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James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
March 12, 2003
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today to discuss a vitally
important issue, the regional implications of the changing nuclear equation on
the Korean Peninsula.
The Problem
Let me begin by recapping the problem: For many years, North Korea's nuclear
weapons program has been of concern to the international community.
In 1993, North Korea provoked a very serious situation on the Peninsula with its
announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, setting in
motion a crisis-and-negotiation scenario that culminated in the 1994 Agreed
Framework.
While North Korea adhered to the Agreed Framework "freeze" on its declared
plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon, last summer it became apparent that
the North had been pursuing for several years another track covertly to acquire
nuclear weapons, a uranium enrichment program.
Our discovery of this program and North Korea's refusal even after acknowledging
it to us, to dismantle it, forced us to set aside a policy we had hoped would
put us on a path toward resolving all of our concerns with North Korea -- a path
that would have offered North Korea an improved relationship with the United
States and participation in the international community, with the benefits and
responsibilities conferred by membership in the international community.
Instead of undoing its violations of existing agreements with the U.S. and South
Korea, as well as of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards agreement, the North has
escalated the situation, first by expelling IAEA inspectors, then announcing its
withdrawal from the NPT.
More recently, the North restarted its reactor at Yongbyon, conducted test
firings of a developmental cruise missile, and intercepted an unarmed U.S.
aircraft operating in international airspace with four armed North Korean
fighter aircraft.
Each of these North Korean provocations is designed to blackmail the United
States and to intimidate our friends and allies into pushing the United States
into a bilateral dialogue with the North -- giving the North what it wants, and
on its terms. What the North wants is acceptance by us that North Korea's
nuclear weapons are somehow only a matter for the D.P.R.K. and the U.S. This may
be tempting to some nations. But it is not true.
Why a Multilateral Approach
We tried the bilateral approach 10 years ago, by negotiating the U.S.-D.P.R.K.
Agreed Framework.
We agreed to organize an international consortium to provide the light water
reactor project and to finance heavy fuel oil shipments, in exchange for the
freezing and eventual dismantling of the North's graphite-moderated nuclear
program. Our agreement also set aside North Korea's obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In 1993 and 1994, and over the past decade, we made a number of statements
relating to North Korea's security.
And we found the North could not be trusted. This time, a new and more
comprehensive approach is required. The stakes are simply too high. North
Korea's programs for nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them at
increasingly longer range, pose a serious regional and a global threat.
A nuclear North Korea could change the face of Northeast Asia -- undermining the
security and stability that have underwritten the region's economic vitality and
prosperity, and possibly triggering a nuclear arms race that would end prospects
for a lasting peace and settlement on the Korean Peninsula.
The stakes are no less compelling for the international community, which would
face the first-ever withdrawal from among the 190 signatories to the NPT,
dealing a serious blow to an institution that may be even more relevant and
necessary today than ever in its history. And an economically desperate North
Korean regime might sell fissile material or nuclear arms abroad. Make no
mistake, we believe we can still achieve, through peaceful diplomacy, a
verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.
However, to achieve a lasting resolution, this time, the international
community, particularly North Korea's neighbors, must be involved. While the
Agreed Framework succeeded in freezing the North's declared nuclear weapons
program for eight years, it was only a partial solution of limited duration.
That is no longer an option.
That is why we are insisting on a multilateral approach, to ensure that the
consequences to North Korea of violating its commitments will deny them any
benefits to their non-compliance. It was easier for North Korea to abrogate its
commitments to the United States under the Agreed Framework, thinking it would
risk the condemnation of a single country.
In fact, the past six months have shown that the international community is
united in its desire to see a nuclear-weapons free Korean Peninsula. North Korea
has no support in its policies as reflected in the 35-0-0 and 33-0-2 IAEA votes.
If our starting point for a resolution is a multilateral framework, therefore,
we believe that this time, it will not be so easy for North Korea, which seeks
not only economic aid, but also international recognition, to turn its back on
all of its immediate neighbors and still expect to receive their much-needed
munificence. This would further North Korea's own isolation with an even more
terrible price to be paid by its people, who are already living in abject
poverty and face inhumane political and economic conditions. States cannot
undertake this task alone. International institutions, particularly the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council, will have an
equally crucial role to play.
Thus, as Secretary Powell explained to our friends and allies in Northeast Asia
when he visited the region last month, we are moving forward with plans for
multilateral rather than bilateral talks to resolve this issue. But the rubber
hits the road when we are faced with violations of those agreements and
commitments. Moreover, it is important to underscore that multilateral support
for such regimes as reflected in the NPT is critical.
We must, in dealing with North Korea, be mindful that other would-be nuclear
aspirants are watching. If North Korea gains from its violations, others may
conclude that the violation route is cost free. Deterrence would be undermined
and our nonproliferation efforts -- more critical now than ever -- would be
grossly jeopardized.
Regional Implications
Achieving a multilateral approach to eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons
program will take time. The key states in Northeast Asia -- South Korea, Japan,
China, and Russia -- all share the common goal of seeking a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula. However, each also has a unique historical experience with North
Korea and very distinct concerns.
Japan has suffered a legacy of North Korean abductions of innocent Japanese
civilians, as well as the threat posed by North Korea's missile program. The
cool admission of kidnappings from the Japanese home islands followed by
untimely deaths stunned many Japanese.
For China, a nuclear North Korea raises the specter of a regional arms race and
a neighbor with a very unstable economic backdrop to its nuclear ambitions --
and a potentially huge burden on Chinese resources.
Russia is likewise concerned about a regional nuclear arms race and instability
on its far eastern border.
And, the people of South Korea want national reconciliation, yet worry about the
economic costs and burdens that this could impose.
As the foregoing should make clear, all of North Korea's immediate neighbors
feel they have a stake in the outcome of the diplomatic process and want to be
consulted and engaged in achieving a resolution. For that reason, all of them
support the principle of multilateral dialogue.
Indeed, since the Secretary’s trip to the region last month, our discussions
with Japan, South Korea, China and others have been focused on the specific
modalities of a multilateral approach, rather than its merits.
What I would like the committee to understand, however, is that in response to
North Korean demands for bilateral U.S.-D.P.R.K. dialogue, they have asked that
we also address D.P.R.K. concerns directly. We have told our partners that we
will do so -- but in a multilateral context. This time, we need a different
approach. This time, we cannot run the risk of another partial solution.
The process for achieving a durable resolution requires patience. It is
essential that North Korea not reprocess its spent nuclear fuel into plutonium.
That could produce significant plutonium within six months. But the HEU
alternate capability is not so far behind. Resolution is not just a matter of
getting the North to forswear its nuclear weapons ambitions, but also to accept
a reliable, intrusive verification regime, including declaration, inspection,
and irreversible and verifiable elimination.
North Korea has so far rejected a multilateral approach, but we do not believe
this is its last word or its final position.
Members of the Committee will recall that last year, North Korea loudly refused
our proposal for comprehensive talks until finally convinced to follow through
on that offer by Japan, South Korea, and China. We then had to shelve our talks
with the discovery of the clandestine HEU program, of course. This time our
friends and allies have again begun working on North Korea. Indeed, as the South
Korean Foreign Ministry noted on March 7, “North Korea could find some benefits
from multilateral dialogue which bilateral dialogue cannot provide.”
In the end, though, North Korea will have to make a choice. Over the past 10
years, Pyongyang has been in pursuit of two mutually exclusive goals. The first
is nuclear weapons. The second is redefining its place in the world community --
and, incidentally its access to international largesse -- by broadening its
diplomatic and foreign economic relations. The D.P.R.K. needs to accept that it
cannot do both.
Unfortunately, North Korea's choice to date has been to proceed with nuclear
weapons development and to escalate international tensions, while demanding
commitments and dialogue. North Korean provocations are disturbing, but they
cannot be permitted to yield gains to North Korea. The international community
must, and indeed is, impressing on the North that it is in its own best interest
to end its nuclear arms program.
The North must understand that to choose the path of nuclear weapons will only
guarantee further isolation and eventual decline, if not self-generated
disaster. The United States is open to ideas about the format for a multilateral
solution.
One idea is for the Permanent Five -- the U.S., China, France, Great Britain,
and Russia -- to meet together with the Republic of Korea, Japan, the EU, and
Australia. Others have suggested other ideas, such as six-party talks: North and
South Korea, the U.S., the P.R.C., Japan, and Russia.
President Bush has repeatedly said we seek a peaceful, diplomatic solution with
North Korea, even though he has taken no option off the table. The President has
also stressed that we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the
people of North Korea and that we will not use food as a weapon.
We recently announced an initial contribution of 40,000 tons of food aid to
North Korea through the World Food Program, and we are prepared to contribute as
much as 60,000 tons more, based on demonstrated need in North Korea, competing
needs elsewhere, and donors' ability to access all vulnerable groups and monitor
distribution of the food.
In closing, I would note that in the past, North Korea has indicated it wanted
to transform its relations with the United States, South Korea and Japan. North
Korea has the ability to achieve such a transformation. The question is whether
it has the will to do so. The D.P.R.K. will need to address the concerns of the
international community.
First, North Korea must turn from nuclear weapons and verifiably eliminate its
nuclear programs. President Bush has said he would be willing to reconsider a
bold approach with North Korea, which would include economic and political steps
to improve the lives of the North Korean people and to move our relationship
with that country towards normalcy, once the North dismantles its nuclear
weapons program and addresses our long-standing concerns.
While we will not dole out “rewards” to convince North Korea to live up to its
existing obligations, we and the international community as a whole remain
prepared to pursue a comprehensive dialogue about a fundamentally different
relationship with that country, once it eliminates its nuclear weapons program
in a verifiable and irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its
international obligations.
Of course, for full engagement, North Korea will need to change its behavior on
human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the State
Department list of states sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of
mass destruction programs, cease the proliferation of missiles and
missile-related technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional force
disposition.
As I said, we remain confidant that diplomacy can work -- and that there will be
a verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea's nuclear program. To that end,
the United States is intensifying its efforts with friends and allies. Thank you
for this opportunity to discuss this important issue today with you.
We will continue to work closely with the Congress as we seek a multilateral,
diplomatic solution with respect to North Korea.
[End]
Released on March 12, 2003
Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
