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Next Steps: Beyond the
CTBT
Liu Huaqiu
INESAP Conference, Shanghai
8-10 September 1997
Liu Huaqiu is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Arms Control and Disarmament at the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC). The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of CDSTIC.
Since Nineties, nuclear arms control and disarmament has made considerable progress. Following the START I Treaty, the United States and Russia signed the START 11 Treaty in which both sides agreed to cut their deployed nuclear warheads to 3000-3500 by 2003. In 1996, five nuclear states and many other states signed the CTBT Treaty.
What comes after the CTBT? There are a lot of suggestions made by arms control experts or governments, such as:
—Cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
—Initiating negotiations to further reduce nuclear weapons;
—Taking nuclear forces off alert;
—Removal of Warheads from delivery vehicles;
—Treaty of No-First-Use, etc.
All these steps are good, but which is the key one that would make a breakthrough in the nuclear arms control and toward a nuclear-weapon-free world? I would like to make some comments.
1. The most likely development is the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Like the CTBT, the United States intends to prevent nuclear proliferation and limit the nuclear development of the medium nuclear states. China seems likely to support negotiations for a cut-off treaty as a step toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe the attitude of India and other threshold states towards this negotiation would be the same as to the CTBT. It pas already been reflected in the Conference on Disarmament negotiation this Spring in Geneva. In addition, different countries would have their different definitions of the terms such as fissile material, production and producing facilities in a cut-off treaty, and their own views on the scope of a cut-off treaty and its verification. It is quite evident that to reach a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable cut-off treaty would be a very arduous tapsk. In my view, this treaty, like the CTBT, would have more political than military significance.
2. Although Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to negotiate START III at the Helsinki summit this Spring, the contradiction between the United States and Russia on the issue of NATO expansion is likely to be an obstacle to negotiation. Even with the conclusion of the START III Treaty, the U. S. and Russia could still keep huge nuclear arsenals, between 2000-2500 nuclear warheads on each side by the year 2007. Moreover, according to the Helsinki summit, the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START III Treaty will be extended from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. If this got approval by the U. S. Senate and the Russian Duma, it would mean a retrogression in the nuclear disarmament. If not approved, the Russian Duma would not ratify START I, and START III would remain an outstanding issue.
3. Taking nuclear forces off alert or removal of warheads from delivery vehicles, both are good confidence-building measures, but I do not think that they could be alone achieved. Obviously, they should be accomplished in a framework of certain arms control or disarmament agreement.
4. In my view, a no-first-use treaty among the nuclear weapon states would be a breakthrough in the nuclear arms control, and a key step towards nuclear-weapon-free world.
(1)No-first-use is a very good confidence-building measure (CBM). Nowadays people are keen on establishing CBMs. Why not establish confidence-building measures first in such an important field as preventing a nuclear war?
(2) If all nuclear states conclude such a treaty, then the United States and Russia should abandon their extended deterrence and cut their nuclear arsenals to a level comparable to that of the medium nuclear states. The latter would then join the nuclear disarmament process, leading to a total ban of nuclear weapons.
(3)A no-first-use treaty would also require ending the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the removal of first-strike capability, taking nuclear forces off alert and the removal of warheads from delivery vehicles.
(4) Nuclear weapons might be resorted to in three situations:
(a)in a surprise pre-emptive attack aimed at disarming the adversary by eliminating its strategic nuclear potential;
(b) as an escalation of hostilities started with conventional weapons;
(c)as a reprisal for nuclear attack.
A no-first-use treaty would outlaw the use of nuclear weapons in the first and second situations. In practice, such a treaty would be tantamount to a non-use treaty, and it would make it much easier to conclude a treaty specifically outlawing all nuclear weapons.
(5)A no-first-use treaty would include the guarantees of non-use, or no threat of use against non-nuclear-weapon states, it would decrease the role of nuclear weapons and be conducive to the establishing of nuclear-weapon-free zones, thus enhancing the non-proliferation regime.
(6)The 1925 Geneva Protocol was in fact a no-first-use treaty in relation to chemical weapons (because some nations kept the option of retaliation). The negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention has shown that the route from non-use, or no-first-use, to total ban was correct and effective.
During the Cold War, the argument against a commitment to no-first-use by the United States and its allies was that the former Soviet Union had massive superiority in conventional weaponry in Europe that could be balanced effectively and with less expense with nuclear weapons. This argument ceased to be valid following the end of the Cold War. But now the United States is putting forward new arguments for their possession of nuclear weapons, such as:
· ·to prevent Japan and Germany developing nuclear
weapons by means of providing them with a nuclear umbrella;
· to deter some Third World countries from using
chemical or biological weapons by the threat of nuclear retaliation.
I believe neither of these arguments are tenable. First, if we totally ban nuclear weapons, then not only Japan and Germany, but all countries are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons. Second, I consider the United States and its allies to be so strong in conventional force capability that they need not use nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological weapon attack. Moreover, such nuclear deterrence to Third World countries is not credible.
It is obvious that among the steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free would, no-first-use is an important one. Thus, I suggest we must concentrate our efforts first for such a treaty, for it is feasible and could make a break through in nuclear disarmament.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
