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United States statement to the IAEA Board of Governors concerning the provision of a Chinese research reactor to Nigeria
March 1996

Mr. Chairman,

Although the United States did not oppose a consensus by this board to approve the project for supply of a research reactor to Nigeria by the People's Republic of China, my delegation has a number of concerns about the project which I would like to place on the record of our meeting.

First, although this is a relatively small facility, using a limited quantity of nuclear material in its core, any reactor can pose safety risks if the highest level of safety are not consistently and uniformly applied throughout the life of the installation. Responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations lies with the state in which the facility is built and operated. We trust that Nigeria will assure that the highest levels of safety are met with regard to this facility.

Second, we note that the fuel to be supplied to this reactor is ninety per cent enriched  in the isotope U-235. Such highly enriched uranium required stringent physical security and protection measures to prevent any possible diversion by unauthorized persons. The United States has long supported programs to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in research and test reators and would have wished that this facility, also, could have been fueled with material posing a lesser risk, if diverted. We trust that Nigeria will assure that needed physical security measures are established and maintained throughout the life of the facility.

Third, we join Canada regarding the human rights situation in Nigeria. We too, look forward to early and concrete actions by Nigeria's government to move toward a more democratic system.
 
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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