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"The Future Role of
Nuclear Weapons"
Xu Jian
INESAP Conference, Shanghai
8-10 September 1997
In today's world, the danger of a nuclear war between great powers is diminishing, thanks to the end of the cold war. The indefinite extension of NPT, the signing of CTBT, and the START II agreement between the US and Russia are further encouraging signs showing that the world is making progress on the way of minimizing and hopefully eliminating the remaining potential threat of nuclear weapons to the human beings. A realistic assessment of the current and future role of nuclear weapons would help us know what and how much can be sought or expected in this direction in the forthcoming decade. There are both positive trends and difficult problems regarding this question.
The first positive trend is the diminution of nuclear deterrence in security relations between established nuclear powers, especially between the US and Russia. This trend is a logical result of the end of the cold war which has paved the way for major powers to seek a new model for the management of their mutual security relations: With this model, mutually assured security, which is mainly relied on political dialogue and security cooperation, has replaced mutually assured destruction, which is based on military deterrence and especially the second nuclear strike capability, as the prevailing security culture between the two military superpowers. The signing of the START II and the deactivating of sections of nuclear weapons in the US and Russia testify to this change. Similar moves have also taken place in security relations between China and Russia and, to a lesser extent, between China and the US. This change of security culture and deterrence strategy between great powers and particularly established nuclear powers have great impact on the future role of nuclear weapons: It has provided and may continue to create incentives for the US and Russia to reduce their excessive nuclear arsenals, it lowers the possibility of an inadvertent or accidental nuclear war, it helps strengthen the resolve of world people in fighting against nuclear proliferation and nuclear blackmail.
The second positive trend is the descending role of nuclear weapons in enhancing the prestige of a state in the world in the post-cold war era. The waning of the danger of world war not only feeds the majority of world people with numerous fruits of peace, but also breeds a new situation in which the most eye-catching part of a state's international image and influence is increasingly determined by the its economic rather than military prowess. Related to this change of international environment is the shift of people's concerns in most countries from issues regarding external threats or national survival to questions affecting the quality of people's daily life. This trend testifies to the ending of the predominant position of the military factor in international relations and in the national policy of most countries and demonstrates the ascending significance of a country's comprehensive power based on the economic and technological factors. This change has double effects on the future role of nuclear weapons: It reduces the perceived international prestige of a state inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and adds to the domestic constraints of a state on channeling scarce resources from much needed civilian programmes to military build-up, on the other. In usual circumstances, both effects may dampen a country's will or enthusiasm to seek or develop nuclear weapons and thus are conducive to the global antiproliferation efforts.
These positive trends should promote world people's confidence in ridding the world of the threat of nuclear weapons. That said, however, difficult and even daunting obstacles are still on the way to that ultimate goal. First of all, in spite of the recent changes in the nuclear deterrence strategy of the US and Russia regarding their mutual security relations, there is a trend of reinforcing or reemphasizing the role of nuclear deterrence in meeting certain security demands or interests in the two and some other nuclear powers. For instance, Russia no longer keeps to the commitment of the former Soviet Union to non-first-use of nuclear weapons and retakes nuclear deterrence to cope with even conventional military threats to its national security. For the US, nuclear deterrence remains the key instrument not only in defending its national security, but also in underpinning the its capabilities to police international seas and intervene in regional conflicts. The fact that four out of the five openly declared nuclear powers (except China) get away from the principle of non-first-use nuclear indicates that still too much in the post-cold war security culture of some of the nuclear powers is relied upon or tied to nuclear deterrence, albeit in a relatively narrower scope and less appalling sense compared with the cold war period.
Related to this problem is the excessive amount of nuclear arsenals left in the world. The US and Russia (former Soviet Union) bear special responsibility for this situation. The two largest nuclear powers would be left with deployed nuclear arsenals of 3000 to 3500 strategic warheads and 1600 to 4000 non-strategic warheads by 2003 when START II is supposed to be completely implemented. Even staying with the present deterrence strategy of these two countries, this size of nuclear stockpiles of these two nuclear powers is too large.
The third problem arises from the difficulties in coping with potential sources of nuclear proliferation. The appeal of minimum nuclear deterrence to some countries, especially to quasi-nuclear powers, remains strong. The danger of nuclear blackmails by terrorist groups cannot be ruled out. The gap between nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of massive destruction (chemical, biological, or other high-tech weapons) tends to get shortened in terms of their devastating power. These problems, among others, highlight the weakness of the current international non-proliferation regime and further complicate the political and technical issues to be resolved in limiting the threat of nuclear weapons to the world.
In conclusion, the strategic significance of nuclear weapons is narrowing and descending, especially for managing security relations of great powers, in the post-cold war international environment. As a result, the world has made progress in alleviating threats inherent in nuclear weapons and still can do much more in the direction of approaching a nuclear-free world. It would be no easy task, of course, given existing barriers of various types. To overcome these difficulties, it is imperative that all nuclear powers commit themselves to the non-first-use principle in order to minimize the danger inherent in nuclear deterrence, that the two largest nuclear powers further cut short the size of their bloated and excessive nuclear arsenals so as to pave the way for other nuclear powers to join the nuclear arms reduction, and that all countries in the world comply with the rules of the international non-proliferation regime. They are among the most important objectives that all countries and people in the world would have to seek next decade in the efforts of making a world free of nuclear weapons.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
