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Statement by Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy
US Permanent Representative to the IAEA and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
On the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
31 July 1985
I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you today on the proposed agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This agreement was signed in Washington on July 23. We believe this agreement is important to the interests of both countries and supportive of our shared nonproliferation objectives.
The agreement establishes the basis for cooperation in a variety of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It provides the basis for export of nuclear reactors, fuel, components, and the exchange of technology including cooperation in health, safety, and the environmental implications of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement is not, however, a commitment to supply. Rather, it provides the legal framework within which nuclear cooperation may take place. Once the agreement enters into fporce, nuclear reactors, components, and nuclear fuel may be exported under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in accordance with existing law and regulations.
The agreement permits nuclear cooperation between the United States and China exclusively in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It contains reciprocal commitments by the United States and China that nuclear facilities and materials subject to the agreement will not be used for any nuclear explosive or military purpose. This guarantee, as well as other assurances and controls in the agreement, will help preserve the distinction between the civil and military use of nuclear energy. It is also important to stress that cooperation under the agreement is limited to nonsensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. It expressly excludes the transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology such as enrichment or reprocessing. Nor does it in any way require that technology of strategic or military significance be transferred.
Provisions of the Agreement
I would now like to turn to a brief examination of the specific provisions of the agreement we have signed with the People's Republic of China. The text of the agreement and supporting documents developed during its review within the executive branch have been transmitted to the Congress by the President. The text, in most respects, does not differ significantly from new and renegotiated agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation which we have concluded with other countries since enactment of the Npuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and which have been before Congress for review. The agreement with China fully meets all the requirements specified in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear-weapon states.
Specifically, section 123 requires that such agreements contain several guarantees by the cooperating partner.
The first guarantee is that no nuclear materials or equipment subject to the agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 3, of the proposed agreement with the P.R.C.
The second guarantee required is that no nuclear material or equipment subject to the agreement will be transferred beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the agreement of the United States. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 1, of the agreement.
The third guarantee required is that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material subject to the agreement. This requirement is met by article 6 of the agreement.
The fourth guarantee required is that no nuclear material subject to the agreement will be enriched, reprocessed, altered in any form or content, or (in the case of weapons-usable materials) stored without the prior agreement of the United States. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 2, of the agreement.
The Chinese understood U.S. legal requirements, said they had no plans to undertake the activities in question, and were concerned that, in the event of possible future Chinese changes of plans, the United States would give a timely response. While the language that was negotiated is different from that appearing in other agreements, it provides that China may not engage in any of the specified activities without the agreement of the United States. If long-term arrangements are not agreed, it makes cleapr that each side will refrain from such activities if either side objects--i.e., until there is mutual agreement between the United States and the P.R.C. Both the United States and the P.R.C. understand this.
All of these guarantees are reciprocal in nature and would apply to Chinese exports to the United States. They are, in substance, identical to those in all our other post-1978 agreements. Unlike the other agreements concluded since 1978, however, this one is with a single nuclear-weapon state, as such states are defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This agreement does not provide for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the P.R.C. on nuclear material, equipment, or facilities subject to the agreement since they are not required for nuclear-weapon states by either the Atomic Energy Act or the NPT. But neither does the agreement foreclose such safeguards, were China to undertake a voluntary offer with the IAEA as the other nuclear-weapon states have done.
The agreement contains provisions for consultations, exchanges of information, and visits to the sites of materials, facilities, and components subject to the agreement. The agreement also provides for exchanges of views and information on each country's national accounting and control systems and consultations on physical protection measures. The purpose of these exchanges of visits and information is to ensure that the provisions of the agreement are effectively and openly carried out, including the provision that cooperation will be for exclusively peaceful purposes. Those provisions have the duration envisaged in Section 123(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Benefits of the Agreement
There are very substantial benefits to be derived from this agreement. The agreement will lay the groundwork for strengthening economic ties between the United States and China and create new opportunities for U.S. companies to participate in China's expanding energy sector. China has begun the development of a major nuclear power program to meet its growing energy needs. The Chinese view nuclear energy as playing a key role in China's industrial development and modernization program. U.S. firms arep already involved in other energy projects in China to develop coal, oil, and other energy resources, and we believe that participating in a diversified and well-balanced energy program in China is supportive of U.S. interests.
A most important benefit of peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and China is the opportunity it provides for both countries to work together to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. President Reagan has declared that the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective of the United States. This consideration was at the top of our agenda during our talks with the Chinese and will remain the paramount concern of the United States. Clearly, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must rest on a foundation of shared views and principles on the necessity of deterring the threat of nuclear proliferation.
Since negotiations began on the proposed agreement, China made significant new statements of its nonproliferation policy which show that China is opposed to the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. On January 10, 1984 at the White House, Premier Zhao stated:
China does not advocate nor encourage proliferation. We do not engage in proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.
Premier Zhao reiterated this statement in February in Beijing and at the sixth National People's Congress in May. The Premier's speech to the National People's Congress is the closest equivalent in China to a presidential "State of the Union" address. The Statement was endorsed by the National People's Congress and published as official policy.
In January 1985, the official Chinese press published a statement by Vice Premier Li Peng that China has no present or future intention to help non-nuclear-weapon states develop nuclear weapons and that China's present or future cooperation with other countries is confined to peaceful purposes. The Chinese have made clear to us that when they say that they will not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons, this also applies to all nuclear explosives. This is a basic Chinese policy which we belipeve will guide China's nuclear cooperation in the future.
China has also taken important steps to participate in international nonproliferation efforts. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in January 1984 and has stated that it requires the application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. In adopting this policy, China is acting in accordance with existing international norms for nuclear trade.
As China undertakes nuclear cooperation with other countries and moves into international nuclear affairs, it is vital that we have a bilateral forum which allows us to work closely with China to maintain and strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. The agreement itself establishes a formal framework for consultations enabling regular exchanges of views and information on matters of mutual interest, including means to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.
Our contacts with the Chinese have already demonstrated that they appreciate the importance we attach to nonproliferation. We are satisfied that the policies they have adopted are consistent with our own basic views. Formalizing our ties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through an agreement for cooperation will provide a means to advance our shared objectives.
We believe the agreement serves the national security and nonproliferation interests of the United States. We believe it deserves the full support of the Congress.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
