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Briefing by Mr. Liu Jieyi Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament Dept. MFA on the Promulgation of Regulations on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the Control List
August 27,
2002
Mr. Liu Jieyi: As you know, on August 22, the
Chinese Government promulgated Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles
and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the
Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies
Export Control List. This is another important measure
China has taken to implement its missile
non-proliferation policy, to further strengthen export
controls over missiles and missile-related items and
technologies and to energetically enhance such controls
by legal means.
China attaches great importance to non-proliferation and
is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The
Chinese Government has always been consistent in this
policy. On the export control of missiles and
missile-related items and technologies, China has always
taken a prudent and responsible attitude. As early as
ten years ago, in February 1992, China declared that it
would observe the guidelines and parameters of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the export
of missiles. Since then, we have taken administrative
means to implement our non-proliferation policies and
fulfill our commitments in this regard.
In recent years, the international situation has
undergone changes. China is also moving toward a market
economy. China's export control needs to take into
account these developments to ensure the effectiveness
of China's non-proliferation policies. The legislation
in export control is the way to achieve this objective.
After thorough study and hard work, China formulated the
Regulations and the Control List.
Now, I would like to give you a brief account of the
basic elements in the Regulations and the Control List:
1. The Regulations provide for a licensing system for
export control of missiles and missile-related items and
technologies. Without being licensed, no export can take
place. More specifically, the export of items and
technologies contained in Part I of the Control List,
e.g. ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rockets and
unmanned aerial vehicles and their specially designed
items and technologies, shall be subject to the
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on
Administration of Arms Export as arms. Should the
exports of dual-use items and technologies contained in
Part II of the Control List be related to military
purposes, they shall also be controlled in accordance
with the Regulations on Administration of Arms Export.
The Regulations on Administration of Arms Export
stipulate that the export of above-mentioned items and
technologies shall only be operated by designated
companies, not by all companies. The export of relevant
items and contracts shall be examined and approved by
the competent department for administration of arms
trade and a license shall be required for the export.
The company shall, when filing an application for a
contract of arms export, provide valid certification
documents of the recipient country concerning, among
other things, the end-use and end-user.
The export of items and technologies contained in Part
II of the Control List for civilian purposes shall be
registered with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation. Exporters shall submit valid
documents including the end-user and end-use
certificates when applying for export licenses.
Importers shall guarantee not to use items and
technologies for purposes other than the declared
end-use, nor to transfer them to any third party without
the prior consent of the Chinese Government. The
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
shall, jointly with other relevant governmental
departments including the Foreign Ministry, make a
decision of either approval or denial regarding an
export application. When an export has a bearing on the
State security, social and public interests, the case
shall be submitted to the State Council and the Central
Military Commission for approval.
2. The Regulations reflect the "catch-all" principle in
export control where there is a risk of proliferation.
When examining the export application and making a
decision of either approval or denial, the competent
department will take into consideration the end-use and
end-user of the items as well as the WMD proliferation
risks. If the importer violates the end-use guarantee or
there is a risk of proliferation, the competent
department may suspend the export license already
granted.
The Regulations specially stipulate that if an exporter
knows or should know that the missile-related items or
technologies to be exported will be used by the
receiving party directly in its program for developing
missiles that can be used to deliver weapons of mass
destruction, the exporter is still required to apply for
export license even if the items and technologies do not
figure in the Control List. Furthermore, the competent
departments may decide, on an Ad Hoc basis, to exercise
export control on specific items and technologies not
contained in the Control List.
3. The Regulations and Control List will be strictly
enforced. To ensure the authority and strict enforcement
of the Regulations, the Regulations provide for
clear-cut penalty measures for violations. Violators
shall be investigated by relevant competent governmental
departments for criminal liability in accordance with
the provisions of the criminal law on the crime of
smuggling, illegal business operations or other crimes;
if such acts are not serious enough to warrant criminal
punishment, they shall be punished by administrative
means such as fines or revoking of the licensing for
foreign trade operations.
Where government officials in charge of the export
control of missile-related items and technologies abuse
powers or neglect their duties, they shall be
investigated for criminal liability in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the criminal law; if such
acts are not serious enough for criminal punishment,
they shall be given administrative sanctions according
to law.
The promulgation of the Regulations and the Control List
marks a milestone in China's legal framework for export
control. China will continue to improve its existing
controls in the light of need and also drawing on other
countries' successful and applicable experiences.
For years, the Chinese Government has been working on
the legislation of export control over the sensitive
items in other fields. The Chinese Government has
successively formulated a series of laws and regulations
and established relevant export control regimes in
recent years, under which strict controls are exercised
over the exports in nuclear, chemical and biological
fields. Furthermore, China will continue to take
measures to further improve and strengthen its relevant
laws and regulations. These efforts are underway.
In the nuclear field, China has already promulgated the
Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control, the
Regulations on Control of Nuclear Export and the
Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-use Items and
Related Technologies Export. In this regard, we are
adopting two lists, the Zangger Committee List and the
Nuclear-Supplier-Group's List.
In the chemical field, China has promulgated the
Regulations on the Administration of the Controlled
Chemicals, and strictly controls the production,
operation, stockpiling, use, import and export of the
chemicals listed on the Controlled Chemicals List.
Further measures are underway to strengthen and improve
export controls over other relevant chemicals and
related equipment and technologies.
In the biological field, China has in place rules and
regulations governing the activities such as managing,
use, stockpiling, carrying, transporting and transfer of
related dangerous bacteria (viruses) and vaccine. The
Chinese Government is currently working on specific
export control regulations on dual-use biological
materials and related equipment.
The above mentioned extra export control measures in
biological and chemical fields are expected to come out
soon. Together with the promulgated governmental rules
and regulations such as the Regulations on the
Administration of Arms Export and the Administrative
Regulations on the Import and Export of Technologies,
China's regulations on export control for
non-proliferation will cover all kinds of sensitive
items such as nuclear, biological and chemical items and
missiles and all types of arms concerned, thus forming a
very comprehensive system of the export control over
sensitive items.
That's the end of my monologue and I am ready to take
questions.
Q: Will China continue to sell missiles or
missile-related items and technologies to Pakistan, Iran
and Yemen?
MR. LIU: In the first place, I am not sure about the
factual basis of what you were suggesting in your
question. China has been implementing a very strict
policy on the non-proliferation of missiles and
missile-related items and technologies. What we have
been doing is to strengthen the relevant export controls
in order to make sure that we are doing this in a
comprehensive legal framework. The Regulations and
Control List will be strictly enforced. Since we are
talking about Regulations promulgated by China, I don't
think it's fair and polite to bring other countries into
discussion.
Q: As far as I know, this export control regime and list
were agreed on November 2000, why did it take two years
for you to formulate it?
MR. LIU: The Regulations and the Control List are very
comprehensive. If you saw the List, you would realize
the kind of technical detail contained in the List and
the wide area it covers. So it would take the time and
efforts of the experts from different fields to come out
with the Control List. We have been working very hard on
this. We have been taking the non-proliferation policy
very seriously and doing the best we can to translate
this policy further into a legal framework as embodied
in the Regulations and Control List.
Q: Thank you very much for the important welcome news.
Under Secretary Armitage is in China, does this have any
relation to this action?
MR. LIU: I am sure you have heard reports. I have seen
nothing else besides the reports.
Q: Is there anything you are expecting the United States
to respond to this gesture, for example, would you
welcome the lifting of the ban on American commercial
satellites being launched on Chinese rockets?
MR. LIU: Thank you for bringing up the issue of
satellites launches. I think satellite launching in
itself is something that benefits both sides. There
shouldn't be any conditions attached to that. We hope
the barriers will be removed soon so that this
cooperation which benefits both sides can go ahead.
Q: You mentioned the civilian use technologies will be
administered by MOFTEC, and military use items and
technologies will pass through Central Military
Commission. Is the central military Commission the
ultimate authority on deciding how something goes out of
it?
MR. LIU: According to the Regulations, the Control List
is divided into two major parts. The first part would be
related to items used directly for military purposes.
The second part would be dual use items and
technologies. For the second part, it is the duty of
MOFTEC to receive applications and to examine the
applications for export licenses together with other
relevant government ministries including the Foreign
Ministry. The first part follows the procedure of the
Regulations on the Administration of Arms Export. For
any item or technology on the Control List, if it
concerns state security and other things as stipulated
in the Regulations, it can be submitted to the State
Council and also the Central Military Commission for
approval.
Q: Is the List following the MTCR? Or is it a List maybe
countries like Germany or the United States would have?
Can you compare? The second question is about countries.
Is China concerned about similar countries like Germany
or the United States?
MR. LIU: You can get the Control List on the Foreign
Ministry's website. It is a comprehensive List. In
drawing up the List, we were guided by the consistent
policy taken by the Chinese Government with regard to
the nonproliferation of missiles and missile-related
items and technologies. We also took into account the
specific situation in China. Certainly we drew heavily
on international experience including MTCR. If you
compare the List with MTCR, you will find that the
categorization is a bit different for the sake of easy
administration. There are items not contained in MTCR in
the List. So in this respect, this List covers a wider
area than MTCR. Of course there is also a very limited
number of MTCR items that are not in the list because
they are not really that relevant, either because we
don't have them, or they have never come into the
picture, or because our experts do not know exactly what
they are.
As for the second section, the Regulations will be
applied across the board. No names appear in the
Regulations or Control List. No names means all names.
Q: Is there any technology transfer in the past three
years which would not take place if this Regulations
have been enforced?
MR. LIU: The enforcement of the non-proliferation policy
of the Chinese Government has been always strict. In all
countries, there are individuals that try to violate the
policies or laws. Some very few cases did occur in
China, but the violators would be punished duly by law.
Even in countries with the strictest export controls,
law enforcement officials are very busy to track down
their own companies and individuals who try to outsmart
their regulations. That is an export control issue
common to all countries.
Q: Will these Regulations now apply to pre-existing
contracts? There was at least one contract that came
into dispute with the United States in negotiating the
aftermath of November 2000 agreement, in which China was
arguing that this pre-existing contract should be
excluded from the agreement.
MR. LIU: The Regulations control relevant items and
technologies by a licensing scheme. In other words,
starting from August 22, all relevant exports will have
to have a license from either MOFTEC or according to the
Regulations on the Administrations of the Arms Export,
in order for items to go through the customs. I don't
think contracts are something relevant.
Q: How would the Regulations affect the approval of
these technologies compared with what they were before?
MR. LIU: We would examine the required documents,
including the information about end-use and end-user. We
would also assess the weapons of mass destruction
proliferation risks. A whole range of factors will
figure in the consideration and decision on the license
for the export.
Q: When will China join the MTCR? Secondly, there is a
report in Pakistan newspapers that Pakistan's missile
development will be affected by the regulations.
MR. LIU: We have been in close consultations for years
with members of the MTCR, to exchange views on what MTCR
is and the direction it is taking. As I said, when China
drew up the Control List, we took into account the
experience in other areas, including MTCR, because the
Annex of MTCR is of reference value. For the
non-proliferation regime to be effective, it needs to be
universal and non-discriminatory. More work need to be
done for MTCR in this regard.
I am not aware of the newspaper report that you referred
to.
Q: The United States has been pushing the Regulations
for a long time. Now would you be expecting something or
more things from the United States? We have already
mentioned the satellite. And do you think the United
States will scale down the sales of weapons to Taiwan?
Or support in other areas?
MR. LIU: About the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, there
shouldn't be any sale of weapons to Taiwan in the first
place. As you know, there are three joint communiqués
between the United States and China. The United States
is obligated in this respect.
I think I laid out specifically and in detail the
reasons and considerations behind many years of efforts
on part of the Chinese Government to improve its export
control mechanisms in the area of missiles and in other
areas. First and foremost it is translation into a legal
framework and specific control lists of the consistent
policy of Chinese Government with regard to the
non-proliferation of missiles and the related items. As
you know, in November 2000, the United States and China
made arrangements. We each made a declaration in this
area, in which the United States made the commitment in
the field of satellite launches. It is important for any
country to honor its commitment.
Q: How do you think about the impact of missile
Regulations to the whole export of China?
MR. LIU: As the Regulations and Control List are just
being applied, it is very hard to foresee now. In a few
months time I can tell you on basis of facts.
Q: Where do you see the biggest area of risks for
proliferation of today's world? Which regions or which
countries do you fear the proliferation risks most?
MR. LIU: It is the common understanding of the
international community that proliferation risk is
everywhere. If you look at the United States anthrax
incidents, you can realize that even in the United
States, something of this kind can take place. I think
in the new situation, especially after the September 11,
we need to take a fresh look at the non-proliferation
issue. Prior to the tragic terrorist incident of
September 11, nobody thought that box knives could be
weapons. We need to be vigilant everywhere.
Q: Currently, the UN is trying to formulate an
international convention on non-proliferation of
missile. Does China have a position on that? The US has
expressed doubts that an international regime would be
stronger than the MTCR.
MR. LIU: I think you are referring to the Export Group
of the United Nations on the issue of missiles. That
Expert Group concluded its work on a report to the
General Assembly of United Nations. China sent an expert
to the Group. This is an area in which the United
Nations can very effectively and usefully work. We
support the efforts in United Nations to strengthen a
rule-based universal and non-discriminatory
non-proliferation regime. So any efforts in this
direction will be welcome.
I am not in the best position to answer for the United
States. We support firmly the role of United Nations. I
think for any country that fully supports
non-proliferation, there shouldn't be any problem in
supporting the United Nations in this area.
Q: Suppose there had been this regulations in place
earlier, do you think there has been the exports that is
now impossible?
MR. LIU: The policy of Chinese Government has been
consistent with regard to the prevention of
proliferation of missiles and missile-related items and
technologies. It is not something like what you cannot
do now was something that you could do in the past.
Q: You said that the Chinese regulations went further
than MTCR regulations. And what were not included in the
Chinese regulations are irrelevant to China. Why didn't
China join the MTCR and adopt the irrelevant regulations
because they don't mean anything to China anyway, and
adopt the stricter rules? What is the stumbling block?
MR. LIU: In this case, the MTCR rules are not
necessarily stricter rules. For China, the Chinese
Regulations and Control List are stricter than MTCR,
because they include relevant items for China that are
not in the MTCR list. I don't think taking fully without
any modifications the MTCR list would make them stricter
than the current Control List. On the contrary, the
reverse is true. About the relations between China and
MTCR, I just mentioned that we have been having
discussions with MTCR members over the years on MTCR and
the things that MTCR members do. I don't think whether
joining or not joining the MTCR is an issue directly
related to what kind of a strict export control regime
China is adopting.
Q: Since November 2000, the United States has put
sanctions three times against Chinese companies because
of proliferation. Do you think it would happen again?
MR. LIU: In the first place, the sanctions are not
warranted. Secondly, applying sanctions is not the way
countries should deal with each other in the area of
non-proliferation, an area of common concern to the
international community where cooperation is more
appropriate. These sanctions should be lifted.
Q: I just want to clarify the process of making the
regulations. Could you explain what was the work you
have done since President Bush came to Beijing?
MR. LIU: The process of drawing up the regulations and
list predated February. It was a process started long
before that.
Q: What is the specific work you did from February to
today? The Americans were trying to say that you have
objective difficulties in legislation. And this is a
factual question. For six months you didn't come out
with the regulations, now you came out yesterday with US
Deputy Secretary in Beijing. I was wondering what work
you have done in promulgating the regulations?
MR. LIU: These are regulations formulated by the
government authorities of China. I don't think any other
country know how China was working on these Regulations
and Control List. We promulgated them on 22 of August,
because they were ready on that date. If they were ready
some other date, we would have promulgated them some
other day.
Q: My understanding is that the U.S. is requesting some
of the items in the Control List be outright banned
export. My understanding is that all the items in the
Control List and the Regulations could be exported on a
case by case basis. Why is China doing it this way?
MR. LIU: Every country is doing it this way, the United
States, European countries, other countries, and MTCR
members. The MTCR itself is a control regime, not a
prohibition regime. No item contained in the MTCR is
prohibited. So China is simply doing something that all
other countries are doing, taking fully into
consideration the risk of proliferation in the relevant
field.
Q: You said the sanctions the US imposed on Chinese
companies are not warranted. Could you tell us a little
bit why they are unwarranted, because the transfers
didn't take place, or the items that were transferred
are not ones that are legislated by the US, or the items
transferred are not considered as the risk of
proliferation.
MR. LIU: We were not given detailed accounts of what
those alleged activities might entail. But of course
that does not mean that we are not taking the issue
seriously and try to find out the fact. But the way that
countries deal with each other in an area that calls for
cooperation shouldn't be applying sanctions.
Q: And the new regulations says that if there are
violations that do not amount to criminal penalties,
there will be administrative fines ordered. Is there any
administrative fines levied against those companies?
MR. LIU: Even in the past, prior to the promulgation of
the regulations and the control list, there were laws in
place to punish those who violate the Chinese
Government's policy.
Q: Is the TMD considered as proliferation according to
your standard?
MR. LIU: The security challenges we face today have
changed, as evidenced by the tragic incident on
September 11. It is necessary for countries and
governments to cooperate to address such challenges,
especially the challenges posed by non-state actors,
terrorists and transnational crimes. To develop
elaborate systems like missile defense systems is simply
not the answer. Also, there are different views even in
the United States about the nature of missile defense,
whether it being a system of defense, or a system of
offense, or a system combing both defense and offense.
The most important thing is to maintain the
international arms control and disarmament regimes, and
to strengthen, not to weaken the rule-based arms control
and disarmament. The development of missile defense is
not in conformity with this general direction. It will
not be an answer to the challenges or threats that it
was allegedly intended to address.
The Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List, 25 August 2002
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
