Zhu Mingquan The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 1997

From: Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997, Volume 4, Number 2), Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

By Zhu Mingquan

Mingquan Zhu is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He is also affiliated with Fudan’s Center for American Studies and the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security. He is the author of two recent books: Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Prevention (1994) and U.S. National Security Policy (1996), both published in Chinese.

China's current policy of nuclear nonproliferation has been discussed by many Western writers.2 In this regard, the credibility of China’s nonproliferation pledges often has been a hot topic in the U.S. Congress and mass media. Critics see China as a main violator of the international nonproliferation regime and as a major contributor to the danger of nuclear proliferation today. They often emphasize and exaggerate the gap and conflicts between China and the United States in their perceptions and policies on nonproliferation. But, in fact, a serious and systematic analysis of Chinese nonproliferation policy indicates that these views are lopsided and untenable. By tracing the history of China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, its main elements, and its driving forces, this article shows that China’s nonproliferation policy has evolved considerably. China has steadily narrowed the gap between itself and the United States, gradually becoming more cooperative with the international nonproliferation regime. Moreover, this trend continues.

The evolution of China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy can be divided roughly into three stages: 1) emphasis on the national right to develop nuclear weapons (1949-1959); 2) acceptance of the nonproliferation norm and independence from the international nonproliferation regime (1959-1984); and 3) gradual integration with the international community (1984-present).

First Stage: Emphasis on the National Right to Develop Nuclear Weapons

The first stage covers the period from 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, to 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union accelerated their cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation.

During these 13 years, China had no real nuclear policy, and certainly no nuclear nonproliferation policy. Official documents show that China’s leaders often repeated what had been said by the Soviet Union, then considered its "big brother." For example, as late as 1959, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi said: "We hold that the new initiatives suggested by the Soviet government on arms control are fully in accord with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and people of all other states in the world."3 On the same day, this standing Committee passed a resolution to support the "Soviet initiatives of complete and thorough disarmament." China adopted a diplomatic strategy of "leaning to one side," the Soviet Union. The field of nuclear policy was no exception.

Nevertheless, the actions and words of Chinese leaders at that time provide some clues to unique Chinese perceptions about nuclear nonproliferation. To a very great degree, these views were related to China’s national ambitions to become a major world power. Moreover, since the new government was established after a "people’s war" fought with "millet plus rifles,"4 one would not expect serious insights or policies on the advanced nuclear weapons possessed at that time by only three major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. In fact, even the nuclear policies of these countries were in an embryonic form.

At this stage, nuclear weapons were regarded as one form of "conventional weapon" by Chinese leaders, although their special killing capability was admitted. A typical expression of this position appeared during Mao Zedong’s talk with Anna Louis Strong, an American correspondent, in August 1945, immediately after the United States bombed Japan with two atom bombs. He said:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass destruction, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons.5

Nine years later, Mao still adhered to that view of nuclear weapons. In October 1954, he was told by Indian Prime Minister Nehru that there was a qualitative difference between cold weapons, hot weapons, and atom bombs.6 The basic difference among them, Mao responded, lies in the fact that only a relatively few people can be killed and wounded with cold weapons, a few more with hot weapons, and even more with atom bombs.7 In Mao’s mind, their sole difference was reflected in the scope of causalities.

In 1957, with the successful launching of the first Soviet artificial satellite, the first successful test of a long-range missile, and the conflicts with Western powers in Egypt, Vietnam, and Syria, Mao Zedong made another famous pronouncement about the international environment: "The east wind now prevails over the west wind." This optimistic mood was expressed in a speech made in Moscow. He said, in a nuclear war, "even if one-half of the population in the world died, another half would survive. Moreover, imperialism would be destroyed and the entire world would be socialized. After some years, there would be 2.7 billion people again."8

Accepting this overly simplistic view of nuclear weapons, Chinese leaders believed that any sovereign state had a legal right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense, just as they could develop any conventional weapon. China decided to develop nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s. The inherent logic for it was very clear: "Since many countries are developing them, surely China has to do the same. We would hope nuclear weapons could be banned, but until then we will still have to develop them."9

Moreover, China regarded its development of nuclear weapons as support for the world’s "oppressed people." On May 17, 1960, Mao Zedong told a delegation of the Algerian provisional government:

There are many people in our country, but only a very limited amount of steel. France exploded two atom bombs and we don’t even have one. It is understandable for de Gaulle to look down upon us. The French can only see money, steel, and atom bombs. Thank you for respecting our position. We don’t have atom bombs and can only send you lesser guns. Ten years from now, when we have more steel and atom bombs, your situation will also be changed accordingly.10

In fact, in a sense, China favored a kind of multilateral nuclear deterrence at that time. On September 28, 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai repeated what was said by Mao Zedong 16 years earlier: "If all countries have nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear wars would decrease."11

Therefore, it was understandable that China did not hide its interest in nuclear weapons at that time. On October 23, 1954, Mao Zedong told the Indian Prime Minister: "China has no atom bombs now and I don’t know whether India has them or not. We have just started our research."12

Since the development of nuclear weapons was seen as the legal right of sovereign states, Chinese leaders treated cooperation among socialist countries in this field as a kind of manifestation of proletarian internationalism.

When China began to develop nuclear weapons, it got some important help from the Soviet Union,13 especially in October 1957, when Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the Chinese leader who was in charge of the development of nuclear bombs and missiles, visited Moscow. Nie and his Soviet counterpart signed the "Agreement on Producing New Weapons and Military Technological Equipment and Establishing Synthetic Atomic Industry," in which the Soviet Union promised to assist China in its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Afterwards, some important equipment was sent to China from the Soviet Union, including two short-range ballistic missiles (R-2). Also, at that time, some Soviet technical experts on atomic bombs and missiles went to work in China. This cooperation on nuclear weapons was highly praised by Chinese leaders. At the April 1959 session of the National People’s Congress, Premier Zhou Enlai said that "the help of the Soviet Union’’ had played "a tremendous part" in the development of China.14

As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, however, the situation changed. The Soviet government unilaterally withdrew from all agreements related to the development of nuclear weapons, refusing to provide China with sample atom bombs or technical information for atom bomb and missile production. China condemned this as a naked betrayal of the friendship and solidarity among socialist countries.

Second Stage:

The second stage covers the period from 1962 to 1984, when China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At this stage, China began to build up its own nuclear arsenal. The collapse of nuclear cooperation between China and the Soviet Union was a heavy blow to China in its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, China was experiencing severe economic difficulties as a result of the disastrous "Great Leap Forward." China’s time-table for atom bomb development was delayed accordingly. Nevertheless, China made its first test of an atom bomb on October 16, 1964. Nearly three years later, it tested its first hydrogen bomb. The successful development of nuclear weapons changed China’s position from a non-nuclear weapon state to a nuclear weapon state and improved China’s understanding of nuclear weapons and nuclear wars.

It was at this stage that two major nuclear powers—the Soviet Union and the United States—entered serious talks and reached some influential agreements related to nuclear nonproliferation, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, 1963) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1968), which banned the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974). There were various motives for such agreements, but, one key aim must have been to prevent China from getting nuclear weapons or improving its nuclear arsenal. If China had signed the LTBT in 1963, it could not have conducted its nuclear test the next year. Also, if China had adhered to the TTBT, it could not have improved its nuclear weapons by testing.

Also, during this time, a systematic theoretical debate developed between China and the Soviet Union on various issues, including the nuclear issue. The Chinese side claimed its position and policy were really Marxist and Leninist, criticizing the Soviets’ as revisionist. While Chinese leaders had a different understanding of Marxist-Leninist theories and were influenced by their theoretical divergence with the Soviet side, they were dominated by a unique revolutionary emotion and national concerns. They believed their views were absolutely right, and that the Soviet Union, in collusion with the United States, was trying to strangle revolutionary China. Gradually, they became carried away by the emotion and domestic and deviated from the principles they had wanted to defend.

Against this background, China developed its own perceptions and policies on nuclear nonproliferation—both for pragmatic reasons and for purposes of doctrinal debate. At the same time, China could develop nonproliferation policies because it had a better understanding of these issues.

Chinese leaders insisted on the right of peace-loving countries to develop their own nuclear weapons in order to break the so-called nuclear monopoly and end the nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail carried out by the major nuclear powers. According to Chinese leaders, it was the nuclear monopoly and corresponding behavior of the nuclear powers that had seriously endangered peace, security, and stability in the world. Obviously, this posture continued China’s position shaped during the period from 1949 to 1962.

When China was developing its nuclear weapons under arduous conditions, the Soviet government informed China of its mutual understandings reached with the United States in August 1962. The Soviets and United States agreed that: 1) nuclear weapon states would assume the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons and technical information needed for their production to non-nuclear weapon states; and 2) non-nuclear weapon states would assume the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons or to ask for them from nuclear weapon states and not to accept technical information needed for their production. The Chinese government responded in a memo that China could not support a treaty by which any country "would have privileges to monopolize nuclear capability in the world and issue orders arbitrarily to other countries."15

On August 15, 1963, in an official statement, the Chinese government said: "It depends on whose hands they have been put into whether nuclear weapons are beneficial to the peace; ‘no’ in the hands of imperialist countries but ‘yes’ in the hands of socialist countries."16

On November 19, 1963, in an open letter to the Soviet leaders that dealt with the issue of peace and war in particular, China said: "We have consistently held that socialist countries have to get and maintain nuclear superiority. Only then can we force imperialism not to dare to initiate nuclear wars and make our contributions to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons."17 The letter concluded with: "The more countries develop their own nuclear weapons, the more possible it is to prohibit nuclear weapons, and the more possible it is to delay a world war."18 This letter sounded like another argument for multilateral nuclear deterrence.

However, China made it clear that it would not approve the import and export of nuclear weapons. In effect, it accepted the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. Thus, China’s nonproliferation policy made major progress at this stage.

China’s position on export and import of weapons can be traced back to the time when China did not possess its nuclear weapons. In a 1963 statement issued about the LTBT, the Chinese government disclosed the "hypocrisy" of the treaty, but suggested nevertheless that nuclear weapons and associated technical materials needed for their production not be exported and imported under any conditions.19 This position was further developed after China possessed nuclear weapons. On October 16, 1964, the day China made its first successful nuclear test, the Chinese government reiterated this position in an official statement.20 On November 3 of the same year, at his meeting with the British Minister of Trade, Zhou Enlai criticized the U.S. plan for a multilateral nuclear force by remarking that "it means nuclear proliferation."21

After the NPT was signed in 1968, China adopted a position critical of its discriminatory nature and refused to adhere to it. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders declared publicly that China would avoid nuclear proliferation and would not help other states in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons.22

In the same spirit, China encouraged the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. This issue was raised first on August 11, 1963, when Zhou Enlai met a delegation from Columbia. He said: "I have an idea: A nuclear weapon-free zone should be established in Latin America. It should not be permitted to use, import, make, or test nuclear weapons, so that this region will not be threatened by nuclear weapons. Is it not very attractive?"23 On August 21, 1973, China signed Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean ("Treaty of Tlatelolco"). It was the first of the five nuclear weapon states to sign.

While China accepted the norm of nonproliferation, it remained vigilant and adopted an attitude critical of nonproliferation talks and agreements initiated by the two major superpowers; China was unwilling to participate in the international nonproliferation regime centered on the NPT. This refusal was the main factor that differentiated China’s nonproliferation policy at this stage from that of the later third stage.

When the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed the LTBT in 1963, the Chinese government pointed out sharply: "The key purpose of this treaty is to make all peace-loving countries, China included, unable to increase their defensive force by the partial nuclear test ban, so that the United States can make unbridled threats and blackmail against them."24

When the three nuclear weapon states signed the NPT in 1968, Chinese leaders lashed out violently and persistently against its "hypocrisy" and "discrimination." Ten years later, the Chinese government, in a document submitted to the United Nations, made the following statement:

The so-called NPT is a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the U.S. to maintain their nuclear monopoly. By it, they not only try to restrict other countries in their efforts to develop nuclear force for self-defense, but limit their peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the two superpowers are further intensifying the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, they seek to limit the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. They praise the NPT as a major measure in overcoming the threat of nuclear war. This does not convince others. There is no reason to impose the NPT on other countries arbitrarily.25

In fact, Chinese leaders were very sensitive to any suggestion made by the two superpowers on nonproliferation and other arms control issues. In November 1977, the Soviet Union made some suggestions on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and consolidation of the nonproliferation regime. Chen Chu, the Chinese delegate, said in the United Nations:

Everyone knows that the Soviet Union has conducted several hundred nuclear tests. After enough nuclear tests in the atmosphere had been made, then it suggested a limited nuclear test ban. Now, after enough underground nuclear tests have been conducted, it suggests a ‘temporary’ ban of any nuclear test. Actually it went ahead boldly with nuclear tests when they were needed, and would not let others conduct such tests after it has done enough.26

Finally, Chinese leaders suggested a no-first-use principle as the first step toward the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. This was China’s major contribution to nonproliferation thinking. Since then, it has stuck to this principle.

In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union first promoted the slogan of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Significantly, since its establishment in 1949, the PRC has always seen complete prohibition as a fundamental goal of nuclear disarmament, even after the Soviet Union turned away from this slogan because of its unrealistic nature. But, at the same time, China devised a no-first-use policy as an initial step toward the final goal. Thus, China integrated an ideal approach with a realistic goal.

The idea was suggested by Mao Zedong before China owned nuclear weapons. On September 24, 1961, he asked the British Marshall Montgomery whether it was possible to reach an agreement not to use nuclear weapons.27 On August 22, 1964, in meeting with foreign visitors, Mao Zedong said:

It is possible for our country to produce a few atom bombs, but we are not going to use them. Why do we want to produce them if we are not going to use them? We will use them as defensive weapons. Some nuclear powers, especially the United States, like to use atom bombs to threaten other countries.28

This no-first-use principle was formally made public on October 17, 1964, the next day after the first Chinese test of atom bomb. On behalf of the Chinese government, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to all heads of government in the world. It said that "the Chinese government declares solemnly: At any time and under any situation, China will not use nuclear weapons first." Also, this letter recommended a conference of government heads of all countries to discuss the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. As a first step, the conference should reach an agreement on the following points: "Countries which own or will own nuclear weapons soon, should assume the responsibility not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, against nuclear weapon-free zones, or against each other."29

The no-first-use principle is consistent with China’s repeated statements that its nuclear weapons were developed to break the nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats, and nuclear blackmail of the major nuclear weapon states. China’s very limited amount of nuclear weapons would only serve for the purpose of self-defense. This principle also embodied China’s new understanding of the catastrophe of nuclear war.

Third Stage:

The third stage began in 1983 and continues today. At this stage, Deng Xiaoping, the de facto Chinese paramount leader, initiated a program of developing the national economy and improving the people’s living standards. Guided by this pragmatic line, China is experiencing a new "Long March" of reform and opening up.

In order to achieve these goals, as Deng Xiaoping pointed out, both a stable domestic environment and a peaceful international environment are needed. He said, "only with a peaceful environment can [economic] development be accomplished smoothly."30 Furthermore, in his mind, a peaceful international environment was emerging. On March 4, 1985, in a meeting with a Japanese delegation, he said:

For many years, we have always emphasized the danger of war. Now there have been some changes in our views. We feel that forces which can restrict the danger of war have made encouraging progress in spite of its continuous existence.31

With this recognition, China not only opened up its national gate to foreign traders and foreign investors gradually, but also became more willing to cooperate with the outside world on political and security issues, including nonproliferation.

Also, since 1985, a widespread and thoughtful exchange of views has been promoted between Chinese officials and scholars and their Western counterparts. This exchange has played a very positive role in bringing about a kind of consensus between China and Western countries on the negative affects of nuclear proliferation on global and regional stability and on approaches for preventing nuclear proliferation.

Therefore, China has become more integrated with and more accommodating of the international nonproliferation regime. First, contrary to its previous position, China now has established a position of objecting to any nuclear proliferation.

As late as in the early 1980s, China was "emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel."32 Afterwards, this "selective" attitude changed. Particularly in the early 1990s, Chinese leaders repeated China’s absolute opposition to nuclear proliferation on various occasions. On April 1, 1991, in a meeting with Director General Hans Blix of the IAEA, Premier Li Peng said: "China’s position is clear-cut, that is, China won’t practice nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any other country."33

Also, at this stage, China promulgated a policy, in unequivocal language, of not helping other countries in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

In January 1984, when the Chinese premier visited New York City, he told leaders of The New York Times: "We neither support nor encourage nuclear proliferation, and we don’t help other states to develop nuclear weapons."34 In 1987, Wu Xueqian, China’s Foreign Minister, said to the 42nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly: "We don’t stand for, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation."35 This statement expresses the so-called policy of "three not’s." Especially since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has reiterated this "three not’s" policy again and again in response to criticisms of China’s position on nuclear exports.

More significantly, after a long period of caution and hesitation, China has gradually developed its overall cooperation with the international nonproliferation regime.

In 1984, China joined the IAEA. Since then, China has undertaken to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the IAEA Statute, including the obligation to apply IAEA safeguards as a condition for its nuclear exports. In 1985, China declared that, of its own free will, it would submit part of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. In 1988, China and the IAEA signed an agreement on voluntary safeguards under which China provided the IAEA with a list of facilities subject to such safeguards. In November 1991, China officially announced that on a regular basis it would report to the IAEA any exports to or imports from non-nuclear weapon states involving nuclear materials of one effective kilogram or more. In July 1993, China formally promised that it would voluntarily report to the IAEA any imports or exports of nuclear materials and all exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials.36

For years after 1968, China refused to sign the NPT, a crucial component of the international nonproliferation regime, calling it "discriminatory." However, in August 1990, a delegation from China attended the Fourth NPT Review Conference, as observers, held in Geneva. In its "Document on Basic Positions" submitted to the conference, the delegation admitted that "the NPT has played a certain positive role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the maintenance of world peace and stability."37 Then, one year later, on August 10, 1991, Premier Li Peng announced that "the Chinese government has in principle decided to accede to the NPT in order to promote the goal of achieving the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."38 On March 9, 1992, China acceded to the NPT formally. In May 1995, at the Fifth review conference of the NPT, China supported the decision to extend the treaty indefinitely.

A new development related to the change of China’s attitude to the NPT is the publication of its three principles on nuclear exports: 1) they should serve peaceful uses only; 2) IAEA safeguards should be accepted; and 3) no transfers to a third country should be made without China’s consent.39

While China was preparing to accede to the NPT, it also adopted a more amenable attitude toward the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In November 1991, when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Beijing, the Chinese government showed its willingness to abide by the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR on the condition that the United States would cancel three sanction measures it had imposed on China one year earlier.40 On February 1, 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen furnished Baker with written confirmation of this obligation. According to Baker, Qian agreed specifically to observe the MTCR guidelines when transferring M-9 and M-11 missiles.41 On May 28-29, 1992, at the third round of conventional arms talks among the five permanent U.N. Security Council members, the "Interim Guidelines" were agreed upon for exports of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction. That document referred again to China’s "support for" the MTCR.42

At this stage, China developed a complete and systematic policy framework on nuclear nonproliferation. Generally, China has contemplated the issue of nonproliferation in a broader context than most other countries. In China’s view, nonproliferation is not a goal in itself. Signing and extending the NPT are not sufficient. In order to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear war and bring about a world free from nuclear weapons, nonproliferation should be pursued together with other measures: the signing of a no-first-use treaty by nuclear weapon states, the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the promotion of nuclear disarmament, and international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.43

This policy framework provides insight into the real aim of nonproliferation as well as practical means of achieving nonproliferation. Moreover, it offers a firm basis for dealing with various issues involving nuclear nonproliferation: How to balance the relationship between nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament? And how to balance the relations between nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy? Judging by experience and the lessons learned by the international community on nuclear proliferation prevention, only when these issues have been answered and solved properly can the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime be strengthened. The true goal of nuclear nonproliferation, namely, the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the world, can then be advanced very effectively.

Conclusions

Because of their own international positions, political philosophies, and security perspectives, China and Western countries, especially the United States, still have substantial differences in perceptions and policies on nonproliferation. As an example, China has laid more stress on the special responsibilities and obligations of the major nuclear powers—the United States and Russia—for nuclear nonproliferation. In addition, China has paid more attention to the right of developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, China still has some reservations about the nature and functions of some international institutions and agreements.

There are also some important differences between China and the United States on whether China has kept the pledges it made and accepted responsibility under the international nonproliferation regime. In other words, are there any discrepancies between what China has said and what it has done? The Chinese government claims that it has never exported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production. The United States, however, has criticized some of China’s exports as violations of its obligations under the NPT. In the case of the MTCR, the same problem exists. Moreover, there are still some disagreements between the two nations over the pledges that have been made by China and the responsibilities that China should accept according to certain international conventions.

Nevertheless, the PRC’s nonproliferation policy has gone through a very positive process of gradual evolution and improvement since its founding in 1949. China has become more cooperative with the policies of most other countries in the world.

1. China has accepted the perspective supported by most other countries on the danger of nuclear proliferation. In the 1950s and early 1960s, not only did Chinese leaders claim that "peace-loving" and socialist countries had a right to develop nuclear weapons, but they also believed that this spread of nuclear weapons would strengthen international peace. By the 1990s, China had formally declared its opposition to nuclear proliferation by "any country." Thus, over the course of 30 years, China’s position has been adjusted radically.

2. China has completely accepted the international norm of not helping other countries in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons. By 1987, China had developed the policy of the "three not’s," the essence of which is to eschew nuclear proliferation. Also, Chinese leaders have affirmed that China has not helped any country develop nuclear weapons. Despite some differences over the discrepancies between China’s words and deeds, it is very apparent that, as a whole, China has accepted the obligations established by the international community.

3. China has made substantial progress towards cooperation with the international nonproliferation regime. Since the early 1980s, it has stopped isolating itself from the international community and has taken a more approving attitude toward various international organizations and conventions on nonproliferation, either by joining them or by agreeing to abide by them. In general, China has begun to play a more important role in these regimes.

4. China has established a systematic policy framework for nonproliferation. In time, it will be considered more seriously and not just treated as propaganda. China’s nonproliferation efforts will then become much more effective.

There are three broad trends that support this positive evolution of China’s nonproliferation policy, and they can be expected to continue and accelerate for a long time in the future.

First, China’s international standing has improved because of the reinforcement of its national defense and the improvement of the international environment. It has shifted from being vulnerable to being more secure. China has become more self-confident in dealing with the two major nuclear powers and has been less hesitant to collaborate with the international nonproliferation regime.

Second, China’s national concerns have become more pragmatic especially after Deng Xiaoping ushered in a new epoch in its history. Development of the national economy and promotion of living standards have become more urgent issues for Chinese leaders. These new priorities have made it necessary and possible for China to strengthen its cooperation with the international community in many ways, including nonproliferation.

Third, China has been involved in a continuous learning process. It learns from itself. For example, the development of its nuclear arsenal has deepened its understanding of the dangers of nuclear proliferation. More importantly, by frequent exchanges with the outside world, many new concepts and ideas relating to arms control and nonproliferation have increased in their influence on Chinese leaders and the professional segment of society.

Differences and conflicts on nonproliferation policy between China and the United States exist. But, this gap has been significantly narrowed in spite of some twists and turns in the process. Since the world is undergoing a profound transformation in terms of its material environment as well as ideological perceptions, these differences and conflicts can be reduced further. Cooperation between China and the United States can improve if both sides take more positive attitudes and refrain from simple censure or defense. In fact, this is a field for the two countries to find common interests and there are plenty of reasons to be optimistic about this prospect.

Notes

1 I would like to express my special thanks to Monte Bullard, Clay Moltz, and Bates Gill for their comments on the drafts of this paper.

2 Among them, I would mention Alstair Iain Johnston, "China’s New ‘Old Thinking’," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96); Zachary Davis, "China’s Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," Asian Survey 35 (June 1995); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser: "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96); Shirley Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issues Brief, October 17, 1996; Wendy Frieman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995," The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Spring-Summer 1996).

3 Xie Yixian, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi 1949/1979 (A Diplomatic History of China) (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, 1988), p. 298.

4 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), p. 302. Mao Tse-tung is the old spelling of Mao Zedong.

5 Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 4 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 100.

6 Cold weapons are those made of "cold" metal, such as spear and sword; hot weapons are those using powder, such as gun and cannon.

7 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 170-172.

8 Ibid., p. 294.

9 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: Central Archives Press, 1990), p. 319.

10 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 420.

11 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 319.

12 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 170.

13 See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 39-41; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 28-30.

14 O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 140.

15 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 300.

16 Ibid., p. 302.

17 Guanyu Guoji Gongchan Zhuyi Yundong Zongluxian de Bianlun (Debate on the General Line of the International Communist Movement) ( Beijing: People’s Press, 1965), pp. 264-265.

18 Ibid., pp. 264-265.

19 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 303.

20 Ibid., p. 305.

21 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 433.

22 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 305.

23 Ibid., p. 331.

24 Ibid., pp. 301-302.

25 Xinhua, "Quanmian Jielu Sulian de ‘Huanhe’ ‘Caijun’ Pianju"(Comprehensive Disclosure of Soviet Fraud of ‘Detente’ and ‘Disarmament’), Rennin Ribao, May 30, 1978, p. 2.

26 Xinhua, "Woguo Daibiaotuan Tuanzhang Huang Hua de Fayan" (The Speech of Huang Hai, Our National Delegation Head), Rennin Ribao, December 1, 1977, 6.

27 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 476.

28 Ibid., p. 540.

29 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 433.

30 Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Volume 3 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1983), p. 56.

31 Ibid., p. 105.

32 Xinhua, "Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to Indian Journalists," Chinese Statements on Proliferation Issues—1979-1991; in FBIS-SM-91-10007, p. 1.

33 Xinhua, "Premier Li Peng in a Meeting with Director General Hans Blix of the IAEA," Chinese Statements on Proliferation Issues—1979-1991; in FBIS-SM-91-10007, p. 3.

34 Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Guoji Xingshi Nianjian 1985 (Survey of International Affairs) (Shanghai: Shanghai Branch of Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1985), p. 296.

35 Ibid. 1988, p. 283.

36 International Office of the State Council of the PRC, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament," Beijing Review, 38, 46 (1995), p. 18.

37 Xinhua, "Bixu Quanmian Jinzhi he Chedi Xiaohui Hewuqi" (Must Prohibit and Dismantle Nuclear Weapons Comprehensively), Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1990, p. 6.

38 Xinhua, "Zhongguo Zhengfu Yuanze Jueding Canjia Bukuosan Hewuqi Tiaoyue" (Chinese Government Decides to Accede to the NPT in Principle), Renmin Ribao, August 11, 1991, p. 1.

39 International Office of the State Council of the PRC, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament," Beijing Review, 38, 46, (1995), p. 18.

40 Xinhua, "Waijiaobu Fayanren Tan Beike Fanghua Chengguo" (Spokesman of Foreign Ministry Talk about the Result of Baker’s Visit of China), Renmin Ribao, November 18, 1991, p. 1.

41 Jane A. Morse, "U.S. Lifts Missile Sanction on China," Foreign Policy Background (Press and Cultural Section, U.S. Embassy in China), FP-1744, April 9, 1992.

42 Lee Feinstein, "Third Round of Arms Talks to Resolve Notification Issue," Arms Control Today 22 (June 1992), p. 21.

43 Xinhua, "Chanshu Zhongguo Zhengfu Helichang" (Elaboration of the Nuclear Position of Chinese Government), Beijing Ribao, September 21, 1994, p. 4.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.