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The Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Middle East Nuclear Issue
2002 Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review
Conference
April 2002
The Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
1. The prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation is an effective and essential
step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament complement each
other and are mutually reinforcing. The efforts made by the international
community to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation are an indispensable part of
international disarmament process.
2. States parties should devote themselves to building a global security
environment of cooperation and mutual trust, and to ensuring common security for
all members of the international community, so as to root out the motivation of
some states to acquire, develop and maintain nuclear weapons. This is the
fundamental guarantee for preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.
3. The exercise of double or multiple standards on non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons must be discarded. This is an important prerequisite for the success of
non-proliferation effort.
4. States parties should strengthen dialogue and cooperation on the prevention
of nuclear weapons proliferation on an equal footing. The concerns about the
nuclear proliferation should be addressed in strict accordance with the
obligations and procedures stipulated in the relevant international legal
instruments. This is the correct and effective way to deal with issues of the
prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
5. Universal adherence to the NPT is an important component of preventing
nuclear weapons proliferation. Countries that have not yet acceded to the NPT
are urged to do so unconditionally at an early date and to place all their
nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in
accordance with the Treaty.
6. IAEA safeguards is an effective shield against nuclear weapons proliferation.
All states should support the safeguards and the ?integrated safeguards
program? developed by the Secretariat through combining traditional safeguards
program with strengthened safeguards measures. Those which have not yet signed
the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement should accelerate their
negotiations with IAEA and bring it into effect as soon as possible.
7. The States bear unshirkable responsibility for physical protection of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities. Every state should, taking account of their
own situations, make and complete their laws and regulations on physical
protection, so as to prevent nuclear material from being acquired and nuclear
facilities from being targeted by terrorists. All states should support IAEA?s
efforts in countering against nuclear terrorism. In order to achieve an early
amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the
States Parties should abide by the consensus reached at the Informal Expert
Conference in May 2001.
8. Efforts should be made to prevent restrictions on international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the name of preventing nuclear weapons
proliferation.
9. Strengthening nuclear export control is one of the important means to prevent
nuclear weapons proliferation. All states parties should, in accordance with
Article 3.2 of the NPT, strengthen nuclear export control. A universal and
non-discriminative international treaty should be concluded through negotiations
at an early date , so as to establish a just and equitable global
non-proliferation mechanism in replacement of the current export control regimes
based on group of countries.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
10. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have important significance in promoting nuclear
disarmament and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, enhancing peace and
security at the level of region and the world at large.
11. All the nuclear-weapon States should undertake unconditionally not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude international legal instruments there
upon.
12. The principles on establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted by UNDC
in 1999 should be adhered to faithfully.
13. Nuclear-weapon States should support the efforts of non-nuclear weapon
states in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements
freely arrived at among the states of the regions concerned. The legal status
of the nuclear-weapon-free zones should be respected. The nuclear-weapon States
should undertake corresponding obligations in a legally binding manner.
14. Nuclear-weapon States should, in accordance with the provisions contained in
paragraph 5, Article VII of the Final Document of 2000 NPT Review Conference,
take steps to bring into effects their security assurances provided by the
nuclear-weapon-free-zones treaties and their protocols.
Middle East Nuclear Issue
15. The Middle East issue should be resolved in a spirit of reconciliation. The
United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, should be supported to
play an active role in this regard. Parties concerned should earnestly carry
out the agreements and common understanding reached on the basis of relevant UN
resolutions and the principle of ?land for peace?.
16. The initiatives and the efforts made by states in the region to establish a
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass
destruction should be supported. Practical measures must be taken to promote
the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other
weapons of mass destruction in accordance with relevant General Assembly
resolutions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference.
17. Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA
safeguards will play an important role in realizing the goal of universal
adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
