Statement by Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz (31 July 1985)

Statement by Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

31 July 1985

It is a pleasure for me to join Secretary [of Energy John] Herrington, ACDA Director Adelman, and Ambassador Kennedy to discuss with you the U.S.-P.R.C. agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. In my prepared remarks, I would like to stress the importance of this agreement in our overall relationship with the P.R.C.

But first, a word about the road we traveled before the agreement was signed last week. Mr. Adelman's and Ambassador Kennedy's statements explain the importance of this agreement to our nonproliferation goals, and I do not want to go over the same ground. But I would like to underscore that U.S. nonproliferation concerns were paramount in our negotiations with the Chinese on the agreement. The requirements of U.S. nonproliferation policy and law--and not other foreign policy considerations--were absolute determinants of the shape and content of the agreement which we initialed and signed and of the discussions related to it. Despite the importance we attach to our overall relationship, great though it is, we repeatedly emphasized to the Chinese that the relationship could in no way obviate the need to meet our nonproliferation requirements and the requirements of U.S. law.

Only when our nonproliferation concerns were met--concerns addressed in Mr. Adelman's and Ambassador Kennedy's testimony--were U.S. agencies able to move forward with a recommendation to the President that the agreement be signed. Over the past year and more, many people in our government worked hard on this issue. Discussions with the Chinese continued through diplomatic channels for many months prior to Ambassador Kennedy's June trip to Beijing.

The groundwork was completed during that June visit. But further inter-agency consultations here, reporting to the President, and the President's own decision to approve were required before the agreement could be signed. We were pleased that these procedures were completed in time for the Li visit, which offered a propitious occasion for a signing ceremony, but we were fully prepared to take more time if that had been necessary.

Now that U.S. Government concerns have been met and the agreement is signed and before Congress, let me turn to the question of what this agreement will mean for bilateral relations between the United States and China.

Implications for U.S.-China Relations

The first images that some in the United States might conjure up are those of pure economic gain for our side: billions of dollars in contracts; massive U.S. equipment exports; aid to the stricken American nuclear power industry; U.S. reactors for the city lights and factories of China.

There is a kernel of truth behind these somewhat exaggerated expectations, but I would submit that dreams of one-sided commercial gain do not constitute the most important positive aspects of our cooperation with China in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Yes, there will be opportunities for American companies to compete for nuclear power business in China. The market is there, and European and Japanese competitors are already active in it. China will look to the outside primarily for assistance in building up its indigenous nuclear power plant manufacturing industry. Over the long run, more than anything, China will want to import technology, modern management methods, and old-fashioned engineering know-how. In these areas--which are vitally important for the safety and efficiency of reactor operation--U.S. companies have a wealth of experience and flexibility, which puts them in a strong competitive position.

Also, there is no doubt that in the first stages of China's nuclear power program--in which three or four nuclear plants will be built, including five to seven reactors--the Chinese industry will want to make major equipment imports. A nuclear cooperation agreement will have to be in force before U.S. companies can apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ship major reactor components to China.

But beyond its implications for the sale of discrete pieces of equipment for nuclear power reactors in China, the agreement can fill a gap in our relationship with the P.R.C. Once in force, it will become an important support of a general framework of cooperation with China. If we fail to bring it into force, the framework will be that much less coherent and that gap--which you could label "nonproliferation objectives and peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy"--will remain open.

For the past several years, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has worked to strengthen and broaden political and economic ties with the P.R.C. Seeing a modernizing China as a potential force for peace and stability in East Asia, the United States is committed to assisting China's ongoing modernization effort. The President and other Administration leaders have recognized that, while we and China have our differences, we consider China a friendly country. While not a U.S. ally, neither is China allied with any other power, and it shares some important concerns with us. Holding this basic view of China's position in the world, the United States has sought to regularize our relations.

In areas such as trade, investment, finance, civil aviation, and scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation--to name a few--we have sought to establish a framework of agreements and arrangements consistent with the generally good relations we and China enjoy. In setting up this framework, we and the Chinese have learned a great deal about each other's political and economic systems. Our bilateral agreements offer mutual benefits and mutual obligations. They have been a measure of China's interest in strengthening its ties with us and a test of our commitment to China's modernization.

We think the framework we have built up has not only benefited our bilateral relations but also encouraged China to be a more constructive player in the international arena. From another viewpoint, China's own push to open its economy and society to the outside world after years of isolationism has been an impetus for U.S.-P.R.C. bilateral cooperation. Whatever one's point of view, I think it's fair to say that our framework of cooperation with China and China's opening up to the outside are mutually reinforcing and mutually beneficial.

Within the context I've described, the nuclear cooperation agreement will reinforce the Sino-U.S. relationship by furthering both our nonproliferation goals and our cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We in the Administration think it is an important agreement--one that deserves the support of the Congress.

To sum up, bringing the present agreement into force will:

Allow us to maintain constructive consultations with the P.R.C. on nonproliferation issues;
Give U.S. firms the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the development of China's civil nuclear power industry; and
Reinforce the overall framework of our relationship with the P.R.C.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.