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"OBSTACLES TO NON-PROLIFERATION"
Zhu Chenghu
Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University
INESAP Conference, Shanghai
8-10 September 1997
The views expressed in this paper are purely those of the author. They
represent neither the views of the Institute for
Strategic Studies, nor those of the National Defence University.
Since the conclusion on of the INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of 1987, especially after the end of the cold war, substantial reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers has been witnessed. The INF treaty was successfully implemented by the two superpowers. By May 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union had dismantled all of their intermediate and intermediate-short range nuclear weapons. The INF treaty is the first agreement in the history of mankind to eliminate a sort of weapon and also the first agreement to reduce the nuclear armament since the emergence of nuclear weapons. Since then, the international arms control and disarmament have entered a new stage which is characterized by the substantial reduction of their nuclear and conventional arsenals by the two superpowers. This has not only helped to relax the international strategic situation, but also promoted the process of disarmament and the establishment of arms control and disarmament regimes and systems.
Since early 1990s, the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union) have concluded START I and START II. According to START II, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to 3500 and 3000 respectively by January 2003. This will help to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia should this treaty be approved by the Russian Duma. Some welcoming progresses have also been made in the establishment of arms control regimes and systems since the end of cold war, for example, the indefinite extension of NPT and conclusion of CTBT, establishment of nuclear-free zones in some regions, etc. However, there are NPT and CTBT which strictly prevent proliferation of nuclear weaponry technologies and nuclear materials though, yet proliferation has never been stopped and it is still posing a great threat to peace and stability of the world and to the security cooperation as well. In today's world, proliferation of nuclear technologies and other high technologies is still the primary concern of politicians, strategists, scholars and even soldiers. It is an important factor contributing to the instability and even potential conflict in some regions in the world. It is not that the people of the world do not want to stop the proliferation, it is not that the world does not have systems or regimes to prevent proliferation, the problem lies in the fact that in today's world, there are still some obstacles to the non-proliferation.
The process of nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia is far from satisfaction
Although some agreements have been reached between the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union) on the disarmament of their nuclear arsenals and great progresses have been achieved, yet the process is far from satisfaction. Firstly, according to START II, the United States and Russia will still have 3500 and 3000 warheads by 2003. These nuclear weapons themselves will provide the United States and Russia with the capability to destroy the world for several times, and the people of the world will continue to live in nuclear terror. Secondly, the START II is yet to be approved by the Russian Duma. At present, it is very difficult for Russian Duma to approve it, because the Russians are feeling threatened by NATO expansion to the countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, which used to be members of the Warsaw Pact and within the Soviet sphere of influence. And the expansion will turn the buffer states in the Central and Eastern Europe into Russian adversaries. Thirdly, the nuclear warheads to be dismantled according to START II are only the deployed weapons of the two countries, while their nuclear weapons kept in stock are not included in the 3500 and 3000. And the two countries concealed the number of their nuclear weapons by use of the calculation rules in the treaties. Actually, by 2003, the two countries still have nearly 20000 nuclear warheads. Fourthly, up to now, the disarmament in nuclear weapons only means dismantling of the nuclear warheads from the delivery vehicles, not the physical destruction. This means that no one can tell whether the dismantled warheads will be remounted on their delivery vehicles or not.
Nuclear arms race is still going on
Although the people of the world, and the colleagues present at this conference in particular, have made great efforts to stop nuclear arms race and to prevent proliferation, the race in nuclear arms between the United States and Russia has never been stopped, not to mention the race in conventional arms. The people of world have witnessed that since late 1980s, the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union) have made some efforts in reducing their nuclear arsenals. But, while reducing their nuclear weapons in number, they are also doing great efforts in the research and development of new nuclear weapons. For example, both countries are carrying out research into the fourth generation of nuclear weapons and the improvement of the capability of the existing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, while approving START II, the Senate of the United States also approved the missile defence initiative. All these efforts have been intended for the superiority in nuclear arms. And I am afraid that these efforts may lead to the stop of reduction of nuclear arms and a new round of nuclear race. Hence the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The existing arms control systems and regimes are not fair and discriminating
Such existing arms control systems and regimes as NPT, CTBT and MTCR, have played some positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies, and the missiles and technologies. But all these systems and regimes are not so fair, but discriminating. They have been intended to serve and protect the interests of the few big powers, but limit the others. Therefore, it is very difficult, and even impossible, to prevent the proliferation, if the big powers do not take practical measures to restrain and limit themselves.
In view of the capability, proliferation can be divided into two categories: External proliferation and internal proliferation. By external proliferation, the author means that the nuclear and high technology free countries develop nuclear and other high technology weapons with the aid and help of other countries. By internal proliferation, the author means that the countries develop their weapons and technologies by relying on their own efforts without relying on any other country. With the existing systems and regimes available, external proliferation might be prevented to some extent, but internal proliferation can hardly be prevented, because possession of nuclear weapons and missiles is not the patent of the nuclear powers or some countries in the world, all countries in the world, big or small, rich or poor, enjoy the equal right in the development of any type of weapons. Some nuclear powers are continuing their efforts to improve their nuclear weapons and develop new ones, threaten and intimidate the nuclear free countries with their nuclear weapons on the one hand, they try to stop the nuclear free countries from developing their own nuclear weapons for self-defence on the other. At the same time, they are practicing double or multiple standard. They are proliferating nuclear technologies and friction materials to their allies that are considered by them as good civilians. They are against developing countries to carry out any cooperation in technologies which might be useful in developing of missiles, but they are free to carry out missile exports and imports among the developed countries. So most articles in the existing systems and regimes have intended to limit the developing countries that are discriminated by the systems and regimes. Therefore, the systems and regimes are not fair.
The negotiation process is not democratic enough
The negotiation process of the existing arms control systems and regimes has been lack of democracy. The views and interests of the developing countries were seldom observed. The contents of the systems and regimes have been worked out according to the desire of major powers, and that of the developed countries in particular. They have also been intended to serve and protect the interests of the developed countries.
These are the major obstacles to non-proliferation. With the above-mentioned obstacles, the process of arms control and disarmament is difficult to develop to the desired direction, and it is difficult to prevent proliferation.
To materialize non-proliferation, major actors, the United States in particular, should take practical measures in controlling themselves.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
