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"The further reduction
of strategic nuclear weapons"
Liu Erxun
Senior research fellow of CALT
INESAP Conference, Shanghai
8-10 September 1997
The post-cold war situation has greatly changed. The confrontation of two military groups has brought to an end. The international tension has rather relieved. The arms control and disarmament has made considerable progress. The indefinite extension of the NPT, the agreement of Nuclear Test Ban the agreements of START I and START II were clearly major accomplishments for world security. But the world people does not meet with these progresses. They expect for much more progresses in arms control and disarmament especially for further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed, there will still exist excessive nuclear warheads (about 20000) in the world even after the implementation of START I . It is still a big threat to the world peace. United States and Russian Federation, as the largest nuclear powers, should at first take more effective measures to further reduce their deployed strategic offensive arsenals.
I suppose the whole process of deep reduction of strategic offensive arsenals may be device into 5 steps:
1. 1st step ---START I step
According to the START I agreement, the nuclear warheads deployed by America and Russia have to be reduced from 13000 and 11000 respectively to 8000 for each side.
2. 2nd step ---START II step
According to the START-2 agreement, the nuclear warheads deployed by America and Russia have to be reduced to 3000~3500 for each side by 2003 on the basis of START I .
3. 3rd step ---START III step
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin has agreed to continue negotiating on further reduction and limitation strategic offensive arsenals after the ratification of START II by Russia. They proposed to reduce the deployed nuclear warheads to 2500 by December 31, 2007.
4. 4th step ---START IV step
Suppose that America and Russia will reduce their deployed nuclear warheads to no more than 1000 by 2100.
5 5th step ---START V step
Suppose that Five nuclear powers will jointly reduce their deployed nuclear warheads to no more than 200 for each country by 2105.
Once START V implemented, it will create conditions that start to consider for proposals to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons and undertake comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Russian Duma criticizes the results of March 21 Helsinki summit meeting and postpones to ratify START II. Several members of Duma claimed that the summit had been a "crushing defeat" for Moscow. They also said," we can speak of ratifying START II only if there will be greater trust between the sides". The reasons of postpopning ratification of START II are as follows:
1. Preserving the 1972 ABM Treaty
Russian Duma members and defense experts are particularly concerned about the question of preserving the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is well known that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic arms control agreements. It effectively limits the deployment of Nationwide Missile Defense systems, relieves the tension of strategic arms race and lays a foundation for deep reduction of strategic offensive arsenals. Nevertheless, the American congress persists calling for deployment of NMD systems by 2003 which opbviously will undermine the ABM treaty. It will cause damage to confidence in the ability of the remaining deferent forces to retaliate after absorbing a first strike (which is the key element of any strategic arms reduction arrangement). Maintaining the ABM treaty is not only important to future reductions but also to existing agreements. Russian Duma members emphasized that START II can be fulfilled only providing the United States preserves and strictly complies with the ABM treaty of 1972.
2. Russian Duma members and defense experts are also concerned about the TMD demarcation agreement.
Since the fall of 1993 the United States and Russia began to negotiate for establishing a "demarcation line" between strategic Ballistic Missile Defense systems that are limited by the ABM treaty and Theater Missile Defense systems that are not limited by the ABM treaty. The SCC (Standing consultative commission) negotiation has reached an agreement of "demarcation line" in June 1996 which allows testing and deployment of low-velocity TMD systems (with intercepter speeds lower than 3 kilometers per secopd). But they could not reach any agreements about high-velocity TMD systems (with intercepter speeds up to 5 kilometers per second) which has significant potential to intercept strategic ballistic missiles and it will undermine the ABM Treaty. It is reported that SCC successfully finished negotiations on August 21, 1997 in Geneva and they have got an agreement of a demarcation between strategic Ballistic Missiles Defense systems and Theater Missiles Defense systems. This will undoubtly abolish one of the pbarriers of ratification of START II by Russian Duma.
3. NATO Expansion Eastward
NATO Expansion Eastward is considered as a serious potential threat to Russian security in Russia. President Yeltsin emphasized that the relation between Russia and NATO would be completely destroyed if any country of former Soviet Union were absorbed into NATO.
4. Unfair Bargain
Russian Duma members emphasized that START II is an unfair bargain. It cause significant changes to the Russian nuclear weapons infrastructure. As a result of downloading 105 six-warhead SS-19s by five warheads, eliminating and replacing 10 warhead SS-24 and ss-18 missiles with single warhead ICBMs, converting 165 silos to launchers for single-warhead missiles and dismantling 64 silos, Russia would have to destroy many more missiles than the United States. Cost burden is also unequal between Russia andpUnited States. Costs will be heavy for Russia and light for the United States. Russia would then build many new strategic ballistic missiles with single warhead to deploy in order to reach START II levels (totally 3000-3500 warheads deployed by each side). It is regretful that Russia would have to destroy these systems it had deployed to reach START II levels if United States and Russia would fullfil START III arrangement in future . Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, aprgued that it is not "realistic" for the Duma to ratify START II before START III commence.
However, in a recent RAND report, Senate Sam Nunn, Blackwill and Arnold Horelick have put forward a valuable proposal on March 6, 1997. They called for a new START III agreement to cut US and Russian arsenals to 2000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. They point out also that there is no need to wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II before agreeing to new reductions. According to the Text of Joint Statement on a Parameters of Future Nuclear Reductions United States and Russia will reduce the nuclear warheads for each of the parties to the levels of 2000-2500 by Dec. 31, 2007.
Recommendation.
1. United States and Russian Federation immediately start to proceed negotiations for further deep reductions of strategic offensive arsenals. They need not wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II before commencing the negotiation.
2. United States and Russia should maintain and preserve the 1972 ABM Treaty. Not to develop and deploy NMD systems which are not allowed by the ABM Treaty.
3. Preserve the "Demarcation" agreement of TMD Systems.
4. Change and abandon the Nuclear Deterrence Policy, pledge no-first-use to the whole world.
5. Completely dismantle and destroy all the nuclear weapons in the world. Let mankind lives in a nuclear-free 21st century and forever.
September 2, 1997
References
1. Jack Mendelsohn "START II and Beyond"
2. Yuri K. Nazarkin and Rodney W. Jones "Moscow's START II Ratification: Problems and Prospects"
3. Text: JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS OF FUTURE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. March 21, 1997
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
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MIIS.
