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"Some Thoughts in the
Nuclear Weapon Convention"
Wu Jun
Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
P.O. Box 8009-22, Beijing 100088, China
INESAP Conference, Shanghai
8-10 September 1997
Abstract
On 10 December 1996, the United Nations has voted to support a resolution for a Nuclear Weapon Convention, Which would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. I believe no first use should be the first step to the convention. The United States and Russia must continue to show leadership in reversing the nuclear accumulation of Cold War.
On 10 December 1996, More than two-thirds of 169 voting states supported a resolution for a negotiation for Nuclear Weapons Convention which would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. The concept of the Nuclear Weapons Convention follows the models of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention and would in a similar way to prohibit nuclear weapons by international law, completing the global ban on weapons of mass destruction. The resolution refers to the decision of the Internatpional Court of Justice in the Hague, which was declared in July 1996 that "the threat and use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law." If the Convention could be negotiated, the nuclear disarmament will be very easier, and there will be less risk of nuclear weapon proliferation....
1. Except China, the other nuclear weapon countries have voted against the whole resolution of NWC; it is well known that nuclear weapon convention must be supported by nuclear weapon states. Although most nuclear weapon states have declared a "negative security assurance" to non-nuclear states, that is promise to refrain from nuclear throats against non-nuclear states with some conditions, they insist nuclear weapon play important role in their national defense. The USA strategy has changed little from the cold war era. The Nuclear Posture Review undertaken by Clinton administration concluded that all three legs of strategic triad should continue to operate, but the Review did not address the future and utility of the nuclear force over the long term. But nuclear deterrence is still a fixture of U.S. national security strategy. US and its NATO allies as well as France retain their Cold War "weapons of last resort" doctrine that allows the first use of nuclear weapons if deemed necessary to cope with non-nuclear attacks. Russian declared nuclear doctrine has changed from no first use in 80s of former Soviet Union to reserving a nuclear option in response to a conventional attack from any quarters.
2. Nuclear weapon is military superior to other countries for most nuclear weapon countries. The unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the offense-defense balance in military conflict, since even a single large nuclear warhead that managed to penetrate deployed defense could destroy a great city. During the cold war, USA and former Soviet Union competed for the superiority to the other, they were engaged in armament race, developed tens thousands nuclear weapons which could destroy the world several times. France and Britain take the nuclear weapons as a important role in their military strategy. They don't want make Non First Use Pledge (NFUP). Because if they make the NFUP, the nuclear weapon will be less important and will lead to reduce the superiority. China, who is only the nuclear country made the "NFUP unconditionally" on the data of the first nuclear explosion in 1964, does not take the nuclear weapons as a important role in the military strategy. As the China government stated, "China's producing nuclear weapon is for breaking the monopoly of U.S. and Soviet Union...The purpose producing nuclear weapon of China is to destroyed it". As a declared nuclear weapon state, China always support nuclear weapon convention.
3. There are too much nuclear warheads in the world, and which make the world insecure. During the Cold War, Nuclear weapons were at the center of U.S. and Soviet national security strategies. Both countries developed large, diverse, and accurate nuclear forces that were maintained at high alert levels. Now, with the impetus of the end of the cold war, the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia are shrinking significantly. But the reduced forces could still inflict catastrophic damage on the societies they target or could target, and the thousands of non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear warheads not addressed by the START process and likely to be retained without further agreements will pose substantial risks of breakout, theft, or unauthorized use. The basic structure of plans for using nuclear weapons appears largely unchanged from the situation during the Cold War, with both sides apparently continuing to emphasize early and large counter force strikes and both remaining capable, despite reductions in numbers and alert levels, of rapidly bringing their nuclear forces to full readiness for use. As a result, the dangers of initiation of nuclear war by error or by accident remain unacceptably high. All of problems mentioned above should be considered for nuclear weapon convention procedure.
The end of the Cold War created favorable environment to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and USA made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine have relinquished their nuclear weapon. South Africa has dismantled their 6 nuclear warheads and joined NPT. Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear weapon convention. Canberra Commission has stated "The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, to make a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear weapons and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." I think several steps we should push for the convention.
No First Use Treaty Is a Key Step. Making or no making "No First Use Pledge"(NFUP) of nuclear weapon depends on the strategy, how important role the nuclear weapon is in their military strategy. Because the defensive purpose, Chinese nuclear weapons only be demanded used in retaliatory attack on nuclear strike. Therefore, China always support eliminate nuclear weapons. But others nuclear weapon states persist in the nuclear weapons playing the role of "last resort". NFUP can diminish the importance of nuclear weapons. We know that all weapons play the role of threat and distruct. With no first use treaty, all this factors could be diminished. At present, nuclear weapons are an enduring reality and are not likely to disappear in foreseeable future, their numbers may decrease and the nature of the threat faced from them may change, but they simply cannot be eliminated from defense police and strategy. The role of nuclear weapon must be changed, nuclear weapon will be a virtual defense weapon, the real nuclear disarmament can be under way.
"NFUP" is profitable to both the world and nuclear countries, and can be accepted by all the nuclear countries. For the small nuclear countries (France, Britain and China), they can not make first attack on any countries. Because they have very limited nuclear abilities, they can't defeat a country at first attack, especially attack to the super nuclear countries (USA and Russia), and the retaliatory strike will be very severe, I don't think there are any country can bear the strike. And if without "NFUP", these country will be the first chosen goal of nuclear attack by USA or Russia during a war. Therefore, I think the nuclear weapon in these countries had better be a defensive weapon instead of first use weapon if they don't want threaten non-nuclear states. For USA and Russia, the threat has receded from each other, the nuclear proliferation threat has become more important. Both countries have emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent conventional military power and they are well equipped to deter or defeat conventional attacks using conventional weapon alone. Because both country have assured they not use nuclear weapon against non-nuclear states, Who attack nuclear states first with nuclear weapon, Who will be caused a retaliatory strike which is also a severe. From the result of AISAC research, NFUT should be profit to USA.
"The United States and Russia must continue to show leadership in reversing the nuclear accumulation of Cold War Their purpose should be to move toward nuclear force levels for all the nuclear weapon states which would reflect un ambiguously the determination to eliminate these weapons when this step can be verified with adequate confidence.". Although START II limits the number of warheads that can be mounted on strategic delivery vehicles, it does not limit the number or types of warheads that each side may possess. That is, under the terms of the treaty, each side can keep as many warheads as it desires. The treaty only limited in how many of those warheads may be mounted on long-range missiles or bombers. This failure to limit warheads, combined with the inherent capability of some delivery vehicles to carry many more warheads than START II permits, provides the possibility of rapid breakout. Russia or US could relatively quickly place additional warheads on land-and sea-based missiles and bombers. Now US and Russia Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed on a framework for START III. To make nuclear disarmament more solid, more practical and irreversible, it should be carry out the talk on monitor warhead stockpiles and dismantling activities during the START III negotiation. Scientist must research a method to deal with the weapon used material (Come from stock pile and from weapon dismantlement).
Reference
1. "Executive Summary" Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapon.
2. "The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy" Committee on International Security and Arms Control.
3. Jurgen Scheffran, "The window of opportunity and the Nuclear Weapons Convention" Editorial of lNESAP, Issue No. 11 December 1996.
4. Merav Datan etc. "Nuclear Weapons Convention on Track", lNESAP, Issue No. 11 December 1996.
5. David Gompert, etc. US Nuclear Declamatory Policy, The Question of Nuclear First Use", Published 1995 by RAND.
6. Rebecca Johnson, "Nuclear Disarmament Needs New Thinking and Strategies", lNESAP, Issue No.13 July 1997.
7. Merav Datan, "Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Released", INESAP, Issue No.13 July 1997.
8. Statement by the INESP Coordinating Committee December 12,1996, "Majority of UN General Assembly Votes for Negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention" lNESAP, Issue No.11 December 1996.
9. Pascal Boniface, "French Nuclear Strategy and European Deterrence: 'Les Rendez-vous Manques"', Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 7, No2 (August 1996)
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material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
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