Statement by Kenneth L. Adelman (31 July 1985)

Statement by Kenneth L. Adelman Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee On the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 31 July 1985

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished committee today to discuss the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and China--the first agreement with a nuclear-weapon state since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

Before addressing how this agreement advances important nonproliferation interests, I should place it into the broad picture of enhanced U.S.-Chinese consultations on arms control. This type of consultation followed on the heels of the President's April 1984 visit to China. Soon thereafter, in the summer of 1984, I led a delegation of American officials to Beijing to concentrate on arms control. The Chinese reciprocated by having their arms control experts come here just last month.

Nonproliferation has been a key topic in these discussions with the Chinese. I explained to the Chinese that nonproliferation is one of the highest U.S. priorities as well as the one area of arms control which has been perhaps the most successful. This agreement continues that record.

This committee has, of course, already received ACDA's Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement on the agreement, which we provided to the President prior to his approval of the agreement. The prime question before you now--as before the President on July 23--is: "Does this new agreement contribute to U.S. nonproliferation efforts?" I believe the answer is a resounding "yes." Why? Because our agreement with China helps ensure that they are part of the nonproliferation solution rather than part of the pproblem.

China's Nonproliferation Policy

During the 1960s and 1970s, China rejected nonproliferation norms. They actually portrayed proliferation in a favorable light by openly declaring that the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe would diminish the power of the United States and the Soviet Union and enhance the opportunities for revolution. China denied that a world of more nuclear-weapon states would enhance the risk of nuclear war.

China also undertook no international legal obligations and had no policy to require safeguards and other controls on its nuclear exports. This naturally quickened our concerns about Chinese actions that could help other countries acquire nuclear explosives. Clearly, herein lay the potential for great harm to global nonproliferation efforts in both word and deed. And, needless to tell this committee, words are exceedingly important in this realm. They affect the strength of the international norms and sptandards upon which nonproliferation ultimately rests.

Against this background, the United States opened talks on peaceful nuclear cooperation with China--first in 1981 and then more intensively in 1983--with ACDA participating in all stages of the negotiations.

After 2 years of negotiations, an agreement was initialled during President Reagan's visit to China. It then became necessary to engage in further discussions with China to clarify matters related to implementation of its nuclear policies. We did not want to proceed until we were completely satisfied. We were willing to wait as long as need be. These discussions concluded successfully at the end of June.

Over these past 2 years, the Chinese Government has taken a number of important nonproliferation steps.

First, it made a pledge that it does "not engage in nuclear proliferation" nor does it "help other countries develop nuclear weapons." The substance of this pledge has been reaffirmed several times by Chinese officials both abroad and within China. In fact, China's sixth National People's Congress made this policy a directive to all agencies of that large and complex government. As such, it constitutes a historic and positive change in China's policies. It helps bolster rather than break down those criptical norms and standards that comprise the nonproliferation regime.

Second, in January 1984, China joined the over 100 members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays such a critical role in international nonproliferation efforts. This was a necessary step in China's evolution toward acceptance of the basic norms of nuclear supply.

Third, China adopted a policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. This, too, was a big plus. Not only could a supplier that did not accept this basic norm directly contribute to spreading uncontrolled nuclear equipment and material to potential nuclear-weapon states, it could also undermine the consensus of supplier countries that has been painstakingly constructed over the past decade.

Fourth, during our hours and hours of discussions, the Chinese have made its clear that they will implement their policies in a manner consistent with the basic nonproliferation practices we and other support so vigorously.

In the short span of 2 years, China has embraced nonproliferation policies and practices, which it had eschewed so vociferously for a quarter of a century. This clearly is a turnabout of historic significance in our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are to be applauded for such a change of course.

We can take a measure of pride in this as well. For I believe that the lengthy discussions by the United States and other supplier nations with China, combined with the prospect of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, contributed heavily to these Chinese actions.

Protecting U.S. Interests

We will, of course, watch Chinese practices closely to satisfy ourselves that China's actions are consistent with its words, with our expectations, and with our policies and laws. The Chinese know that. They know that nuclear cooperation with us rests on their strict adherence to basic nonproliferation practices discussed and clarified at such great length. The agreement before you rests on that foundation. It could rest on no other.

As presented in ACDA's Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, all statutory requirements for such agreements have been fully met. Two issues that were subject to protracted negotiations are worth mentioning.

The agreement before you contains a provision for "mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits" in connection with transfers under its terms. This was done to help ensure that all the agreement's provisions will be scrupulously honored. The specifics of visits and information exchanges will be worked out with the Chinese before any licenses are issued for nuclear exports. They will permit visits by U.S. personnel to sites in China wherever our material or equipment, subjectp to this agreement, is located.
The second issue concerns the right of prior approval over reprocessing of spent fuel subject to the agreement. The agreement notes that neither party contemplates reprocessing such material. In fact, activities of this kind are not likely to become an issue in China for at least 15 years. While the language dealing with this issue does differ from that in other agreements, it is clear that China cannot reprocess without U.S. approval.

Other aspects of our assessment statement can be fully explained in response to your questions. Let me just add now that U.S. interests are fully protected. This agreement includes many written guarantees and controls to ensure that material, equipment, or technology supplied by the United States will not be misused.

If they are misused, or if China's nonproliferation policies do not live up to their pledges and to our expectations, we have clear recourse. We hope and expect that this agreement will lead to significant peaceful nuclear commerce with China--otherwise the President would not have sent it to you--but the agreement is only an umbrella agreement. That is, it permits, but does not require, the export of any nuclear items. Thus, if Chinese behavior ever became inconsistent with our understandings, we wouldp suspend the licensing of exports. The Chinese know that.

Conclusion

China's recent nonproliferation steps are and will be critical to our mission of bolstering vital nonproliferation norms and standards. Our long talks with the Chinese, as well as the prospects of civil nuclear cooperation with the United States and other suppliers, contributed to these major improvements in China's nonproliferation policies. Further, as I said, the agreement will enhance our efforts to cooperate to strengthen nonproliferation norms and actions.

Thus, I believe this agreement is fully in U.S. national interests. I trust that, after a thorough consideration of all the issues, you and the whole Congress will agree.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.