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Statement by Sha Zukang,
Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
28 March 1996
(CD/PV.733)
(Translated from Chinese)
Mr. President, may I begin first by warmly congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? The Chinese delegation is convinced that with your outstanding ability and rich experience in multilateral diplomacy you are sure to guide this Conference to success. I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I also wish to take this opportunity to express my thanks to your predecessor Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands for his contribution to the work of the CD.
The CTBT negotiations have entered their third year. In accordance with the relevant resolution of the General Assembly we are required to conclude a treaty as soon as possible this year. People are watching with great interest to see whether the CD can live up to the expectations of the international community and fulfill its mandate within the time-frame specified in the General Assembly resolution. Before the end of the first part of this year's session I would like to explain the position of the Chinese delegation on some of the important issues in the CTBT negotiations.
We all agree that the current negotiations are not conducted in a vacuum but are influenced invariably by the developments in the international situation as a whole. In fact, the initiation and progress of the negotiations and the future signing, ratification and entry into force of the treaty are all closely linked to the changes in the international situation. Since the end of the cold war and especially in the l990s the international situation has undergone drastic changes. Today the world is still in the process of complex and profound changes with the overall trend moving towards relaxation. The bipolar system has come to an end together with the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs and the transition towards multipolarity has accelerated. A new world structure is taking shape. The world wants peace, countries need stability, economies need development and mankind desires progress. This has become the main theme in the world today and this trend will last for quite some time in the future. It is in such an international environment that the nuclear super-Powers have embarked on the path of nuclear arms reduction, ensuring the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is against the same backdrop that the CTBT negotiations have been initiated, and are now progressing successfully. It is safe to say that the above-mentioned important developments in the field of arms control and disarmament are just a natural result of the development and changes in the international situation. Proceeding from its analysis and understanding of the international situation, China believes that, as long as all the parties concerned show enough political will and the necessary flexibility in the negotiations, it is possible to achieve the objective of concluding a treaty this year.
At present, the 1.2 billion Chinese people are concentrating on modernization with full confidence. China needs a long-term peaceful and tranquil international environment and has been making every effort to achieve this end. In the past two years and more, the Chinese delegation, under instructions from the Chinese Government, has been participating in the CTBT negotiations in a positive, serious and responsible manner. This is an aspect of our comprehensive effort. The Chinese delegation hopes to conclude no later than 1996 a good CTBT which will genuinely prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions and which will be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable so as to promote international peace and security.
Since the beginning of this part of the CD session and as the CTBT negotiations progress, countries participating in the negotiations have deepened their debate and understanding of the relationship between the CTBT and nuclear disarmament. Since this question bears on how such a relationship I should be reflected in the treaty, the Chinese delegation regards this debate as normal and necessary. It is our sincere hope that a common understanding can be reached on this issue at an early date, thus accelerating the negotiations. The Chinese delegation understands and sympathizes with the demand of a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework. China has always stood for the early and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and has put forward a package of proposals for this purpose at the United Nations General Assembly. We have always regarded the CTBT as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, because a treaty like this, for the first time banning all nuclear-weapon test explosions in the world in the form of an international legal instrument, will certainly promote the process of nuclear disarmament and lay the groundwork for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, we should note that the advent and development of nuclear weapons has been a lengthy historical process. So likewise the complete elimination of such weapons will also take some time. The Chinese delegation is of the view that the specific time-frame for nuclear disarmament should be decided within the context of negotiations on a convention banning nuclear weapons. I wish to emphasize here once again that the indefinite extension of the NPT and the indefinite validity of the CTBT must in no way be interpreted so as to perpetuate the privileged status of the nuclear-weapon States in possessing nuclear weapons.
The Chinese delegation is pleased to note that all parties are in favour of the early conclusion of a good CTBT this year. We have to admit that the timing and quality of the treaty are both important. On the other hand, they may be in some way contradictory to each other. This in effect is a contradiction between political will and reality. Nevertheless, it is not a contradiction which cannot be resolved. But in order to resolve this
contradiction, one must recognize that reality. It is sometimes necessary and even unavoidable - to chant slogans or make strong appeals. However, in our view, it is a little late at this stage for that kind of thing. It would be even more shabby if the real intention is to divert people's attention in order to make sure that "what is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable''. The reality we are faced with at present is this: although we have already settled a large number of issues, there are still quite a few political and technical issues that have yet to be resolved. As the CTBT will have a long-term bearing on international peace and security, we are against wrapping up these issues in a simplistic, hasty manner for the sake of mere political expediency. Rather, we would like to see them settled with a realistic and serious attitude. Anyone who misinterprets this position as being "negative'' to the negotiations would be doing so either out of ignorance or with ulterior political motivation. The Chinese delegation maintains that, in order to resolve all the remaining issues, we need to recognize one another's legitimate concerns and, on that basis, show sufficient flexibility to work out the necessary compromises. Any attempt to make use of one's superiority in certain areas to seek unilateral advantage from the treaty is to court failure, leading the negotiations down towards a dead end. I would like to take this opportunity to point out that China is willing to compromise on some issues, but this cannot be done on a unilateral basis. Under no circumstances will China accept any country imposing its will on others.
The first part of this 1996 CD session is coming to an end. Reviewing the CTB negotiations over the past two years, especially during this part of the CD session, we have every reason to be satisfied with the progress achieved during such a short period of time. All negotiating parties in the past two years have explained their positions, exchanged views and understood each other's concerns. During this part of the CD session, the Iranian and Australian delegations have put forward their clean texts, both of which have absorbed many proposals of other parties and can serve as useful reference material for negotiation. We also expect the working paper of the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee to offer valuable reference materials for us, so that we can pursue further our negotiations and reach agreement on the basis of the rolling text. In short, we already have a solid basis for negotiation. As mentioned earlier, there are still some major unresolved questions that will have a direct bearing on the universality and effectiveness of the treaty. We should attach sufficient importance to these questions.
I would now like to explain the position of the Chinese delegation on some of the major issues of the negotiations. First, concerning the scope of the treaty. China is committed to concluding a CTBT which prohibits any nuclear-weapon test explosion at any place and in any environment. Proceeding from this guiding principle, the Chinese delegation proposed at the outset of the negotiations its scope text prohibiting any nuclear-weapon test explosion which releases nuclear energy. The phrase "release of nuclear energy" in the Chinese text was intended to distinguish the scope of the CTBT from that of the PTBT and TTBT and to define the scope of the CTBT with more precise and scientific language. The Chinese delegation has always held that the scope of the CTBT should exclude any threshold.
After two years of negotiations, most countries have reached a common understanding on the phrase "any nuclear-weapon test explosion" in the scope article. That is to say, the future CTBT will without any threshold prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion. In view of this understanding, and for the purpose of accelerating the pace of our negotiations, China. now decides to withdraw the phrase "release of nuclear energy" from its proposed text.
There are still some outstanding issues in the scope article which remain to be settled. It is the sincere hope of the Chinese delegation that all sides will make an effort, in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, in order to find proper solutions to these issues.
Second, concerning peaceful nuclear explosions. The Chinese delegation has noticed that on this important matter of principle there exist divergences. Any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. This is an important matter of principle. Therefore, it would be incorrect if the CTBT should ban PNEs. It may be due to the same reason that both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT contain clear-cut provisions of principle permitting PNEs. As a populous developing country with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. China fully shares the concern over the possible misuse of PNEs. However, we think that this issue can be resolved by establishing a strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs.
Third, concerning entry into force. The Chinese delegation holds that the CTBT has two main objectives: to promote nuclear disarmament and to prevent nuclear proliferation. These two objectives are closely linked and equally important, and neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Undermining either objective may affect the realization of the other. The accession of all nuclear-capable States to the treaty is the legal guarantee for the realization of the above-mentioned objectives. Therefore we support the formula whereby the CTBT shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all nuclear-capable States, as specified in a relevant IAEA list. As for the simple formula of a waiver of EIF requirements, we understand the good intention of the proponents to ensure the early entry into force of the treaty. However, this would put the cart before the horse and would not be conducive to the realization of the main objectives of the treaty. I wish to stress that, although the ratification of the treaty by the five nuclear-weapon States may be a prerequisite for the entry into force of the treaty, we definitely cannot agree to confining the conditions for the entry into force of the treaty only to ratification by the five. For it is inappropriate, from the point of view of political equality, to single out the five nuclear-weapon States. This can be interpreted as a kind of political discrimination. More importantly, this would deviate from the objectives of the treaty.
Fourth, concerning the trigger mechanism for on-site inspection. The Chinese delegation maintains that the international monitoring system under the supervision of the treaty organization, representing all States parties and providing services to all States parties, is relatively objective and just. In comparison, national technical means are controlled and used by individual States parties or small groups of such parties. If NTMs are incorporated into the international verification system or used for triggering OSIs, it would inevitably put most of the States parties, developing countries in particular, in an extremely unequal position, because of the selectivity and subjectivity that are inherent in the use of such means. This is obviously unreasonable and unjustifiable. Given the past lessons in this connection, the Chinese delegation firmly believes that it is necessary to prevent certain countries from taking advantage of their superior NTMs to harass and discredit the developing countries frequently with dubious information and even infringe upon their legitimate security interests. Experience has shown that intelligence information, claimed to be "reliable" has often proved to be most unreliable. Using this kind of information to trigger OSIs is unacceptable and abhorrent.
The Chinese delegation is of the view that after two years of negotiation, the direction which a final solution to the basis of an OSI request will take has become clear. That is, a request for an OSI can be based only on monitoring data from the IMS. Specifically speaking, OSIs should be directed at ambiguous events detected by the IMS and located by the IDC. So long as the above-mentioned requirements are met, both the data contained in the IDC's Standard Screened Events Bulletin (SSEB) and the raw data from the IMS can be used to trigger an OSI. Only in such a way can we ensure equality between States parties under the treaty and the objectivity and justice of the international verification mechanism contained therein.
The Executive Council, as a broadly representative body, should exercise supervision over OSIs throughout the process. As a first step, the Council should consider and approve the request for an OSI by a two-thirds majority of all its members, namely by a "green light" procedure. This procedure should apply to both the first and the second phases of OSIs. It is our view that triggering OSIs through an automatic or simplified procedure will make OSIs vulnerable to possible abuse, which is the reason why China, together with many other countries opposes this idea. On the other hand, if the requesting State party can put forward, in an open manner, verifiable and convincing evidence in its request for an OSI, it should not have any unnecessary worry about not obtaining a two-thirds majority of the Council members for approval of this "reasonable request''.
Fifth, concerning the conduct of OSIs. As is known to all, OSIs and the IMS constitute the two cornerstones of the international verification system of the CTBT. IMS technologies are all remote sensing and detection technologies, while OSI activities may affect the normal operation and normal security of States parties. Therefore it is quite natural for all sides to attach particular importance to OSIs.
The Chinese delegation is of the view that, while fully recognizing the importance and necessity of the OSI mechanism, we should also note that the purpose of OSIs is to clarify ambiguous events detected in the territories of the inspected States parties. Therefore it is inappropriate to prejudge the inspected State as a "violator" before the result of the inspection endorsed by the Council. In this connection, we cannot regard OSIs as a punitive measure against the inspected State party. The inspection team should strictly abide by the mandate approved by the Council and respect the sovereign rights of the inspected State party. The inspected State party is obliged to provide the necessary assistance to the inspection team to ensure the smooth and effective conduct of the inspection.
During the OSI process, necessary measures should be taken to protect the legitimate security concerns of the inspected State party and to prevent nuclear proliferation. The inspected State party, if it deems that some of the activities proposed by the inspection team may affect its legitimate security interests has the right to impose different degrees of restrictions on the activities of the inspection team and propose alternative measures to demonstrate its compliance with the treaty. The access regime under negotiation in Working Group 1 is an important issue which will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the verification regime and the national security of all States parties. The Chinese delegation is ready to join efforts with other delegations to establish a good verification regime for the treaty.
Sixth, concerning the international monitoring system. Thanks to joint efforts by all sides, the IMS is now almost in its final shape. The Chinese delegation is satisfied with and encouraged by the work done in this respect. We are ready to work together with other delegations to finalize our work on a complete IMS plan at an early date. On the question of radionuclide monitoring, the Chinese experts, after carefully studying the proposals of other countries, concluded that it is not cost-effective to include noble gas monitoring into the radionuclide monitoring network. The Chinese delegation is reviewing its position on such remaining issues as satellite images and satellite and EMP monitoring, taking into account the discussions held in the past two years.
I wish to point out that, politically speaking, the IMS as currently designed gives concrete expression to the principle of equality among all States parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Technically speaking, the IMS is based on the principle of uniform global coverage and a uniform detection threshold. In other words, it provides equal and balanced monitoring in all regions and in all States parties. This principle, which has guided the design of the IMS, cannot be renegotiated. As a matter of fact, with the IMS as currently designed, China's nuclear test site is subject to a monitoring intensity higher than the global average. This is a fact recognized by the IMS expert group. Under such circumstances, further enhancing the detection level for China's test site is excessive and unacceptable.
Since the Chinese Government decided to participate in the CTBT negotiations more than two years ago, the Chinese delegation has been participating in a positive, serious and responsible manner. It has made effort and contributed to the progress of the negotiations. The Chinese delegation will continue work towards the conclusion of a good CTBT within 1996.
Before concluding my statement I wish to make the following comment. Some delegations in their statements have expressed their concern about the nuclear tests conducted by China. Our Government has a very clear position on this issue. As it is-known to all already, I do not need to repeat it here. However, I do wish to take this opportunity to point out that. there is no ground to feel such concern about China's nuclear tests.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
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