CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

The Nonproliferation Review:
Winter 1994, Volume 1 - Number 2

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

by Deborah A. Ozga (1)

Deborah A. Ozga is Project Manager of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal, non-treaty association of states that have an established policy or interest in limiting the spread of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR's origins date back to the 1970s, when the U.S. government became aware of dangers posed by the missile programs of developing nations. Several events, including South Korea's 1978 ballistic missile test, Iraq's attempt in 1979 to purchase retired rocket stages from Italy, India's July 1980 SLV-3 testp, and the former German firm OTRAC's 1981 testing of a rocket in Libya, contributed particularly to U.S. apprehensions.²

The concerns of the United States were translated into a Reagan administration initiative that resulted ultimately in an agreement by seven founding members to limit the spread of missiles and missile technology and in the release of guidelines on April 16, 1987. According to the guidelines, the MTCR's original purpose was to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation by placing controls on equipment and technology transfers which contribute to the development of unmanned, nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Over time, that goal was expanded to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons.³

The MTCR currently provides the central institutional arrangement, as well as the base international norm, for dealing with missile proliferation. But while the international community now recognizes the spread of missiles and missile technology as a crucial security issue, the sweeping political changes witnessed over the last three years demand a re-examination of the regime's focus, strengths, weaknesses, and ability to combat missile proliferation in a new, rapidly-changing international order. China's and North Korea's continuing aid to foreign states' missile programs increases the importance that a well functioning regime is in place to deal with missile proliferation issues. This report is intended to provide the necessary background data with which to undertake this reassessment.

Guidelines and Annex

At its founding, MTCR members released guidelines explaining the regime's general principles and an annex defining certain technologies to be controlled. The original guidelines established that MTCR members would refrain from exporting annex items on a voluntary and independent basis. The guidelines also outlined the basic criteria to assess missile-related export applications, such as nuclear proliferation concerns, the nature of the recipient state's missile and space programs, the item's significancp in the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system, end-use assessment of the item, and any relevant multilateral agreements. At the same time, a wide spectrum of activities were permitted, including provisions for educational exchanges, research programs, and servicing agreements. According to the guidelines, the MTCR was not intended to impinge upon the peaceful use of advanced missile technology, national space programs, or international space cooperation efforts "as long as such programs could nopt contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems."4

The guideline update in January 1993 extended the regime significantly to cover not only delivery systems for nuclear weapons but also for other weapons of mass destruction. The new guidelines added that there is a "strong presumption" to deny an export if an MTCR member judges that a missile, whether or not listed in the annex, is "intended" for use in weapons of mass destruction delivery systems. In theory, the changes establish substantially tightened control parameters, since chemical and biological warheads can be placed on small rocket systems that fall well below the previous 500 kg. and 300 km. parameters.

The current technical annex contains 20 item groups divided into two categories. Category I consists of complete missile systems and subsystems as well as specially designed production equipment and technology for these systems.⁵ In regards to Category I exports, the guidelines state "there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers (...)."⁶ They also require that "Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized."⁷ Other Category I transfers will be authorized on "rare occasions" where a government secures binding intergovernmental end-use assurances from the recipient. Category II items consist of less sensitive components and technologies, most of which have dual-use applications.⁸ These items may be exported by MTCR members, provided that the importing state furnishes sufficient end-use guarantees for the item.

Two critical control parameters established by the annex are the 300 km. range limit and the 500 kg. payload limit. According to a Canadian government release, the 500 kg payload limit recognizes that emerging nuclear states are likely to develop initially relatively-heavy, and rather crude, nuclear weapons. The 300 km. range correlates to distances in a majority of strategic theaters of conflict where nuclear missile use might be considered. This range was also considered to be a convenient, workable, and achievable parameter around which international export controls could be established.⁹

Organizational Operations Meetings:

MTCR members conduct three types of meetings: plenary, technical, and special. MTCR members meet at least once a year for a plenary session to exchange intelligence information regarding missile proliferation developments, to discuss proliferation policy issues, and to explore ways of improving the regime's performance. At technical meetings, representatives examine the regime's specific control parameters to refine and expand the annex. Special meetings have been called for recruitment purposes; two supch instances were meetings for non-MTCR Western European states and for the newly-democratized nations of the Eastern bloc.

Member states volunteer to host MTCR meetings. The hosting nation serves as chairman and determines the meeting's agenda. France acts as the regular Secretariat, fulfilling the regime's normal administrative functions, which include serving as the point of contact. Decisions taken by members such as approval of membership applications and annex changes require a consensus vote. Due to intelligence sharing among members, records of meetings and negotiations remain confidential.

Membership:

Full member states are those nations that either joined the regime at its inception, later submitted applications that were approved for membership, or were directly recruited by the regime to participate in its closed circle. The recruitment process often involves seminars, dialogue in the form of bilateral consultations, and fact-finding missions by MTCR delegations. Recruiting attempts have included, for example, U.S. efforts to obtain some form of participation in the regime by the Soviet Union. Simpilarly, Japan has approached (sometimes with other MTCR members) China, North Korea, Argentina, Brazil, as well as the former Soviet Union, encouraging them to adopt MTCR guidelines.¹⁰ It should be noted that since the end of the Cold War and the advent of the Persian Gulf crisis, membership size has dramatically increased. Thirteen of the MTCR's current members joined between August 1990 and June 1993.

Decisions regarding a state's application to join the MTCR are made on a confidential, case-by-case basis. MTCR members generally judge applicants on the effectiveness of a state's export controls, its contribution to the regime, and its proliferation record. Backing and assistance from an influential member can also be helpful in gaining membership. All members must approve of an applicant before it is admitted to the regime.

Adherence:

Since its onset, the MTCR has welcomed adherence to its guidelines by all states. The definition of "adherence," however, varies widely. A state, such as South Africa, can adopt export controls based on MTCR guidelines and proclaim itself to be an adherent. This does not necessarily imply that members will automatically recognize the "adhering" nation as an adherent; each member state has its own policy for determining whether a nation is an official adherent. For example, the United States has in the ppast only recognized adherent status after a bilateral accord has been reached. Its efforts with Russia and Israel are both cases in point.¹¹ Recognition of adherent status by the U.S. government is particularly critical, as its sanction laws are triggered when non-MTCR participants transfer controlled goods to other non-participants.

Some states volunteer their adherence while others are pressured into announcing that they will observe the guidelines. In some cases, nations which formulate their export controls around the MTCR or adhere because of national interests, do in fact later become formal members, as did Sweden, Argentina, and Hungary. On occasion, states such as China, Israel, and South Africa have expressed support or interest in the MTCR only after members began to scrutinize them for missile proliferating behavior or had actually imposed sanctions on these countries.

Membership Rationale:

The most-often cited rationale for participation is a state's desire to accede to global nonproliferation norms. There are, however, numerous other economic and political rationales for joining or seeking to join the MTCR. For those nations with few or no highly developed missile-related technology industries, there is a desire to avoid being targeted as a point of transhipment. Ireland and New Zealand have both cited this as a reason for joining the regime.

There is another perception among applicants that MTCR membership will ease access to controlled dual-use technologies. While full membership may promote some forms of technological cooperation, such as within the European Space Agency (ESA), it will not automatically reduce or remove certain export controls, as can be seen with intra-COCOM transfer arrangements. Under current U.S. export law, end-use guarantees of MTCR items are required for all nations, except Canada.¹² However, it should bpe noted, that other members address technology transfers differently. Their assumption is that membership in the MTCR and other export control regimes implies that a prospective importing nation shares a concern regarding missile proliferation issues. Hence, such a nation is less likely to engage in proliferating behavior and thus access to dual-use technology is eased.

MTCR participation can also be politically motivated, as involvement implies association with a select group of developed states. A nation that endorses arms control and aligns itself with nonproliferation regimes demonstrates its willingness to participate as a member in good faith in the international community. Finally, declaring support for the MTCR also serves as a tactic to decrease political pressure or remove sanctions when a nation comes under criticism for its export policies.

Rationales for states not to join or adhere to the regime include: the MTCR is seen as a medium for economically developed nations to defend their space industries; it is an instrument designed to suppress developing nations from developing militarily; some aspects of the agreement are ambiguous and arbitrary; trade among members is not restricted; and, it has no applicability to a nation's industry. India has prominently made known its objections to the MTCR, citing the regime's "discriminatory" naturep and narrow approach to the global arms race, its function as an impediment to the economic progress of developing states, and the self-righteous attitudes of regime members.¹³

Implementation:

Due to the leading role of the United States in the MTCR's development and its position in the international system, the United States is not surprisingly a dominant actor relative to other members in regime implementation. At its inception, MTCR restrictions were "virtually identical" to the previously established U.S. export restrictions, and by securing the participation of other states in the regime, the United States in essence institutionalized its policy on missile proliferation on an internationpl level.¹⁴ The United States has actively promoted its nonproliferation policy through the MTCR. It has vigorously pursued bilateral MTCR-related discussions with Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, Italy, and the former Soviet Union in order to promote its missile nonproliferation policy. In the summer of 1992, the United States also called on all members to establish controls which reflect those declared in the December 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI).¹⁵ More repcently, the Clinton administration introduced a new nonproliferation policy which stated that Washington would encourage all MTCR members to adopt policies as "vigilant" as that of the United States.

The United States stands out among members in promoting MTCR enforcement. It enacted a sanctions law in 1990 that is triggered when non-MTCR participants transfer items covered by the MTCR to other non-MTCR participants. This law has been invoked on six different occasions. Conversely, most other members use a low-key approach in dealing with the MTCR on a public level. Even at its founding, France, Italy, and West Germany did not publicly announce their participation in the regime.¹⁶ As a low-profile group, members take care not to criticize the organization openly or express issues of contention. Likewise, members do not express criticism or sympathy regarding U.S. MTCR sanctioning activity, unless they are directly involved in the transaction. Other members, such as Japan, have avoided using economic sanctions as a policy tool and prefer to pursue diplomatic discussions.

MTCR Strengths and Weaknesses

In several instances, the MTCR has proven to be an effective instrument in combating missile proliferation. It has been credited with countering missile proliferation by causing missile program dismantlement, cancellation, conversion, schedule delays, as well as increasing development costs and parts scarcity.¹⁷ Specific successes include the dismantling of Argentina's Condor II project, the cancellation of two Brazilian systems (Avibras's SS series and Orbita's MB series), and delays in Indipa's missile program. Israel, once a target of the MTCR, is now an adherent. The regime is also credited with delaying China's sales of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan as well as having encouraged Germany to improve its export control enforcement legislation.¹⁸ While it cannot ultimately prevent a country from developing a missile program, it can slow down the rate of technology diffusion.19

The MTCR has also brought major supplier nations closer together in coordinating and standardizing their export control policies and operations.²⁰ It fosters dialogue among members and serves to warn indigenous missile developers that their programs are not going unnoticed. The MTCR has brought to the forefront the idea of national accountability in export behavior as well as increasing awareness of arms transfer issues. Likewise, the MTCR should be credited as a serious effort to discourage other nations from developing missile programs or engaging in the proliferation of related technologies.

The MTCR does, however, have a number of important shortcomings, most of which have been highlighted in the non-proliferation literature. Briefly, these weaknesses include:²¹

The MTCR has a limited membership.
As a supplier regime, the MTCR is seen by some as discriminatory in nature, antagonizing relations between developed and developing nations.
Disputes arise among members in defining how and when the transfer of missile technologies for peaceful purposes should take place.
In practice, members implement the guidelines inconsistently.
Since the MTCR does not have treaty status, it is non-binding and not enforceable.
Certain guidelines may be criticized as vague and open to interpretation.
Membership provides target states with no specific positive incentive to forgo development of a missile program.
The regime offers no economic or security benefits.
There is no medium for collective response in the event of a violation.
The regime cannot address every aspect of missile technology proliferation due to the technology's nature (i.e., smaller systems are regularly traded on world markets).

Fortunately, the MTCR is an evolving instrument and members are attempting to confront some of these weaknesses. Ongoing efforts to increase the effectiveness and relevance of the regime include expanding the membership, increasing the frequency of MTCR-related discussions, and tightening technical controls. However, many of these approaches may be experiencing diminishing returns. While expanding the membership is desirable, most nations that would be readily accepted by the MTCR are already members.22 Few other nations, at this point, have an export infrastructure and a nonproliferation record that would in the short term meet relevant membership standards. Proliferation discussions are very important, but without greater action, their impact can be minimal. Moreover, further efforts to tighten the regime would likely require addressing technologies associated with smaller missile systems, that are regularly exported by regime members to non-members. Additional modifications to the regime wilpl likely be necessary if the MTCR is to do more in the future than simply reduce the rate of technological diffusion over the long term.

Thinking about the Future

In discussing the MTCR's future, one first must focus on the regime's future goal or purpose. By reducing the rate of missile technology diffusion, the MTCR buys time against further missile proliferation; absent other supporting pressures, however, the MTCR cannot alone prevent a state from developing a missile program. If member states are satisfied with this "delaying" role, the MTCR's limited growth potential need not be of concern. If, however, the MTCR intends to address areas such as defining andp encouraging the so-called "peaceful uses" of missile technology, increasing membership, and discouraging states from developing their own missile programs, then it is time to reexamine the MTCR's limits and ambiguities.

In rethinking the regime, certain issues need to be given consideration. Missile proliferation involves two parties, buyers and sellers. Hence, the regime must aim to promote maximum membership development, encompassing in some form all potential suppliers and recipients. With technological diffusion ever-present, the members need to examine how to promote peaceful uses of that technology internationally. Standardized methods for providing end-use guarantees need to be developed so that suppliers feel confident that their exports will not be diverted. Finally, international norms of commercial cooperation, trust, and disarmament should be fostered.²³

There are numerous possibilities for either reshaping the MTCR or integrating broader export control and arms control options into the regime. Some proposals include internationalizing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty ²⁴; reducing world arsenals to the zero ballistic missile level ²⁵; creating an international clearinghouse for dual-use exports ²⁶ ; creating a World Space Organization to include an international inspection system for the launch of space objects ²⁷ ; establishing of an international launch notification center (to include ballistic missile tests) ²⁸ ; creating a warhead inspection regime ²⁹ ; developing confidence building measures ³⁰ ; and consolidating the MTCR with other regimes such as the London Suppliers Group to form a super regime. Much could also be learned from other nonproliferation or confidence-building regimes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the UN Arms Trade Register, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can provide insights into new possibilities with respect to what is achievable in the realms of safeguarding, inspections, transparency reporting, and crisis prevention.

Regardless of the approach, reconstituting the MTCR to create a sound instrument to address future missile proliferation issues would need to include:

A legally binding instrument that provides clearly written export guidelines on which states can base national export controls. (It should be fairly narrow in interpretation.)
A mechanism to provide recourse in the event of regime violations or guideline interpretation disputes.
A means of facilitating and guaranteeing dual-use technology transfers that provides access to states wishing to utilize missile technology for peaceful purposes.
A mechanism for addressing the security concerns of suppliers through the utilization of safeguarding agencies and verification techniques.
An avenue to promote negotiations for missile reductions.
Increased transparency in the exports of sensitive technologies. (One possibility that would compliment the current practice of providing denial notifications and occasional courtesy notification of Category I scheduled transfers, would be providing advance notification of all MTCR-controlled item transfers.)
A shifting of the organization's rationale from a supplier/export barrier regime to center on creating a broad international effort to discourage missile proliferation and support peaceful uses of technology.

These approaches take into consideration many of the weaknesses of the current regime. A more formal structure will discourage violations by implying greater national commitment and obligations. Missile arsenal reduction talks, confidence building measures through export transparency, and the promotion of norms discouraging missile program development while encouraging peaceful uses of missile technology contribute to promoting overall international system stability.³¹ Finally, reformulation pwill enable the MTCR to confront a greater variety of missile proliferation issues and will provide support for regulating international dual-use technology trade in other areas.

While this strategy does have advantages, there are high hurdles to surmount. Safeguarding of technology with currently available techniques may prove to be a difficult task.³²Supplier states will argue that they have a right not to sell missile technology if they so choose in order to protect commercial and security interests, while developing nations will argue that they have a right to develop missiles for legitimate defense and economic needs, especially if other nations retain their own missile capabilities. In addition, reshaping the MTCR will undoubtably require a long renegotiation process; consensus may not be achievable and political support may not be forthcoming. Finally, some members may not want to institutionalize the regime further. For instance, they may view rigid export controls as hampering their high-tech export promotion efforts. On the other hand, institutionalization of what some members view as lenient controls would legitimize "dangerous" transfers to nominally civilian space programs.

Of those items mentioned above, the most critical point is the safeguarding of missile technology. Some exporting nations will not be prone to accepting a safeguard arrangement until they are confident that exported technology will not be subject to diversion. On the other hand, few nations appear willing to renounce their space and missile programs. If current methods for safeguarding missile technology fail to offer sufficient confidence for exporting nations to proceed with transfers, then an increase in confidence levels may need to be developed first.

The other difficulties highlighted above require new political thinking befitting a new security environment. The MTCR must, in itself, become a confidence building measure (CBM). Presently, intra-regime transfers are conducted with an implicit assumption that no contribution to proliferation is occurring through these transactions. While a certain standard of export controls is maintained among members, intra-MTCR transfers occur because there is confidence in the recipient's utilization of the received item. Ideally, confidence levels and commercial relationships need to be raised so that those developing nations eager to participate in technology trade may do so as easily as MTCR members.

Because the MTCR was never created with the intention of becoming missile proliferation's panacea, it cannot be expected to be the only instrument for dealing with the problem of missile proliferation. The organization, after six years of formal existence, has now matured as a nonproliferation regime. Left as is, the MTCR will remain an instrument that addresses only certain aspects of the missile proliferation problem. The MTCR has the potential to affect significantly not only missile proliferation, but also the shape of world space and dual-use technology markets. However, it remains to be seen whether members will simply endorse a stricter administration of the status quo, or whether they will have the collective will and vision necessary to press for the creation of a stronger and more vibrant organization.

1972

The United States becomes aware of the potential threat posed by missiles and missile technology proliferation as well as by increased international competition in the space launch industry. The government issues policy directive NSDM-187, which bans the export of SLV technology and establishes the process of reviewing export requests on an individual basis. The United States, however, offers other nations its launch services at cost. The policy directive is reportedly designed to support NASA and Ameripcan aerospace industries.³⁷

1981

The United States establishes an inter-agency task force to study the spread of missiles and related technologies in order to make recommendations on reducing nuclear-capable missile proliferation.³⁸

1982

11/82

The U.S. government establishes a new policy on missile proliferation when President Reagan signs National Security Council Decision Directive 70, which calls for investigating methods to control such proliferation. The directive provides a framework for negotiations with the British government regarding missile proliferation issues.³⁹

Late 82-early 83

The United States initiates bilateral negotiations with the U.K. regarding missile proliferation. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan join in closed negotiations shortly thereafter. According to the Canadian government, participation in the discussions is based on whether a nation is considered to be a major supplier of missile-related equipment and technology. The select group is considered to be in the best position to determine how to standardize national export controlsp. The Soviet Union is not invited to participate.⁴⁰

1983

6/83

The first multilateral meeting between all seven original members takes place.⁴¹

1985

3/85

Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States reach a consensus on controlling the proliferation of missiles and their technologies. Members agree to implement MTCR export restrictions before they officially go into effect. The consensus includes controls on strictly military technologies as well as on dual-use goods. Public announcement of the MTCR agreement is delayed when France demands U.S. concessions on the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga.^42p

1986

12/86

According to the Canadian government, members reach "full convergent views" regarding the content of the MTCR guidelines.⁴³

1987

4/16/87

With an exchange of diplomatic notes, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States formally establish the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and publicly release the guidelines and annex for sensitive missile-relevant transfers. France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany do not issue a formal statement regarding their participation in the regime.⁴⁴

Fall 1987

American and British officials say that the defense division of the Rome-based National Industrial Applications Company (SNIA-BPD) is supplying missile technology for Argentina's Condor II project in violation of the MTCR. U.S. authorities pressure Italy to stop the sale of the missile technology to Argentina by blocking the sale of U.S. technology to SNIA. Germany's participation in the Condor II project is also criticized by both the U.S. and U.K. governments.⁴⁵

1988

c. 1988

A European-lead MTCR meeting is held for European non-MTCR participants.⁴⁶

3/88

The Brazilian Air Force announces that it is unable to construct the VLS launch vehicle before 1992 due to MTCR restrictions on transfers of rocket/missile components.⁴⁷

4/88

After Italy addresses U.S. concerns regarding SNIA's technology sales to Argentina, the United States resumes exporting technology to SNIA-BPD.⁴⁸

9/8-9/88

The first MTCR policy group meeting takes place in Rome. Members discuss emerging missile programs including Argentina's Condor II, Brazil's Sonda IV, and Israel's Jericho II. Members agree to hold regular meetings to sustain and fortify the regime.⁴⁹

9/26/88

At a U.S.-Soviet meeting in Washington, the United States begins discussion with the Soviet Union regarding the MTCR agreement in an effort to promote Soviet cooperation with the regime.⁵⁰

12/1-2/88

In Moscow, the United States again holds discussions with the Soviet Union on missile nonproliferation and the MTCR.⁵¹

1989

2/9/89

U.S. Representative Howard L. Berman introduces HR. 963 (the Missile Technology Control Act of 1989) requiring the President to levy at least one of three types of sanctions on U.S. or foreign businesses for violating the MTCR. Although the legislation is passed overwhelmingly in the House in July 1989, it does not survive as an amendment at the House-Senate conference committee review of the 1990 Defense Authorization Bill.⁵²

4/89

Spain announces that it will adhere to MTCR guidelines.⁵³

5/2/89

In Congressional testimony, U.S. Ambassador Holmes testifies that: "In nearly all of our high level contacts with the PRC in 1988 and so far in 1989, we have stressed the dangers of missile proliferation and sought Chinese restraint in their export programs. We believe the Chinese understand our concerns and hope they will show restraint in transfers of missiles and technology covered by the MTCR ... we are continuing to talk to them."⁵⁴

5/89

Secretary of State James Baker meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow and attempts to persuade the Soviet Union to join the MTCR.55

5/89

Novosti quotes Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Karpov as being in favor of lowering current MTCR payload and range levels to 200 kg. and 150 km. Soviet officials express dissatisfaction with restrictions currently in force, describing them as "inadequate and imperfect." They also express dissatisfaction with the lack of restrictions on technology transfers between MTCR members.56

6/22/89

U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman proposes S. 1227, which calls for sanctions against U.S. and foreign violators of the regime, stricter interpretation of MTCR provisions and increased membership.⁵⁷

7/89

Citing a possible violation of the MTCR, the U.S. State Department issues a strong protest to the French government over the proposed transfer of Arianespace's Viking rocket motor technology and the dispatch of a team of rocket experts to Brazil. The French initially appear to withdraw from the deal, but when China makes several overtures to Brazil, France begins to reevaluate the sale.⁵⁸

7/89

U.S. Senators John McCain and Albert Gore propose S.1421 (wider in scope than S. 1227, mentioned above), which establishes MTCR sanctions and strengthens the U.S. export licensing system. The bill is opposed by both the Commerce Department and the State Department. The Bush administration complains that the sanctions are too broad and that they impinge on the President's right to review missile sales on a case-by-case basis. In discussing the proposal, Senator Richard Lugar comments, "The United States proutinely discusses with its partners the activities of some of their companies which may be involved in missile proliferation. In general, the MTCR partners are very open in these discussions. But the question must be posed: Would such partners be as willing to share sensitive information on missile-related activities of their own companies if such a sharing could lead to U.S. sanctions?"⁵⁹

7/30/89

Italian authorities file charges against nine former SNIA-BPD employees for illegally exporting missile technology to Argentina's Condor II project.⁶⁰

10/31/89

McCain and Gore circulate a revised version of S. 1421, addressing MTCR-related sanctions, to be submitted on 11/2/89 as S. 1830. The new version deletes two requirements contained in the original bill: (1) a prohibition against imports from an MTCR violator; and (2) a requirement that all missile-related export license applications not covered by the U.S. Munitions List be reviewed by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. McCain calls the MTCR agreement "nearly toothlessp." Henry Sokolski, acting deputy for nonproliferation policy at the Pentagon echoes Senators Lugar's earlier concerns in criticizing the bill, saying: "Partners who might wish to consult with us on missile-related activities of their own companies would be unlikely to do so if the result would be to invite U.S. sanctions against those companies."⁶¹

10/89

U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle comments that the chief problem in the MTCR is the lack of more adherents. He calls upon all European Community members to join the regime.⁶²

10/89

Commenting on the controversy over France's plans to transfer Viking rocket motor technology to Brazil, a French Embassy spokesman states that the MTCR agreement explicitly permits transfer of missile technology under certain circumstances, and that France would provide the technology to Brazil only in the presence of adequate safeguards to insure that the technology is used in a peaceful manner. U.S. officials note that the technology could be used to produce ballistic missiles and that Brazil has a hipstory of developing military rockets from its civilian space program. A spokesperson from the Brazilian Embassy comments that Brazil would not employ the technology for military ends, but rather for the "peaceful space industry in Brazil, which we think we have a right to do."⁶³

U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman comments on French President Mitterand's decision to approve the sale, saying "If the proposed French technology transfer goes through, the MTCR will be effectively a dead letter." British officials, also concerned over the sale, assert that France has deliberately interpreted the MTCR in a loose fashion.

According to reports, the deal may force a reevaluation of the regime by MTCR members. The regime is already undergoing scrutiny in Europe as MTCR members believe that the U.S. Congress is attempting to reduce European foreign military sales. Reportedly, the U.S. Congress is pressuring the Administration to impose sanctions on European companies that violate the regime.⁶⁴

10/89

France proposes to sell India cryogenic engine technology, saying that such a sale is not against MTCR regulations. The United States protests the offer as a violation of the MTCR agreement and threatens France with economic sanctions.⁶⁵

11/19/89

U.S. Senator Heinz introduces S. 1924, which addresses the U.S export control system's handling of MTCR items and establishes sanctions against violators. In discussing the bill, Heinz also points out the MTCR's weaknesses: lack of enforcement authority, limited membership, lack of consistency in implementation, and disagreement on which nations should become members and under what circumstances. Heinz calls for bilateral initiatives on the part of the United States to obtain commitments from China, thep Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Argentina, and Brazil to MTCR adherence.⁶⁶

12/5-6/89

The second MTCR plenary meeting takes place in London. Participants include Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Spain becomes the eighth nation and first non-original member to participate in the MTCR. Participants discuss membership expansion and reaffirm their decision to hold regular meetings. British, Canadian, and American officials pressure France to cancel the Viking sale to Brazil.⁶⁷

12/19/89

In Paris, the United States discusses missile nonproliferation and the MTCR with the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

1990

2/10/90

A joint communique, issued by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker states that the United States and the Soviet Union "both adhere to the export guidelines of the existing regime relating to missiles, which applies to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers." The Soviet Union reportedly will maintain its policy of exporting Scud-Bs to Afghanistan until the conflict in that country is resolved.⁶⁹

4/25/90

The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands issue a joint statement announcing their intention to join the MTCR. Their participation brings the regime's total membership to 11. The Benelux nations express the hope that those EC nations which are not members will join in the near future.70

4/90

During ministerial meetings in Washington, the Soviet Union reportedly asked the United States to explore an issue with other MTCR members which relates to Soviet MTCR membership: whether or not the Soviet Union will be accorded the information sharing rights associated with MTCR provisions.71

5/90

The United States blocks re-export of Brazilian missile components previously shipped to the United States for thermal treatment. The U.S. government holds the shipment to review the export license in terms of MTCR compliance, thus implying concern over the parts' end-use in Brazil's missile program.⁷²

5/31-6/3/90

At the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Washington, the Soviet Union signs the Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation in which it supports MTCR "objectives" and agrees to observe its provisions. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker later testifies on 6/13/90 that "We are discussing with the Soviets and our MTCR partners ways by which the Soviet Union could associate itself even more closely with the regime."⁷³

7/90

Australia joins the MTCR. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Defense Minister Robert Ray issue a statement noting that Australia's participation in the MTCR is to "help control the proliferation not only of nuclear-armed missiles but also a wide range of missiles regardless of the type of warhead carried(...).Australian participation will be consistent with our strong support for export controls on sensitive military items, particularly those related to chemical or nuclear weapons. It also refplects Australia's concern about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons." Australia's implementation of the guidelines begins August 1, 1990.⁷⁴

7/17-20/90

The third MTCR policy meeting takes place in Ottawa, Canada. The eight MTCR members attend, along with new members: Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In announcing the meeting, Secretary of State for Canadian External Affairs Joe Clark states that "Canada attaches great importance to the Missile Technology Control Regime as an essential component of our efforts to work for peace and security. It is important we do all that we can to ensure that destabilizing weapons systems do not sprping up in new locations at a time when great progress is being made in improving East-West relations."⁷⁵ France becomes the Secretariat for MTCR affairs.

Members debate the Soviet Union's application for full membership to the regime and survey technical and administrative hurdles associated with managing MTCR guidelines. They consider changes in reporting methods, the comprehensiveness of the MTCR guidelines and annex, and better ways to coordinate the exchange of relevant information. As a result, partners establish an MTCR Technical Working Group to further address these issues, and decide to strengthen and update the annex. Members conclude that to date the MTCR is effective in fulfilling the purposes for which it had been designed and issue an appeal for all other nations to adhere.76

8/90

The U.S. State Department approves the release of thermally-treated missile casings to Brazil.⁷⁷

8/90

France takes up its duties as the MTCR Secretariat.⁷⁸

9/19/90

Representative Berman's amendment to HR 4739, requiring the President to levy U.S. sanctions for MTCR violations, is passed by the House of Representatives. In defending the amendment, Berman notes that "[E]very day we see an example of how usually Western companies evade the principles embodied in the MTCR so far without punishment....The company most responsible for helping the Iraqi missile program does millions of dollars of business with the United States."⁷⁹

9/90

Israel Aircraft Industries is negotiating with the U.S. government to determine if the proposed Missile Technology Control Act of 1990 (MTCA) will hinder activities associated with the Shavit space launch program.⁸⁰

10/90

The MTCA, which requires the President to penalize individuals, companies or governments that violate the MTCR, is passed by House and Senate conferees.⁸¹

11/5/90

Congress amends the Export Administration Act of 1979 when it passes the MTCA as part of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1991 (HR 4739). Under the MTCA (Title XVII of Public Law 101-510), the President must impose not less than one of the following sanctions for a period of two-five years: denial of U.S. export licenses, prohibition of contracting with the U.S. government, and/or a prohibition on procuring products or services from the U.S. government. The President, if he informps Congress, may waive sanctions if: (1) the product or service is necessary for national security; (2) the recipient of the sanctions is the sole source supplier of a product/service; (3) the product/service is supplied to the U.S. government, or is supplied under a defense co-production agreement or a NATO Program of Cooperation.⁸²

11/15/90

Denmark announces that it has joined the MTCR. Copenhagen states that the decision to join results from the increasing numbers of countries acquiring missile technology and the consequences of such activities, many of which have been brought into focus by the Persian Gulf crisis. While it does not have a highly developed missile industry, Denmark does not wish to be a point of technology transshipment. Licenses for Category I items will be addressed by the Ministry of Justice, while Category II items wipll be handled by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice.⁸³

12/90

Austria's parliament (Nationalrat) makes the decision to join the MTCR.⁸⁴

Late 90

The British Government officially informs British Aerospace (BAe) that its participation in a joint venture with Arab British Dynamics (ABD) is contrary to the government's commitment to the MTCR. The Cairo-based ABD was reported to be involved in developing and producing Scud-B missiles for the Egyptian military. BAe eventually removes its personnel working in Egypt and withdraws from the venture in 8/92.85

1991

1/29/91

New Zealand's Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control Hon. D.A.M. Graham announces that his government "has arranged to take part in the MTCR," and that "New Zealand's participation in the MTCR complements our efforts to halt nuclear proliferation and to eliminate chemical weapons." He continues, "There is nothing to suggest that New Zealand is involved in supplying missile technology. But we do not want to tempt arms traders to use New Zealand as a point of transfer by having less stringent controls phan other countries."⁸⁶ According to Graham, his government hopes all nations involved in missile-related transfers (in particular key exporters like the Soviet Union and China) that are not participants in the MTCR, will observe the MTCR's export restraints. Graham also comments that the New Zealand government made its decision to adhere to the regime before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis. Implementation of the new missile technology export controls becomes effective on 11/1/91.^87p

1/91

The first MTCR technical meeting takes place in Germany.⁸⁸

1/91

Norway adheres to the MTCR. Oslo views the step as "an important supplement to existing rules governing its exports of strategic equipment, services and technology. Its adherence is also an indication of Norway's support for international efforts aimed at reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons."⁸⁹

2/91

Austria gives formal notification of its participation in the MTCR.90

2/91

India's A.P.J. Kalam, Director of Defense Research & Development Laboratory and head of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, notes that one of the program's aims is to combat the MTCR.91

2/91

Mahmoud Karen, Egypt's representative to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, calls for multinational efforts to strengthen the MTCR.92

3/7/91

The Finnish Council of State incorporates MTCR export controls into its Decree on the Export and Transit of Defense Material. The controls will become effective on 4/1/91.⁹³

3/11/91

The Bush administration releases a list of technology and equipment sold to Iraq by U.S. firms between 1985 and 1990. Export of some of these items should have been restricted, since the U.S. government decided to implement MTCR export controls in 1986, before the agreement was formerly announced. The release, however, claims that "no license applications for any MTCR items have been approved for export to Iraq."94

3/10-12/91

After U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon meets with Chinese officials, he comments, "There are many countries, and China is one, that have a defense industry thats [sic] pretty expensive. Obviously, sales abroad help to subsidize the domestic arms industry...[but] the Chinese have indicated that they will honor those [MTCR] parameters." The purpose of Solomon's visit was to protest China's missile sales to Pakistan.95

3/18/91

A second MTCR technical meeting takes place. Japanese representatives note that some clauses of the agreement are open to different interpretations by participant nations. Members discuss issues concerning annex and guideline clarity. Members agree to some guideline clarifications.96

3/19-20/91

The fourth MTCR meeting takes place in Tokyo. The seven original members attend, along with Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Norway participate for the first time. Luxembourg does not send a delegation. Canada recommends that the meeting focus on expanding the "Equipment and Technology Annex" since "the Annex might usefully be amended to account for the differing parameters (distance and payload) necessary for the delivery of Chemical and Biological Weappons Nonproliferation Project."⁹⁷

Per the Canadian suggestion, members agree to expand the annex. Discussions revolve around widening MTCR "objectives" to include chemical and biological weapon delivery systems. Members agree to revise the "Equipment and Technology Annex" before the close of 1991 as the current text (from the mid-1980s) fails to address many important technological developments. While some proposed modifications are adopted at the meeting, time constraints dictate that not all of the issues requiring clarification are addressed.

In view of the Gulf War, members cite the importance of stricter verification. Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe notes that, "the very fact that Scud missiles were launched against friendly and peaceful countries until a fortnight ago...brings us once again the urgency of the proliferation issue of mass destruction weapons."⁹⁸ On Japan's initiative, members make an appeal for all nations to adhere to the agreement. Japan also agrees officially to discuss membership with China.

In addition, Canada recommends that members assess which nations might be encouraged to adhere to the export guidelines. The membership of Turkey and other European states is discussed.⁹⁹

3/27/91

In response to the calls for his country's adherence, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen states, "Those countries that did not attend the meeting should not be called upon to assume corresponding obligations to an agreement reached among some other countries."¹⁰⁰

3/91

Sweden bases its missile technology export controls on MTCR guidelines.101

4/23/91

Leonid Sharin, Acting Chair of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and National Security, notes Soviet interest in MTCR participation, provided that COCOM export restrictions to the Soviet Union are dropped.102

5/5/91

Argentine Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez reports that Argentina is studying the possibility of joining the MTCR.103

Early 5/91

The United States meets with China regarding proliferation issues and encourages China to follow MTCR guidelines. In response to U.S. pressure not to sell M-9 and M-11 missiles, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen states that China did not participate in the creation of the MTCR and "should not be called upon to assume corresponding obligations."104

5/27/91

President Bush announces that he will impose sanctions on China for selling M-11 missile parts and technology to Pakistan. Sanctions required by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act are placed on the China Great Wall Industry Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. They include a ban on cooperation with China in space launch activities and the denial of a sale of 20 high-speed computers with missile applications valued at $30 million. Some Chinespe officials respond that M-11 transfers are not covered by the MTCR guidelines because the M-11's range is not more than 186 miles (300 km.). However, the firm that markets the M-11, the Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, had earlier issued a sales brochure describing the M-11 missile as being able to carry an 800 kg. warhead to a range of 180 miles. Sanctions are implemented on June 16, 1991.105

5/28/91

Argentine Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzales announces that Argentina will follow MTCR guidelines and will cancel the Condor II project. He states that "this is the healthiest attitude that Argentina could adopt in order to show that we are not engaged in an arms race."¹⁰⁶ Following the announcement, Argentina asks current MTCR members for advice on regulatory issues which need to be implemented so that Buenos Aires will be in accordance with MTCR guidelines. In unofficial discussions wipth Argentina, MTCR members show a willingness to provide assistance.¹⁰⁷

5/91

A third MTCR technical meeting is held in Paris. Participants review and update the MTCR annex in preparation for a November policy group meeting.108

5/30/91

The Office of the President of the French Republic releases its "Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament," in which France recognizes the role of the MTCR in arms control, but points out that the current regime is only a step towards a more general agreement. France calls for a broader agreement with geographic enlargement, increased control, universal applicability to all members, establishment of rules for international cooperation for civilian use of space, and prevention of technology leakage from civpilian to military projects. France proposes the development of confidence-building measures, including the establishment of a "code of good conduct" and a mechanism for the notification of space launches.¹⁰⁹

6/91

Chinese officials inform U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew that Beijing is considering joining the MTCR.¹¹⁰

7/1/91

Sweden introduces legislation (sfs 1991:341 and 1991:343) prohibiting the export of civilian products that can be used in weapons of mass destruction, including products and equipment employed in missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Stockholm cites the growing risk of proliferation of technologies that can be used for NBC weapons as its rationale for joining.111

7/8/91

Sanctions announced by U.S. President Bush on two Chinese entities (China Great Wall Industry Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation) and one Pakistani entity (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) become official. These entities will be denied license applications to export items covered by the MTCR Annex for two years.¹¹²

9/5/91

Sweden joins the MTCR. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs document, as a result of participating in the MTCR, Sweden will gain access to information needed for implementing export control legislation that it had already adopted. Presumably, by taking these steps, Sweden will also avoid discrimination against its industries and research institutions that seek to import goods from MTCR member states. Minister for Foreign Trade Anita Gradin comments on Sweden's non-proliferation policy initiatives,p stating: "It is important for Sweden to participate in the international endeavor to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a major aspect of our policy of disarmament and is also justified by the threat to regional stability which can result from the proliferation of technologies for weapons of mass destruction, as has been shown in the Middle East and the Gulf area."¹¹³

9/91

Israeli Defense Ministry Director General David Ivri meets with Pentagon officials in Washington to discuss the MTCR agreement. Israel reportedly agrees to accept the conditions of the regime. According to Israeli sources, the United States threatens to sanction Israel if it fails to comply with the MTCR.114

9/27/91

The United States invokes sanctions against South Africa's Armaments Corporation (Armscor) for engaging in missile proliferation activities. The two-year sanctions will prevent Armscor from receiving U.S. exports of items covered by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, disqualify them from acquiring U.S. government contracts, and proscribe U.S. firms from importing Armscor merchandise. The U.S. sanctions were allegedly triggered by Israeli aid to South Africa in developing ballpistic missiles and supplying key components.¹¹⁵

9/91

Finland announces its intention to join the MTCR, bringing the number of formal members to 18. According to a Finnish government official, the decision to join the MTCR is based on the fact that, historically, Finland has cooperated and coordinated its export controls with the United States and its allies. According to the same official, joining the MTCR is a part of Finland's economic policy, to help meet Helsinki's need to secure Western technology for industrial development. Finally, the fact that Fipnland will become a full member of the European Space Agency makes MTCR membership useful, as some exchanges of information are easier when all members operate under the same export control system.116

10/3/91

Bowing to U.S. pressure, Israel announces its intention to abide by MTCR restrictions by the end of 1991. In exchange, the United States waives sanctions against Israel for aiding South Africa's ballistic missile development efforts. According to published reports, Israel was hoping to evade the adoption of MTCR guidelines until the end of 1992, when its missile-related agreements with both South Africa and China would have been fully executed. According to Ha'Aretz, the Director-General of the Israeli pDefense Ministry M. David Ivri stated that a refusal by Israel to adhere to the MTCR would risk precipitating American sanctions against Israel.117

10/11/91

In response to U.S. sanctions against Armscor, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha meets with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen and labels the sanctions as being "unfair." However, Botha does voice South Africa's interest in the MTCR saying, "If we cannot be full members surely they can create another form of membership. We want to belong to the club and be part of an organization which can together control and perhaps exchange technology and knowledge with pone another."¹¹⁸

10/14/91

According to officials from the Israeli government's Rafael Armament Development Authority, the expected adoption of MTCR guidelines by Israel will not hinder the sale of the Arrow ATBM or other warhead technology abroad.¹¹⁹

10/91

A multilateral group of MTCR representatives meets with Russian officials in Moscow to discuss missile proliferation.120

10/91

The Bush Administration expresses its intention to lift some restrictions placed on Israeli defense exports in light of Israel's willingness to sign the MTCR.¹²¹

11/4-7/91

The MTCR's fifth plenary meeting takes place in Washington. Finland and Sweden attend for the first time. Participants examine the criteria for evaluating membership applications and search for a means to expand membership.

Members discuss expanding the regime to cover all types of weapons of mass destruction, but they reject the concept of lowering system range thresholds. Members also examine adjusting current guideline parameters, recognizing the need to allow for legitimate transfer of missile technology for peaceful uses. Reportedly, current MTCR guidelines are viewed by some member states as excessively restrictive.

The revised and updated MTCR Annex from the previous technical meeting is adopted. In many cases notes are added at the end of each item section; the notes contain definitions or further clarifications of technical parameters. The new version of the annex contains definitions for "microcircuit" and "radiation hardened," while "production equipment" is expanded to apply not only to serial production, but all production. A new terminology section clarifies the terms "specially designed," "designed or modipied," "usable in," and "capable of," which are used throughout the new annex's item sections. These terms provide a more specific description to determine the extent to which an item is dedicated toward missile applications. In many cases, the term "designed or modified" replaces "specifically designed" to encompass a greater range of dual-use items. New Item 17 (materials, devices and specially designed software for reduced observables) and Item 18 (devices for use in protecting rocket systems and unmannepd air vehicles against nuclear effects), are added to the annex. Members approve Item 19 (complete rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles not covered in Item 1 with a range equal or greater than 300 km.) but do not implement it.

Argentina requests that the United States officially communicate Argentina's adherence to the MTCR and request an invitation to the sixth plenary meeting. According to the Felix Menicocci, Third Secretary in the Argentine Foreign Ministry, Directorate for International Security, Nuclear, and Space Affairs, there was "considerable satisfaction on the part of the members regarding Argentina's decision to join the regime..."122

11/17/91

Secretary of State Baker announces that his visit to China produced a Chinese verbal agreement to adhere to MTCR guidelines. In exchange, the United States will remove sanctions placed on two Chinese firms in 6/91. Mr. Baker interprets the agreement to preclude M-9 and M-11 sales. However, China's official News Agency and Beijing Review says only that China "may consider observing the MTCR guidelines and parameters in actual transfers."¹²³ Before accepting the guidelines, China argues that thpe M-11, which carries an 800 kg. payload a range of 290 km. fell below the regime's restrictions. The U.S. response is that lowering the M-11's payload would extend the range to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCR.124

12/20/91

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reports that the United States will lift restrictions imposed in 6/91 when Beijing agrees to adopt safeguards against missile proliferation.¹²⁵

12/24/91

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.