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Statement by Sha Zukang,
Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
6 June 1996
(CD/PV.737)
Mr. President, may I begin by most warmly congratulating you on taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament? China and Pakistan have long enjoyed friendly relations and cooperation, characterized by mutual understanding and support, in international affairs in particular. This relation is based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and has withstood the test of time. In international affairs our relationship can serve as a model for State-to-State cooperation.
A deep friendship has also been forged between the Chinese delegation and the delegation of Pakistan as well as between myself and you, Sir. The Chinese delegation is convinced that, with your outstanding diplomatic skill and your profound understanding of international affairs, you are sure to guide this session of the CD to a successful conclusion and play a leading role at the critical juncture of the CTBT negotiations. I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I also wish to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Fisseha Yimer of Ethiopia, and look forward to cooperating with him and the Ethiopian delegation.
We have entered the final stage of the CTBT negotiations. After two years of hard work we have finally come to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Needless to say, we are still faced with some important outstanding issues. These issues can only be resolved through genuine negotiations by all the interested parties. The Chinese delegation is convinced that, as long as all parties negotiate in good faith with an attitude of mutual respect and the necessary flexibility, we would be able to live up to the high expectations of the international community and conclude the CTBT by the end of June. The Chinese delegation is ready to make unremitting efforts towards this objective.
The CTBT has a direct bearing on China's fundamental security interests. Admittedly the world situation has undergone drastic changes as compared to the cold war era. However, hegemonic ambitions are still there and the habit of interfering with other countries' internal affairs has not changed. Programmes to preserve and maintain the largest nuclear stockpiles for the seeking of perpetual nuclear superiority are well under way, and the pursuit of the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons is yet to be discarded. In these circumstances China has undertaken certain risks, both politically and in terms of its own security, in agreeing to negotiate and conclude a CTBT. However, in order to promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and in response to the call by the broad non-nuclear-weapon States, the Chinese Government has made a political decision to participate in earnest in the CTBT negotiations. The objective of China is to conclude a treaty of equality, a treaty that is universally acceptable and a treaty that does not prejudice China's legitimate security interests. For this purpose, the Chinese Government has adopted a very serious and responsible attitude towards the negotiations. In order to facilitate the early conclusion of the CTBT, China is ready to make the necessary compromises, but these compromises cannot go beyond the limit of the requirements of China for its basic national security interests. In the following I would like to explain the position of the Chinese Government on some major issues in the CTBT negotiations.
First, scope and peaceful nuclear explosions. No arms control or disarmament treaty should hinder the scientific and economic development of its States parties. This is a universally accepted principle. As a technology with enormous potential, PNEs, if used properly, can play a dynamic role in promoting the economic development of some countries. This is of special significance for China - a populous country with a large territory but relatively scarce natural resources. We cannot agree to ban a promising technology just for the sake of banning nuclear-weapon test explosions. As the saying goes, the baby should not be thrown out with the bath water - a simple wisdom. China's original intention in raising the issue of PNEs remains unchanged. The concerns that PNEs are not easily distinguishable from nuclear explosions for military purposes, and that they may have an adverse effect on the environment, are fully shared by us. However, we do not think these problems are insurmountable. Although we still need to be convinced by the various counter-arguments, we also recognize the fact that the CTBT negotiations have reached their final stage, and in order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the time-frame as planned, the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on PNEs, China can agree to a treaty provision that the possibility of permitting the conduct of PNEs shall be considered by the review conference of the States parties. If all the States parties agree to permit the conduct of PNEs by consensus, the conference of the States parties shall immediately commence its work with a view to agreeing on arrangements for the possible approval and conduct of such explosions. The arrangements shall preclude any military benefits and shall be consistent with the obligations of States under other international agreements.
This is a major move of flexibility by the Chinese Government for the sake of an early treaty. It is China's hope that other countries will seriously consider this formulation and reciprocate with the same spirit of flexibility. If consensus can be reached on this, China will be in a position to consider favourably the scope language contained in CD/NTB/WP.222, which in essence bans any nuclear weapon test explosion and any other nuclear explosion.
Second, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and security assurances. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament constitute two of the basic objectives of the CTBT, which are equally important and indispensable. For the sake of nuclear non-proliferation, it is essential to condition the entry into force of the treaty on the joining by all those States technically capable of conducting nuclear explosions. Therefore, on the issue of entry into force, the Chinese delegation supports any prpposal consistent with the above principle. Likewise, the Chinese delegation is against any proposal which will negate or weaken the principle, such as the so-called waiver clause. Nuclear disarmament is an issue that the CTBT cannot evade. China has always stood for the early elimination of all nuclear weapons and regarded the CTBT as a concrete step towards this objective. For this reason, China supports the position of the G-21 that some language on nuclear disarmament be included in the relevant part ofpthe treaty. Due attention should also be given by the treaty to negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and agreement among the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. At the beginning of the negotiations, China advocated a separate article in the treaty on this issue and tabled a textual proposal. As another gesture of flexibility, the Chinese delegation now agrees to withdraw the proposed text. However, China's political position remains unchpanged, and we continue to insist that these ideas be reflected in the preambular part of the treaty.
Third, the trigger mechanism for on-site inspections. The last and most important issue I would like to talk about is the trigger mechanism for OSIs. This issue touches upon the security interests of all States parties and it exemplifies the principle of equality and justice of the treaty. Therefore, whether we can successfully conclude a CTBT and whether the treaty can attract universal adherence will, to a large extent, depend on whether we can resolve this issue properly. In order to settle this issue, it is essential to tackle properly the relationship between the basis for a request and the decision-making procedure of the Executive Council. The international monitoring system is a result of joint efforts by experts from many countries and will operate under the supervision of the Technical Secretariat of the future treaty Organization. Its facilities and data will be calibrated and certified by the Technical Secretariat. Therefore, data obtained by the IMS will normally be reliable, and should serve as the primary basis for triggering an OSI. At the same time, we recognize that, globally speaking, there is a gap between the capabilities of the IMS and the verification requirements of the treaty, owing to factors like financial constraints. This gap should not be overlooked, of course.
In this connection, NTMs may have a supplementary role to play. However, the problem is that the NTM capabilities vary greatly from country to country in terms of quantity as well as quality, since countries are at different levels of development. A large number of developing countries have no or very few NTMs suitable for this treaty, unlike a small number of developed countries. If these latter countries are allowed to use NTMs without any restriction, then the large number of developing countries will inevitably be subjected to discrimination. It doesn't take much common sense to know that the countries that have strong NTMs will not use these means against themselves. The likely target countries of NTMs may well be the developing countries, particularly those perceived as a ''threat". What is more important, as they are under national discretion, NTMs are inherently selective and discriminatory. Due to such a nature, if NTM data are used as the sole basis for triggering an OSI, this may easily open the door to possible abuse of the right to request an OSI, which will seriously undermine the solemnity of the verification system and even the treaty itself. Therefore, necessary restrictions have to be imposed on the use of NTMs. The Chinese delegation is of the view that, if NTM data are to be used as a part of the basis for triggering an OSI, they must be technical in nature, reliable, verifiable and obtained in keeping with universally accepted principles of international law. Such data should also go through a process of strict technical and political examination. The Chinese delegation is categorically against triggering an OSI with so-called human intelligence. OSIs will be politically sensitive and to a certain extent may infringe on the sovereignty of the inspected States parties. Therefore, OSIs can only be the last resort of the verification system, used under extreme circumstances. This makes an OSI a rare rather than a routine event. For this reason the treaty should, on the one hand, provide for the necessary procedures of consultation and clarification, so as to avoid unnecessary OSIs, and on the other hand, establish a stringent decision-making process for the EC to review and approve OSI requests, so as to prevent as far as possible any abuse of OSIs.
There are now on the table several proposals on the Executive Council's decision-making process. There is a "red light" option, which will mean automatic launching of an OSI unless the majority of the EC members disapproves. There is a "green light" option, under which a request for an OSI should be approved by a certain majority of the EC members. There is also an option of mixing the green and red lights. For the "green light" option, there is also a difference in the intensity of the colour, that is, simple majority or two-thirds majority. I would like to point out that since an OSI is a last resort of the verification system, the launching of an OSI can only be considered as a substantive issue in the EC. One may ask, if such an issue is not a substantive issue, what other issues can be considered as substantive in the EC? Considering the inherent nature of OSIs, and especially the fact that NTMs may play a certain role in triggering an OSI, the Chinese delegation firmly believes that, in order to ensure the justice of OSIs, an OSI request must be approved by a two-thirds majority of all EC members before an OSI can be conducted. Some expressed the concern that, if the decision-making process of the EC is too strict, this may delay the arrival of the inspection team at the inspected area, hence weakening the effectiveness of an OSI. The Chinese delegation believes that such a concern can be addressed and might be unwarranted. According to the report of the OSI expert group submitted in December 1994 (CD/NTB/WP.198), for xenon gas, which is the most time-critical phenomenon of a nuclear explosion, so long as the inspection team arrives at the site within two weeks after the event takes place, good detection probability can be achieved. This has provided a sound scientific framework for the design of various time-lines. My delegation is convinced that through discussions we can find a proper solution which on the one hand will ensure the effectiveness of an OSI and on the other hand will provide sufficient time for deliberations in the EC.
Only three weeks are left before the end of June, when the negotiations are expected to be concluded. Let us exert maximum efforts and concentrate on the negotiations so as to fulfil the task entrusted to us by the international community. The Chinese delegation will spare no effort in this regard.
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