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Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya on China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Practice
17 October
2002
The People's Daily published an article
entitled Keep on Improving Non-Proliferation Mechanism
and Promote World Peace and Development -- China's
Non-Proliferation Policy and Practice by Vice Foreign
Minister Wang Guangya on October 16, 2002. The article
was also published in China Daily on October 17 and will
be published in Beijing Review (Issue No. 44). The full
text is as follows:
To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems is conducive to
the preservation of regional and world peace and
security. This is now a consensus of the international
community. Over the past decades, the international
community has, with the joint efforts of all countries,
established a relatively complete international
non-proliferation system. Such a system has played a
positive role in slowing down and preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
maintaining global and regional peace and stability.
Today when peace and development are the main themes,
the international non-proliferation process has become
an important component of mankind’s pursuit of peace and
development.
In recent years, economic globalization and the rapid
development of science and technology have provided the
international community with good opportunities for
cooperation and development but at the same time new
challenges to international security as well.
Non-traditional security threats as represented by
international terrorism are increasingly grave. The
world is facing a new situation in which traditional and
non-traditional security factors are interwoven whereas
the non-traditional ones are steadily on the rise. The
sarin gas attack that took place in Japan several years
ago, the September 11th terrorist attacks in the US last
year and the subsequent anthrax scare are all typical
reflections of this situation. Under the new
circumstances, countries are more closely linked to each
other in security matters and their interdependence is
ever deepening. To step up international cooperation and
seek common security of all countries has become an
inevitable demand of the times. At present, it is a
particularly important and urgent task to strengthen
international cooperation in the non-proliferation area
and to develop and improve the international
non-proliferation system.
As a major country, China has all along taken a
responsible attitude towards international affairs and
actively committed itself to the preservation and
promotion of world peace, stability and development. We
have always believed that proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is neither in the interest of world
peace and stability, nor beneficial to the security of
China itself. Therefore, China has consistently stood
for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and firmly
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems. For this, China has over the
years been an active participant in international
non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, we have
steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating,
encouraging or assisting any other country in developing
weapons of mass destruction and made our contribution
with concrete deeds to the international
non-proliferation process.
Up to now, China has acceded to almost all the
international legal instruments and most of the
international organizations related to non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. In the nuclear field, it
joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1984 and placed its civilian nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards on voluntary offer. It acceded to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
in 1992. In 1997, it became a member of the “Zangger
Committee”, which is an international nuclear export
control mechanism. It signed the Additional Protocol to
its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1998 and
completed the domestic legal procedures in early 2002
for the entry into force of the Protocol, thus becoming
the first among the five nuclear weapon states that has
done so. China was among the first countries to sign the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and
has supported and actively participated in the work of
the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). In the
biological and chemical fields, it joined the Biological
Weapons Convention in 1984 and has taken an active part
in the international efforts aimed at enhancing the
efficacy of the convention. China made positive
contribution to the negotiation and conclusion of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and ratified the convention
in 1996. Since the entry into force of the convention,
China has always supported the work of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and
carried out in earnest all its obligations thereunder.
Moreover, it has supported the efforts of relevant
countries to establish nuclear-weapon free zones by
acceding to the relevant protocols to the treaties on
the nuclear-weapon free zones in Latin America and the
Caribbean, South Pacific and Africa, and has made an
explicit commitment to sign the related protocol to the
Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone.
At the same time, China has been positive and
open-minded about all proposals on strengthening the
international non-proliferation system. We support the
endeavor made by the international community to resolve
the missile proliferation issue and are actively
involved in the work of the UN Panel of Governmental
Experts on Missiles and the international discussions on
the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (ICOC) and the Global Control
System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile
Technologies (GCS). The September 11th attacks have made
it more urgent to prevent terrorist organizations from
getting hold of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore,
China supports the IAEA in playing its part in
preventing potential nuclear terrorist activities. China
has been an active player in the work to amend the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and played a constructive role in this
process.
Effective control of the materials, equipment and
technologies that can be used for the development and
production of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems is an important aspect in the
fulfillment of international non-proliferation
obligations by countries and the key to the success of
the international non-proliferation efforts. As a
country with relatively comprehensive scientific,
technological and industrial capacities, China knows
full well its international responsibility on the
non-proliferation issue. China has long adopted strict
measures both on the management of sensitive items and
technologies at home and on export control, and it has
constantly improved such measures in light of the
changing situation.
For a rather long period in the past, China followed a
central planning system with its economy dominated by
state-owned enterprises, and the state relied mainly on
administrative measures in import and export management.
It was effective under the then historical conditions.
However, with the deepening of reform and opening-up,
tremendous changes have taken place in China’s domestic
economy and foreign trade. The original management model
is becoming less effective in meeting the requirement of
the current situation, and needs to be transformed into
a system based on legal means. Therefore, since the
beginning of the reform and opening-up, especially in
the past decade, we have steadily strengthened the
framework of law for non-proliferation in a spirit of
“governing the country by law”, so as to ensure the
effective implementation of the government policies on
non-proliferation. As China has already joined the World
Trade Organization, Chinese enterprises and individuals
will be more extensively and deeply involved in
international economic activities. The task for export
control according to law will grow heavier. The rising
terrorist threat has also set out new requirements for
our non-proliferation work. Therefore, it seems all the
more imperative to further strengthen the framework of
law for non-proliferation and to establish an open and
transparent system of laws and regulations suited to the
market economy. The Chinese Government and state leaders
have all along attached great importance to this work.
Under the direct attention and guidance of state
leaders, China’s non-proliferation work has made much
headway. Now China has established a relatively complete
mechanism of non-proliferation management that covers
nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other fields.
In the nuclear field, China exercises stringent
management and control over nuclear export and nuclear
material. China’s nuclear export is monopolized by
companies designated by the State Council, adhering to
the following three principles: nuclear materials
imported from China will be used only for peaceful
purposes, placed under IAEA safeguards, and not
transferred to a third country without prior consent of
the Chinese Government. In 1997, the Chinese Government
issued the Regulations of the PRC on Nuclear Export
Control. Apart from the above-mentioned three
principles, the Regulations also give expression to the
policy of not rendering any assistance to nuclear
facilities that are not placed under IAEA safeguards.
The Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations of
the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and
Related Technologies Export in 1998, thus improving
China’s system of law on nuclear export control. In
nuclear material management, after joining IAEA, China
established a “State System for Accounting and Control
of Nuclear Material” in compliance with safeguard
requirements and “Nuclear Material Security System” in
keeping with the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. The Chinese Government issued the
Regulations of the PRC on Nuclear Material Control and
its Practice Guidelines in 1987 and 1990 respectively.
To this day, no illegal transfer of nuclear material has
occurred in China.
In the chemical field, China has strictly discharged its
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and
never manufactured, stockpiled, or helped any other
country to acquire or develop chemical weapons. From
1995 to 1997, the Chinese Government issued a series of
laws and regulations, such as the Regulations on the
Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, Controlled
Chemicals List and Rules on the Implementation of the
Regulations on the Administration of the Controlled
Chemicals, in order to exercise a strict control on the
production, operation, import and export of dual-use
chemicals and related equipments and technologies.
According to these regulations, the import and export of
controlled chemicals must be entrusted to
state-designated companies, and no other entities or
individuals are allowed to engage in such business. The
Chinese Government made revisions to the Controlled
Chemicals List in 1998, adding 10 chemicals to the list.
To intensify the export control of chemicals and related
technologies and equipment, the Chinese Government will
issue the Administrative Rules on the Export Control of
Relevant Chemicals and Related Equipment and
Technologies (including an export control list) soon.
In the biological field, China has always strictly
fulfilled the obligations under the Biological Weapons
Convention. Over the past decade and more, the Chinese
Government has formulated a series of regulations,
setting strict provisions on the activities such as
production, management, use, stockpiling, carrying and
transfer of relevant dangerous bacteria (viruses),
vaccine and biological products. To improve the export
management on dual-use biological products and related
equipment and technologies, the Regulations on the
Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and
Related Equipment and Technologies (including an export
control list) will be issued soon.
In the missile field, China has all along taken a
prudent and responsible attitude towards the export of
missiles and related technologies. In 1992, China
declared that it would observe the guidelines and
parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) in the export of missiles and related
technologies. China declared in 1994 that it would not
export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary
parameters of the MTCR--that is, inherently capable of
reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at
least 500 kg. In 2000, China further declared that it
had no intention to assist any country in any way in the
development of ballistic missiles that can be used to
deliver nuclear weapons. Recently, the Chinese
Government promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on
Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and
Technologies and the Export Control List, which are of
great significance as they incorporate, in light of
China’s actual conditions and the prevailing
international practice, the export of missiles and
missile-related items and technologies as well as
missile-related dual-use items and technologies into a
framework of law-based management.
In addition to the above-mentioned specialized
provisions, some other laws and regulations issued by
the Chinese Government also cover the management of
sensitive items and technologies. In order to carry out
a unified administration of arms trade, the Chinese
Government promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on the
Administration of Arms Export in 1997. According to
these regulations, China sticks to the following three
principles in arms export: conducive to the capability
for legitimate self-defense of the recipient country;
not detrimental to peace, security and stability of the
region concerned and the world as a whole;
non-interference in the internal affairs of the
recipient country. The Regulations stipulate that arms
export can only be conducted by arms trading companies
with business operations rights for arms export, subject
to a licensing system, and that dual-use products whose
end-use is for a military purpose will be controlled as
arms. China promulgated the Administrative Regulations
of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of
Technologies in 2001, putting a strict control on the
export of nuclear technologies, technologies related to
dual-use nuclear products and the production of
controlled chemicals and military technologies. To
prevent terrorist activities using chemical or
biological means, China made a new amendment to the
Criminal Law in 2001, which explicitly identifies as
crime such acts of endangering public security as
illegal production, transportation, stockpiling and
spreading toxic materials, pathogen of infectious
diseases. Besides, China’s Criminal Law, Customs Law and
Law of Administrative Punishment have also provided
relevant legislations with the basis for punishment.
It is not difficult for us to see from the above that
the Chinese non-proliferation management mechanism has
two basic characteristics as follows:
1. The administrative management has been by and large
transformed into one of management by law. Compared with
administrative orders, management by law has such merits
as clearly defined rights and obligations, extensive
application, greater transparency and stronger
operability. The current Chinese non-proliferation legal
system has also given full expression to these
characteristics. As an integrated whole, this system has
not only adjusted the corporate and individual behaviors
in the production and operation of sensitive items, but
also made corresponding stipulations about the rights
and obligations of the competent authorities of China.
At the same time, in the relevant laws and regulations,
necessary provisions have been laid down against
breaches of law, and a set of punishment mechanism
including administrative and criminal punishment has
been set up. Following the principle that laws must be
observed and strictly enforced, we have continued to
step up the supervision and effectively prevented some
law-breaking cases. Every enterprise or individual that
engages in illegal transactions, once verified by the
competent authorities, will be dealt with according to
law. Practice shows that the new management mechanism
has not only ensured the implementation of the
government’s non-proliferation policy and the smooth
operation of normal business and trade, but also
produced good results by enhancing the international
community’s understanding of China’s policy.
2. On the basis of taking full consideration of China’s
national conditions, this mechanism has been brought in
line with the international practice. In building up the
non-proliferation mechanism, we need not only to
consider the national conditions, but also to draw upon
some international practices, as inevitably required by
the larger international environment. At present, China
has adopted such international practices as the end-use
and end-user guarantee system, licensing system, control
list and “catch-all” principle, which have been applied
to nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other
fields. China has also converged with international
standards in terms of the scope of the control lists. In
the nuclear field, our Nuclear Export Control List and
Export Control List of Nuclear Dual-use Items and
Related Technologies cover all the items and
technologies included in the “Zangger Committee” list
and control list of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In
the biological and chemical fields, our lists cover all
items and technologies in the control list of Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Australia Group. In the
missile field, our list is basically the same as the
MTCR Annex in terms of the control scope and relevant
parameters.
The Chinese Government has been firm and consistent in
its policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. We believe that on such a good foundation
as it is now, our non-proliferation work will be even
more successful. However, we are also aware of the new
requirements and the challenges to our work by the
ever-changing international and domestic situations. In
future, on one hand, we need to strengthen law
enforcement efforts and the promotion of policies and
laws, so as to ensure the full implementation of the
existing laws and regulations. On the other, we need to
consolidate and improve the current legal and management
mechanisms in light of the changing situation and in a
spirit of keeping pace with the times. Meanwhile, we
believe that no country can proceed with
non-proliferation effort in isolation from others and
that it is vitally important to boost international
cooperation and exchanges. To conduct all kinds of
international cooperation and exchanges helps countries
to draw upon the successful experience and measures of
others to offset their own weaknesses, and also
facilitates the resolution of differences and
enhancement of mutual trust. Therefore, the Chinese
Government has all along attached importance to
international cooperation in this field and maintained
good communications and consultations with other
countries. Under the new situation, we are ready to
further expand and deepen our non-proliferation
exchanges and cooperation with other countries.
The non-proliferation efforts of each and every country
and the development of the international
non-proliferation system are complementary and closely
related. The international non-proliferation objectives
cannot be achieved without efforts of individual
countries. And the development of non-proliferation
system in these countries is inseparable from the
overall improvement of the international
non-proliferation mechanism. In the past decade or so,
the international non-proliferation regime has become
stronger, but it still faces many problems and
challenges. Strengthened non-proliferation should not
hinder international scientific and technological
cooperation, nor should it impede developing countries’
peaceful uses of science and technology. In pursuing
non-proliferation goals, the international community
should uphold justice, take a serious approach and
forsake selfishness and double standard. Nowadays,
terrorism and other non-traditional threats are posing
new challenges to the international non-proliferation
system. Whether the international non-proliferation
system can last long and the non-proliferation
objectives can be materialized depend on whether we can
properly settle these issues. The international
community should pay close attention to it.
China has always been committed to the sound development
of the international non-proliferation system. We
believe that since the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction has its complex causes, non-proliferation
efforts should follow the principle of seeking both
temporary and permanent solutions, and these solutions
should be sought through political and diplomatic means.
Sanctions, pressures or threat of force cannot solve the
problem, rather it will damage the good international
environment needed for the development of international
non-proliferation system. A general improvement in
international relations is both the fundamental way to
eliminate threats and the precondition for an effective
conduct of non-proliferation efforts. Only through joint
efforts of the international community can the
non-proliferation objectives be realized. However, to
ensure the wide support of countries and their extensive
participation, the whole non-proliferation system must
be just and reasonable. That is, the non-discriminatory
nature and the countries’ right to peaceful uses of
advanced science and technology must be guaranteed. The
consolidation of the existing non-proliferation
mechanisms and the establishment of new ones should both
be based on universal participation and democratic
decision-making by all countries with a full play to the
role of the UN. China is ready to work with the rest of
the international community to promote the development
and improvement of the international non-proliferation
system and make contribution to international peace,
stability and development.
Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
