Sha Zukang 26 June 1997 Disarmament Anti-Personnel Landmines

Statement by Sha Zukang,
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador,
to the Conference on Disarmament
on China's Views on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APLs)

(plus additional interventions)

26 June 1997
(CD/PV.770)

First of all, Madam President, please allow me on behalf of my delegation to extend my heartfelt congratulations to you on your assumption of the CD's presidency. My delegation will cooperate fully with you. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my keen appreciation to the successive Presidents since the beginning of this year's session for their efforts aimed at an early start of the CD's substantive work. Availing myself of this opportunity, I would also like to bid farewell to our former colleagues who left their posts of heads of delegations to the CD this year. Their contributions to the work of the CD in the recent past, especially the negotiations on the CTBT, will be remembered for ever. Meanwhile, I would like to extend a warm welcome to the colleagues who have taken up their poses recently.

Today the Chinese delegation wishes to focus its comments on the issue of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). The APL issue has become a hot topic in recent years. Differing views have been expressed on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. Some regard it as a purely humanitarian issue. Some believe that it falls within the realm of disarmament and national security. Others think it is an issue with both a humanitarian and a security bearing. Consequently, there are proponents of a total ban on APLs and strong opponents of such a ban who argue instead for appropriate restrictions on the use of APLs. There are still others who favor a phased approach leading towards the ultimate prohibition of such weapons. As to how to address the issue of APLs, some are bent on the "Ottawa Process" aimed towards a total ban; some regard the CD as the appropriate forum for negotiations; other maintain that the issue should be further handled within the framework of the amended landmine Protocol to the CCW. There are still others who have the benign hope that the three mechanisms may complement one another. In short, APLs have grown into a big issue though they remain simple weapons. In the light of this, the Chinese delegation believes it is necessary to clarify and reach some common understanding of the origin of the APL issue, thereby facilitating the pursuit of the best solution.

First, the origin of the APL issue. Any conventional weapon, including APLs, can be used to kill or injure people. This is a common fact. However, as a purely defensive weapon, the APL has received "special treatment". This is due to two reasons: the side-effects of old type APLs and their indiscriminate use; and the less than adequate post-conflict demining efforts. Therefore, in order to eliminate the APL's threat to innocent civilians, to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction and to resolve the so-called APL issue, efforts should be in the above-mentioned two aspects. Sweepingly blaming landmines themselves or on any use of APLs for all civilian casualties is not true to the facts, and such an attitude cannot constitute our starting point for addressing and resolving the landmines issue. It is important to come to such an understanding, since only after we have found the true cause of the issue can we proceed to seek fitting solutions.

Second, solutions to the APL issue. Proceeding from the above, the Chinese delegation holds that the fundamental objective in resolving the landmine issue should be the prevention of civilian casualties, with our efforts concentrated on clearing those old-type landmines, especially APLs, left over from past conflicts and overcoming the shortcomings of the old-type landmines and preventing their indiscriminate use. If the CD decides to address the landmine issue, it should seek solutions in these aspects.

The most pressing issue facing the international community is the early elimination of the threat posed by landmines to innocent civilians. Almost all such casualties have been caused by those landmines already deployed. So long as these landmines remain uncleared, people living in landmine-affected places cannot enjoy tranquility, let alone a peaceful life and economic reconstruction. This problem will not be talked away, and the adoption of a convention on the so-called total prohibition of landmines will not offer an immediate solution. The international community has made some efforts and progress in post-conflict demining, but much more is called for. The Chinese delegation hopes that all capable countries, especially those developed countries with better financial resources, technologies and equipment, will make greater efforts to help remove landmines left over from past conflicts.

Furthermore, for various reasons, there are still many landmines on the territories of a number of countries deployed or abandoned by foreign troops. Some of them were abandoned during the Second World War. The countries concerned have requested that mine-deploying countries shoulder the responsibility for removing these landmines. The Chinese delegation is of the view that either for the purpose of resolving mine-related humanitarian concerns, or in the interests of fulfilling arms control obligations, the clearance of abandoned landmines should become an important part in the solution of the APL question. In this connection, reference can be drawn from the relevant provisions of the CWC. When addressing the landmine issue, the CD should seriously discuss the question of demining, including that of abandoned landmines.

The Chinese delegation is of the view that alongside efforts to clear landmines left over from past conflicts it is necessary to prevent the indiscriminate use of landmines, especially the old-type dumb mines. Only in such a way can we resolve the landmine issue once and for all. We are pleased to not that in May 1996 States parties to the CCW agreed to amend and strengthen the landmine Protocol. The amended Protocol expressly prohibits the use of undetectable landmines, bans the production of such landmines after 1 January 1997, and strictly confines the use of non-self-destructing landmines to perimeter-marked areas to ensure the exclusion of civilians. The Protocol sets forth technical specifications on self-destruction self-deactivation of APLs, thus restricting the military life of almost all APLs to 120 days. Considering the fact that the indiscriminate use of APLs mainly takes place in domestic armed conflicts and is committed by non-governmental military groups, the amended Protocol prohibits the transfer of any mine to any recipient other than a State and to States which are not bound by this Protocol, and extends the scope of application to armed conflicts not of an international character. These important new prohibitions and restrictions are of greater significance for preventing the indiscriminate use of landmines and facilitating the removal of landmines already deployed. We are convinced that so long as all countries accede to and strictly abide by the amended landmine Protocol, the difficulties in post-conflict demining efforts will be greatly reduced and the question of civilian casualties can be thoroughly resolved.

Third, the total prohibition of APLs. The Chinese delegation never doubted the sincerity and enthusiasm of countries concerned in promoting the total prohibition of APLs, and welcomes the unilateral national measures by some of these countries towards a total ban. China is in favor of imposing strict and feasible restrictions on APLs and their use, thereby achieving the objective of an ultimate ban in a step-by-step manner. We are of the view that though the total ban is aimed at realizing humanitarian ideals, the elimination of an entire category of purely defensive conventional weapons is obviously a major disarmament measure. Therefore, when addressing the APL issue, the dual aspects of humanitarian concerns and legitimate national security requirements have to be taken into consideration when formulating specific measures or-steps. In the final analysis, ensuring national security itself is an important aspect of humanitarian concerns.

As for security purposes, the military value of APLs differs from country to country, from time to time and from place to place. Different countries have totally different degrees of reliance on APLs. For those countries possessing advanced weapon systems, which enjoy collective defense through military alliances and a better security environment and have experienced no major wars on their territories for a long time, APLs may not be of great military value. They may even regard other countries' APLs as a nuisance to their overseas military operations. However, for developing countries like China, which have long land borders and an uncertain security environment and lack defensive weapons, APLs remain an indispensable, legitimate and conventional means of national defense. In fact, even some top military Powers in the world have indicated they also have security concerns that can be covered only by APLs.

In short, China is not opposed to the objective of prohibition of APLs realized in a phased approach, but cannot agree to an immediate total ban. In order to meet its legitimate territorial defense requirements, China cannot but reserve its legitimate right to use APLs on its own territories before alternative means are found and defensive capabilities established. China can only accept an international APL agreement that fully accommodates its above-mentioned security concerns. China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace and never engaged in overseas aggression. We have no intention of using landmines in other countries. Should China use APLs in legitimate circumstances, it would be for the purpose of defense against foreign military intervention or aggression, safeguarding its national unification and territorial integrity and ensuring a peaceful life for its own people.

Fourth, mechanisms for addressing the APL issue. There are several mechanisms at present for addressing the APL issue. Many delegations have voiced their views as to which is the best. The Chinese delegation would also like to take this opportunity to express its preference.

In the first place, there is the CCW mechanism. For addressing humanitarian restrictions on conventional arms, the ideal mechanism is the CCW [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its protocols. First, the Convention covers many kinds of conventional weapons, including landmines, that are subject to humanitarian restrictions, thereby constituting an independent legal system of its own. Second, the conclusion of the landmine Protocol to the Convention and amendments to it have taken into accoupt both humanitarian concerns and security interests and have accumulated experience in this regard. Third, the amended landmine Protocol has broadened its scope of application, remedied shortcomings relating to old-type landmines and set forth further restrictions on the use of landmines. Fourth, most countries capable of developing, improving and manufacturing landmines have acceded to the Convention. Fifth, the amended landmine Protocol stipulates that a conference of States parties should be held annualpy to review the operation of the Protocol, a provision not seen in any other multilateral disarmament agreements. The annual conference will also consider the development of technologies to protect civilians against the indiscriminate effects of landmines. Admittedly, a shortcoming of this mechanism is that the Convention lacks universal adherence. In fact, most countries which voted in favor of the fifty-first United Nations General Assembly resolution banning APLs, including some of the worst mine-inflicped countries, have yet to accede to the CCW and its protocols. It is safe to say that, if the amended landmine Protocol can be universally and strictly observed, the damaging effects of old-type long-life landmines will be eliminated and the use of landmines will be exclusively aimed at military targets. Therefore, judging by its objective nature, international legal obligations and the number of States parties, the CCW and its protocols provide us with the best mechanism to address the APL issue. The Chinpese delegation prefers achieving the ultimate total prohibition of APLs in a phased approach within the CCW framework.

The second mechanism is the CD mechanism. Judging by their purely defensive nature and their limited impact on international security, landmines can hardly be treated as a priority item on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Moreover, the time is not ripe for the prohibition of small defensive conventional weapons like APLs. As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the CD should instead concentrate on those arms control and disarmament issues that have a significant impact on international security and stability. In this regard, the Chinese delegation's position is clear-cut. Besides, it is obviously inappropriate for the CD to take up the APL issue alone and make no arrangements for other agenda items. Nevertheless, considering that the overwhelming majority of CD members demand or are prepared to address the landmine issue at an early stage, the Chinese delegation is willing to show flexibility. We will not object to the appointment of a special coordinator in the CD to deal with the APL issue. For China, what matters is the objective of the negotiations, not the negotiating forum. If the CD decides by consensus to address the landmine issue, it should be capable of accomplishing the task given its function, representation, expertise and experience. In accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, any arms control or disarmament agreement should not in any way diminish national security. In addressing the landmine issue, it is imperative to accommodate both specific conditions of different countries and bearing in mind the priorities and real effects of mine clearance, with a view to adopting proper and feasible measures that attract universal adherence and, in a step-by-step manner, realizing the ultimate objective of a total ban of APLs.

The third mechanism is the "Ottawa Process". The Chinese delegation has taken note of the intentions of the Ottawa Process to negotiate and conclude an international convention on a total ban of APLs before the end of this year. We respect the sovereign decisions of the participating countries and understand their humanitarian intentions and wishes. It is our view, however, that this process focuses solely on humanitarian concerns while neglecting or not adequately taking into account many countries' legitimate military requirements for the use of APLs in defending their territories. Furthermore, it takes no account of the universality that is crucial for any truly effective international agreement. Therefore, the practical value and realistic effects of this process are doubtful. We also note that some participants in the process are members of military alliances. The truth is that, even if these countries themselves ban landmines, they can still benefit directly or indirectly from the use of APLs in joint overseas military operations as their allied partners may not impose a total ban. In contrast, those countries outside of any military alliance and relying on themselves for national defense will have no access to such benefits. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the Ottawa Process will have a negative impact on the authority of the CD as the "sole" multilateral disarmament negotiating body, and on the entry into force of the amended landmine Protocol to the CCW.

I now turn to China's actions in support of humanitarian efforts. China has made active efforts to accede to international humanitarian laws. China has always attached great importance to humanitarian laws applicable to war situations, and has taken concrete and effective measures to reduce human suffering caused by wars. Since 1929, China has been a State party to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. In 1981, China participated in the conclusion of the CCW and its protocols and was among the first group of countries to sign and ratify these instruments. As a matter of fact, only 15 countries ratified the Convention in 1982, not including some countries which today seem to be very active. Subsequently, and proceeding from the same spirit, China participate in the negotiation and conclusion of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and the amendment of the landmine Protocol. China has made significant contributions to the enactment of new international humanitarian laws and to the enhancement of restrictions on APLs. The Chinese Government will, in a spirit of humanitarianism, consider positively the ratification of these protocols at an early date.

China strictly abides by the CCW and has carried out a large-scale demining campaign. Chinese troops strictly abide by the CCW and other relevant international laws. They confine their research on and use of landmines to the scope permitted by the CCW and have never violated the Convention. Proceeding from humanitarian considerations, China has never developed booby traps. In order to protect civilians, Chinese troops carried out an unprecedented large-scale demining campaign from the beginning of 1993 to the end of 1994 in the border areas of the Guangxi Autonomous Region and Yunnan province. They removed nearly 1 million landmines and other explosive devices, opened up more than 170 routes for cross-border trade and transferred to the local people more than 90 million square meters of landmine-free areas which had been walked through by military mineclearers. This campaign provided a guarantee for the physical safety of the local people and their economic construction.

China has tried its best to provide assistance to landmine-affected countries. The Chinese Government has always been concerned about the civilian casualties caused by landmines in mine-affected regions and supported international humanitarian efforts to prevent the indiscriminate harming of civilians by landmines. China has provided demining equipment and training in demining free of charge to Cambodia and other countries. The Chinese Government will continue to support international cooperation in mine clearance and provide demining assistance within its capabilities to other developing countries.

China exercises strict control on the transfer of landmines. In order to prevent the indiscriminate use of landmines, China has always taken a very prudent and responsible attitude towards the export of landmines. China participated in the consensus of the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly resolution on the moratorium on the export of APLs. In fact, since this resolution was adopted, China has not exported any APLs. During the CCW Review Conference in 1996, the Chinese Government solemnly declared that it would implement a moratorium on the export of APLs which are not in conformity with the technical specifications contained in the amended landmine Protocol. Therefore, as to the prohibition of exports of APLs, the amended Protocol has already entered into force for China.

On the issue of APLs, the Chinese delegation has taken a realistic and cool-headed attitude and an objective approach. We hope, with the help of an analysis of the root cause of this issue, to seek balanced and feasible solutions acceptable to all parties. In the light of the divergent views on this issue, the Chinese delegation is ready to join other delegations in further exploring this issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

My statement has been long and has taken up a great deal of time. However, this is the first time I have made a statement this year, so I apologize.

Subsequent intervention by Sha Zukang:

During this morning's plenary the Chinese delegation made a statement on the subject of APLs. With regard to that statement some expressed their support. Others expressed different views with regard to a certain part of that statement. As far as my delegation is concerned, that is nothing but normal, because in the very first paragraph of my delegation's statement we made it very clear that there are different views on the APL issue. In the last paragraph of my statement I once again mentioned that pn the issue of APLs there are different views. Therefore it can be said that the Chinese delegation is by no means surprised by the comments we have heard. It is precisely because we have different views that there is a need to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of all parties. It is precisely because there are differences between us that there is a need to conduct discussions, including the possible future negotiations. If at the very beginning the views are all convergent, then there will bep no need for meetings any more. Therefore, with regard to the views expressed by others, my delegation has full understanding. At the same time, my delegation is gratified that some delegations have attached such great importance to the statement by my delegation.

The second point I would like to make is that the members of my delegation are by no means military experts, and I especially am not. Therefore, if I am asked to make a distinction as to whether the landmine is a defensive or an offensive weapon, it will be difficult for me to do so. I would have to rely on my experts. They are all Chinese. The Chinese experts may not see eye to eye with other experts. As a layman, however, I am aware that even the landmines that are used during attack are still defensive in nature. They do not change their characteristics of being defensive. Therefore we can leave this topic for further discussion. I would hope as a layman I could be convinced by others.

Another point I would like to make is on the Ottawa Process. We certainly respect the sovereign decisions of those States participating in the Ottawa Process. I wish them good luck. In my statement I only expressed doubt that the Ottawa Process might have an effect on the role of the CD as the single multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament area. I only raised that point. Of course, if there is no negative effect whatsoever, my delegation would then be able to say "Long live the CD". As to whether my statement represents only a personal value judgment, indeed that is the case. It is the value judgement of my delegation. It is 100 per cent true. Therefore I have no interest whatsoever in imposing that value judgement on others. Finally, I would like to congratulate ourselves on the decision we took this morning. I hope that with regard to the difference that exists among us we will have the opportunity to conduct full discussions.

Subsequent intervention by Sha Zukang (the next day):

My delegation is most pleased that yesterday we came to a consensus decision on the question of APLs and decided to appoint a special coordinator. My delegation welcomes the decision. In fact, this is a decision welcomed by all of us. Under your presidency, Madam President, as well as with efforts by your predecessors, this is the only result achieved by the CD this year. This is something very gratifying.

During yesterday's plenary, my delegation listened very carefully to the views expressed by all sides. The impression we had was that on the question of the work program the CD could not devote itself to only the question of APLs. In other words, we should at the same time work on other issues. I didn't hear any objection to that understanding. In view of that, it is only appropriate for us to take decisions with regard to other items in the work program. As to whether we eventually can come to a decisipon, that will only be clear when we reach the point of making that decision. If we cannot come to a decision we can still have informal consultations. However, there is one point that has to be clear: the CD cannot concentrate on landmines alone. That is the first point I would like to make.

Next, on the NSA [negative security assurances] issue. That is also the first issue raised by the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka which calls for our decision. My delegation certainly supports his proposition. On this issue, my delegation would give its unwavering support to the legitimate demand from the G-21. The reason is as follows: in recent years there have been great changes. Although we are confronted with various kinds of difficulties in the international situation, changes of a fundamental nature have occurred. This is a fact of life. In other words, the cold war is over. Under the new international circumstances the nuclear Powers have no reason whatsoever not to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. In particular, in 1995 the NPT Treaty was extended indefinitely. Most non-nuclear-weapon States supported the indefinite extension of that treaty or at least accepted the indefinite extension. Despite the fact that China itself is a nuclear Power, my delegation holds the view that this constitutes maximum flexibility and a sacrifice made on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, the non-nuclear-weapon States' demand for early assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them is absolutely legitimate. We cannot say that in the world today only nuclear-weapon States should enjoy absolute security whereas other countries shall not have what they deserve in terms of security. Therefore, if a decision is put to a vote, my delegation will resolutely support the establishment of an ad hoc committee. With regard to the mandate of that ad hoc committee, a mandate is already contained in CD/1121. To be frank, my delegation is not entirely pleased with such a weak mandate. That mandate is outdated. However, since the G-21 is ready to use such a mandate, my delegation can agree to take that mandate as a basis. Given the fact that the mandate contained in CD/1121 was agreeable to all of us in 1992, five years later in 1997 such a weak mandate should be even more acceptable. If there is any change to be negotiated, the mandate should be drastically strengthened. These are the views I would like to set out for the time being.

Subsequent intervention by Mr. Wang:

I will be very brief in the interest of saving time. With regard to the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space, I would like to emphasize that my delegation has always attached great importance to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and lent its support in setting up the relevant ad hoc committee to start genuine negotiations. However, as has just been pointed out by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, these negotiations cannot be limited to confidence-building measures in outer space. China was a co-sponsor of last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution on outer space. We are of the view that the mandate contained in CD/1125 should be revised in the light of the General Assembly resolution. We are anxiously waiting for the United States to review this issue from the perspective of preventing the weaponization of outer space and to show flexibility as early as possible. In fact, speaking of the weaponization of outer space, it is no longer a question of prevention, ratherp it is an urgent issue calling for immediate solution. My delegation will participate actively in the consultation on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space.

Subsequent intervention by Mr. Wang:

Again, I will be very brief. The Chinese delegation does not believe it is necessary to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments this year. Firstly, as has been pointed out by our colleague from Algeria, the mandate of the previous TIA Ad Hoc Committee has been fulfilled. It was precisely on that basis that the United Nations General Assembly adopted the relevant resolution. The second reason is that work has already been done in the CD and relevant arrangements, such as the Unpted Nations Register on the transfer of conventional arms, have already been established. The Register is in the process of being implemented and China has taken part in it. Under such circumstances, if the CD continues to seek or explore some abstract or sweeping TIA measures, my delegation does not see any practical meaning in this. My delegation is not against transparency as a matter of principle. We only feel that all transparency measures are in fact treaty-specific. For instance, China, like many otper countries, accepts the IAEA safeguards. That in itself constitutes a transparency measure. We have accepted the on-site inspection provision under the CWC. That, of course, is also a transparency measure. Furthermore, China has concluded bilateral or regional multilateral agreements on confidence-building with some neighboring countries. An important component of these agreements is the transparency measures. For the reasons listed above, I would like to reaffirm my delegation's belief that it is not nepcessary to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments in this year's session of the CD. Of course, that does not mean that my delegation is not willing to exchange views with interested delegations on this issue. On the contrary, we are quite ready to do so.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.