: Hou Zhitong, China’s Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, stated at the UN General Assembly on Oct 21, 1994, that China supports the steps taken by the international community for nuclear disarmament and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Hou favors the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He asserted that China would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.

Godwin, Paul H. B. and John J. Schulz, “China and Arms Control: Transition in East Asia,” Arms Control Today, volume 24, (November, 1994), p. 7-11.

ABSTRACT: China’s half-hearted participation in the arms control measures in the post-Cold War world economy and efficient indigenous defense establishment can be related to its experiences in the century of humiliation, marked by unequal treaties and oppression by hostile powers. China has established friendly relations with all countries, though its policy of pretending to be a strong military power while not having the potential has resulted in the negation of its friendly foreign policy as other countries become wary of its military power. It has stated its reluctance to participate in global arms control and has clearly proved this attitude in its dealing with the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Olsen, Edward A. and David Winterford,  “Multilateral Arms Control Regimes in Asia: Prospects and Options,” Asian Perspective, volume 18, (Spring/Summer 1994), p. 5-37.

ABSTRACT: Examines sources of post-cold war tensions in the region and the likely impact of multilateral regional arms control upon Asia-Pacific international relations. Some focus on Soviet cold war arms control proposals, China’s role in Southeast Asia, Korean peninsula security, and US policies.

Secretary Christopher; Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, “The U.S. and China: Curbing Missile And Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” US Department of State Dispatch, volume 5, number 42, p.701, October 17, 1994.

1993

Li, Daoyu. “Foreign Policy and Arms Control: The View from China,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, number 10, (December, 1993), p. 9-12.

ABSTRACT: China’s limited nuclear weapons are only for self-defense and it is committed to nuclear non-proliferation. China’s foreign policy is guided by principles of world peace and progress and is opposed to forming military and political power blocs. China also believes all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, conventional, biological and chemical, ought to be eliminated. With the objective of achieving peace and stability in relations with its neighbors, China has held negotiations and signed various agreements with India and many republics of the former USSR.

1992

“China Puts Forward Proposal for Nuke Armament,” Beijing Review, volume 35, number 45, (9 November 1992), p. 13-16.

ABSTRACT: China abrogates the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons to promote and maintain world peace, security and development. It proposes an international agreement regarding the use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the withdrawal of deployed nuclear weapons in other countries and a ban of the use of outer space studies to develop weapon systems. The Chinese government recognizes every country’s right to take a stand on this issue. It also reiterates its commitment to promoting peace and security in the Asia Pacific region and in the world.

Lewis, John W., and Hua Di,  “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, volume. 17, number 2 (Fall 1992), p. 5-40.

1991

“Arms Talks Provide a Useful Forum,”  Beijing Review, volume 34, number 26, (1 July 1991), p. 30.

Segal, Gerald. “A New Order in Northeast Asia,” Arms Control Today, volume 21, (Spring 1991), p. 14-19.

ABSTRACT: Current status of formal and informal arms control agreements among the Soviet Union, China, and the Koreas.

 



II.  Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament
A.  Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation  B. Nuclear Testing and CTBT  C. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A.  Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation
       1. General Surveys  2. Nuclear Sales to India and Pakistan   3. Nuclear Exports to Iran, Iraq and Syria
       4. China and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

General Surveys

2003

Goldstein, Lyle J., "When China was a 'rogue state': the impact of China's nuclear weapons program on US-China relations during the 1960s," Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 (2003), pp. 739-764.

Wright, David and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Estimating China's Production of Plutonium for Weapons," Science and Global Security 11, number 1 (2003), pp. 61-80.

2000

Roberts, Brad, Robert Manning, and Ronald Montaperto, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," Foreign affairs, 79, no. 4, (2000), p. 53 (11 pages).

1999

Hirsch, Theodore M. and Bonnie D. Jenkins,  “Arms Control and Disarmament,” The International Lawyer, volume 33, number 2 (Summer 1999), p. 473.

1998

Yuan, I, “US-China Nonproliferation Cooperation: Debacle or Success? A constructivist/Neorealist
Debate,” Issues & Studies, volume 34, number 6, p. 29, 1998.

1996

Johnston, Alastair I., “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control
Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” China Journal, number 35 (January 1996), p. 27-61.

Suttmeier, Richard P. and Peter C. Evans, “China Goes Nuclear,” China Business Review
(September-October 1996), p. 16-21.

Wallerstein, Mitchel B., “China and Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?” Survival, volume 38, number 3
 (Autumn 1996), p.  58-66.

1995

Caldwell, John and Alexander T. Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Strategic Review, volume 23, (Fall 1995), p. 27-37.

ABSTRACT: Examines China’s current and potential atomic weapons capabilities and military strategy; impact on regional and international security; implications for the US.

China State Council Information Office, “China: Arms control and Disarmament” (PRC white paper; November 1995), in Beijing Review, number 48, November 27-December 3, 1995.

Gronlund, Lisbeth. et al. “China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off,” Survival, volume 37, number 4, (Winter 1995), p. 147-68.

ABSTRACT:  The success of the convention on prohibition of fissile material production largely depends on China’s participation. The production cut-off can become an important nuclear disarmament measure if China agrees to sign the treaty. China’s decision will depend on its nuclear-weapons program and its security concerns regarding the weapons programs of other countries. The United States and Russia can encourage China’s participation by keeping their stocks under international safeguards and reducing their nuclear weapons.

McLauchlan, Greg. “Nuclear Politics on the Pacific Rim,” Peace Review, volume 7, number 2, (Summer 1995), p. 149-154.

ABSTRACT: The contested terrain of nuclear politics on the Pacific Rim is examined. For the past fifty years, the Pacific Rim has been one of the world’s most militarized regions. That legacy has produced a variety of nuclear politics postures among the many countries in the area. The US has exerted considerable pressure to extend the nuclear nonproliferation treaty while simultaneously expanding the targets of US nuclear forces, & has thus wasted a historic opportunity to push the world toward a non-nuclear future. North Korea has pursued nuclearization in the face of harsh US economic sanctions & has threatened to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty. Strong pressure from China & Japan has forced the US to back off from its hard-line stance, but tensions in the area remain. Japan, the only nation that has experienced nuclear attack, has renounced nuclear weapons & could be a strong regional force for nonproliferation, but many of the legal & institutional underpinnings of Japan’s push toward non-nuclear peace have begun to wither away. The nuclear future of the region is in doubt.  Adapted from the source document. (Copyright 1996, Sociological Abstracts, Inc., all rights reserved.)

US Department of State Dispatch, volume 6, number 17, (24 April 1995), p. 354-6.

ABSTRACT:  For their mutual economic good, China and the US must maintain open markets. For greater national and international security, problems between the two nations such as policy on nuclear nonproliferation must be negotiated.

White, Gerard. “Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control:  Should the United States Government Substantially Change Its Foreign Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China?” Congressional Digest, volume 74, number 8-9, (August-September 1995), p. 218-21.

ABSTRACT:  The US should link its most favored nation agreement with China to nuclear proliferation issues to force the latter to desist from supplying nuclear weapons to developing countries. Through this policy, the US can prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and guarantee global peace.

1994

“China Proposes Nuclear Package,” Beijing Review, volume 37, number 41, (10 Oct. 1994), p. 29-33.

ABSTRACT: Chinese vice-premier Qian Qichen’s address at the 49th session of the United Nations General Assembly underlined the need for total destruction of nuclear weapons and stated the Chinese government’s stand on nuclear, economic and social policies. He said that all countries possessing nuclear weapons must make an unconditional pledge not to initiate their use and not to threaten non-nuclear states. He also said that China was against protectionism and discrimination in international trade.

Holloway, Nigel. “Goodwill Proliferates: U.S. and China Sign Missile, Nuclear Accords,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, number 42, (20 Oct. 1994), p. 20.

ABSTRACT: China and the US have signed accords on limiting nuclear proliferation and restricting the export of missiles. The nuclear agreement states that the two nations will work together to support a ban on ‘the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.’ That statement may convince North Korea to be more accommodating. In the missile statement, China for the first time agreed to the accepted definition of a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a topic that has caused the US to cut off some trade to it.

Hughes, David. “U.S. Study Details Nuclear Weapons: National Resources Defense Council Report on Great Britain, France and China,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 140, number 16, (18 April 1994), p. 43.

ABSTRACT: An NRDC study of nuclear-weapons inventories and future plans in China, France and the UK was aimed at promoting openness in negotiating future treaties. One surprise was the level of US help France received in perfecting its weapons. Details of each country’s programs are provided.

Lockwood, Dunbar. “The Status of U.S., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia,” Arms Control Today, volume 24, number 9, (Nov. 1994), p. 21-5.

ABSTRACT: The nuclear strategies and the deployment of nuclear weapons by the US, Russia and China in Northeast Asia will play a major role in the arms control and stability of the region and influence the nuclear strategies of weaker nations. The US policy in East Asia has been marked by the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons and oldest strategic weapons from the region. Russia’s forces have also reduced the bombers and dismantled land-based missiles. China, on the other hand, has built its nuclear forces but is not likely to start a nuclear conflict in the region.

Shuey, Robert, and Shirley A. Kan, “Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,” CRS Issue Brief, 29 June 1994, p. 1-15.

Sutter, Robert G., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Plicies: Implications and Options for the United States,” CRS report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994).

“The U.S. and China: Curbing Missile and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” (Statements by Warren Christopher and Qian Qichen) US Department of State Dispatch, volume 5, number 42, (17 Oct. 1994), p. 701-3.

ABSTRACT: The United States and China are seeking to resolve differences over the Missile Technology Control Regime, which covers the export of missiles. The two countries are also seeking to control the spread of fissionable nuclear materials.

1993

Butler, Steven and Julie Corwin. “Pacific Thunderclaps: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Buildup in Eastern Asia,” U.S. News & World Report, volume 114, number 24, (21 June 1993), p. 41-5.

ABSTRACT: The balance of power in Eastern Asia is shifting rapidly, as several nations build up their nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals. North Korea backed down from its threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but China is increasing military spending.

Cao, Hongxing. et al. “Climate Effects of Nuclear War in China,” Journal of Environmental Sciences, volume 5, (1993), p. 230-240.

ABSTRACT: By utilizing simulations of climatic response to nuclear smoke, which were made by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA, climate change in China induced by a large-scale nuclear war is analyzed. Remarkable climate change in China following nuclear smoke injections is found. The surface air temperature decreases dramatically around all China, surface cooling is 13 degrees C averaging over whole China in July and maximum cooling is 23.4 degrees C, 3 degrees C cooling in January and maximum 8 degrees C for the 150 Tg smoke injection (equivalent to the base-line nuclear war). However, the change in temperature is heterogeneous, implying that the rise in temperature happens over some parts of China.

Hersh, Seymour M., “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, 29 March 1993, p. 56-73.

ICT (International Campaign for Tibet), Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Waste on the Tibetan Plateau
(Washington, D.C.: ICT, 1993).

1992

Fieldhouse, Richard, “China’s Role in Proliferation,“ Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, volume 2, number 2 (Fall 1992), p. 537-557.

Hua Di, M. Granger Morgan, and Herbert Wulf, “The Arms Trade and Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in China,” in PSIS (Program in Science and International Security), Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), p. 1-17.

“NPC Decides to Join Nuclear Arms Pact,” Beijing Review volume 35, number 2, (13 Jan. 1992), p. 9-11.

Strauss, Marshall. “China the Next Great Proliferator,” Nuclear Times, volume 10, number 1, (Spring 1992), p. 20- 24.

ABSTRACT: China has been engaging in the profit-motivated proliferation of nuclear weapons while maintaining a facade of cooperation with international efforts to control nuclear arms. China has also developed a military-industrial complex for the export of arms. The children of China’s communist rulers control this operation and a large part of the profits are kept outside the country, presumably in preparation for an escape to another country. The US should support pro-democracy elements in China to end the abuse by China’s elite and stop its role in arms proliferation.

Zhao, Xiaowei. “The Threat of a New Arms Race Dominates Asian Geopolitics,” Global Affairs, volume 7, (Summer 1992), p. 29-40.

ABSTRACT: Impact of Chinese military policy and arms sales, focusing on proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. Assistance to North Korea and exports to South and Southwest Asia.

1991

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Bending Rules: Industrialized Countries Question China’s Cooperation With Developing Countries on Nuclear Projects,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 151, number 20, (16 May 1991), p. 15.

Nelan, Bruce W. “For Sale: Tools of Destruction,” Time, volume 137, number 16, (22 April 1991), p. 44.

Nuclear Sales to India and Pakistan

2003

Jain, Sushil Kumar, "Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics," International Political Science Review, 24, no. 1 (2003), pp. 113-122.

2002

Hagerty, Devin, "China and Pakistan:  Strains in the Relationship,"  Current History, 101 (September, 2002), pp. 284-289.

1996

Doherty, Carroll J. “Business Stakes are High in Sanctions Debate; Administration and Some Lawmakers Want to Avoid Cutting Off Loans for Beijing Over Nuclear Issue,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, volume 54, number 13, (30 March 1996), p. 891-3.

ABSTRACT: China’s alleged sale of nuclear-related equipment to Pakistan jeopardizes $10 billion in loans and other financing awaiting approval by the Import- Export Bank, the chief US guarantor of credit for overseas sales. A 1994 nuclear non-proliferation law requires President Clinton to cut off the credit, and frantic efforts by administration officials have uncovered no alternatives. The dispute merely presages debates congressional debates in the summer of 1996 over China’s trade status.

Holloway, Nigel and Ahmed Rashid. “Sparks For Tinder: Reports that China Exported Nuclear Technology to Pakistan have Strained an Already Tense Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 8, (22 Feb. 1996), p.14-7.

ABSTRACT: Reports that China provided nuclear aid to Pakistan have created tension between the US and China and may indirectly threaten the tenuous peace between China and Taiwan. The foreign ministers from China and Pakistan deny the reports that China provided machinery for concentrating uranium to Pakistan. If the reports are confirmed, the Clinton administration could levy strict economic sanctions against China for violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such sanctions, however, could jeopardize the US’s attempts to discourage China from attacking Taiwan.

Medeiros, Evan S. “U.S. Considers Sanctions on China for Weapons, Technology Transfers,” Arms Control Today, volume 26, number 1, (Feb. 1996), p. 21-3.

ABSTRACT: US intelligence sources revealed in Feb 1996, that China sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan, which could be a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ring magnets are used to produce highly- enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration is weighing the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on China and Pakistan, but is trying to balance the advantages of sanctions against US business interests in China. China has also been accused of selling C-802 cruise missiles to Iran, a violation of a 1992 pact.

“Row Over? America, China and Pakistan,” The Economist, volume 339, number 7966, (18 May 1996), p. 37-9.

ABSTRACT: The US dropped plans to boycott of Export-Import Bank loans to China after an official proclamation that China will no longer aid any un-safeguarded nuclear facility. The US had protested the delivery of Chinese ring magnets to Pakistan, which were suspected of being for nuclear-fuels production.

“U.S. Halts Funding Over China Nuclear Sales,” Facts on File, volume 56, number 2882, (29 Feb 1996), p. 115.

ABSTRACT: Sale of nuclear technology by China to Pakistan causes the Export-Import Bank to delay loan processing for one month while sanctions are considered

1995

“China’s Broken Promises: The World Needs to make it Keep Them,” The Economist, volume 336, number 7922, (8 July 1995), p. 17-9.

ABSTRACT: China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, and vowed to abide by the
Missile-Technology Control Regime in 1994, but there is some evidence the nation has not adhered to these agreements. It has violated the test ban treaty and sold uranium to India.

McDonald, Hamish. “Nuclear Pay-Off: China to Supply Enriched Uranium to India,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 3, (19 Jan. 1995), p. 22.

ABSTRACT: The Jan 5, 1995, announcement of a transfer of nuclear fuel from China to India highlights the growing ties between the two nations following a 1993 high-level visit. The fuel will help power the Tarapur plant near Bombay, which operates under international auspices. Most of India’s plants use enriched uranium that can be reprocessed to make plutonium for atomic weapons, and are not subject to international controls. The transfer took place a few days before US Defense Secretary William Perry’s visit.

1992

Cheung, Tai Ming and Salamat Ali. “Nuclear Ambitions; Pakistan Deal Bolsters China’s Defense Industry,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 3, (13 Jan. 1992), p. 12.

1991

Chellaney, Brahma “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security, volume. 16, (Summer 1991), p. 43-72.

ABSTRACT: Potential impact on regional and global security of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan; analysis of conceptual approaches to nonproliferation. With particular reference to the existing nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and China.

1990

“One Crackdown Leads to Another:  US Nuclear Technology Sanctions Against China,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 46, number 1, (Jan.-Feb. 1990), p. 3.

Nuclear Exports to Iran, Iraq, and Syria

1996

Timmerman, Kenneth R. “Does Iran Have the Bomb: Iran No Longer Pretends Not to Be Developing Nuclear Weapons; But New Information About Sales By Russia And China, and Much More, Suggests that the Mullah Regime is a Lot Closer than Anyone Thought,” American Spectator, volume 29, (Feb. 1996), p. 28-30.

ABSTRACT: Examines events and indicators of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, since 1984.

1995

Medeiros, Evan S. “China, Russia Plan to Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales to Iran,” Arms Control Today, volume 25, number 4, (May 1995), p. 23.

ABSTRACT: The Clinton administration has failed to convince China and Russia to reconsider the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. Both countries refused to give in to the US government’s plea, despite being offered classified intelligence information showing Iran’s intention to use the technology to develop nuclear arms. However, China and Russia did promise to establish bilateral working-level groups to pursue negotiations with the US. Moreover, China has pledged that the nuclear reactors to be sold to Iran will be placed under UN Atomic Energy Agency.

1993

George, Alan. “No Hidden Agenda: Syria to Establish First Nuclear Reactor Imported From China,” The Middle East, number 229, (Dec. 1993), p.10.

ABSTRACT: Syria will install its first nuclear reactor imported from China, at a location 30 kilometers south east of Damascus by the end of 1994. The reactor is similar to Canada’s Slowpoke with a mass of 985 grams. Syria plans to use the nuclear installation for agricultural, geological and medical purposes. The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1976. The dir-general is the US-trained physicist Assad Loutfi. Syria’s nuclear program is entirely pacific.

1992

“China Nuclear-Plant Pact Announced,” Facts on File, volume 52, number 2704, (17 Sept. 1992), p. 692-4.

1991

Cheung, Tai Ming and Salamat Ali. “Strategic Triangle: China Strengthens Relations With Iran And Pakistan,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 154, number 46, (14 Nov. 1991), p. 11-3.

“China Fuels Iraq’s Nuclear Power: China’s Sale of a Nuclear Power Plant to Iraq,” New Scientist, volume 131, number 1776, (6 July 1991), p.15.

China and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

2000

Scheinman, Lawrence, "Politics and pragmatism: the challenges for NPT 2000,"Arms Control Today, April 2000

1995

Du, Gengqi. “NPT Treaty at Crossroads: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty,” Beijing Review volume 38, number 17, (24 April 1995), p. 19-22.

ABSTRACT: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty is up for renewal in 1995 and all but 15 UN members will meet between Apr 17 and May 22, 1995 to review the treaty. The treaty has resulted in preventing almost all horizontal proliferation and enhanced international security. However, because it has not controlled vertical proliferation, non-nuclear countries are critical of the treaty’s favoritism of nuclear countries.

Holloway, Nigel. “Trick or Treaty? That Depends on Whether You’ve Got the Bomb or Not:  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 21, (25 May 1995), p.16-8.

ABSTRACT: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in New York, which ended on May 12, 1995, resulted in a unanimous decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty though some of the 175 nations felt pressured into that position. China was one of the strong supporters of nuclear disarmament, gaining it credibility in the diplomatic circles, but its decision to test a nuclear device only three days later has undermined any gains. Many Asian nations, especially those without nuclear capabilities, felt universality suffered under the decision.

Mendelsohn, Jack and Dunbar Lockwood. “Article VI Activities of Britain, France and China,”  Arms Control Today, volume 25, number 2, (March 1995), p. 12.

ABSTRACT: Britain, France and China, all signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, have made open announcements for negotiating a comprehensive test ban by 1996. Article VI of the treaty pledges good faith negotiation. Though the three countries have brought about considerable changes in their policy and are keeping a check on their nuclear activities, still it has been opined that the countries continue to modernize their nuclear forces.

1994

“Proper Priorities Needed for the NPT,” Nature, volume 368, number 6469, (24 March 1994), p. 275.

ABSTRACT: Sustaining the support of China for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is more important than forcing North Korea to accept an inspection team from the International Atomic Energy Agency to scrutinize its plutonium samples at the risk of a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council. The divided opinion of the signatories of NPT over North Korea’s attitudes toward outside interference in its national nuclear scenario runs the risk of a vertical split in the nuclear policemen of the world.

1993

Friedland, Jonathan. et al. “Knocking Heads. Japan Enters South Asian Nuclear Debate: India, Pakistan, China and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 15, (15 April 1993), p. 12.

ABSTRACT: Japan is wielding its economic aid to cajole India and Pakistan into accepting the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to draw China into multilateral talks on security in South Asia. Japan hopes that its large contributions to the region, which amounted to $1.6 billion in 1991, will ensure the success of this new initiative. The Japanese government would like to bring all three countries together to discuss security issues including the nuclear question.

1992

“China Accedes to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Beijing Review volume 35, number 13, (30 March 1992), p. 16.

ABSTRACT: China has agreed to abide by the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. On Mar 9, 1992, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen turned over to British Prime Minister John Major China’s Instrument of Accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The US, UK and the former USSR are the other signatories to the treaty. The decision to abide by the treaty was agreed upon by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Dec 29, 1991. Provisions of the instrument are discussed.

Wolfsthal, Jon B. “China Nears NPT Membership, U.S. to Drop Missile Sanctions,” Arms Control Today, volume 22, number 1, (Jan.-Feb. 1992), p. 46.

ABSTRACT: China is expected to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before the end of Mar 1992. The country’s National People’s Congress agreed to comply with the NPT in a Dec 29, 1991 vote. With the signing of the treaty, China would be prevented from exporting nuclear weapons and weapons technology to non-NPT signatories. China has also agreed to conform with International Atomic Energy Agency regulations concerning nuclear technology exports. The US is reportedly preparing to lift sanctions against the country in exchange for Chinese compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime.

B.  Nuclear Testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

1997

Gerardi, Greg and Fisher, Richard, “China’s Missile Tests Show More Muscle,” Jane’s Intelligence
 Review, March 1997.

1996

“China Halts Nuclear Testing,” Beijing review, Volume 39, Number 34, p. 5, 1996.

Collina, Tom Zamora. “Crunch Time in Geneva: Final Negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Underway,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 52, number 3, (May-June 1996), p. 10-3.

ABSTRACT: Final negotiations will resume in May 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland, to complete the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty for its presentation to the United Nations in Sep 1996. China and India could hold up completion of the treaty because of goals each country has set.

Holloway, Nigel. “Bargaining Counter: U.S. Offers China a Nuclear Carrot,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 13, (28 March 1996), p. 20.

ABSTRACT: While the US bolsters Taiwan against China’s military exercises, officials of the two countries are meeting at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. US officials at the conference continue to lobby against China’s insistence on allowing ‘peaceful nuclear explosions,’ offering instead computer software to help model the explosions. The software could help China ensure the reliability of its nuclear weapons, without helping it to make more advanced ones. Backers of the effort, launched in Oct 1994, call it the lesser of two evils.

Horgan, John. “‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Explosions: China’s Interest in this Technology May Scuttle the Test-Ban Treaty,” Scientific American, volume 274, number 6, (June 1996), p.14-6.

ABSTRACT:  China’s emerging interest in peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) could impede passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China seeks an exclusion of PNEs for purposes such as diverting freshwater to the Gobi desert, but critics note that any nuclear explosion can provide useful information about nuclear weapons.

Norris, Robert S. and William M. Arkin. “Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-1995,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 52, number 3, (May-June 1996), p. 61.

ABSTRACT:  France decided to test six nuclear weapons in 1995 and 1996 despite widespread public opposition, and stated it would sign the comprehensive test ban once the testing was complete. China also tested nuclear weapons in 1995. Statistics about the number of nuclear weapons tests are listed.

“Nuclear Controls: Tightening,” The Economist, volume 339, number 7970, (15 June 1996), p. 40-2.

“Testing,” The Economist, volume 339, number 7970, (15 June 1996), p. 4.

ABSTRACT: China’s nuclear testing has been strongly criticized by Japan, which has adopted a resolution to combat the process, cancelled its financial aid to China and is reportedly planning to appeal for a United Nations resolution calling for the termination of all testing. Sino-Japanese relations are deteriorating due to the unnecessarily severe steps taken by Japan. Japan, which remained silent on the nuclear testing conducted by other countries, especially the United States, is reacting excessively towards China.

1995

“China Conducts Nuclear Tests: Japan Cuts Aid in Protest,” Facts on File, volume 55, number 2857, (31 August 1995), p. 632.

ABSTRACT: China announced Aug 17, 1995, that it had conducted an underground nuclear weapons test.

Goodwin, Irwin. “Despite Nuclear Tests By France and China, Prospects Rise for Comprehensive Test Ban,” Physics Today, volume 48, number 10, (Oct. 1995), p. 51-4.

ABSTRACT: Pres. Bill Clinton supported a ‘zero threshold’ nuclear test ban on Aug. 11, 1995. His decision has boosted the chances that the five global nuclear powers will end a long-running deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland.

Johnson, Rebecca. “Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT – Undermined,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 51, number 5, (1995), p.11-3.

ABSTRACT: The breaking of the nuclear test moratorium by Jacques Chirac’s France with its planned testing in the S Pacific has seriously hampered the CTBT. The US has offered plans to increase the threshold for testing above the original four pounds. The concerns of non-nuclear countries are also discussed.

Ren, Xianfang. “Japan: Big Fuss Over Nuclear Tests,” Beijing Review volume 38, number 42, (16 Oct. 1995), p. 22.

ABSTRACT: Seismologists believe the test occurred around Lop Nor, Xinjiang. Japan cut off foreign aid to China on Aug 29,1995, in protest of the test. China says it will halt testing when a worldwide ban is imposed.

1994

“China Conducts Nuclear Test: October 1994 Underground Test in Lop Nor Despite Moratorium on Testing by Four Leading Nuclear Nations,” Facts on File, volume 54, number 2813, (27 Oct. 1994), p. 804-6.

Gupta, Vipin, “The Status of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
 January 1994.

Naeye, Robert. “China Calls: Seismic Waves from an Underground Nuclear Explosion in China Reveal the Earth’s Inner Structure,” Discover, volume 15, number 1, (Jan. 1994), p. 36.

ABSTRACT: An underground nuclear explosion in China in May 1992 sent seismic waves through the earth that revealed an anomaly on the border of the earth’s core and mantle. Measurements of a primary wave that had split in two indicated a rock-like structure 200 miles square and 80 miles deep.

Shen, Dingli. “Toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A Chinese perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 50, number 2, (March-April 1994), p. 51-5.

ABSTRACT: China has conducted far fewer nuclear weapons tests than other nuclear powers and will be reluctant to agree to a comprehensive test ban. The Chinese government supports nuclear nonproliferation and has repeatedly stated that it will never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.

1993

Brown, William. “Chinese Test Site Forced into Public View,” New Scientist, volume 140, number 1893, (2 Oct. 1993), p. 5.

ABSTRACT: Remote-sensing specialist at the Imperial College in London, UK, Vipin Gupta, has developed a system to trace underground nuclear testing sites. His partnership with the independent organization Veric has allowed this information to be released to the public. Gupta has pinpointed China’s main testing sites through the analysis of satellite pictures and the use of sysmatic instruments. All 38 of China’s tests have been undertaken at the Lop Nor site on the edge of the Taklimakan desert, which is 100,000 square kilometers. All tests since 1980 have been undertaken underground.

“China Airs Stand on Nuclear Testing,”  Beijing Review, volume 36, No. 42, (18 Oct. 1993), p. 4.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese government has pledged its support for global nuclear disarmament although it has admitted to the possession of nuclear arsenals for self-defense. An underground nuclear test was performed on Oct 5, 1993, but the government insists that it will never initiate the use of nuclear arms or provoke other countries to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese government agreed with non-nuclear states that a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear arms testing is essential for stability and peace in the world.

“China Conducts Nuclear Test,” Facts on File, volume 53, number 2759, (14 Oct. 1993), p. 763-5.

ABSTRACT: China performed an underground nuclear weapons test in Western China on Oct 5, 1993, despite pleas by the US and other large nations to forgo the testing. None of the five countries with nuclear weapons capability have conducted nuclear testing since Sep 1992.

Collina, Tom Zamora. “China Bucks Ban With Bang,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 49, number10, (Dec. 1993), p. 3-5.

ABSTRACT: China conducted an underground nuclear test on Oct 5, 1993, in defiance of international pressure to adhere to a voluntary test ban until a comprehensive test ban treaty is in place. China’s action is not expected to provoke a resumption of testing by other countries.

Lockwood, Dunbar. “China’s Nuclear Test Prompts U.S., Others to Review Test Policies,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, number 9, (Nov. 1993), p. 20.

ABSTRACT: China’s nuclear test on Oct 4, 1993, will seriously affect the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations and make an extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty difficult. The US and other nuclear powers may end the moratorium on nuclear tests depending on security perceptions. China has defended the nuclear test saying it had conducted the least number of nuclear tests among the nuclear powers, which is correct according to available statistics.
 

1992

“China’s Smoke Signal: Nuclear Warhead Detonated in Xinjiang Province as Part of a Military Testing Program,” Time, volume 139, number 22, (1 June 1992), p. 23.

“Large Nuclear Explosive Tested,” Facts on File, volume 52, number 2688, (28 May 1992), p. 398.

Strokan, Sergei. “Echo from the Chinese Bomb Blast: One-Megaton Nuclear Test Explosion in China,” Moscow News, volume 24, number 3531, (14 June 1992), p. 14.

ABSTRACT: China displays her nuclear power when a one-megaton nuclear test bomb goes off in a northwest desert. China disapproves of the way the new world is developing and may take up arms to defend Third World countries despite China’s commitment to nuclear disarmament. China’s refusal to disarm her standby missiles is viewed with concern by nearby Japan and India, prompting them to take measures for their security.

1991

Fieldhouse, Richard. “China’s Mixed Signals on Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 47, number 4, (May 1991), p. 37-43.
 

C.  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

2002

Debontride, Bernard, "Nuclear power - Ling Ao shows how it should be done - Recent experience in China has demonstrated how to build nuclear plants on, or even ahead of, schedule and well within budget," Modern power systems, 22, no. 8, (2002), p. 31 (4 pages).

2001

Naiyan, Wang, "The energy development and the environmental protection in China," Fusion engineering and design, 54, no. 1, (2001), p. 135 (6 pages).
 

"The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology," RAND Monographs/Books MR-1292-AF, 2001.

1995

“China’s Power Industry Reaches a New Level,” Beijing Review,  volume 38, number 47, (20 Nov. 1995), p. 17-19.

ABSTRACT: The power industry of China is highly qualified in the fields of power grid construction, transmission lines and in the total installed capacity. The installation of units producing 200,000 kw has led to rapid economic and technical development. China’s power industry includes nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric power plants. Foreign investments are utilized in this industrial sector and domestic level generating units are being improved. Power grids are being constructed in all the urban and majority of the rural areas.

Jiang, Xinxiong. “Nuclear Power: Peaceful Use and International Cooperation,”  Beijing Review, volume 38, number 50, (11 Dec 1995), p. 15-19.

ABSTRACT: China’s nuclear policy is geared towards the non-military applications of nuclear power. The country shares the goal of the international community to transfer military technology to industries. The Qinshan and Daya Bay nuclear power plants were constructed in the early 1980s primarily to provide electricity. China has established cooperative agreements with more than 10 countries for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

“Nuclear Industry Seeks Cooperation: Expansion of Nuclear Industry in China,”  Beijing Review, volume 38, number 4, (23 Jan. 1995), p. 6.

ABSTRACT: Government officials in China opine that international cooperation and aid will contribute to the growth of its nuclear industry and power sector. Entering the global market will enable China to adopt advanced technology and attract investments from developed nuclear power sectors. China’s potential to construct low-capacity nuclear facilities will be useful to developing countries.

“Progress in Nuclear Physics: Discoveries of Chinese Nuclear Physicists,” Beijing Review, volume38, number 12, (20 March 1995), p. 29.

ABSTRACT: Chinese scientists at the China Institute of Atomic Energy, Beijing, have made important discoveries in low-energy nuclear physics, nuclear structures and nuclear reacting mechanisms using the HI-13 tandem accelerator. Scientists have also developed new experimental techniques and equipment at the tandem accelerator.

1994

“Canadian Nuclear Reactors Bought by China,” Facts on File, volume 54, number 2816, (17 Nov. 1994), p. 865.

ABSTRACT: China’s purchase of two Candu nuclear reactors from Canada was one in a large trade mission undertaken by the two countries in Nov 1994. The Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd will supervise construction of the reactors, which are needed in China to meet energy needs.

1993

“Nuclear Plants to go to Iran, China: Russia Will Build Nuclear Power Plants in Iran and China,” Facts on File, volume 53, number 2728, (11 March 1993), p.164-66.

Zhang, Ping. “Experts Work for Peaceful Nuclear Use,”  Beijing Review, volume 36, number 44, (1 Nov 1993), p. 6-9.

ABSTRACT: Scientists at Plasma Physics Institute in China developed the HT-7 Tokamak-type nuclear fusion controlled by supercondors. The nuclear fusion was a clean source of energy and is the fourth one, the other three being in Russia, France and Japan. The construction of the device was possible due to China’s progress to market economy.

Zheng, Zhipeng. “The Present and Future of China’s Particle Physics Research,” Science, volume 262, number 5132, (15 Oct. 1993), p. 368.

ABSTRACT: China has been involved in particle research since the field’s beginnings, and the country aims to make more contributions to the field in the future. Discoveries made at the Beijing Electron-Positron Collider and the Beijing Spectrometer are also discussed.

1992

Goldstein, Carl. “The Nuclear Option: Nuclear Energy in China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 23, (11 June 1992), p. 50-52.

ABSTRACT: Nuclear energy is a significant component in China’s energy plans because of the support given by Premier Li Peng. Despite international cutbacks in nuclear power generation due to growing doubts regarding its economic viability, China pushes on with nuclear energy development. Problems regarding radioactive wastes and decommissioning of decrepit plants have been put aside so that coal-powered energy can be complemented with nuclear power. Chinese energy officials justify this policy by pointing out the unreliability of coal supplies for existing coal-fired power plants.

Zhuo, Peirong and Jiang Hanzhen. “Building China’s First Nuclear Power Station: Qinshan Nuclear Power Station,”  Beijing Review, volume 35, number 8, (24 Feb 1992), p. 35-39.

ABSTRACT: The Qinshan Nuclear Power Station, the first Chinese nuclear power plant, started electric power production on Nov 20, 1991. The Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Development Institute designed the plant, which is located along Hangzhou Bay for optimal safety. The plant was designed to withstand an intensity seven earthquake and a sea wall was constructed as protection against tsunamis. The International Atomic Energy Agency conducted a 19-day inspection and certified that the plant conforms to its standards.

1991

“Development of China’s Nuclear Science,” Beijing Review volume 34, number 7-8, (18 Feb. 1991), p. 42-49.

Gallagher, Michael C. “Hong Kong Fears Chinese Chernobyl,”  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 47, number 8, (Oct. 1991), p. 9-13.

ABSTRACT: Hong Kong is worried about the potential for a Chernobyl-type accident at the Daya Bay nuclear power station in Guangdong, China. However, China says it is taking all safety precautions to prevent such an event.

Han Guojian. “China - A Country of Nuclear Power,” Beijing Review  volume 34, number 51, (23 Dec 1991), p. 16-20.

“Innovative Pressureless Nuclear Heating Reactor: Construction of Low Temperature Nuclear Reactor in Fuxin, China,” Beijing Review volume 34, number 46, (18 Nov. 1991), p. 45.

“Nuke Industry. Safety First: Control of Radiation Levels in Nuclear Installations in China,”  Beijing Review volume 34, number 23, (10 June 1991), p. 9-11.

“Nuclear Reactor for Peaceful Use: Heavy-Water Reactor for Research Purposes for Algeria,”  Beijing Review volume 34, number 19, (13 May 1991), p. 8.

“Sino-French Contract Signed: Fragem Co. of France to Design and Manufacture Nuclear Fuel Components for China’s Pressure Stacks,”  Beijing Review volume 34, number 25, (24 June 1991), p. 42.

1990

Liu, Jianjun. “Nuclear Technology Boosts Agriculture: China’s Research and Application System for Nuclear Agronomy,”  Beijing Review  volume 33, number 38, (17 Sept. 1990), p. 28-31.

Yao, Jianguo. “International co-operation sought: for construction of Chinese nuclear power plant,”  Beijing Review volume 33, number 29, (16 July 1990), p. 43.
 



III. Arms Transfers (Non-Nuclear Weapons)
A.  China's Arms Exports  B.  China's Arms Imports

A.  China's Arms Exports
    1. General Surveys  2.  Sale of Missiles to Pakistan  3.  Alleged Shipment of Chemical Weapons to Iran
     4.  Arms Export to Other Countries

General Surveys

1997

Paquette, Laure, “Arms Exports and Arms Control in Mainland China Manufacture and Trade of Major Weapons Systems, 1989-92,” Issues & Studies, Volume 33, Number 3, p. 69, 1997.

Wandi, Jiang. “Tighter Exprot Controls on Nuclear Exports,” Beijing Review, (1-7 Dec. 1997), p. 21-23.

1996

Kan, Shirley A. “Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service Report 96-767 F, Library of Congress, (13 Sept. 1996), p. 27-36.

Kan, Shirley A. “Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service Report 96-767 F, Library of Congress, (17 Oct. 1996), p. 4-5.

Kan, Shirley A. and Zachary Davis, "China," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak, (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 36-39.

1995

Eikenberry, Karl W., "Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers", McNair Paper, No. 36
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995).

Gronlund, Lisbeth, et al. “China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-off,” Survival volume 37, number 4, (Winter 1995-96), p. 147-50.

US Government Accounting Office. “Export Controls: Some Controls over Missile-related Technology Exports to China are Weak,” (Washington DC: GAO/NSIAD-95-82, April 1995).

1994

Englemann, Larry and Roy Rowan. “Boom Booming: Chinese Overseas Arms Businesses,” The New Republic, volume 210, number 23, (6 June 1994), p. 19.

ABSTRACT: China has enjoyed more than $13 billion in arms sales since 1985, often clones of sophisticated weapons such as the Israeli Python 3 ground-to-air missile. The sales undercut China-US relations by making providing weaponry which fuel guerrilla and international conflicts.
 

1993

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Arms Reduction: The PLA’s Main Weapons Dealer Goes Civilian,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 41, (14 Oct. 1993), p. 68.

ABSTRACT: Poly Group Corp, the arms dealer for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is shifting its goals to profit making in civilian sectors. The move comes as part of the PLA’s strategy to make up for declining purchasing power due to inflation. Poly has been renovated into an independent conglomerate corporation with interests in property development, shipping and Hong Kong trade. Xie Datong, executive director of Poly, defended its arms sales policies as strictly controlled.

Peng, Qingyuan. “China’s Stand on Arms Transfer,” Beijing Review volume 36, No. 18, (3 May 1993), p. 8-10.

ABSTRACT: China became signatory to the UN’s Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Convention on Chemical Weapons in 1993. The country also supports the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between the US and Russia. However, China believes that any move towards disarmament and arms control should take into consideration the sovereignty of each nation in protecting its national interests and security. Address delivered by Peng Qingyuan at the 89th Inter-Parliamentary Conference held in New Delhi in Apr 1993.  This is a major turnaround for the Chinese to limit sales of conventional weapons.

Wolfsthal, Jon B. “New Reports of Missile Transfers Stir Debate on China’s MFN Status,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, number 5, (June 1993), p. 32-34.

ABSTRACT: Reports confirming China’s sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan could jeopardize China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading position and inhibit US trade with supplier companies according to the 1991 Defense Authorization Act. This act is directed against violators of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Congress has made repeated attempts to impose conditions on China’s MFN status though under present circumstances it could lead to China’s interference in America’s efforts to persuade North Korea not to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Zuckerman, Mortimer B. et al. “ ‘China’s Arms Sales are Very Limited’: A Conversation with Party Leader Jiang Zemin,” U.S. News & World Report, volume 114, number 10, (15 March 1993), p. 60-62.

ABSTRACT: Jiang believes that pressure applied against China to force changes in its human rights policy would be ineffective. Jiang discusses Chinese policy as it relates to a variety of topics including arms sales, the economy and trade with the US. Includes interview with China Institute for International Studies Chairman Xu Xin.

1992

Bitzinger, Richard A. “Arms To Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World,” International Security, volume 17, (Fall 1992), p. 84-111.

ABSTRACT: Impact of sales on regional security developments and on Western security interests; prospects for modernization in light of the limits on domestic research and imported technology.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Unguided Missile:  China’s Arms Exports,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 5, (6 Feb. 1992), p. 42-44.

ABSTRACT: China’s defense industry relies mainly on arms-export firms to sell military wares to Third-World countries. With the reduced demand for conventional weaponry, China has began marketing satellite-delivery systems and nuclear technology to its foreign clients, possibly for military applications. International pressure is being brought upon China to regulate its foreign arms sales.

“Fighting Back: China,” The Economist, volume 322, number 7749, (7 March 1992), p. 36.

ABSTRACT: China ranks fifth as an arms merchant, behind the US, the Soviets and Germany. Is has only 10% of the market in the poorer countries however. China’s 3.2m-man army needs to be modernized. Hard currency from arms sales will enable China to do this.

Gill, Bates R. “Curbing Beijing’s Arms Sales,” Orbis, volume 36, (Summer 1992), p. 379-96.

ABSTRACT: Reviews developments since the 1950s and US efforts to check the arms outflow.

Hyer, Eric. “China’s Arms Merchants: Profits in Command,” The China Quarterly, number 132, (Dec. 1992), p. 1101-19.

ABSTRACT: China has increased its arms trade since its establishment as the People’s Republic of China, earning an annual income of US $2 billion. China exports its weapons to its neighboring countries and western powers. The Maoist government had allotted a substantial part of the budget for defense but Deng Xiaoping reduced this allotment in 1978, as a result of which the arms industry and the People’s Liberation Army incurred a loss. Foreign markets were sought to compensate for the loss and strengthen the domestic economy.

Kamal, Nazir. “China’s Arms Export Policy and Responses to Multilateral Restraints,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 14, number 2, (Sept. 1992), p. 112-42.

ABSTRACT: China’s arms trade earnings were significantly boosted by the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, the US and other western countries moved to limit China’s arms exports by coercing the latter to sign the two international accords, which limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China acceded to US pressures and reduced its arms exports to Third World nations. It feared that a confrontation with the US on arms shipments could jeopardize its earnings from the US-China trade. However, the stability of such arms restraints could be altered if China moves for greater economic liberalization.

“Over the Cliff: China’s Arms Sales Profits,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 137, number 5, (3 August 1992), p. 19.

1991

Di, Jua and Zue Litai. “Beijing’s Defense Establishment: solving the Arms-export Enigma,” International Security, (Spring 1991).

Doherty, Carroll J. “Arms Sales Reports Stir Hill Critics: China’s Arms Sales Policy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, volume 49, number 17, (27 April 1991), p. 1046.

Ellis, David. “China’s Eager Missile Merchants: China’s Sale of Weapons of Mass Destruction may Endanger Relations with the United States,” Time, volume 137, number 15, (15 April 1991), p. 17.

“Gun Diplomacy: China,” The Economist, volume 321, number 7730, (26 Oct. 1991), p. 40-42.

ABSTRACT: China has agreed with US, Soviet Union, France and Great Britain to limit arms sales.

Lawrence, Susan V. “Inside Beijing’s Arms Bazaar: Well-Connected Firms Compete for Customers,” U.S. News & World Report, volume 111, number 4, (22 July 1991), p. 36-39.

Lewis, John W. et al.  “Beijing’s Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma,” International Security, volume 15, number 4, (Spring 1991), p. 87-110.

“No Friend In Deed: China,” The Economist, volume 321, number 7732, (9 Nov. 1991), p. 36.

ABSTRACT: Secretary of State James A. Baker will visit China with hard words about China’s role as arms merchant to the world. A further charge that China sold enriched uranium to Iran has further heated the issue. China angrily compares its ‘insignificant’ sales to those of the US itself.

Rizvi, Gowner. “Has China Sold Out the Third World?” World Press Review, volume 38, number 12, (Dec. 1991), p. 12-4.

ABSTRACT: China has aligned itself with other major nations by signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty much to the dismay of many in the Third World had seen to China as a means to acquire nuclear weapons.

Watson, Russell and Frank Jr. Gibney. “Merchants of Death: China’s Arms Sales,” Newsweek, volume 118, number 21, (18 Nov. 1991), p. 38-40.

ABSTRACT: China’s sales of weapons to Iran and other countries has become a source of friction with the US. Pres Bush is concerned that these arms sales will worsen instability in the Middle East. The US may retaliate if China does not restrain its weapons industry.

1990

Kan, Shirley, “China’s Arms Sales: Overview and Outlook for the 1990s,” in U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, China’s Economic Dilemma.

Sales of Missiles to Pakistan

1994

Englemann, Larry and Roy Rowan. “Boom Booming: Chinese Overseas Arms Businesses,” The New Republic, volume 210, number 23, (6 June 1994), p. 19.

ABSTRACT: China has enjoyed more than $13 billion in arms sales since 1985, often clones of sophisticated weapons such as the Israeli Python 3 ground-to-air missile. The sales undercut China-US relations by making providing weaponry which fuel guerrilla and international conflicts.

“U.S., China Resolves Missile-Sales Dispute,” Facts on File, volume 54, number 2812, (20 Oct. 1994), p. 768-770.

ABSTRACT: The US withdrew its restrictions on selling high-technology equipment to China on Oct 4, 1994, after China agreed to stop exporting medium-range missiles. The US had established the ban in Aug 1993, because it claimed China was supplying Pakistan with missiles.

1993

Borrus, Amy. “Getting Tough with China Could be Tough on the U.S.: Sanctions over Arms Sales to Pakistan Might Hurt Trade with Beijing,” Business Week, No. 3335, (6 Sept. 1993), p. 39-40.

ABSTRACT: US sanctions against China in response to China’s transfer of missile components to Pakistan may hurt up to $500 million in US exports and may cause China to sell even more arms. Cray Research Inc and AT&T are among the firms whose relations with China may be hurt.

Chanda, Nayan. “Red Rockets’ Glare: China’s Sale of Missiles to Pakistan and Alleged Shipment of Chemical Weapons to Iran Further Worsen an Already Strained Relationship with the US,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, (9 Sept. 1993), p.10-11.

ABSTRACT: Impact of US economic sanctions. US reaction to Chinese sale of M11 short-range tactical guided missiles to Pakistan in violation of nonproliferation agreement and interception of the Chinese freighter Yin He, believed by US intelligence to be carrying chemical munitions to Iran. Sino-American relations deteriorated due to US fears that China was increasing its sales of weapons to other countries. First came suspicions that a Chinese ship was illicitly transporting components for chemical weapons to Iran, followed by the supposed sale of Chinese M11 missile technology to Pakistan. The M11 sale prompted the US on Aug 26, 1993 to impose two-year sanctions on 10 Chinese aerospace companies. However, one sign that US-China relations may eventually improve is the American decision to allow China to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.

“China Protests Against US Sanctions,”  Beijing Review volume 36, number 36, (6 Sept. 1993), p. 6-8.

ABSTRACT: China has denied the accusation that it had sold the M-11 missile to Pakistan and has claimed that the US decision to impose economic sanctions against China is baseless. The Chinese officials have tried to explain their commitment to the MTCR, but to no avail. The US has also banned the export of sensitive US technology to China for two years, which, according to Liu Huaqiu, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, has created a breach in the Sino-US relations.

“Diplomacy Hit by Missile: China and America,” The Economist, volume 328, number 7826, (28 August 1993), p. 32-34.

ABSTRACT: US-China relations are again strained, three months after China’s most-favored nation status was renewed in May 1993. The US is upset about China’s sale of missile technology to Pakistan, the expulsion of labor activist Han Dongfang and China’s rising trade surplus with the US.

“Psst! Wanna Buy a Missile? U.S. Places Sanctions Against China in an Attempt to Block Arms Sales,” Newsweek, volume 122, number 10, (6 Sept. 1993), p. 28.

ABSTRACT: The sanctions imposed by the US on China, as a way to prevent international arms sales, will probably not work. The Chinese are not dependent on US exports and can easily obtain what they need in Europe. The sanctions may end up hurting US industry more than China’s.

Strokan, Sergei. “China Sold Missiles to Pakistan,” Moscow News, number 33, (13 August 1993), p. 6.

ABSTRACT: The CIA is investigating reports on China’s sale of M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, which will develop its own missiles on acquiring knowledge on Chinese missile technology. If the deal goes through, the US will resort to strict action on China and Pakistan, although China, which is a part of the Missile Technology Control Regime, would not have violated any international commitments. China’s economic contacts with the US will be severed, leading to stagnation in its economic development.

“United States as Proliferation Policeman: US Penalizes China for Selling Arms to Pakistan,” Nature,  volume 365, number 6441, (2 Sept. 1993), p. 1.

ABSTRACT:  Pres Clinton has imposed economic sanctions on China for selling ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. The sanction includes a ban involving sales worth over $1 billion in terms of high technology products. Pres Clinton adopted this tough stance after the US intelligence agents uncovered evidence to prove that China had violated the Missile Technology Control Regime. The ban may cost American defense manufactures up to $500 million in sales and jobs.

Wolfsthal, Jon B. “Clinton Adjusts China Policy, May Narrow Sanctions,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, number 10, (Dec. 1993), p. 18.

ABSTRACT: The Clinton administration may reduce the sanctions imposed on China to improve bilateral relations. Continued sanctions can affect the US aerospace industry by denying it lucrative Chinese contracts. Consequently, China may receive the Cray supercomputers and two satellites which it wishes to buy from the US. The US is still doubtful of China’s commitment to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and has sought China’s adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime policies.

1992

“China’s Adherence to Missile Control Guidelines,” US Department of State Dispatch, volume 3, number 10, (9 March 1992), p. 189.

ABSTRACT: The US recognizes China’s acceptance of the guidelines set forth by the Missile Technology Control Regime, and will remove sanctions imposed on China after two companies transferred missile technologies in violation of the agreement.

Alleged Shipment of Chemical Weapons to Iran

1993

Chanda, Nayan. “Drifting Apart: A Row Over a Chinese Ship the US Claims is Carrying Banned Chemicals to Iran Highlights the Deteriorating Ties Between the Two Countries as Their National Priorities Diverge,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, (26 Aug. 1993), p. 10-11.

ABSTRACT: US Navy interception of Chinese freighter, allegedly carrying ingredients for making mustard and nerve gases, in the Strait of Hormuz. Implications of the Yin He incident for US efforts to halt proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and China’s efforts to increase arms sales to the Middle East.

Chanda, Nayan. “Red Rockets’ Glare: China’s Sale of Missiles to Pakistan and Alleged Shipment of Chemical Weapons to Iran Further Worsen an Already Strained Relationship with the US,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, (9 Sept. 1993), p. 10-11.

ABSTRACT: Impact of US economic sanctions. US reaction to Chinese sale of M-11 short-range tactical guided missiles to Pakistan in violation of nonproliferation agreement and interception of the Chinese freighter Yin He, believed by US intelligence to be carrying chemical munitions to Iran.

Eckerman, Celes. “Inspection of Chinese Cargo Ship Yields No Evidence of Chemicals,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, No. 8, (Oct. 1993), p. 19.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese ship, Yui He, did not carry chemical weapon components to Iran as was suspected earlier. The ship was inspected at the Saudi Arabian port of Dhamman by Saudi and Chinese officials, who cleared it of the charge. The ship was allegedly carrying thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, used in the production of mustard and nerve gas. The US claimed to have had evidence that the ship was bound for Iran with the chemicals and desired to inspect it or block its entry into Iranian ports.

Liu Yegang. “Chinese Cargo Ship ‘Yinhe’ Cleared of Suspicion,”  Beijing Review  volume 36, number 38, (20 Sept. 1993), p. 19-21.

ABSTRACT: An inspection carried out by Chinese and Saudi Arabian officials with a US technical advisor, confirmed that the Chinese cargo ship, ‘Yinhe’ was not carrying the banned chemicals thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride. The US alleged that its intelligence indicated that the ship was carrying the chemicals prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, of which China is a signatory. The mistake prevented the ‘Yinhe’ from delivering its goods on time and caused it to run out of fuel and water.

Yue, Tiao. “US Breaches International Law on the ‘Yinhe’ Incident,” Beijing Review volume 36, number 38, (20 Sept. 1993), p. 12-14.

ABSTRACT: The US mistakenly accused a Chinese cargo ship, the ‘Yinhe’, of carrying the chemicals thiodiglycol and thionyl, which are used to make weapons. A joint Saudi-Chinese inspection group proved this to be false in Saudi Arabia, but the ship had already been prevented from carrying out its business. The Chinese government has always obeyed international conventions and the accusation has damaged the US’s relations with China.

Arms Exports to other Countries

2003

"PENALIZING BEIJING - The Bush administration is accelerating sanctions against Chinese companies over arms proliferation," Far Eastern economic review, 166, no. 44, (2003), p. 32 (2 pages).

1993

Lintner, Bertil. “Arms for Eyes: Military Sales Raise China’s Profile in Bay of Bengal: China’s Sales to Burma,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 50, (16 Dec. 1993), p. 26.

ABSTRACT: Chinese sales of military equipment to Burma and cooperation with Burma’s army, navy and air force are causing alarm among countries with an interest in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea portions of the Indian Ocean. India, Indonesia, Thailand and Japan are particularly concerned about Sino-Burmese naval activity in the region. Chinese leaders, evidently believing in Burma’s strategic value due to its position between India and Southeast Asia, have provided the Burmese junta with modern tanks, warplanes, warships and new naval facilities.

Navias, Martin. “Proliferation in the Middle East and the North Asian Connection,” Arms Control, (London) volume 14, (Dec. 1993), p. 287-310.

ABSTRACT: Examines trade in non-conventional weapons and ballistic missiles by China and North Korea; some focus on sales to Iran during its war with Iraq, 1980-88.

1991

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Missile Refrain: US Pressures China on Missile Sales to the Middle East,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 152, number 26, (27 June 1991), p. 12-14.

Gill, R. Bates. “China Looks to Thailand: Exporting Arms, Exporting Influence,” Asian Survey, volume 31, number 6, (June 1991), p. 526-540.

CAPTIONS: PRC Arms Transfers to Thailand, 1985-90, by year of order. (table); Values of exports of major weapons by China, 1985-89. (table)

1990

Lintner, Bertil. “Lock and Load: Chinese Arms Supply to Burma Indicates the Ruling Government is Determined to Stay in Power,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 149, number 37, (13 Sept. 1990), p. 28.

“Who, Us? Chinese Ammunition in Iraq,” The Economist, volume  317, number 7675, (6 Oct. 1990), p. 38.

B.  China's Arms Imports
    1.  General Surveys  2.  Arms Acquisition from Russia  3.  Import of Weapons from Israel
    4.  High-Tech Transfers from the United States

General Surveys

2002

"CHINA - PAYING FOR A BIG STICK - The People's Liberation Army is the world's No. I arms buyer and isn't shy about its growing power, prompting some concern in foreign capitals . Plus: Beijing is a key market for Russia and Israel," Far Eastern economic review. 165, no. 3, (2002), pp. 30 (6 pages).

2001

Ahrari, Ehsan, " Iran, China and Russia: The Emerging Anti-US Nexus?" Security Dialogue, 32, no. 4 (2001), pp. 453-466.

1996

Proteous, Holly. “China’s View of Strategic Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, volume 8, number 3, (1 March 1996), p. 134.

1995

Gill, Bates, and Taecho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons,” SIPRI Research report no. 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Gill, Bates. “Determinants and Directions for Chinese Weapons Imports,” Pacific Review, volume 8, (2 Nov. 1995), p. 359-82.

ABSTRACT: Considers domestic and international factors shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms imports likely to result from those policies.

1993

Rosenberg, Eric, “China’s weapons Buying Spree Is on the Upswing,” Defense Week, 24 May 1993, p. 2.

Arms Acquisitions from Russia

2003

"Russia-China Defence Technology Cooperation and her Emerging Military Capability,"Asian defence journal, no. Jul/Aug, (2003), pp. 4-5.
 

Donaldson, Robert H., and John A. Donaldson, "The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning," International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003), pp. 709-732.

1994

Urusov, Mikhail. “Russia is Arming China,” Moscow News, No. 40, (7 Oct. 1994), p. 8.

ABSTRACT: China is the largest recipient of Russian military hardware, with estimated purchases, inclusive of technology transfers, of $5 billion for 1994. There are about 1,000 Russian military technicians working in China to help enhance its rocket and nuclear technology. China is likely to maintain its military supply relationship with Russia despite opposition from the US since Russian arms are between two and two-and-a-half times cheaper and sometimes qualitatively better than US weapons.

1993

Cheung, Tai Ming. “China’s Buying Spree: Russia Gears Up to Upgrade Peking’s Weaponry,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 27, (8 July 1993), p. 24-26.

ABSTRACT: Russia’s arms sales to China have increased greatly since the two countries restored military ties in 1990. Russian Pres Boris Yeltsin reported that China purchased $1.8 billion in weapons in 1992. Weapons acquired have included 26 Su27 jet fighters, a large number of S300 air-defense missile systems and two to four Kilo-class conventional submarines. China’s acquisition of the fighters is worrisome to its neighbors, especially Taiwan, who fear that China’s air power is now superior. Russia promises that its weapons sales will not upset the Asian-Pacific balance of power.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Sukhois, Sams, Subs: China Steps Up Arms Purchases from Russia,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 14, (8 April 1993), p. 23.

ABSTRACT: China has raised the level of weapons acquisitions from Russia in 1993. The Chinese military budget gained 13.5%, and improvements in naval and air forces are being funded. S300 missiles have been bought, for surface-to-air defense. Talks are also underway to spend about $1.5-2 billion on Kilo submarines and 26 Sukhoi Su27 jet fighters.

Karpov, Mikhail. “A Stable and Prosperous China is in Russia’s Interests: Russia to Increase Military Assistance to China,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, volume  44, number 49, (6 Jan. 1993), p. 20-22.

ABSTRACT: Russia believes that increasing military assistance to China will boost natural commercial gain for the country even as Russian officials predicted that Sino-Russian trade might reach $5 billion in 1993. Meanwhile, Russia has sought to assuage the international community regarding a possible breakout of military conflict when it reiterated that any military assistance to be undertaken would not upset the existing balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Yu, Bin. “Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security,” Asian Survey, volume  33, number 3, (March 1993), p. 302-317.

ABSTRACT: An analytical study is presented that attempts to discuss Sino-Russian military ties for the 1990s. Since late 1990, both countries have undertaken major transactions of various types of military equipment. Observers believe that the arms sale will not pose an immediate threat to countries in Northeast Asia, which are well equipped with advanced military hardware. In Southeast Asia, however, many countries fear the possibility of heightened political and military instability if increased military assistance continues within the Asia-Pacific region.

1992

Cheung, Tai Ming.  “Arm in Arm: Warming Sino-Russian Military Ties Worry US,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 45, (12 Nov. 1992), p. 28.

ABSTRACT: America is worried that the broadening of Sino-Russian military relations will significantly affect the balance of power in the region. The US is especially concerned that Russia is aiding Chinese nuclear, missile and space strategies and is strengthening arms trade through intelligence exchanges. These exchanges may go against international non-proliferation treaties. China, in addition, may give the technology to other countries.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Loaded Weapons: China on Arms Buying Spree in Former Soviet Union,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 35, (3 Sept. 1992), p. 21.

ABSTRACT: China is updating its obsolete arms arsenal by buying advanced weaponry from the former Soviet Union. These weapons have the added advantage of being cheap. Additionally, the Russians are willing to accept barter as a system of payment for these weapons. An aircraft carrier, aircraft, radar systems and armored vehicles are just some of the advanced weapons being sought by China. Furthermore, the Russians are willing to help the Chinese in improving their arms industry.

Fulghum, David A. “Chinese Coveting Offensive Triad,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume  137, number 12, (21 Sept. 1992), p. 20-22.

ABSTRACT: China is developing a long-range ballistic missile and is planning to acquire modern fighter planes from Russia and a Ukrainian aircraft carrier. The collective arsenal will help China to assert its claim of possession on the Spratly Islands.

Greenwood, Gavin. “Carried Away: Western Reactions to China’s Acquisition of Carrier Force,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 27, (9 July 1992), p. 8-10.

ABSTRACT: The alleged plan of China to build an aircraft carrier should not worry Western politicians and policymakers. The plan, if hatched, would take years to carry out. Furthermore, there is intense and prevalent opposition from Taiwan and other Asian nations to such a plan. It is contended that even if the plan were to push through, the carrier would be an unnecessary expense on the part of China because its neighbors possess adequate anti-ship weapons and the potential arena of naval conflict, the South China Sea, is replete with reefs that are the nemesis of ships.

“Russian Arms Sales to China Reported,” Facts on File, volume  52, number 2714, (26 Nov. 1992), p. 897.

1990

Cheung, Tai Ming. “A Sale is in the Air: China Poised to Buy Soviet Fighters,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 149, No. 36, (6 Sept. 1990), p. 20-21.

Import of Weapons from Israel

2002

"Phalcon Reverberations - Eighteen months after Israel terminates its Phalcon aircraft contract with Beijing, experts estimate China has suffered a three-year modernization setback," Defense news, 17, no. 7, (2002), p. 4 (2 pages).

2000

"Israel - Supplicant and benefactor reverse roles as the US appeals to Israel to reconsider arms sales to China," Middle East international, no. 623, (2000), p. 6 (2 pages).

1995

Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Softly, Softly: Discreet Israeli Weapons Sales Flourish in Asia,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (19 Jan. 1995), p. 26-7.

ABSTRACT: Emphasis on technology and munitions exports to China and Southeast Asia. “Invisible” Israeli upgrades to US, Soviet, or European aircraft, warships, tanks, and supply of low-visibility arms, including missiles and missile guidance systems, electronic equipment, avionics, patrol boats, and Uzi submachine guns.

1993

Nelan, Bruce W. “Israel’s Secret Weapon,” Time, volume 142, number 17, (25 Oct. 1993), p. 42-44.

ABSTRACT: Billionaire arms merchant Shoul Eisenberg has managed Israeli military sales to China that may have totaled several billion dollars. Eisenberg may have been given the exclusive rights to negotiate with China on behalf of Israel by former Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

“Rabin Defends China Arms Sales,” Facts on File, volume 53, number 2764, (18 Nov. 1993), p. 869-871.

ABSTRACT: Israeli Prime Minister Rabin believes that Israel did not violate US restrictions on re-exporting US military technology when it sold arms to China. He believes that US grants worth $3 billion are not in danger as a result of Israel’s actions.

1992

Feinstein, Lee. “Audit Criticizes Oversight of Arms Transfers to Israel,” Arms Control Today, volume 22, number 3, (April 1992), p. 14-16.

ABSTRACT: The State Department’s inspector general released a report stating that the department consistently ignored laws prohibiting transfers of US weapons to third countries. The report stated that Israel, a major recipient of US arms, has continually made unauthorized transfers of weapons since 1983. The report came after unconfirmed allegations that Israel had given China technical data on the US patriot missile system.

Morrocco, John D. “U.S. Probes Alleged Israeli Violations of Technology Transfer Regulations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 136, number 12, (23 March 1992), p. 22-24.

ABSTRACT: Allegations that Israel violated technology transfer regulations by shipping Patriot missile technology to China will be investigated by a US fact-finding team in a visit to Israel. Rumors of secret deals between Israel and China have circulated since the early 1980s.

“U.S. Ends Probe on Missile Transfers: Missile Transfers from Israel to China,” Facts on File, volume 52, number 2682, (16 April 1992), p. 277-9.

ABSTRACT: The State Department reported that it found no evidence of transfers of antimissile systems or military technology from Israel to China. The State Department did accuse Israel of unauthorized sales of US weapons to Third World countries.

High-Tech Transfers from the United States

2001

Qingmin, Zhang, "US 'Dual Track' Policy: arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan," Journal of Contemporary China, 10, no. 26 (2001), pp. 89-105.

1996

Gilley, Bruce and Nigel Holloway. “After the Fact: Pentagon to Probe Hi-Tech Transfer to China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 5, (1 Feb. 1996), p. 15-17.

ABSTRACT: The US Defense Department will conduct an investigation to assess whether the telecommunications technology transferred from the American company SCM to the Chinese company Hua Mei Communications will be used by the People’s Liberation Army. The transfer may have involved John Lewis, who has worked for SCM and has ties to the Pentagon, which has authority over such transfers. Lewis may have a conflict of interest due to his involvement in Pentagon affairs and his possible involvement in telecommunications companies in China.

Gilley, Bruce. “Peace Dividend: In the Name of Defense Conversion, Some Well-Connected American Businessmen have Transferred State-Of-The Art Communications Technology to a Company Half-Owned by the Chinese Army, Alarming Some U.S. Officials,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 2, (11 Jan. 1996), p. 14-17.

ABSTRACT: A group of well-connected US businessmen has alarmed defense officials by transferring ultramodern communications technology to a Beijing company half-owned by China’s military. Jahn Lewis, a friend and advisor to US Defense Secretary William Perry, founded a joint venture called Hua Mei Telecommunications, owned half by SC&M/Brooks Telecommunications and half by a PLA company, Galaxy New Technology. The deal, arranged without Pentagon approval, gives China 21st-century command and control capabilities.

Holloway, Nigel. “Muddy Waters: U.S. Attorney Starts Probe of High-Tech Sale to China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 20, (16 May 1996), p. 20.

ABSTRACT: The US Attorney’s Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether sophisticated machine tools were diverted from a McDonnell Douglas joint venture in China to a factory that manufactures cruise missiles. McDonnell Douglas and partner China National Aerospace Import and Export Corp were granted an export license by US government agencies in 1994 for machine tools to be used to manufacture the MD80/90 airliner in Shanghai, China. McDonnell Douglas discovered that six of the 17 machine tools ended up at a cruise missile factory in Jiangxi province.

Holloway, Nigel. “Playing for Keeps: China Bought Hi-Tech American Machine Tools, Ostensibly for Civilian Use. Instead it Sent Them to a Weapons Factory - Exposing U.S. Export Controls as Ineffective,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 6, ( 8 Feb 1996), p. 14-17.

ABSTRACT: US aerospace company McDonnell Douglas discovered in Mar 1995 that equipment it sold to China was being used in violation of export agreements, raising further concerns about technology transfers benefiting China’s military. The affair has apparently been resolved to the US government’s satisfaction, but China’s assurances that the sophisticated machining equipment was not being used for military purposes comfort few of its neighbors, especially as some was installed at a plant that makes both military and civilian parts. Includes related articles on security in Asia and the machine tools involved.

1994

“Confounded by the Chinese Puzzle: Aircraft-Engine Sale to China Circumvents Export Controls, Contradicts Official Stand on Trade,” Time, volume 143, number 17, (25 April 1994), p. 39.

ABSTRACT: A contract by Garrett Corp to sell aircraft engines to China, purportedly for training planes, has arms-control exports worrying about their potential use in cruise missiles. The deal belies US posturing about rescinding China’s Most Favored Nation status.

1993

Feinstein, Lee. “Bush Approves Arms Sales to China, Kuwait in Final Weeks,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, number 1, (Jan.-Feb. 1993), p. 23-25.

ABSTRACT: Outgoing Pres George Bush announced major arms sales to China and Kuwait concluded during the last weeks of his administration. Bush’s decision effectively ends the ban on weapons sale to China, which was imposed following the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. The weapons sale includes radars, avionics equipment, anti-submarine torpedoes and ground-based radars capable of spotting enemy artillery. The Bush administration has also finalized the sale of $4.5 billion worth of tanks and other ground equipment to Kuwait.

Fulghum, David A. “China Exploiting U.S. Patriot Secrets,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 138, number 3, (18 Jan. 1993), p. 20-22.

ABSTRACT: China is covertly using Patriot missile technology to improve less sophisticated Soviet surface-to-air defense missiles. The technology is also being used to develop ballistic missile reentry vehicles that can avoid US defenses.

1992

“Taking a Chance on China: United States’ Removal of High-Technology Sanctions Against China,” U.S. News & World Report, volume 112, number 8, (2 March 1992), p. 12.
 



IV.  China and Regional Security
A.  China's National Security Perceptions  B.  China and Regional Security  C.  The China Threat  D.  Taiwan Straits Crisis
E.  South China Sea Disputes

A.  China's National Security Perceptions

2002

Hedstucka, Michael, "Rocket Poker Over the Hegemony in East Asia:  Chinese Security Policy in the Era of American Missile Defense Plans,"   Asien Afrika Latinamerika 30, number 6 (2002), pp. 539-553.

2001

Medeiros, Evan S. "Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views From Washington, Beijing and Tokyo," The Stanley Foundation and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001.

1999

“China Changes its Strategic Mindset,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, volume 11, number 12, (1 Dec. 1999).

“Nuclear Weapons are Not the Great Equalizer,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, volume 150, number 3, (18 Jan. 1999), p. 70.

Timmerman, Kenneth R. “Dumbing Down Missile Defense,” The American Spectator, (Jan. 1999).

1998

“As China Rises, Must Others Bow?” The Economist, (27 June 1998), p. 23.

1997

Gregor, A James, “East Asian Stability and the Defense of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” Comparative strategy, Volume 16, Number 4, p. 321, 1997.

Kagen, Robert. “China: The End of Engagement,” The Weekly Standard, (10 Nov. 1997).

Ross, Robert S. “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997), p. 33.

1996

Dreyer, June Teufel, "China’s Strategic View: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army," (CarlisleBarracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996).

Kim, Samuel S., "China’s Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996).

Li, N. “Doctrine, Training and Capabilities. The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 443-463.

1995

Caldwell, John, and Alexander T. Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Strategic
Review, volume 23, number 4 (Fall 1995), p. 27-37.

Hu, Wei-Jen, “In Search of National Security: Strategic Concepts of the Republic of China at a
 Crossroads,” Comparative strategy, Volume 14, Number 2, p. 195, 1995.

Johnston, Alistair, Iain. “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security volume 20, number 3, (Winter 1995-1996): p. 5-42.

1994

Armstrong, David, “Chinese Perspectives on the New World Order,” Journal of East Asian Studies,
 volume 8, number2 (Summer-Fall 1994): 454-481.

Das, N. “The Erosion of Communism and China’s Changing Threat Perception,” Journal of Developing Societies, volume 10, number 1, (1994), p. 91-100.

ABSTRACT: The erosion of communism in neighboring Soviet Russia and East Europe has not only raised serious questions in China about the credibility of Marxism/communism in establishing an egalitarian socialist society, but it has also introduced new strategic-politico-military concerns for China’s governing elites. China continues the massive modernization of its armed forces; the government is still preoccupied with external aggression and internal instability. On a close examination it seems that Chinese policymakers are still overly sensitive and preoccupied with future uncertainties, i.e. mistrust of the West in general and the political-military threat from Japan in particular. -from Author

Hilali, A. Z. “China: Geo-political Environment and Security Perceptions,” China Report, volume 30, number 3, (1994), p. 309-329.

ABSTRACT: The value of a geo-political perspective is that it emphasizes questions of location, distance, topography and ethnic geography, which shape the security of states. In using this perspective to analyze contemporary China one can see a certain geo-political consistency in the security issues facing China’s leaders. The Chinese government, since 1949, has faced inherited problems of the relations between ‘China proper’ and ‘outer China’, poorly defined boundaries and long-term changes in the relative power of the states in East Asia. Moreover, there are also certain basic, National policies consistent with these issues: a determination to maintain a unitary state, to establish new, equal treaties, to delimit disputed boundaries and to maintain superiority in the face of other regional powers. -from Author

Jencks, Harlan W., “The PRC’s Military and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” Issues &
Studies, volume 30, number 11 (November 1994), p. 67-82.

Munro, Ross H., “Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War, Where It Doesn’t,” Orbis, volume 38, number 3 (Summer 1994), p. 355-372.

Segal, Gerald. “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs, (Sept./Oct. 1999), p. 24.

Shambaugh, David. “China’s Fragile Future,” World Policy Journal, volume 11, number 3, (Fall 1994), p. 41-46.

ABSTRACT: China’s dynamic nature, with its rapid growth in economy, largest standing army and vast industrial expansion, and its new, strengthened status that is threatened by corruption, inflation and unemployment have led to instability in the country. The declining health of the political patriarch Deng Xiaoping and the lack of organized succession arrangements will also hamper unrestrained development. The power of the Communist Party has decreased in the early 1990s and the central authority has failed to control investment and tax collection effectively. Increased military spending in China and the lack of transparency threaten the security of the region.

Shambaugh, David. “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 13, number 1, (Spring 1994), p. 3-26.

1993

Ball, Desmond, “The Most Promising CSBMs for the Asia-Pacific Region,” paper prepared for
 international conference “The Asia-Pacific Region: Links Between Economic and Security
Relations,” University of California, La Jolla, san Diego, May 13-15, 1993.

Glaser, Bonnie, “China’s Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions,” Asian Survey, volume 33, number 3
 (March 1993), p. 253-254.

Hu, Weixing, “Beijing’s New Thinking on Security Strategy,” Journal of Contemporary China, number 3
 (Summer 1993), p. 50-65.

Sheng Lijun. “China’s View of the War Threat and its Foreign Policy,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 11, number 3, (1993), p. 47-69.

ABSTRACT: In analyzing China’s foreign policy since 1949, people tend to take for granted the nature of China’s concern for its national security as the predominant factor in the development of its foreign policy. The evidence given in this article argues that at least as early as the late 1970s, leaders in Beijing, predominantly Deng Xiaoping, no longer held Mao’s view of the inevitability and imminence of world war, and of the Soviet threat to China’s national security. From the beginning of the Deng era in 1978, national status enhancement or muscle building through modernization had replaced national security as the persistent and principal theme in China’s foreign policy. We should not interpret the main reason for China’s increased push for the formation of an international anti-hegemony united front as its increasing concern about the Soviet threat to its national security. When China abandoned this united front foreign policy to adopt the Independent Foreign Policy in 1982, it was neither because of a new global reality that was shaping the reorientation of its foreign policy nor because only in 1982 did China rediscover the Soviet threat. -from Author Descriptors: foreign policy ; war threat ; developing country ; geopolitical position ; national security ; united front policy; China.

1992

Godwin, Paul H.B. “Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, volume 519, (Jan. 1992), p. 191-102.

Shambaugh, David. “China’s Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” Survival, volume 34, (Summer 1992), p. 88-106.

ABSTRACT: Influence of international relations, East Asian regional security, and domestic factors on defense policy.

1990

Malik, J. Mohan. “Chinese Debate on Military Strategy: Trends & Portents,”  Northeast Asian Studies, volume 9, (Summer 1990), p. 3-32.

ABSTRACT: Military, especially nuclear, capabilities; major themes of the security debate as reflected in the views of China’s military experts.

B.  China and Regional Security

2003

Gill, B. and A. Thompson, "A Test for Beijing:  China and the North Korea Nuclear Quandary," Arms control today. 33, Part 4 (2003): 12-14.

2002

Pollack, Jonathan, "Chinese Security in the Post-11 September World: Implications for Asia and the Pacific," Asia-Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (2002), pp. 12-30.

2000

Berger, Thomas, "Set for stability? Prospects for conflict and cooperation in East Asia," Review of International Studies, 26(3) (July 2000), pp. 405-428.

"Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in East Asia. East Asian strategic review 2000," Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000, pp. 65-92.

1998

Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Managing a Great Power Relationship: The United States, China and East Asian Security,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 21, Number 1, p. 1, 1998.

Graham, Horman A, “China and the Future of Security Cooperation and Conflict in Asia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 33, Number 1, p. 94, 1998.

Joshi, Manoj. “Sino-Indian Ties:  Beware the Dragon,” India Today, (27 April 1998), p. 54.

1996

“Asia’s Insecurities; How can the Region’s Nations Keep the Peace?” Asiaweek, (22 March 1996), p. 28.

Dreyer, June Teufel. “Regional Security Issues: Contemporary China - The Consequences of Change,” Journal of International Affairs, volume 49, number 2, (Winter 1996), p. 391-411.

ABSTRACT: Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Korean peninsula are the three major areas of regional disputes involving China. Chinese hegemony will continue unless other Asian states can force China into collective negotiations by making the costs of refusing to negotiate outweigh the benefits of expansion. However, Chinese expansion is likely to be held in check by internal problems and weaknesses within its military.

Gregor, A. James, “China, the United States, and Security Policy in East Asia,” Parameters : Journal of the US Army War College, Volume 26, Number 2, p. 92, Summer 1996

Guo, Zhenyuan. “Asian-Pacific Region Remains Peaceful,” Beijing Review volume 39, number 6, (5 Feb. 1996), p. 8-11.

ABSTRACT: Effective economic and political policies among countries lead to a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the Asian-Pacific region. The establishment of the Asia-Pacific Security Council and the ASEAN Regional Forum also helps in keeping a peaceful environment. The Korean Peninsula, South China Sea area, proliferation of weapons, and the hostile relationship between regional powers are the destabilizing factors in this region.

Segal, Gerald. “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” International Security, volume 20, number 4, (Spring 1996), p. 107-36.

ABSTRACT: China is the most important factor in maintaining regional security in East Asia. An aggressive China would be disastrous to the region’s stability, just as a China in collapse would have an equally negative effect. The dominant school of thought argues that the best way to deal with China is to engage or encourage it to join the regional and global society in preserving the status quo. Another school of thought believes that China should be contained. However, the best approach could be a combination of engagement and constrainment.

Xinbo, Wu, “Changing Roles: China and the United States in East Asian Security,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, p. 35, 1996.

1995

“Chinese Nationalism: New Hopes, Old Fears,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (9 Nov. 1995), p. 20-23.

ABSTRACT: Assesses Communist party efforts to retain power by appealing to nationalism; domestic, regional, and international implications; 2 articles and an interview.

Hu, Wei-Jen. “In Search of National Security: Strategic Concepts of the Republic of China at a Crossroads,” Comparative Strategy, volume 14, (April-June 1995), p. 195-203.

ABSTRACT: Examines Taiwan’s efforts to survive as a nation by seeking dialogue with China in economic, political, and diplomatic areas and by supporting regional security arrangements.

Hu, Weixing. “China’s Security Agenda after the Cold War,” Pacific Review, volume 8, number 1, (1995), p. 117-135.

ABSTRACT: The end of the cold war has changed China’s basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. Beijing’s security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. The pre-Cold War conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. China’s growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing’s attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that the military forces of other countries as well as political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations affect its security. Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defense and non-military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs. The purpose of this paper is to analyze China’s security agendas after the cold war. It examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China’s thinking on national security, and then discusses Beijing’s threat perception and changing defense strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing’s security strategy. It discusses the implications of China’s growing power for regional security. -from Author Descriptors: geopolitical studies ; developing country ; security policy ; national security ; post-Cold War period ; regional security ; security implication ; threat perception; China; Beijing.

Jeshurun, Chandran; Simon, Sheldon W, “China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia,”  The China Quarterly, Number 141, p. 243, 1995.

Li, Rex, “China and Asia-Pacific Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” Security Dialogue, Volume 26,
 Number 3, p. 331, 1995.

“Military Matters,” China Business Review, volume 22, (Nov./ Dec. 1995), p. 9-20.

ABSTRACT: China and Asian security, relations with the US and Taiwan, commercial activities of the Chinese armed forces, and exclusion of China from the international high technology export control regime; 4 articles.

Moltz, J. C. “Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement,” Asian Survey, volume 35, number 6, (1995), p. 511-527.

ABSTRACT: In order to come to grips with the nature of Russia’s current center-periphery dilemma, this article examines the evolving political, economic, and military situation on the Russo-Chinese border, especially since 1985. It begins with a brief overview of the historical context of these developments. The study then moves to a more detailed analysis of recent changes in: border demarcation; military relations; border trade; immigration and societal relations. These data highlight a growing gap between the positive perception of bilateral relations in Moscow and the increasingly negative view of the local Russian Far Eastern population, which could ultimately undermine the rapprochement. The article’s conclusion discusses the domestic political factors that are likely to have the greatest impact on the successful (or unsuccessful) resolution of these tensions. -from Author

Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “Russia, China, and the Far East: Old Geopolitics or a New Peaceful Cooperation?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, volume 28, (Spring 1995), p. 307-18.

ABSTRACT: Points to the Russian Far East and Central Asia as areas in which a confrontation between Russia and China is probable and shows how regionalization can worsen the situation.

Sukma, Rizal. “China’s Defense Policy and Security in the Asia Pacific,” Indonesian Quarterly, volume 23, number 1, (1995), p. 76-87.

ABSTRACT: Examines China’s strategy and its military build-up since the end of the cold war; regional and international security implications.

“Worries across the region, especially about China,” The Economist, Volume 337, Number 7946, p. 81, 1995.

1994

Garrett, Banning and Bonnie Glaser. “Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 16, number 1, (June 1994), p.14-35.

Khanna, V. “China and South Asia in the Post-Cold War World,” China Report, volume 30, number 2, (1994),  p. 121-251.

ABSTRACT: This special issue includes papers which were presented at a two- day seminar on ‘China and South Asia in the post-Cold War world’ held in New Delhi, September 1993. The papers examine the motivations and compulsions underlying the China policies of the various South Asian countries. At the same time the seminar examined some of the factors which influence China’s approach to South Asia: the aspiration to further enhance its great power status; security concerns redefined by the emergence of new equations after the collapse of the Soviet Union; need for peace and stability in its neighborhood so as to proceed undisturbed with its own modernization drive; and the increasing importance attached to the economic dimensions of its foreign policy. -from Editor

Murphy, William J. “Power Transition in Northeast Asia: U.S.-China Security Perceptions and the Challenges of Systemic Adjustment and Stability,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 13, number 4, (Winter 1994), p. 61-85.

Shambaugh, David. “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 13, (Spring 1994), p. 3-25.

ABSTRACT: Examines the relationship between Chinese perceptions of potential conflicts with the US and Asian countries, and the defense doctrine of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army; 1990s. Some focus on the destabilizing effect of China’s defense posture on the region.

Shirk, Susan L. “Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Cooperation,” NBR Analysis, volume 5, (Dec. 1994), p. 5-13.

ABSTRACT: Argues that Chinese foreign policy-makers are slowly overcoming their traditional reluctance to engage in regional security cooperation.

“The Sino-U.S. Relationship and its Impact on World Peace: Statement by William Perry in Beijing, China,” US Department of State Dispatch, volume 5, number 44, (31 Oct. 1994), p. 725-8.

ABSTRACT: The United States affirms its commitment to working with China to enhance global security and support peaceful change. Both countries gain strategic advantage from promoting regional stability and resolving territorial disputes.

Sutter, Robert G., and Shirley Kan, “China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessments, and U.S. Options,” CRS report report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 1994).

1993

Amer, Ramses. “Sino-Vietnamese Relations and Southeast Asian Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 14, (March 1993), p. 314-31.

ABSTRACT: Analyses of the recent normalization of relations between the two countries and prospects for regional stabilization.

“India-China Talks Ease Border Dispute: India and China agreed on September 7, 1993, to a cease-fire in 31-year Himalayan border dispute,” Facts on File, volume 53, number 2757, (30 Sept. 1993), p. 722.

Nguyen, Hung P. “Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo,” Asian Survey, volume 33, number 3, (March 1993), p. 285.

ABSTRACT: Russia may likely continue efforts at achieving Sino-Soviet strategic rapprochement, which it had started back in 1990. The decision to adopt a ‘China-first’ option as part of Russia’s post-Cold War military policy has been motivated by geopolitical, rather than ideological purposes. The move, which has been described as ‘the Eastern Rapallo option,’ allowed increased military cooperation between the two countries. Russia’s military policy favoring China, however, has had serious consequences concerning the republic’s relationship to other countries such as Taiwan and Japan.

1992

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Smoke Signals: China and India to Develop Military Relations,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 45, (12 Nov. 1992), p. 29-31.

ABSTRACT: China and India are hesitantly strengthening military relations to promote mutual cooperation though not necessarily to form military alliances. The increase in Chinese and Indian military maneuvers in Asia necessitates a Sino-Indian military dialogue. India is also keen to improve relations with China because of the strengthening of Sino-Burmese naval cooperation.

Segal, Gerald. “China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union,” Asian Survey, volume 32, number 9, (Sept. 1992), p. 848-69.

ABSTRACT: The collapse of the former Soviet Union meant a more prominent role for China in world affairs. Without China’s cooperation, arms proliferation will continue to pose a threat to global security. Furthermore, the disintegration of the former Soviet republics spurred ambivalence in the Chinese leadership whether to concentrate on local issues or to become more active in regional affairs.

1991

Sismanidis, Roxane D.V. “China’s International Security Policy,” Problems of Communism, volume 40, number 4, (July-August 1991), p. 49-64.

1990

Calabrese, John, “From Flyswatters to Silkworms: The Evolution of China’s Role in West Asia,” Asian Survey, volume 30, number 9 (September 1990): 862-876.

Pollack, Jonathan D. “The Sino-Japanese Relationship and East Asian Security: Patterns and Implications,” The China Quarterly, number 124, (Dec. 1990), p. 714-730.

C.  "China Threat"

2003

Broomfield, Emma V., "Perceptions of Danger:  the China threat theory," Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003), pp. 265-284.

2000

Ding, Arthur S, "China Threat" Debate - Is China a Threat? A Defense Industry Analysis,”  Issues & Studies, Volume 36, Number 1, p. 49, 2000.

Medeiros, Evan S, “The "China Threat" Debate - China, WMD Proliferation, and the "China Threat" Debate,” Issues & Studies, Volume 36, Number 1, p. 19, 2000.

1999

Ming, Zhang, "What Threat?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55(5), pp. 52-57, Sept./Oct. 1999.

1996

Shambaugh, David, “China’s Military: Real or Paper Tiger?” Washington Quarterly, volume 19, number 2, (Spring 1996), p. 19-36.

Whiting, A.S. “The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 596-615.

1995

Chanda, Nayan. “Fear of the Dragon: China’s Military Power,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 15, (13 April 1995), p. 24-28.

ABSTRACT: China is stirring anxiety throughout East Asia with its rapidly growing military might and deliberate vagueness about its claims and ultimate intentions. Both it and its neighbors are restrained thanks to economic ties that are also growing quickly, but some observers fear that China will resume its historical pattern of backing expansionist territorial claims with force. The country has 1.2 billion people and an army of 2.9 million; defense spending estimates range from $10 billion and $50 billion.

“China: New Menace or Misunderstood Giant?” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (13 April 1995), p. 24-6.

ABSTRACT: Impact of China’s military build-up and territorial claims on regional stability; Taiwan’s defensive military planning; US-Chinese military contacts; 4 articles.

"China Threat’ Fallacy Refuted," Beijing Review volume 38, number 40, (2 Oct. 1995), p. 6.

ABSTRACT: General Liu Huaqing, Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of China, believes that there are some in the West who have vested interests in raising the issue of a Chinese military threat. China has always maintained a defensive military position and the Chinese government keeps its defense expenditure to the minimum whereas many countries have enhanced the expenditure on defense.

Ching, Frank. “China’s Military Spurs Concern: A White Paper on Defense Would Ease Neighbors’ Worries,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 19, (11 May 1995), p. 40.

ABSTRACT: China should issue a white paper on defense to allay its neighbors’ concerns and reduce the chance of a regional arms race. Japan, Australia, and other countries have already done so, making their defense strategies more transparent. China’s continuing need to tell other countries’ officials that China is not aggressive reflects continued anxiety, fueled by China’s rapid military build-up and military technology purchases. China also continues to test nuclear weapons and sell weapons abroad.

“The Dragon With New Teeth,” New Statesman & Society, volume 8, number 356, (9 June 1995), p. 5.

ABSTRACT: Militaristic moves by China should be carefully watched by the West. Not only is China demonstrating its military might by testing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, it has also refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Law of the Sea convention.

Eikenberry, Karl W. “Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?” Parameters, volume 25, (Spring 1995), p. 82-103.

ABSTRACT: Examines China’s capabilities, primarily focusing on sources of its military power, and its intentions; implications for US foreign policy and military strategy.

Kristof, Nicholas D. “The Real Chinese Threat,” The New York Times Magazine, (27 August 1995), p. 50.

ABSTRACT: China’s 3.2 million man army is the largest in the world, and some fear that China’s recent military buildup could threaten stability in Asia. Although, China is currently less powerful than the US, some projections show that could change by 2010.

Waldron, Arthur. “Dragon Growling,” National Review, volume 47, number 14, (31 July 1995), p. 44-46.

ABSTRACT: Many Asian countries are concerned about China as a potential military threat. China’s leadership in coming years will determine the course of its military policy. The country’s military, economic and social positions are discussed.

Yuan, Jing-Dong. “China’s Defense Modernization: Implication for Asia-Pacific Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 17, number 1, (June 1995), p. 67-85.

ABSTRACT: Recent discussions of post-Cold War Asia-Pacific security have focused on China’s defense modernization as constituting a major source of regional instability. It has been suggested that China’s military build-up might upset the region’s strategic balance, touching off an arms race, and increasing the likelihood of force being used to resolve territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands. This article argues that alarm about the ‘China threat’ tends to overestimate the significance of China’s recent acquisitions of Russian weaponry and fails to take into account internal and external factors that constrain the pace and scope of Chinese defense modernization.

1994

Chanda, Nayan.  “Gentle Giant: China Addresses ASEAN’s Fear of Military Aggression,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, number 31, (4 August 1994), p. 15-17.

ABSTRACT: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen played down China’s military preparations and posture in talks at the Bangkok meeting of ASEAN. He claimed that Chinese military spending has risen 34% since last year to $6.7 billion thanks largely to 13% inflation in China. Foreign analysts place the total between $28.5 billion and $45 billion. Qian compared China’s spending to that of Japan, India, and the US to show the peaceful and defensive nature of the Chinese military. He claimed China has never invaded a foreign country, and denied that Taiwan could ever hold a UN seat.

Hu Ping. “China Constitutes No Military Threat,” Beijing Review volume 37, No. 47, (21 Nov. 1994), p. 22.

ABSTRACT: The international community has unfounded fears of the Chinese army becoming an aggressor in future. The geographic location of China compels it to maintain a strong army for self defense. China understands its better interests and will abstain from war unless provoked, and will strive to maintain peace in the Asian-Pacific region.

McNaugher, Thomas L. “A Strong China: Is the United States Ready?” Brookings Review, volume 12, (Fall 1994), p. 12-19.

ABSTRACT: Potential threat to US interests of China’s increasing economic and military power. Some focus on Chinese arms control and Southeast Asia.

Ritcheson, Philip L. “China’s Impact on Southeast Asian Security,” Military Review, volume 74, (May 1994), p. 44-57.

ABSTRACT: Examines China’s military purchases, modernization program, and preparations for regional force projection. Implications for ASEAN nations and the US.

Roy, Denny. “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security, volume 19, number 1, (Summer 1994), p. 149-169.

ABSTRACT:  The post-Cold War era is expected to usher in new security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, China’s growing influence in East Asia will provide a formidable competition for Japan. The consequences of Chinese economic growth have been of interest to political analysts. Current trends indicate that China’s ability to achieve superpower status also makes it more likely to be assertive and uncooperative. For East Asian countries, this is an alarming indication.

1993

Huai, Chengbo. “Behind the Fear of a ‘China Threat,“ Beijing Review volume 36, No. 9, (1 March 1993), p. 10.

ABSTRACT: Many westerners warned that China is building up a military force intended to increase its military clout in the Asian region. However, these warnings are unfounded, considering that China spends only $5 per capita on defense. Moreover, the success of China’s economic reformation depends on long-standing peace in the Asian region. Chinese analysts commented that Western fears of the Chinese military threat’ are motivated by concerns over China’s rise as an economic power.

Qian, Qichen. “China Never Seeks Hegemony,” Beijing Review volume 36, No. 31, (2 August 1993), p. 8-11.

ABSTRACT: China is focusing on the development of relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.) ASEAN countries and China have similar views on democratic, humanitarian and environmental issues and are working together with other developing countries to secure national determination and nuclear non-proliferation. Trade between ASEAN countries and China was $8.466 billion in 1992. There is a move to establish a China-ASEAN Joint Committee of Economic and Trade Cooperation and a China-ASEAN Science and Technology Development and Service Centre.

Skosyrev, Vladimir. “Asia is Frightened: Impact of Chinese-Russian Military Alliance,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, volume 45, number 45, (8 Dec. 1993), p. 32-34.

ABSTRACT: Russia’s interest in upgrading China’s defense mechanisms threatens the future of other Asian countries. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev’s visit to China portends stronger military relations between the two countries. The disruption in the supply of arms to China from Western countries since the Tiananmen Square incident resulted in the country’s acceptance of military assistance from Russia.

Su Huimin. “View of a ‘China Threat’ Groundless,” Beijing Review volume 36, number 21, (24 May 1993), p. 10-12.

ABSTRACT: The allegation that the increases in military spending and amassing of advanced weaponry by China constitute a threat to the Asia-Pacific region is baseless. China is fervently advancing the cause of disarmament, and has joined the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All countries allocate resources for building up defenses even during peace purely for stability and security.

1992

Engardio, Pete. et al. “Beijing is on an Arms Binge, and the Neighbors are Nervous: Arms Buildup in Mainland China,” Business Week, number 3273, (6 July 1992), p. 49.

ABSTRACT: The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the closing of the US bases in the Philippines have encouraged China to embark on a major arms buying spree. The move is seen by Chinese leaders as necessary to take their rightful place as the most influential nation in Southeast Asia.

D.  The Taiwan Straits Crisis

2000

Zou Keyuan, "Redefining the Legal Status of the Taiwan Strait," The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 15, number 2 (2000), pp. 245-268.

1999

"China: How the PLA plans to deter US. intervention in Taiwan,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume 162, Number 41, p. 26, 1999.

1997

You, Ji, “Making Sense of War Game Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, volume 7, number 2, 1997.

1996

Barnathan, Joyce and Margaret Dawson. “Escalating the War of Nerves: China’s Military Intimidation of Taiwan,” Business Week, number 3467, (18 March 1996), p. 48-50.

ABSTRACT: China is conducting military maneuvers that are meant to intimidate Taiwan during its first democratic presidential elections on Mar 23, 1996. The Taiwanese are anxious about the military show of strength. US officials so far have remained silent.

Baum, Julian and Matt Forney. “Cross Purposes: China-Taiwan Relations,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 12, (21 March 1996), p. 14-17.

ABSTRACT: A dangerous and persistent gap in perceptions between China and Taiwan could help escalate the crisis there. US President Clinton has abandoned ambiguity, giving Beijing another rhetorical target and a scapegoat for Taiwan’s independence movement. Chinese leaders insist most Taiwanese want quick reunification and fear only a drop in living standards, but military exercises have failed to intimidate Taiwan’s people, and may be driving them into the pro-independence camp.

Baum, Julian and Matt Forney. “Strait of Uncertainty: Taiwan Braves Increased Pressure from China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 6, (8 Feb. 1996), p. 20-22.

ABSTRACT: Mainland China’s pressure on Taiwan continues at a low but persistent level, including incidents that may simply represent a loss of central control, and the effects are still apparent. Anxiety erupts regularly on the island, which is gearing up for its first full-scale presidential elections in March. One high-level report suggests Beijing has assembled a plan for invading after the elections, and that of the 10 steps outlined, several have been taken. Most experts doubt the military advisability of such a move, however.

“China Fires Test Missiles Near Taiwan; Seen as Pre-Election Intimidation Tactic,” Facts on File, volume 56, number 2884, (14 March 1996), p. 162-164.

ABSTRACT: China fired four missiles at Taiwan in Mar 1996, the third time since Jul 1995 that live ammunition has been fired at the island. The actions were viewed as ways to undermine the likelihood that Taiwan Pres Lee Teng-hui would be reelected and demonstrate that Taiwan is still part of China.

“Chinese Shadows: Taiwan Goes to the Polls,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume. 159, (14 March 1996), p. 18-21.

ABSTRACT: Impact of Taiwan’s presidential campaign and potential reelection of Kuomintang President Lee Teng-hui on its relations with China; the unification issue; and prospects for Chinese military action; 4 articles. Role of ethnic solidarity of the Taiwanese versus pan-China nationalism of the mainland.

“Chinese War Games: China Conducts Military Exercises Near Taiwan,” The Economist, volume 338, number 7957, (16 March 1996), p. 6.

Crock, Stan and Amy Borrus. “Yankee, Don’t Go Home: Asia Looks to the U.S. For Security Again,” Business Week, number 3469, (1 April 1996), p. 46-8.

ABSTRACT: Asian leaders believe that only the US can successfully counter the regional clout of China and Japan, which would ensure peace in Asia into the next century. US military carriers sent in response to Chinese war games may critically change US policy towards Asia.

Doherty, Carroll J. “Protests over Taiwan Threats Foreshadow Other Friction,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, volume 54, number 12, (23 March 1996), p. 809.

ABSTRACT: US-China relations are strained over various issues such as the threats against Taiwan, possible sale of nuclear weapons materials to Pakistan, human rights and China’s favorable trade status. Though Taiwan’s Mar 23, 1996 presidential elections may reduce the pressure on that issue, many US legislators feel the US must support Taiwan against a Chinese invasion due to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The nuclear proliferation may generate support for economic sanctions.

Forbes, Steve. “No More Appeasement: US Relations with China Should Change in Light of Chinese Threats against Taiwan; Fact and Comment.” Forbes, volume 157, number 7, (April 1996), p. 25.

Forney, Matt. “Man in the Middle: President Jiang Zemin’s Handling of the Taiwan Crisis Could Determine China’s Direction - And His Own Political Fate. But the Army’s Power Limits His Room for Maneuver,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 13, (28 March 1996), p. 14-17.

ABSTRACT: The current crisis over Taiwan and its impending presidential election is the first major test for Chinese President Jiang Zemin, one that could shunt him aside if he blunders. He has stronger relations with the military than any other top leaders, but not enough influence to sway the generals regarding Taiwan. Increasingly his posture there seems like appeasement, and he has been forced to concede other issues to them in the past. Another long-term problem is his lack of original and timely ideas as a leader.

Forney, Matt and Nigel Holloway. “Time for Soft Talk: For Beijing, After Face-Off Comes Face Saving,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 14, (4 April 1996), p. 16.

ABSTRACT: Harsh rhetoric concerning Taiwan continues to echo around Beijing, where efforts to save face and establish a more realistic position on the issue of reunification now take precedence. Factionalism surrounding the succession struggle in Beijing may prevent a fundamental shift to favoring Taiwan’s international efforts for the next decade, but in the short term a new overture toward Taipei might include more work to agree on President Jiang Zemin’s year-old ‘eight points’ proposal.

Fulghum, David A. and Michael A. Dornheim. “Chinese Missile Shots: Only a Prelude?” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 144, number 12, (18 March 1996), p. 22.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese decision to fire tactical ballistic missiles off of Taiwan is an indication that China is taking its military role in global geopolitics seriously. The US expects China to fire a minimum of 6 medium-range ballistic missiles in the East China Sea on the eastern side of Taiwan.

Harmsen, Peter. “Sooner or Later: Taiwan Pays the Price of Cross-Strait Tensions,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 13, (28 March 1996), p. 58-60.

ABSTRACT: China’s recent threats and missile tests have hurt Taiwan’s currency and stock markets, though so far the government has staved off the worst effects by spending as much as $20 billion. That cannot last indefinitely, so experts are anxious for China to lower the volume after the Mar 23 election. Already GDP growth for 1996 will be down 1%, to 6%, and the stock market has lost 16% since May 1995. Liquidity is likewise low, as depositors withdraw US dollars and invest abroad, though foreign investors in Taiwan seem sanguine.

Horne, Alistair. “The Island that is Really in Danger: Quemoy under Threat from China,” Spectator, volume 276, number 8749, (23 March 1996), p. 21-4.

ABSTRACT: The recent deterioration in relations between China and Taiwan could have particularly severe consequences for the island of Quemoy, which is situated in the Taiwan Straits only just over a mile from Mainland China. This island has little significance for the security of Taiwan itself, and would be extremely vulnerable if US support were not offered in the event of an onslaught by China. However, it seems unlikely that China will risk a direct confrontation.

“Just Playing? Taiwan: Possibility of an Attack from China,” The Economist, volume 338, number 7958, (23 March 1996), p. 32-4.

ABSTRACT: Chinese military exercises near the Taiwan Strait may have been staged to influence the Taiwanese election, but the question has been raised about an actual attack from China. A landing force would be highly impractical, but missile strikes and a naval blockade might be more effective.

Lilley, James R. “Time to Speak Clearly, and Carry a Big Stick,” Newsweek, volume 127, number 12, (18 March 1996), p. 33.

ABSTRACT: China has a history of talking tough but acting pragmatically. The US must make it clear that Chinese interference with Taiwan would risk a stronger US-Japan security alliance, a military buildup in Southeast Asia, a pullout by financial institutions and a prolonged US military presence in Asia.

Lin, C-P. “The External Environment.  The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits,” China Quarterly volume 146, (June 1996), p. 577-595.

Manning, Robert A. and James Przystup. “In Dire Straits: Political Effects of China’s Aggressive Military Displays Towards Taiwan,” National Review, volume 48, number 6, (8 April 1996), p. 29.

ABSTRACT: The US decision to lend a military presence near the straits of Taiwan to act as a counterbalance against China’s reckless military posturing sent a positive message to the countries of East Asia. US diplomatic policy under president Clinton has been viewed as ineffective in regards to China.

Monk, Paul. “China’s Power Trip,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 159, number 12, (21 March 1996), p. 28.

ABSTRACT: A growing China that blends Marxism with aggressive power politics into a heady nationalistic brew raises a serious danger of militarism, especially over the sensitive issue of Taiwan. China is militarily unable to take the island and will remain so for many years, so it bluffs in an effort to win without fighting. That also raises security threats, however, as China risks creating a situation where it must either launch an assault or lose face. Yielding Taiwan in the face of this bluster could be equally dangerous.

Nathan, Andrew J., “China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” China Journal, number 36 (July 1996), p. 87-93.

“Racing: Asia’s Arms,” The Economist, volume 338, number 7951, (3 Feb. 1996), p. 29-31.

ABSTRACT: China and Taiwan are engaged in a competitive weapons-buying spree in the mid-1990s. China is stressing naval upgrades, but it has also been active in the military aircraft market. Taiwan’s $11 billion FY 1996-97 defense budget includes more than a $2 billion increase over prior year levels.

“Taiwan Crisis and Russian-Chinese Ties,” Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, volume 48, (10 April 1996), p. 10-12.

ABSTRACT: Examines the impact of China’s initiation of a large-scale of military exercises in the

“Taiwan Highlights Need for New Missile,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 144, number 12, (18 March 1996), p. 72.

ABSTRACT: The US military’s Patriot Block 4 antiballistic missile system (ATBM) has the ability to shoot down the Chinese Dong Feng-15, the missile that was fired offshore of Taiwan to intimidate that country. US forces in the area should be equipped with the ATBM system to counter the Chinese threat.

“The United States and the Security of Taiwan,” US Department of State Dispatch, volume 7, number 6, (5 Feb. 1996), p. 29-33.

ABSTRACT: The US insists that China and Taiwan work out their differences without war. The US recognizes China as the sole power on the mainland, and that Taiwan is a part of China. In 1982, the US iterated that there is no ‘two China’ policy for the US. All US energy is focused on peaceful settlement.

Watson, Russell. “On a Gunboat to China: Carriers Deploy as the Pressure on Taiwan Increases,” Newsweek, volume 127, number 13, (25 March 1996), p. 37.

ABSTRACT: Chinese war games off the coast of Taiwan, admittedly for the purpose of influencing the Taiwanese elections, have provoked a naval response from the US. The situation is now a standoff, with the superpowers needing to show their opposition to independence and the use of force, respectively.

1995

Baum, Julian. “A Case of Nerves: Chinese Military Maneuvers Cause Alarm,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 29, (20 July 1995), p. 26.

ABSTRACT: Harsh words from China’s Foreign Ministry and a set of military exercises held near Taiwan stirred near-panic on the island in the first days of July, 1995 and sent the stock market down 2.4%. Top politicians soon asked news agencies and top government officials to play down the news, restoring some calmness. The events followed Chinese anger over President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US and planned trip to Japan, both to visit alma maters. Taiwan’s likely Sept bid to rejoin the United Nations should cause further friction.

Baum, Julian. “Pressure Cooker: China’s Relations with Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 34, (24 August 1995), p. 16-8.

ABSTRACT: China’s military exercises and other pressure tactics have had their effect on Taiwan but may ultimately fail to weaken the island’s leadership and morale. Taiwan can resist an invasion, and using missiles against it would destroy the prize. However, China has aroused the pro-unification forces on Taiwan, and especially within the ruling Kuomintang Party, that considers President Lee Teng-hui a pro-independence traitor. Taiwan’s financial institutions have also suffered from the public-relations blitz.

Baum, Julian. “Winged: Locally Made Jet Fighter Fails to Convince Critics,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (12 Jan. 1995), p. 21.

ABSTRACT: Examines capabilities and limitations of Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighter, and mission requirements of the Taiwanese Air Force. Design problems, mechanical malfunctions, limitations imposed by the US, and challenges of China’s modernization program, which draws on Soviet and, reportedly, Israeli technology.

“China Conducts Military Tests North of Taiwan: Tests Seen as Intimidation Tactic,” Facts on File, volume 55, number 2859, (14 Sept. 1995), p. 663.

ABSTRACT: China conducted artillery and missile tests from Aug 15-25, 1995, in the East China Sea, 90 miles away from Taiwan. China had previously tested ballistic missiles in the same region from Jul 21-26, 1995. The tests may be an attempt to intimidate Taiwanese Pres Lee Teng-hui.

Deron, Farncis. “Beijing’s Pressure on Taipei,” World Press Review, volume 42, number 10, (Oct. 1995), p. 12-4.

ABSTRACT: Taiwan is no longer a paramount economic asset on China’s doorstep, since Chinese leaders seek wider international markets. A Taiwan-China war may not happen, but China is increasing tension with its war games in the area. How the US would react to aggression against Taiwan is not clear.

Fulghum, David A. and Michael Mecham. “Chinese Tests Stun Neighbors,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 143, number 5, (31 July 1995), p. 23.

ABSTRACT: China’s neighbors, particularly Taiwan, are very concerned about its missile tests in the East China Sea just north of Taiwan. The series of surface-to-surface missile launches were reportedly impressive, with at least five of the six missiles hitting their targets within a defined ocean impact area. While Chinese officials said that the tests were conducted shortly after midnight to eliminate disrupting civil aviation traffic, airlines in the region avoided the area by rerouting their flights.

Hiebert, Murray. “Treading Softly,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 31, (3 August 1995), p. 16-9.

ABSTRACT: The year-old ASEAN Regional Forum on security’s upcoming meeting follows threatening moves by China sure to cast a long shadow over the conference. Related issues already putting strain on the group include applications from around the world for membership, and Western hopes for a strong structure conflicting with regional fears of antagonizing China. Fortunately, Chinese officials indicate they will follow a conciliatory approach at the July 28 meeting. ASEAN officials hope to keep their group central to the ARF.

“The Prospects for T-day: China and Taiwan,” The Economist, volume 336, number 7930, (2 Sept. 1995), p. 30.

ABSTRACT: China has warned Taiwan that it will invade the island if it seeks independence, undergoes civil unrest, or a foreign power intervenes. The Taiwan air force has prepared four logistical plans for fighting an attack, but China’s superior military strength would likely prevail.

1994

Baum, Julian. “Fear of Falling: Prophet of Chinese Invasion Makes Many Nervous,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, (13 Oct. 1994), p. 24.

ABSTRACT: Renewed concern about military confrontation between China and Taiwan; Chinese and Taiwanese military maneuvers.  Highlighted by book entitled, “August 1995: China’s violent invasion of Taiwan,” by Cheng Lang-ping.

1993

Ching, Frank. “Peking’s Taiwan Paper Shows its Ultimate Reliance on Force,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 37, (16 Sept. 1993), p. 28.

ABSTRACT: China’s white paper on reunification with Taiwan shows that the Peking government has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. The paper defends the possible use of force on the grounds that such action may be necessary to defend China’s sovereignty. But this argument is dishonest since Taiwan is not a military threat to China. Any Chinese attack on Taiwan would therefore be an unprovoked act of aggression against a free people. China’s position, like its opposition to UN membership for Taiwan, betrays a lack of principle.

Zyla, Melana. “Socking it to China: U.S. Senate Authorizes Arms Sales to Taiwan,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 31, (5 August 1993), p. 15.

ABSTRACT: The US Senate’s foreign relations committee voted on Jul 15, 1993 to allow increased weapons sales to Taiwan, a move that angered China. The amendment to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act would abandon mandates for an annual decrease in weapons sales from $3 to $5 million; in 1992 Taiwan was the largest buyer of US weapons. The move antagonizes the White House as well as China; ironically, it may also upset Taiwan, as the latter prefers to hide its dealings behind vague diplomatic communiqués.

1992

Feinstein, Lee. “Administration to Sell Advanced F-16 Fighters to Taiwan,” Arms Control Today, volume 22, number 7, (Sept. 1992), p. 25.

ABSTRACT: The Bush administration approved the sale of advanced F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan. The arms deal, Valued at over $5.8 billion, outraged Mainland Chinese officials and was viewed as the reversal of a 10-year old policy limiting military assistance to Taiwan. Observers believe that the approval was brought about by economic factors, as the deal directly resulted in more jobs for US workers. The Bush administration downplayed Chinese protests, saying that the deal was not in contravention of the US-China Joint Communiqués.

“French Fighter Sale Enrages Beijing: China Protests France’s Sale of Jets to Taiwan,”  Beijing Review volume 35, number 49, (7 Dec. 1992), p. 11-3.

ABSTRACT: China has filed a diplomatic protest with France due to the latter’s decision to sell 60 Mirage fighter jets to Taiwan. China’s Foreign Vice Minister Tian Zengpei was reportedly outraged by the act and has summoned France’s Ambassador to China Claude Martin to discuss with him the implications of the French sale. Tian stressed that the sale was a direct interference in China’s internal affairs, and clearly represents a violation of the diplomatic ties of both countries.

Huang, Wentao. “Groundless Argument, Disastrous Consequence: On the Sale of F-16 Fighter Jets to Taiwan,”  Beijing Review volume 35, number 41, (12 Oct. 1992), p. 34-6.

ABSTRACT: Chinese observers believe that the sale of 150 US-made F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan by the US government will undermine China’s unification efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese officials contend that the arms deal will have a damaging effect on the region’s peace and stability. The US military assistance initiative was a reversal of an earlier US policy recognizing China’s position that Taiwan is a province of China. Officials added further that the sales would only seek to create new tensions within the region.

Proctor, Paul. “Taiwan Fighter Sales Plans Curb China Transport Deals,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 137, number 13, (28 Sept. 1992), p. 24.

ABSTRACT: The expected purchase by Taiwan of fighter planes made in the US and France is angering the Chinese, who are threatening to cancel jet transport orders from both countries. There is little hope that their stance will change the minds of the defense contractors, who are starving for business.

“Taiwan Jet Fighter Sale Approved by President Bush,” Facts on File, volume 52, number 2703, (10 Sept. 1992), p. 659.

ABSTRACT: President Bush agreed to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan, even though a virtual ban on such sales exists. Bush claimed that the sale would save US jobs, but political experts believe that Bush was trying to win votes for reelection.

“US Prepared Fighters Sale Criticized,”  Beijing Review, volume 35, No. 38, (21 Sept. 1992), p.7.

ABSTRACT: China has strongly criticized the recent US decision to sell150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. China contends that the arms deal is a violation of earlier agreements governing relations between the US and China. Furthermore, the US move smacks of foreign interference in China’s internal affairs. The move would also adversely affect reunification efforts between China and Taiwan. China has urged the US to stop the sale in the interest of peace within Asia.

Zhang, Xiaodong. “US Jet Sales Denounced Worldwide,”  Beijing Review, volume 35, number 38, (21 Sept. 1992), p. 15-7.

ABSTRACT: Several countries have voiced their concerns over the recent US decision to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan. These countries say that the US arms deal violates the Sino-US Joint Communiqué of Aug 17, 1982, requiring the US to stop the selling of arms to Taiwan. Among the countries that criticized the US decision are Pakistan, Thailand, Japan, Bangladesh, Singapore, India, Switzerland and Australia.

1991

Clark, Cal and Steve Chan. “China and Taiwan: A Security Paradox,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, volume 5, (Summer/Fall 1991), p. 466-97.

ABSTRACT: Security dimensions in China-Taiwan relations and challenges due to the ebbing of cold war confrontation and domestic political and economic liberalization.

Shih, Chih-yu. “Psychological Security and National Security: The Taiwan Factor in China’s US Policy,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, volume 16, number 4, (Winter 1991), p. 441-68.

Si, Chu. “F-16 Fighters Deal and the Meeting of Five,”  Beijing Review volume 35, number 41, (12 Oct. 1992), p. 33-5.

ABSTRACT: The decision of the US government to sell F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan has produced strained relations between China and other members of the United Nations Security Council. Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqui filed a formal protest against the US government, adding that China finds it difficult to continue discussing arms control issues in light of the sale of military hardware to Taiwan. China has accused the US of openly violating UN principles concerning foreign military sales and its effect on the internal affairs of other countries.

E.  The South China Sea Disputes

2003

Lee Lai To, "China, the USA and the South China Sea Conflicts," Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (2003), pp. 25-39.

Odgaard, Liselotte, "The South China Sea: ASEAN's Security Concerns About China," Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (2003), pp. 11-24.

Song Yann-Huei, "The Overall Situation in the South China Sea in the New Millennium: Before and After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," Ocean Development & International Law 34 (Numbers 3-4/July-December 2003), pp. 229-277.

2002

Kivimako, Timo, "'Reason' and 'Power' in Territorial Disputes: The South China Sea," Asian Journal of Social Science 30, no. 3 (2002): 525-546.

Tonnesson, Stein, "Why are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable? A Historical Approach," Asian Journal of Social Science 30, no. 3 (2002), pp. 570-601.

2001

Hiramatsu, Shigeo, "China's Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives," Asia-Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (2001), pp. 40-50.

Moller, Bjorn, "The military aspects of the South China Sea disputes," COPRI Working Papers 4, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001, pp. 1-28.

2000

Guan, Ang Cheng, "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited," Australian Journal Of International Affairs 54, number 2 (2000), pp. 201-215.
 

1998

Guoxing, Ji, “China Versus South China Sea Security,” Security Dialogue, Volume 29, Number 1,  1998, p. 101.

1997

Magno, Francisco A, “Environmental Security in the South China Sea,” Security Dialogue, Volume 28, Number 1, 1997, p. 97.

1996

Chanda, Nayan and Kari Huus. “Talking Tough, Waving the Flag,” World Press Review, volume 43, number 3, (March 1996), p. 12-6.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese government, stung by being denied the 2000 Olympics in 1993, has been increasingly vocal in its nationalism. The trend toward flexing military muscles was hastened by Taiwan Pres Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995. China asserts South China Sea claims in the Spratly Islands and elsewhere.

“Talking Tough, Waving the Flag,” World Press Review, volume 43, number 3, (March 1996), p. 12-16.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese government, stung by being denied the 2000 Olympics in 1993, has been increasingly vocal in its nationalism. The trend toward flexing military muscles was hastened by Taiwan Pres Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995. China asserts South China Sea claims in the Spratly Islands and elsewhere.

1995

Altmonte, Jose T. “East Asian Security: A Philippine Perspective,” The World Today, volume 51, number 3, (March 1995), p. 44-8.

ABSTRACT: East Asian security is relatively stable as increasing economic growth and integration give people and countries more incentives to cooperate peacefully. Increasing democracy is reducing the ideological and authoritarian nature of most governments in the region. The South China Sea is the likeliest flash-point, thanks to strong competing interests and China’s aggressive pursuit of control. China is also a leader in an emerging local arms race. Southeast Asian unification is the best route to peace and growth.

“China Takes to the Sea: Claims Oil-Rich Islands in the South China Sea,” The Economist, volume 335, number 7912, (29 April 1995), p. 41-3.

ABSTRACT: China’s claim comes within the 3-mile limit near the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam. Southeastern Asian nations are disturbed by her assertiveness and the US may be unable to help them. Perhaps only a collective counter-assertiveness on the part of her neighbors will halt China drive.

“China: Friend or Foe?” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (3 August 1995), p.16-17.

ABSTRACT: Examines regional security issues, including Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan and expanding presence in the Spratly Islands, in context of ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, to be held in Brunei; policy options of Thailand, Vietnam, and the US; 5 articles.

Ching, Frank. “Manila Looks for a Slingshot: Philippines is Bringing International Opinion to Bear on China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 10, (9 March 1995), p. 40.

ABSTRACT: The Philippines are attempting to invoke multinational interests in their dispute over China’s construction of an apparent military outpost in the Spratly Islands, on Panganiban Reef. Also called Mischief Reef, it is near the Philippines, and the Chinese occupation violates the 1992 Manila Declaration. China will certainly want bilateral discussions, but Manila knows it would be at a disadvantage, and would do well to bring the issue up at the ASEAN-China forum on political and security issues in Apr.

Cloughley, Brian, “No need for war in South China Sea.  Despite sabre-rattling, a resource war over the Spratlys is not inevitable,” International Refense Review, Volume 28, Number 6, 1995, p. 22.

Holloway, Nigel. “Jolt from the Blue: U.S. Prodded to Firm Up its Policy on Spratlys,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 31, (3 August 1995), p. 22-4.

ABSTRACT: China’s establishment of potential military structures on the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea surprised the US but has revived its relations with the Philippines. Under prodding from Congress, the White House and the Pentagon have indicated they will strongly resist any aggression in the area, through which much of the world’s shipping travels. ASEAN nations welcomed the signals, but hope that they never have to choose between the US and regional giant China.

Hyer, Eric. “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements,” Pacific Affairs, volume 68, number 1, (Spring 1995), p. 34-55.

ABSTRACT: China is likely to concede to internationally accepted principles on territorial jurisdiction than insist on the recognition of its historical claim to the islands in the South China Sea. Its previous action on its boundary disputes with other countries in the 1960s reflects its willingness to compromise as long as its national security interests are not jeopardized. China would prefer that its boundaries are internationally recognized rather than maintain historical claims.

Leifer, Michael. “Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection,” Survival, volume 37, number 2, (Summer 1995), p. 44-60.

ABSTRACT: There is a strong link between Chinese economic reforms and the security policy in the South China Sea. Without the military might afforded by recent economic growth, it is unlikely that China would be making such a strong claim on the disputed lands. Conversely, the natural resources in the South China Sea and the trade-friendly location of islands there would further the country both economically and strategically.

Manning, Robert A. and James J.  Przystup. “The China Challenge,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 27, (6 July 1995), p. 30.

ABSTRACT: China’s activities in the South China Sea offer the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) its first real challenge but also provide a solid issue to spark a true multilateral organization. The ARF should move quickly to ensure an equitable solution to the problem. First it should demand a freeze on military and economic activity in the area, and then make the South China Sea workshops a true negotiating forum. The US should give Manila military equipment and build military-to-military ties with Vietnam and China.

Salameh, Mamdouh G. “China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict,” Survival, volume 37, (Winter 1995/1996), p. 133-46.

ABSTRACT: Whether China’s search for oil in the South China Sea will affect the strategic environment and the balance of power in Southeastern Asia.

Shephard, Allan. “Oil on Troubled Waters: Indonesian Sponsorship of the South China Sea Workshops,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, volume 18, number 1, (January-March 1995), p. 1-15.

ABSTRACT: The South China Sea workshops that Indonesia organized to discuss the Spratly Islands have had considerable success in creating confidence and building security measures regionally. While not widely known outside the area, these workshops provide fodder for both the content and the format of more prominent conferences. Four meetings have been held thus far among the various claimants to these strategically located and potentially resource-rich islands, with admittedly little progress on their ownership and control.

“The Spratlys Spat,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 15, (13 April 1995), p. 5.

ABSTRACT: China’s actions in the Spratly Islands and to some extent elsewhere suggest less a desire to flex military muscle than a disturbing willingness to heighten tensions and create uncertainty among its neighbors. Its calculated actions appear designed to postpone any final decisions until the Chinese military can enforce that regime’s desires. The US reaction to the incidents is also troubling and suggests a distinct unwillingness to be actively involved in such problems.

Strasser, Steven. “A New ‘Anti-China Club’?” Newsweek, volume 126, number 3, (17 July 1995), p. 30-32.

ABSTRACT: Vietnam wants the US and its future ASEAN partners to join in a kind of containment policy against China. Vietnam has a long history of conflict with China, and believes it is acting as a regional bully in occupying Philippine islands and claiming mineral rights in the South China Sea.

Tasker, Rodney. “A Line in the Sand: Manila Tries to Halt China’s Advance into the Spratlys, Blowing Up Markers and Detaining Chinese Fishermen; But its Diplomatic and Military Weakness Doesn’t Bode Well for the Attempt,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, (April 6 1995), p. 14-16.

ABSTRACT: Dispute following Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef, within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone claimed by the Philippines.

1994

Gallagher, Michael G., “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,” International Security, volume 19, number 1 (Summer 1994), p. 169-194.

Hindley, Michael and James Bridge. “South China Sea: The Spratly and Paracel Islands Dispute,” The World Today, volume 50, (June 1994), p. 109-12.

ABSTRACT: Role of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in negotiating the sovereignty dispute involving China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

Hyer, Eric. Ed. “Special Issue: The South China Sea Territorial Disputes,” American Asian Review, vol. 12, (Winter 1994), p. 7-209.

ABSTRACT: Conflicting claims of Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan, including the dispute over the Spratly Islands; issues include national security, sovereignty, role of natural resources, the oil factor, and efforts to seek peaceful cooperation and conflict resolution; 9 articles.

Shepard, Allan. “Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea and the Neighborhood: Some Solutions,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, volume 17, (April/ June 1994), p. 181-211.

ABSTRACT: Focuses on disputed territorial claims to the Spratly Islands by China and Vietnam, chiefly.

Smith, Esmond D. Jr. “China’s Aspirations in the Spratly Islands,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 16, number 3, (Dec. 1994), p. 274-95.

1992

Awanohara, Susumu. “Washington’s Priorities,”  The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 32, (13 August 1992), p. 18-20.

ABSTRACT: The US government has warned China not to start any hostilities in the disputed South China Sea. The US warning came in the face of China’s provocations directed against some of the countries, which have laid claim to the Spratly and Paracel island groups in the area. Top US officials have expressed concern that countries involved in the dispute may become involved in a race to procure modern naval armaments. The US is trying to bring about a peaceful resolution to the dispute.

Gregor, A. James. “China’s Shadow over Southeast Asian Waters,” Global Affairs, volume 7, (Summer 1992), p. 1-13.

ABSTRACT: Argues that China’s military strategy, armed forces restructuring, and energy shortages make it a threat to international security in the region. Small wars on the periphery, threat to ASEAN nations, China’s PLA “fist” units.

Tanzer, Andrew. “Asia’s Next Flash Point?” Forbes, volume 150, number 10, (26 Oct. 1992), p. 96-99.

ABSTRACT: The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are the focus of a land battle between nearby countries, which are making claims on the islands. The militarily strategically placed Islands are sought by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
 



V.  PLA and National Defense
A. Military Modernization  B.  Defense Industries  C.  PLA--Political Aspects  D.  PLA--Economic Aspects  E.  Air Force  F. Navy

A.  Military Modernization

2001

Shlapak, David, "Chinese Military Modernization and the China-Taiwan Balance," American Foreign Policy Interests 23, number 3 (2001), pp. 173-176.

2000

Karniol, Robert, "China: Despite limited funding, the Chinese PLA has a large number of combat-ready formations with modern views on tactics and strategy," Jane's defence weekly, 34, no. 2, (2000), p. 22 (6 pages).

Swaine, Michael, "Does China Have a Grand Strategy?"Current History 99 (September, 2000), pp. 274-279.

1999

“Military Modernization Downturn - China has slowed its military modernization program due to economic constraints and reluctance by Russia to sell its front-line technology,” Defense News, Volume 14, Number 5, p. 9, 1999.

Ji, You,  "The revolution in military affairs and the evolution of China's strategic thinking," Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore) 21(3), Dec. 1999, pp. 344-364.

1996

Barry, John and Russell Watson. “How We Match Up,” Newsweek, volume 127, number 14, (1 April 1996), p. 41-3.

ABSTRACT: China has the largest standing army in the world, and though it may be technology behind, it is the strongest military force in East Asia. The US may have to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack to maintain credibility as a force in the region and prevent an Asian arms race.

Godwin, Paul. “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 464-487).

Hirschfeld, Thomas. “The Year of the Rat,” US Naval Inst Proc, volume 122, (May 1996), p. 56-9.

ABSTRACT: Examines evidence for claims about China’s rapid military growth and policy differences that draw attention to it, arguing that perceived threat to Taiwan and to US interests is exaggerated; some focus on Chinese naval power.

Johnston, A. I. “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Mondernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 548-576.

Keating, Susan Katz. “Firestorm 2005,” Soldier of Fortune, volume 21, (Feb. 1996), p. 34-8.

ABSTRACT: Assesses growing Chinese military power and potential conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region.

Lai, Andrew, “Preparation for High-Tech Regional Wars,” China Strategic Review, volume 1, number 5, (August 5, 1996), p. 2-6.

Lin, Chong-Pin. “Red Army: Chinese Military Buildup,” The New Republic, volume 213, number 21, (20 Nov. 1995), p. 28.

ABSTRACT:  Most Western observers tend to dismiss China’s military as an obsolete and ineffective behemoth. However, recent events show that China’s ability to project military power beyond its borders has grown significantly.

Shambaugh, David. “China’s Military: Real Or Paper Tiger?” Washington Quarterly, volume 19, (Spring 1996), p. 19-36.

ABSTRACT: Assesses the modernization program of the People’s Liberation Army PLA), its growing military capabilities, and its impact on US interests; ways to engage the Chinese military in the international order.

Shambaugh, David. “The People’s Liberation Army Towards the 21st Century: Continuity and Change. China’s Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 265-298.

1994

Chu, Shulong, “The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War,” Orbis, volume 38, nnumber 2 (Spring 1994), p. 177-192.

Holloway, Nigel. “A Chill Wind: Stealthier Nuclear Missile Raises U.S. Fears,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 158, number 24, (15 June 1995), p. 15-17.

ABSTRACT:  China’s May 29 test-launching of the East Wind 31 solid-fuel ballistic missile raised tensions and inflamed anxieties both in the region and worldwide. Its maximum range of 8,000 km is less than that of some existing Chinese missiles, but it can be transported by truck or, potentially, submarine and launched quickly. US congressmen point to it as an incentive to build an antimissile system, a project Japan may join. A Chinese nuclear missile threat could make the US hesitate if China attacks a neighbor.

Lin, Chong-Pin. “Chinese Military Modernization: Perceptions, Progress, And Prospects,” Security Studies, volume 3, (Summer 1994), p. 718-53.

ABSTRACT: Describes strengthening of the People’s Liberation Army, its munitions and nuclear capabilities, its domestic and foreign policy roles, and offshore military exercises.

Oliver, April. “The Dragon’s New Teeth: China’s Military Buildup,” The Nation, volume 258, number 7, (21 Feb. 1994), p. 229-33.

ABSTRACT: China is in the process of rebuilding its armed forces, with the apparent aim of becoming the dominant military power in Asia. Modernization is a crucial element in the rebuilding, and to this end China is purchasing sophisticated military equipment and hiring ex-Soviet scientists.

Post, Tom. “Prying Open a Secret Army: U.S. Fears About the Chinese Military,” Newsweek, volume 124, number 18, (31 Oct. 1994), p. 40.

ABSTRACT:  Defense Sec William Perry met with leaders of the People’s Liberation Army in an effort to get China to open its military to international scrutiny. The Pentagon is pursuing any chance to influence the direction of China’s military after the passing of Deng Xiao-Ping.

1993

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Quick Response: Military Planners Focus on External Threats,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 2, (14 Jan. 1993), p. 19-21.

ABSTRACT: The wide-ranging reshuffling of China’s central military leadership has led to the modernization of its huge but outdated armed forces. Reorganizing combat forces and rewriting military doctrines are seen to be the emphasis of this effort as fund limitation allowed only a modest acquisition of weapons. A small number of select units will receive more funding for training and will be prioritized in weapons allocation in order to maintain a high level of operational readiness. The primary mission of these elite group armies is to defend the capital from external threat, particularly from Russia.

Godwin, Paul and John J. Schulz. “Arming the Dragon for the 21st Century: China’s Defense Modernization Program,” Arms Control Today, volume 23, (Dec. 1993), p. 3-8.

ABSTRACT:  Analyzes motives and strategies for modernizing nuclear and conventional forces.

Jenkins, David. “Asia’s Scramble for Arms,” World Press Review, volume 40, number 6, (June 1993), p. 16-9.

ABSTRACT:  Both Japan and China are increasing their military power. Japan law now allows troops to serve outside the country and China is seeking to enforce longstanding territorial claims. Singapore, Malaysia and other Asian nations are also participating in the arms buildup.

1992

Ding, Arthur S., “The Streamlining of the PLA,” Issues & Studies, volume 28, number 11 (November 1992), p. 86-98.

Forbes, Malcolm S. Jr. “Ominous,” Forbes, volume 150, number 12, (23 Nov. 1992), p. 25-7.

Lewis, John Wilson and Hua Di. “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, volume 17, number 2, (Fall 1992), p. 5-41.

ABSTRACT:  China’s purpose for building tactical ballistic missiles TBM) essentially followed a political and ideological purpose. During the 1960s and 1970s, China’s dong-feng DF) missile program acted mainly as deterrence towards the US and the Soviet Union. Despite realizing the imperative to convert a part of the country’s TBM capacity to civilian production, the country had to turn to arms exports for them to acquire hard currency. However, due largely to the TBM program’s success, China was able to assert its influence not only towards Asia, but also to the whole world.

1991

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Counter Marching: Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 153, number 32, (8 August 1991), p. 30-3.

 1989

Jencks, Harlan W., “The Military in China,” Current History, volume 88, number 539 (September 1989), p. 265-291.

B.  Defense Industries

1998

Brommelhorster, Jorn; Frankenstein, John; Dreyer, June Teufel, “China and Inner Asia – MIXED
 MOTIVES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES: Defense Conversion in China,” Pacific Affairs,
Volume 71, Number 3, p. 413, 1998.

“China is turning up the pressure on industrial restructuring to drive forward PLA weapons
programmes,” Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume 29, Number 3, p. 22, 1998.

1997

“China's PLA: a force in big business markets - The PLA of China is merging its core commercial
 business units to target domestic and foreign markets well into the next decade,” Jane's
Defence Weekly, Volume 28, Number 24-25, p. 18, 1997.

Ding, Arthur S, “Defense Conversion of the Aviation Industry in Mainland China and Taiwan,”
Issues & Studies, Volume 33, Number 5, p. 1, 1997.

1996

Koretsky, Aleksandr. “China Will Build Russian Planes Itself,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, volume 48, number 8, (20 March 1996), p. 23-5.

ABSTRACT: The Rosvooruzheniye Russian Arms State Company is maintaining its silence over the reported sale of a license to manufacture state-of-the-art SU-27 fighter-interceptors to China. Russia, for the first time since the 1960s, is ready to continue its export of military high technologies to this territory. This assumes significance since the SU-27 is a transcontinental fighter and Moscow could come within its firing range. The sale of the license might result in the erosion of Russian control over the combat aircraft market.

1995

Gill, Bates. “Defensive Industry: China’s Arms Makers Struggle with the Marketplace,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, (30 Nov. 1995), p.62.

ABSTRACT:  Problems in conversion from military to civilian production; national and regional analyses.

Luo Fengniao, “Development of Defense Science, Technology, and Industries in China,” Working Paper for SIPRI, 1995.

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), National Security: Impact of China’s Military Modernization in the Pacific Region, report to Congressional Committees GAO/NSIAD-95-84, 1995.

1993

Frieman, Wendy. “China’s Defense Industries,” Pacific Review, volume 6, (1 Nov. 1993), p. 51-62.

ABSTRACT:  Quality of defense production capabilities and possible security concerns if significant quantities of weapons are sold to a single foreign buyer.

“Military Firms Turn to Civilian Market,” Beijing Review volume 36, number 32, (9 August 1993), p. 5-7.

ABSTRACT: The defense industry in southwest China has been manufacturing civilian goods, instead of arms and ammunitions, since 1983. The military firms have manufactured 4 million motorcycles, 500,000 refrigerators, 100,000 minibuses and other goods of civilian use. The civilian products provide it with a profit up to 86%, and the industry has planned to establish its branches abroad. The industry has collaborated with the United States in two projects worth $220 million for the manufacture of 100,000 cars and 300, 000 motorcycles each year.

1992

Adelman, Kenneth L., and Norman R. Augustine, “Defense Conversion:  Bulldozing the
Mangement,” Foreign Affairs, volume 71, number 2 (Spring 1992), p.26-47.

Jin Zhude, and Chai Benliang, “Prospect on the Peaceful Use of Military Industrial Technologies in China,” paper prepared for the International Conference on China’s 2000-Oriented Scientific and Technological Policy, Beijing, October 25-31, 1992.

Jin Zhude, and Chai Benliang, “Study on china’s Policies of Conversion of Defence Industries,” paper presented at the UN Center for Science and Technology in Development, International Conference on Conversion, Dortmund, Germany, February 24, 1992.

1987

Gallagher, Michael G., “China’s Military Industrial Complex: Its Approach to the Acquisition of
Modern Military Technology,” Asian Survey, volume 27, number 9 (September 1987): 991-1002.

C.  PLA--Political Aspects

2001

Allen, Kenneth, "China's Foreign Military Relations with Asia-Pacific," Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 29 (2001), pp. 645-662.

2000

Jan, George P., "The military and democratization in China in the post Cold War era," International Journal of Public Administration 22(8), 1999, pp. 1241-1268.

1999

Li, Nan, "Organizational changes of the PLA, 1985-1997," China Quarterly 158, June 1999, pp. 314-349.

1996

Barry, John and Russell Watson. “How We Match Up,” Newsweek, volume 127, number 14, (1 April 1996), p. 41-2.

ABSTRACT:  China has the largest standing army in the world, and though it may be technology behind, it is the strongest military force in East Asia. The US may have to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack to maintain credibility as a force in the region and prevent an Asian arms race.

Joffe, E. “Management of the PLA. Party-army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 299-314.

Li Nan, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” China Quarterly, number 146 (June 1996), p. 443-463.

Shambaugh, David. “China’s Military: Real or Paper Tiger?” The Washington Quarterly, volume 19, number 2, (Spring 1996), p. 19.

Swain, M.D. “The PLA in China’s National Security Policy: Leaderships, Structures, Processes,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 360-393.

1995

Yao, Yunzhu. “Chinese Women’s Role in the People’s Liberation Army,” Army Quarterly, volume 125, (Oct. 1995), p. 414-19.

ABSTRACT: Recruitment, military education and training, gender-based division of labor, and increasing opportunities beyond non-combat and auxiliary service. Some emphasis on women officers and generals.

1994

Ching, Frank. “China Makes Concessions: Accord on Military Lands in Hong Kong Appears Near,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, number 16, (21 April 1994), p. 40-1.

ABSTRACT:  China and Britain are near an agreement on the future of military property in Hong Kong when China assumes control of the colony in 1997. Most of the 5,900 hectares of military real estate will be turned over to the China People’s Liberation Army PLA), but the PLA no longer insists on all of it. China has also agreed to return military lands to the municipality when no longer needed for defense purposes. Britain agreed to let the PLA have a base in the downtown area, but obtained an agreement for a smaller military presence. These important negotiation achievements came despite the breakdown in political reform talks.

Lin, Chong-Pin. “The Stealthy Advance of China’s People’s Liberation Army,” The American Enterprise, volume 5, number 1, (Jan.-Feb. 1994), p. 28-36.

ABSTRACT: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army PLA) is increasing its influence both domestically and internationally. The PLA played a major role in suppressing activities in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 and has also served as Deng Xiaoping’s enforcer of reform. The significant growth of the Chinese economy has allowed the PLA to expand technologically, and China’s growing regional influence will likely involve the PLA as well. Additionally, the PLA is likely to play a greater role in domestic politics if a leadership struggle follows Deng’s departure from power.

“The People’s Army: Serving Whose Interests?” Current History, volume 93, number 584, (Sept. 1994), p. 265-70.

ABSTRACT:  The People’s Liberation Army PLA) is a concern not only to the outside world but also to the Chinese leadership, which wonders about where its loyalty lies. The PLA has a substantial political role domestically and often acts like a separate entity.

Yu, Peter Kien-Hong. “Potential Areas of Chinese Regional Military Separatism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 15, number 4, (March 1994), p. 464-99.

1993

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Who’s on Top? China’s Military Faces a Leadership Vacuum,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 16, (22 April 1993), p. 18.

ABSTRACT: China’s 88-year-old leader, Deng Xiaoping, rearranged the command structure of the People’s Liberation Army PLA) in the fall of 1992, a decision that may produce a struggle for control after Deng’s death. Deng refused to part with any aspect of his power over the PLA except to devolve administrative duties to trusted subordinates such as Lieutenant General Wang Ruilin. Since the PLA’s leadership strongly influences the selection of China’s civilian rulers, uncertainty over who will command the PLA after Deng may destabilize the whole country.

“Deng Purges Military Command: Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reorganized China’s military command to ensure his policies would be followed after his death,” Facts on File, volume 53, number 2726, (25 Feb. 1993), p. 127-8.

Dreyer, June Teufel. “The Chinese Military Since the Soviet Coup,” American Asian Review, volume 11, (Summer 1993), p. 25-43.

ABSTRACT:  Examines the defensive and domestic roles of the People’s Liberation Army PLA); implications for future functions.

Li, Nan. “Changing Functions of the Party and Political Work System in the PLA and Civil-Military Relations in China,” Armed Forces and Society, volume 19, (Spring 1993), p. 393-409.

ABSTRACT: De-politicization of the PPWS within the Peoples’ Liberation Army, reducing divisiveness in civil-military relations.

“PLA plc: China,” The Economist, volume 327, number 7809, (1 May 1993), p. 32.

1992

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Back to the Front: Deng Xiaoping’s Moves to De-Politicize the People’s Liberation Army,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 43, (29 Oct. 1992), p. 15-7.

ABSTRACT:  Deng Xiaoping has retired politically ambitious generals and promoted trusted commanders who are more focused on military professionalism in a shakeup of China’s top military leadership to lessen officers’ influence on politics. His most important act was to eliminate a potentially destabilizing dynasty in the military by removing Pres Yang Shangkun and his younger half-brother General Yang Baibing from all their army positions.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Fit to Fight: Reforming China’s Military,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 21, (28 May 1992), p. 24-6.

ABSTRACT:  China continues reforming its military as delegates a meeting of the Central Military Commission agreed on substantial cuts in troops and stricter management of the People’s Liberation Army. No fixed numbers were agreed upon, however, leading to the belief that some commanders are resisting the cuts because of the unemployment that would result. Also discussed at the meeting was the establishment of a new command headquarters that would be directly under general headquarters and in charge of several group armies and rapid deployment forces.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Lost in the Postings: Military Reshuffle in China,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 48, (3 Dec. 1992), p. 16-8.

ABSTRACT: The removal of Chinese army leader Yang Shangkun and Gen Yang Baibing from their posts has led to a reshuffle of China’s top military officers. The two officers were removed because of reported maneuverings to create a power base meant to succeed Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Some of the generals affected by the reshuffle were closely connected to the two former military officials. Lieutenant General Zhang Wannian has been appointed as the new chief of the general staff

Godwin, Paul H.B., “Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” China Quarterly, number 112 (December 1992), p. 572-590.

Lin, Chong-Pin. “The Extra Military Roles of the People’s Liberation Army in Modernization: Limits of Professionalization,” Security Studies, volume 1, (Summer 1992), p. 659-89.

ABSTRACT:  Implications of the PLA involvement in economic, social, and internal political intervention in China; 1980s. DESCRIPTORS: *Civil-military relations-- China People’s Republic); *China People’s Republic)-- Armed forces; *China People’s Republic)-- Government and politics

Scobell, Andrew. “Why the People’s Army Fired on the People: The Chinese military and Tiananmen,” Armed Forces & Society, volume 18, number 2, (Winter 1992), p. 193-214.

ABSTRACT: The People’s Liberation Army played the decisive role in crushing the 1989 student pro-democracy movement in the People’s Republic of China. The actual process by which the PLA became involved in the crisis can be broken down into three phases. First, a divided and indecisive Chinese Communist Party leadership presides over an unprecedented outpouring of public discontent. Second, after much delay, to CCP leaders decided to impose martial law, and units of the PLA try unsuccessfully to enter downtown Beijing and break up the protests. Finally, top CCP leaders order troops to use deadly force. On 3-4 June 1989, troops open fire on crows and succeed in ending the demonstrations, at a cost of hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The PLA’s involvement in the incident has had serious and immediate results for the military, including a marked decline in public prestige and a drop in morale. Over the long term, the 1989 events in China coupled with communism’s global crisis suggest that the natural evolution of the CCP-PLA relationship from symbiotic to coalitional may increase the likelihood of an eventual army-party split.

Yu, Peter Kien-hong. “Regional Military Separatism after Deng Xiaoping,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 11, number 1, (Spring 1992), p. 3-18.

ABSTRACT:  Military separatism has been a dominant feature of Chinese history. There is a high probability that the demise of Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping could lead to widespread regional military separatism RMS) throughout China. However, nobody can determine the exact places wherein RMS would emerge just as nobody can determine when the post-Deng era will begin.

1991

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Gun-barrel Politics: Jiang Zemin Asserts Influence In Military Policymaking,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 151, number 3, (17 Jan. 1991), p. 16-8.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Uncertain Loyalties: Chinese Government Watches out For Signs of Military Restiveness,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 151, number 14, 4 April 1991), p. 29-31.

Gregor, A. James. “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Crisis,” Armed Forces and Society, volume 18, (Fall 1991), p. 7-28.

ABSTRACT:  Focuses on the PLA relationship with the Communist party, especially following the military suppression of student demonstrations in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Role in domestic and foreign policy, the defense budget, military strategy, and professionalization vs. ideology.

Jencks, Harlan W. “Civil-military Relations in China: Tiananmen and After,” Problems of Communism, volume 40, number 3, (May-June 1991), p. 14-30.

Lee, Wei-Chin. “Iron and Nail: Civil-Military Relations in the People’s Republic of China,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, volume 26, number 1-2, (Jan.-April 1991), p.132-49.

ABSTRACT: A recurrent theme in China studies in the influence of the military in power politics and the extent to which its particular interests are under civilian control. Since Deng’s resurgence to power, the People’s Liberation Army PLA) seems to have fallen into disfavor, but a reexamination of civil-military relations in the PRC shows that the situation is complex. Deng’s many military reforms have hardly created an apolitical professional military and the PLA still plays a significant role in Chinese politics. At the same time, because of Deng’s reforms and the particular nature of Party-military relationships in China, military takeover of the Communist Party authority remains unlikely.

“PLA’s 64th Anniversary Marked,” Beijing Review, volume 34, number 32, (12 August 1991), p. 7.

Shambaugh, David. “The Soldier and the State In China: The Political Work System in the People’s Liberation Army,” The China Quarterly, volume 127, (Sept. 1991), p. 527-69.

Zang, Xiaowei. “Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 10, number 3, (Fall 1991), p. 46-61.

ABSTRACT:  Biographies of 224 top Chinese military leaders were studied. A group of young and well-educated military leaders who differ from their predecessors in terms of social and military milieu, took over the reins of the People’s Liberation Army PLA) in the 1980s. However, only a few PLA officers took part in civilian politics. These factors represent the growing professionalism in the PLA. Military technocrats were promoted due to their expertise while military bureaucrats were promoted due to their loyalty and intimate knowledge of the military institution. The present military leadership, therefore, is a bureaucratic-technocracy.

Zhong, Yang. “Civil-Military Relations in Changing Communist Societies: A Comparative Study of China and the Soviet Union,” Studies in Comparative Communism, volume 24, number 1, (March 1991), p. 77-103.

ABSTRACT: Frequency of Chinese media mentions of army activities and military themes. (table); Frequency of Soviet media mentions of army activities and military themes. (table); Frequency of Soviet civilian intrusion into military affairs. (table)

1990

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Basic Marxist Training,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 149, number 34, (23 August 1990), p. 46-8.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Haunted Dreams: Military on Alert in Response to Romania Crisis,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 147, number 3, (18 Jan. 1990), p. 16-18.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Stars and Bars: PLA Reshuffle Reflects Political Patronage,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 148, number 24, (14 June 1990), p. 32.

Dreyer, June Teufel. “The Military in China,” Current History, volume 89, number 548, (Sept. 1990), p. 261-8.

Liu, Congli and Yuanyuan Zhu. “Caring for the men - A PLA tradition,” Beijing Review, volume 33, No. 31, (30 July 1990), p. 20.

Mirsky, Jonathan. “Purging the Army,” World Press Review, volume 37, number 5, (May 1990), p. 15.

“Plenty to Fight About,” The Economist, volume 314, number 7648, (31 March 1990), p. 33.

Sandschneider, Eberhard. “The Chinese Army after Tiananmen,” Pacific Review, volume 3, (2 Nov. 1990), p. 113-24.

ABSTRACT:  Changes in the role of the People’s Liberation Army and the military elite since 1978.

“Strife-torn,” The Economist, volume 314, number 7642, (17 Feb. 1990), p. 35.

1984

Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 1984).

D.  PLA--Economic Aspects

2000

"INTELLIGENCE: The PLA and telecoms; One China," Far Eastern economic review, 163, no. 30, (2000), p. 10 (4 pages).

1996

Ding, A.S. “China’s Defense Finance: Content, Process and Administration,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 428-442.

“Frankenstein, J. and Bates Gill. “The Defense Economy. Current and future Challenges facing Chinese Defense Industries,” The China Quarterly, volume 146, (June 1996), p. 394-427.

Shaoguang Wang, “Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources,” China Quarterly, volume 147, September 1996.

1994

Bickford, Thomas J. “The Chinese Military and its Business Operations: The PLA as Entrepreneur,” Asian Survey, volume 34, number 5, (May 1994), p. 460-75.

ABSTRACT: China’s People’s Liberation Army PLA) has been actively involved in the country’s economic development since 1979. Although they were established to provide income to the military, PLA enterprises have taken a much bigger role, enabling PLA to take advantage of the restructured economy. Consequently, corruption and other organizational problems prevailed within PLA. Moreover, PLA business activities have transformed military personnel into a less-disciplined group.

“China’s New Model Army: Asia,”  The Economist, volume 331, number 7867, (11 June 1994), p. 29-31.

ABSTRACT: China’s official military spending rose sharply since 1991; China became the third-largest military spender in the world. The extra funds, spent primarily to improve response speed and naval equipment, were provided to help the government better manage both domestic and external threats.

Kaye, Lincoln. “Soldiers of Fortune,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, number 31, (4 August 1994), p. 24-6.

ABSTRACT: China’s military may continue to play a large role in the country’s leadership succession. Its emphasis has shifted, however, from defense to military-run business, giving the quartermaster corps power at the expense of the field commanders and commissars. Some observers fear strong ties between the army and local officials could encourage separatism, but that seems unlikely. The central governments budget continues to provide most of the military’s funding and two top military officers are on the short list for chair of the Central Military Commission: Yang Dezhong and Wang Ruilin.

Mecham, Michael and John D. Morrocco. “China’s Military Budget Up 20%: U.S. to Aid Industry,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 140, number 12, (21 March 1994), p. 62-4.

ABSTRACT:  China increased its defense budget mainly because of complaints about old equipment and poor living conditions by the People’s Liberation Army. The US and China will form a joint commission that will evaluate conversion of PLA defense factories.

“Soldiering Pays: China,” The Economist, volume 332, number 7871, (9 July 1994), p. 39-41.

ABSTRACT: While China claims its defense budget is only to be equivalent to $6 billion dollars, many estimate it to be actually $27 billion to $43 billion. Soldiers add to their pay by making appearance on television shows, demanding bribes and embezzling funds.

1993

Chen, Chien-Hsun. “Causality Between Defense Spending and Economic Growth: The Case of Mainland China,” Journal of Economic Studies, volume 30, number 6, (1993), p. 37-43.

ABSTRACT:  Using co integration and Granger causality tests, examines the causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth in mainland China over the period 1950-1991. The results show that defense spending is not co integrated with the real economic growth rate, implying the lack of any long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables. In addition, Granger causality tests indicate causal independence between the two variables. -Author

Cheung, Tai Ming. “PLA, Inc.: China’s Military Launches Profit Offensive,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, (14 Oct. 1993), p. 64-6.

ABSTRACT:  Military-backed companies in defense and civilian industries created to help finance the People’s Liberation Army; growing influence in the Chinese economy; 3 articles. Covers attempts by Poly Group Corporation, the PLA’s main arms exporter, and China North Industries Group conglomerate, to diversify into civilian production; impact of businesses on military professionalism and potential for corruption.

Joffe, Ellis, “The PLA and the Chinese economy: The Effect of the Involvement,” Survival, volume 37,
number 2 (Summer 1993): 24-43.

1991

“The Army that Makes Money: China,” The Economist, volume 321, number 7727, ( 5 Oct. 1991), p. 38.

ABSTRACT:  In 1984 Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told the People’s Liberation Army the government could no longer finance the entire defense bill. Since then the army has been forced into civilian production and business ventures in order to support itself.

Murray, Brian. “Red Army Swords and Free Market Ploughshares,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, volume 10, number 2, (Summer 1991), p. 26-53.

1990

“Changes in Military Spending,” Beijing Review, volume 33, number 37, (10 Sept. 1990), p. 39.

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Political Payoff: PLA’s Budget Share Reflects Greater Clout,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 148, number 14, (5 April 1990), p. 28-30.

1989

Gillespie, Richard E., “The Military’s New Muscle,” China Business Review, volume 16, number 5
(September-October 1989), p. 28-32.

E.  Air Force

2002

"Missing the link - China has never developed an integrated air-defence system," Flight international, (October 29, 2002), p. 45 (3 pages).
 

1999

Lewis, John W., and Yue Litai, "China's Search for a Modern Air Force," International Security 24(1), Summer 1999, pp. 64-94.

1995

Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air force Enters the Twenty-first Century (Santa Monica: calif., RAND Corporation, 1995).

Fulghum, David A. “China Pursuing Two-Fighter Plan,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 142, number 13, (27 March 1995), p. 44-6.

ABSTRACT:  China is planning to upgrade its People’s Liberation Army Air Force fleet by manufacturing Russia’s Su-27 aircraft engines for its proposed F-10 fighters. China may seek Israel’s help in reverse-engineering the engine if Russia does not approve of a co-production agreement.

Fulghum, David A. “Chinese Fighter Force to Shrink In 21st Century,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 143, number 3, (17 July 1995), p. 40-2.

ABSTRACT: A RAND study reports that China will replace half its fighter and attack aircraft by 2005 because they are too old. The remaining planes are already obsolete and the government lacks the budget to modernize them. But it will continue to fund Su-27 long-range strike fighter and F-10 multi-role programs. Financially, the Chinese Navy takes precedence over the Air Force because of growing conflict in the oil-rich South China Sea.

Fulghum, David A. “New Chinese Fighter Nears Prototyping: F-10 Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 142, number 11, (13 March 1995), p. 26-8.

ABSTRACT:  China’s beyond-visual-range multi-role fighter will have its first flight in 1996 and is expected to enter operation in the next ten years. Pentagon officials report that the aircraft is a cross between the Israeli Lavi and the US F-16.

1992

Fulghum, David A. “China Seeks To Build MiG-31: Mikoyan MiG-31 Fighters,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, volume 137, number 14, (5 Oct. 1992), p. 27-30.

ABSTRACT:  China is pursuing a rapid military modernization plan, in which the purchase of aerospace industry assets of the former Soviet Union figures prominently. Systems envisioned under the plan include the MiG-31 or other radar-equipped fighter, a new surface-to-air missile, and a cruise missile.

1991

Latham, Richard J. and Kenneth W. Allen. “Defense Reform in China: The PLA Air Force,”  Problems of Communism, volume 40, number 3, (May-June 1991), p. 30-51.

F.  Navy

1996

Dowing, John, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1996.

1995

Cruz de Castro, Renato. “Interactive Naval Developments of Three Northeast Asian States,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 17, (Dec. 1995), p. 319-36.

ABSTRACT:  Analyzes China’s build-up of naval and air forces in response to arms modernizations in Taiwan and Japan; examines the possibility of an arms race.

1994

Chanda, Nayan. “Aiming High: As U.S. Defense Secretary Perry heads to Beijing to re-open military cooperation, an article arguing that China needs an aircraft carrier rekindles fears about its regional ambitions,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 157, (20 Oct. 1994), p. 14-15.

ABSTRACT: US analysis of an article entitled, “The aviation dream of the Chinese people”, printed in the July issue of Shidian, published by the semi-official China News Service.

Huang, Alexander C., “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Review, volume 47, number 3 (Summer 1994), p. 7-32.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. “A Question of Intent: What is China up to in the South China Sea?” The American Enterprise, volume 5, number 6, (Nov.-Dec. 1994), p. 64-76.

ABSTRACT:  China’s military buildup and its repeated claims to the Spratly Islands and other valuable territory in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits give cause for concern. Its willingness to use force internally is also troubling because countries that do so have a greater propensity to use force and start wars. Fortunately, China shows signs of changing, and its openness in other areas may lead to political reformation and liberalization. Firm and fair treatment from other countries, with clear expectations, will help.

1993

Cheung, Tai Ming. “Lacking Depth,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 156, number 5, (4 Feb. 1993), p. 11.

ABSTRACT:  China’s submarine fleet, though considered to be one of the largest in the world, is not fully operational. Although there is an estimated 100 submarines in the Chinese navy, more than half of this number is either non-operational or decommissioned. Six submarines are locally built with only one of them a Xia-class ship having the capacity to carry strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. Still, military analysts suspect that the Xia is already having technical problems. The small budget for the fleet makes it impossible to upgrade maintenance.

1992

“Navy Escorts Country’s Openness: Chinese Navy to Support Open Policy,” Beijing Review, volume 35, number 18, (4 May 1992), p. 12.

ABSTRACT:  The 3-fleet Chinese Navy has announced its support for the country’s growing openness to the international marketplace. It has been consistently supportive of the country’s projects in the past in addition to performing its primary duty of safeguarding China’s territorial waters. In the realm of economic development, it has constructed ports, power plants and ships. In its effort to boost tourism, the Navy has put in place historic locations and stored cultural artifacts in the country’s bases.

1991

Ji, You and You Xu. “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s,” Pacific Review, volume 4, (2 Nov. 1991), p.137-49.

ABSTRACT:  Assesses the Chinese People’s Liberation Army modernization efforts, particularly the “open-ocean training program.”

Mak, J. N. “The Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment,” Pacific Review, volume 4, (2 Nov. 1991), p.150-61.

ABSTRACT:  Recent roles and doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army Navy; emphasis on the South Sea Fleet.

1990

Song, Yann-huei. “China and the Military Use of the Ocean,” Ocean Development and International Law, volume 21, (2 Nov. 1990), p. 213-35.

ABSTRACT:  Role of perception of threat from the sea in the development of Chinese Navy, maritime interests, and policy.
 



VI.  Appendix: Source List

The volume provides a summary of the journal literature on China’s arms control, disarmament, defense and security issues with emphasis on China’s weapons proliferation. It contains 384 entries of journal articles, drawn from the following six databases of the Dialog Information Services:

 Academic Index
 GEOBASE
 PAIS International Public Affairs International Service)
 Social SciSearch
 Sociological Abstracts
 U.S. Political Science Documents

All entries are Abstracted by the Dialog Information Services. The journals covered by this bibliography are listed as below:

 American Asian Review
 The American Enterprise
 American Spectator
 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
 Armed Forces and Society
 Arms Control Today
 Army Quarterly
 Asian Perspective
 Asian Survey
 Aviation Week & Space Technology
 Beijing Review
 Brookings Review
 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
 Business Week
 China Business Review
 The China Quarterly
 China Report
 Communist and Post-Communist Studies
 Comparative Strategy
 Congressional Digest
 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
 Contemporary Southeast Asia
 Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press
 Current History
 Discover
 The Economist
 Facts on File
 Far Eastern Economic Review
 Forbes
 Global Affairs
 The Guardian
 Indonesian Quarterly
 International Security
 Journal of Asian and African Studies
 Journal of Developing Societies
 Journal of East Asian Affairs
 Journal of Environmental Sciences
 Journal of International Affairs
 Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
 Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies
 The Middle East
 Military Review
 Moscow News
 The Nation
 National Review
 Nature
 NBR Analysis
 The New Republic
 New Scientist
 New Statesman & Society
 The New York Times Magazine
 Newsweek
 Nuclear Times
 Ocean Development and International Law
 Orbis
 Pacific Affairs
 Pacific Review
 Parameters
 Peace Review
 Physics Today
 Problems of Communism
 Science
 Scientific American
 Security Studies
 Spectator
 Strategic Review
 Studies in Comparative Communism
 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
 The Sunday Times
 Survival
 Time
 The Times
 U.S. News & World Report
 US Department of State Dispatch
 US Naval Institute Proceedings
 Washington Quarterly
 World Policy Journal
 World Press Review
 The World Today

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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