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Statement by Sha Zukang,
Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
1 August 1996
(CD/PV.743)
(Translated from Chinese)
Mr. President, the Chinese delegation is pleased to see you once again presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. At present the CTBT negotiations have reached a truly crucial stage. It is our belief that with fair and efficient leadership and a spirit of fully accommodating the legitimate concerns of all negotiating parties we will be able to achieve the conclusion and signing of the CTBT within this year. The Chinese delegation will continue to cooperate fully with you, Sir, and with the other delegations for the realization of this objective.
In order to live up to the long-cherished expectations of the international community and to push forward the CTBT negotiations to promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the Chinese delegation has in the past two and a half years, under the instructions of the Chinese Government, participated in the negotiations in a positive and serious manner. It is our sincere hope that through the joint efforts of all parties concerned we will be able to conclude within this year and on a consensus basis a just, reasonable, verifiable and indefinite CTBT with universal adherence.
In order to facilitate the conclusion of this treaty as scheduled, China has shown compromise and flexibility to different degrees on almost all the important issues in the treaty. On the scope of the treaty, China dropped the phrase "release of nuclear energy" and agreed to ban "any other nuclear explosion" besides nuclear weapon test explosions. On the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions, China respects the position of the other countries and agreed to ban PNEs temporarily. On the issue of undertakings by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, China withdrew its relevant textual proposals. China also dropped its textual proposal on the ''peaceful use of nuclear energy" and "relation to other international agreements". On IMS issues, China withdrew its proposal on incorporating EMP and satellite monitoring networks into the system. The Chinese delegation also showed great flexibility on OSI-related issues, such as consultations and clarifications before OSIs, purpose, time lines, preparations, inspection plan, technical methods and the size of the inspection area. On the OSI access regime, China is now prepared to enter into many new international obligations, including, for the first time, accepting the "overflight regime". On the issue of national technical means (NTMs), China has consistently opposed in the past two years and more the concept of allowing NTMs to play a role in the CTBT verification regime, particularly in the triggering of OSIs. With a drastic adjustment of its position China can now agree to allow purely technical NTMs to play a supplementary role in triggering OSIs. This is a major concession on the part of China at the final stage of the negotiations. As for the trigger basis and decision-making procedure for OSIs, I will explain China's position in more detail later. I wish to emphasize that such flexibility and compromise are no easy matter for China and that they are meant for the sole purpose of facilitating the early conclusion of the CTBT. Needless to say, China's flexibility and compromise will stop on matters concerning its fundamental national security interests.
China has carefully studied the treaty text (WP.330/Rev.1) presented by the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee on 28 June. We hold that the way the text addresses many issues reflects the outcome of hard negotiation in the past two and a half years, covering by and large China's concerns. The Chinese delegation finds these parts acceptable in principle. Meanwhile, I must point out that differences still exist between China's position and the options presented by the AHC Chairman in his text concerning the trigger basis and decision-making procedure for OSIs. The so-called "compromise option" contained in the current Chairman's text accommodates only the needs and interests of certain countries possessing advanced verification technologies, while not fully reflecting or simply ignoring the reasonable proposals and demands put forward by many other countries, including China. It also fails to reflect objectively the real situation of the negotiations at the final stage. This option can hardly ensure fair OSIs. The Chinese delegation is seriously concerned at this. For the Chinese delegation, the trigger basis and decision-making procedure for OSIs is the last unresolved major issue in the negotiations and it deserves a satisfactory solution. For this reason, we suggest that consultations or negotiations on this issue should be conducted immediately in an appropriate manner in order to seek a consensus solution.
The Chinese delegation maintains that neither 28 June nor 29 July is the end of the world. The Chinese delegation is certainly aware that the international community, almost all countries in the world and many non-governmental organizations expect the early conclusion of the CTBT. The Chinese delegation shares this objective. Setting a time line for the negotiations may be conducive to the progress of negotiations. However, the basic objective of our negotiations should be to conclude a treaty which can stand the test of time and will not be detrimental to the legitimate interests of future States parties. For the Ad Hoc Committee itself, the basic objective should be to fulfil its negotiating mandate. The negotiations come to an end only after all negotiating parties agree by consensus that the aforementioned objectives have been realized.
I would now like to explain some basic views of the Chinese delegation on OSI issues and put forward some proposals for resolving the differences. OSI is the last resort of the CTBT verification regime, used under extremely exceptional circumstances. This has been a common view held by all parties; we should therefore adopt a very prudent attitude in dealing with the trigger basis and the decision-making procedure OSIs.
First, the trigger basis. I wish to reiterate that China is firmly opposed to using human intelligence or espionage information in triggering an OSI in the name of "national technical means". China will never allow legitimizing espionage, as it infringes upon national sovereignty, in the CTBT or other future international arms control and disarmament treaties. The Chinese delegation has consistently stressed in the negotiations that in triggering an OSI, information obtained by NTMs cannot enjoy the same status as IMS data. However, the current Chairman's text treats NTMs and IMS information on an equal footing. Since the IMS has to go through a strict technical examination and is accessible to all States parties, while NTMs face no technical assessments or restrictions, therefore the Chairman's text has in reality put NTMs above the IMS. This is too much. The Chairman's text also stipulates that the information obtained by NTMs can independently trigger an OSI. Leaving aside the question of the appropriateness of this provision, it is a fact that only a few technically advanced countries posses such means. Against such a backdrop it is up to the countries possessing such means to decide what, how and when and against whom to use them. This certainly cannot prevent subjectivity, discrimination and the possibility of abuse in the application of NTMs. Moreover, while we at least know the details of the four IMS technologies, the Chairman's text gives no clear-cut definition of NTMs or their scope. Nobody knows the full content of NTMs. Under such circumstances is it reasonable to ask us to accept such an ambiguous concept?
We are able to understand why certain technically advanced believers in power politics and a "world police" are so anxious to replace the IMS by their exclusive NTMs and monopolize international verification. I would like to remind them that the world is changing and justice will prevail over discrimination, equality over hegemony and a minority will not coerce the majority for ever. The time has long gone when certain big Powers exercised their so-called "heaven's decree" and called the shots for all. The Chinese delegation firmly holds that if purely NTM information is allowed to trigger an OSI arbitrarily and under no restrictions, then it will certainly lead to the abuse or misuse of OSIs. China is firmly opposed to a situation in which certain technically advanced Powers might take advantage of NTMs to frequently harass and discredit the developing countries with dubious accusations and infringe upon their illegitimate security interests.
In view of the above-mentioned facts, the Chinese delegation holds that necessary restrictions must be imposed on the NTMs relevant to the verification regime. First, the use of human intelligence and espionage must be completely excluded. Second, all States parties must be aware of what kind of NTMs are allowed. Third, NTM information used to trigger OSIs must be truly technical, verifiable and substantial. For example, for any suspected underground nuclear explosion it is necessary for the OSI request to present data obtained by the relevant seismic monitoring stations - data which are distinguishable from natural earthquakes.
Second, the decision-making procedure. The Chinese delegation has always held that as nuclear explosions are not silent activities they can be detected by means of remote sensing technologies. This is also the starting-point for the design and establishment of the IMS, and this is precisely the difference between the CTBT and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Moreover, many phenomena caused by nuclear explosions persist for a long time. Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary for the Executive Council to examine OSI requests and make political decisions on whether to initiate an OSI within convenient time lines. The current Chairman's text has excluded the so-called "red light" decision-making procedure which means automatic triggering of OSIs unless a majority disapproves. The Chinese delegation is satisfied with this.
The Chinese delegation is of the view that approving an OSI request by a simple majority of all Executive Council (EC) members, as contained in the Chairman's text, is insufficient. According to international practice and the provisions on the functions of the EC contained in the current text, the EC can only make decisions on matters of procedure by a simple majority. OSIs are a last resort of the verification regime to deal with extreme circumstances, and not routine. Therefore, OSIs are by no means a matter of procedure. During the negotiations the Chinese delegation has all along asked those countries which disagree with a "two-thirds-majority green light" to answer a question, which I raise once again today: if OSIs are not a substantive issue, what are the substantive issues for the EC to deal with? This question has never been answered. However, it must be answered. China and quite a number of other countries have consistently held that OSIs are one of the most important substantive issues for the treaty organization to deal with and must be approved by at least a two-thirds majority of all the EC members. The Chinese delegation cannot agree to allowing easy inspections in its country by inspectors coming and going like international tourists. Nowadays some people always talk about democracy to show that only they are democratic. I understand democracy to mean respecting the judgement and choice of the majority. However, those people who talk all day long about democracy do not believe in the ability of the majority of countries to make a correct judgement on such a crucial issue as OSIs. This is most disturbing.
In the final analysis, OSI is not a political game and it should not become a political tool for hegemonic Powers to coerce the weak and small. Technically speaking, so long as the requesting countries can present convincing monitoring data, all responsible EC members will approve the initiation of OSIs without any delay. Therefore, if some country worries that the majority decision of the EC may hinder the initiation of normal OSIs, this may show that it has a guilty conscience in attempting to use groundless information to misuse OSIs. The Chinese delegation is of the view that after the entry into force of the treaty, if any country dares to carry out a nuclear explosion in breach of the treaty and expects most countries to forgive it, then this can only be a total illusion. At that time, even requiring a four-fifths majority in approving an OSI will not save the violator of the treaty. The Chinese delegation proposes a higher majority for approving an OSI only for the purpose of preventing abuse. Unfortunately, this kind of abuse happens all too often and our experience is all too painful in this regard.
In the light of the fact that a quick consensus cannot be reached on the "two-thirds-majority green light", the Chinese delegation hereby formally proposes that the EC should approve an OSI request by a fixed 30 affirmative votes out of its 51 members. This kind of decision-making procedure is nothing new and has its precedent in the United Nations Security Council. Our consideration behind this proposal is that among the 51 EC members, a "simple majority" means 26 votes and a "two-thirds majority" means 34 votes. "Thirty votes" therefore constitute the balancing point. The figure of 30 can demonstrate, on the one hand, that an OSI is not a "routine inspection'' of a procedural nature, and on the other hand can avoid a breakdown of the negotiations due to the intransigence of some countries in refusing to treat OSIs as a matter of substance. Under this "30-vote option", an OSI would be triggered by less than a three-fifths majority of all the EC members. The Chinese delegation maintains that this option is the best possible balancing point to be reached under the current circumstances.
In fact this option was not invented by China. It was proposed informally by some colleagues of other countries during the last part of the CD session. Many countries once indicated their readiness to accept this compromise. Another option is as follows: if the OSI request is based on IMS data only, the decision to approve the OSI shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. If the OSI request is based on a combination of IMS and NTM data, then the decision to approve the OSI should be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of EC members. If the OSI request is based on NTM data only, the decision to approve the OSI should be made by a two-thirds majority of all the EC members. The advantage of this option is that it reflects the principle of distinguishing NTMs from the IMS. The Chinese delegation urges all parties concerned to consider these two options positively and settle this issue by consensus.
The international community is expecting the NTB Ad Hoc Committee of the CD to conclude the CTBT negotiations at an early date. All the sovereign States participating in this negotiation are also expecting their delegates to conclude a good treaty which is just and equal as soon as possible. The Chinese delegation calls on all parties to put aside any prejudice, adopt a reasonable and flexible attitude and make the necessary compromises, so as to eliminate our differences at an early date and to facilitate the conclusion and signing of the treaty as scheduled. The Chinese delegation will continue to cooperate fully with the other delegations in order to fulfil this historic mission.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
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