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1. Drastic reduction from START II to START III
At Helsinki Summit, March 1997, US and Russian President agreed that the next step after START II, Should be negotiation of follow on START III agreement, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads from 3,000-3,500 of START II to 2,000-2,500 on each side. This step is not great enough toward deep cuts. We suggest to reduce more than half of the deployed strategic warheads on the basis of START II. That means reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,000-1,500 level for START III. It will save at least one step toward Number of Zero if we take this option. This is for the objective of building up confidence for non-nuclear states, and convince them not to seek nuclear weapons.
2. START III cover reduction of tactical and stored nuclear warheads
START II (and START III) agreement only agreed to cut deployed warheads, but the stockpile on each side, include tactical and reserved warheads, still at the 9,000 to 15,000 level. Some of the tactical nuclear weapons are more powerful than those counted as strategic nuclear weapons. We suggest that START should cover the reduction of undeployed nuclear warheads and remove tactical nuclear warheads. We agree with the suggestion which required to reduce the total number of nuclear warheads to 5,000 for each side of United States and Russia as a immediate next step.
3. Multi-lateral ABM Treaty.
The Helsinki Summit Statement on ABM Treaty agreed to make amendment to ABM Treaty, permits both side to develop and deploy Theater Missile Defense System which have abilities to intercept strategic threats. The reaction from Russian Duma is not positive to this amendment, it is not only connected to the enlargement of NATO, but also interconnected with the ratification of START II Treaty. ABM (NMD) and TMD with strategic defense capabilities will affect the nuclear force balance between declared nuclear states, a multi-lateral ABM treaty joined by all nuclear states is helpful for other three nuclear states to join nuclear reduction process. Even though negotiations on TMD/BMD demarcation between five Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) member states concluded in Geneva in August 21, 1997. Our observation is the other three declared nuclear states should attend the future dialogue on amendment of ABM Treaty.
4. Stop weapon usable fissile material production and limit fissile material stockpiles.
To reduce and control weapon usable fissile material is an important measure to limit growth of nuclear warheads and prevent non-nuclear states seeking nuclear weapons. A global ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons is a practical step for fissile material cutoff. At the same time, to put civilian use fissile material production and processing under the monitoring of International Atomic Energy Agency is an effective measure to control transfer from Low Enriched Uranium to weapon usable High Enriched Uranium. The same measure should be taken to limit the stockpile of Plutonium produced from reactors.
5. Adopt no-first-use principle.
No-first-use is a promise that nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against each other, also guarantee of non-use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. We strongly urge that every declared nuclear states to announce no-first-use policy. In a changed environments after cold war, nuclear weapons can only be reserved to deterrence and response to nuclear attack. No-first-use agreement is the precursor of Nuclear Weapon Free World.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
