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Negotiation of the "Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty"
 

Source:  Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva

The conclusion of a "Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" (FMCT) will be conducive to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Therefore, China takes a positive attitude towards the negotiation and conclusion of this treaty.

The FMCT negotiation should be carried out in accordance with the mandate contained in the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty should only ban the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should not touch upon the existing stockpiles. The basic obligations of the treaty should cover two aspects, namely, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and prohibiting the diversion of fissile material produced for other purposes after the entry into force of the treaty to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The verification regime of the treaty should comply with the above-mentioned basic obligations for just and effective verification. Moreover, the treaty should neither impede the international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nor undermine the legitimate security interest of the State Parties. To achieve global "prohibition of fissile material production", the treaty should be universal with the participation of all countries capable of producing fissile material.

The priority for the international community is to initiate the FMCT negotiation and to conclude the treaty at an early date. The "moratorium of production" , if declared by countries concerned, might be exploited to delay the treaty negotiation. This will neither promote the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty, nor fundamentally resolve the issues concerning the production and verification of fissile material

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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