 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Deputy Director Of The Center For American Studies At The Department Of International Politics At Fudan University, PRC
"U.S. Plans On National Missile Defense (NMD)
And Theater Missile Defense (TMD):
A Chinese Perspective"
The Monitor, Center for International Trade and Security, Vol. 5, No. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1999. pp. 21-23
On January 20, 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen declared that DOD planned to allocate additional funds to NMD and TMD programs to meet the growing ballistic missile threats from "rogue" states to U.S. territory, U.S. forces deployed overseas and its allies. According to his statement, the new budget will request additions of $6.6 billion to current NMD funding levels for a total of $10.5 billion for NMD through fiscal year 2005. The decision on deploying an NMD system will be made in 2000.
For the TMD, the new budget will continue to support flight testing of the THAAD program and add money to the Navy Theatre Wide (NTW) program in order to allow accelerated deployment of an upper tier system by 2007. Currently, THAAD is scheduled for deployment in 2008 and the NTW in 2010. Also, Cohen announced that the United States will negotiate with Russia on an amendment to the ABM Treaty if it is needed: “While our NMD development program is being conducted consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty, our deployment may require modification to the treaty and the Administration is working to determine the nature and scope of these modifications.”1
Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress was dissatisfied with this statement and tried to push the Administration in speeding the development and deployment of NMD. On March 17, the Senate passed 97-3 the NMD Act of 1999, saying that "it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective NMD system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)." The next day, the House approved 317-102 its own bill with only 15 words: "It is the official policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense.”2 The measure doesn't impose any precondition on this claim as does the Senate's.
These major steps forward both with money and rhetoric towards the acceleration of development and deployment of both missile defense systems have caused broad concern and intense criticism within the United States and abroad, China included. Since the mid-1990s, China has taken a very skeptical and vigilant attitude on U.S. NMD and TMD plans.
Much concern and criticism over NMD and TMD within the United States have centered on the issues, particularly whether they are useful politically, feasible technologically and tenable financially.3 Many Americans believe that it is difficult to develop and deploy well-functioning anti-missile systems as their sponsors assert. In comparison, China's concern and criticism, similar to Russia's, is based on the assumption that the United States can develop and deploy effective anti-missile systems.
On January 21, in commenting on Cohen's announcement made the previous day, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry Xun Yuxi said: The United States has the most advanced and largest nuclear and conventional arms in the world and now it is developing the NMD and TMD with great effort. China has expressed grave concern over this matter.”4 Since then, China has stepped up its talks with Russia on a united approach on anti-missile systems. On April 16, they signed a communiqué, repeating their anxiety over the serious threats that originated from the U.S. plan to deploy anti-missile systems.5
From China's standpoint, the U.S. policy to expedite the development and deployment of NMD and TMD systems is difficult to understand for many reasons. By and large, the United States has exaggerated the danger of missile attack it is facing and made a decision that goes against the trend of the times.
Since the end of the Cold War, major and profound changes have taken place in the world, which are, on the whole, conducive to the relaxation of international tensions and world peace and stability. Against this background, as the only superpower in this world, the United States has every reason to feel much more secure than before.
Even though there exist some countries that are hostile to the United States for various reasons and posses some missiles today, it does not mean that their leaders wish to use them wantonly and arbitrarily against such a nuclear superpower. Either sound concepts of morality, or a realistic assessment of retaliation can deter any of these leaders from launching a missile attack against the United States with WMD warheads, as was shown during the Gulf War. Even as reckless and arrogant as he is, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein did not dare to use chemical/biological weapons against the U.S. allies in the region. Moreover, the United States can prevent these potential dangers by diplomatic and other political approaches.
Therefore, it is not surprising that many people believe that the push for the NMD and the TMD in the United States has not come from a sober analysis of its security environment, but originated from its domestic politics and defense industry. In order to appeal to public attention in the United States, and peddle weapon systems around the world, the dangers of missile attack have been overstated and exaggerated intentionally. If this situation can not be redressed, both the United States and other countries have to pay a high price politically and financially. It will cause global and regional instability, involving various countries into a new round of arms competition.
Specifically, the disruptive influence of NMD systems on international stability and peace will be reflected in three ways. It will prejudice the strategic equilibrium between the United States and Russia, stand in the way of nuclear disarmament, and undermine the deterring capability of China’s small nuclear arsenal. All of these negative effects are directly connected to the functioning NMD system. As explained by Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of DOD on February 24, 1999, the NMD system developed by the United States “would have as its primary mission the defense of all 50 states against a small number of ICBMs launched by a rogue nation; however, such a system would also provide some residual capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic missiles from China or Russia.”6 From this we can easily conclude that the NMD system is also intended to counter Russia and China in addition to those so-called rogue states.
Though General Lyles stressed that this system “would not be capable of defending against a large-scale, deliberate attack” that can only be initiated by Russia, it still can turn the strategic equilibrium between the two major nuclear powers to the disadvantage of Russia.
As many American scholars have noted,7 this equilibrium contributed much to the U.S.-Soviet “long peace” during the era of the Cold War, and is still exerting a pacific impact on current U.S.-Russian relations. This strategic equilibrium has produced the balance of terror between them — the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Namely, any side daring to initiate a first nuclear strike will incur a retaliatory second nuclear strike from other side with its society being destroyed. The ABM Treaty admitted the legality of this balance of terror by limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic-missiles and exposing each to the destructive second strike of other side. With the passage of time, its positive value has been recognized and accepted by China. In fact, some Chinese experts have recently suggested expanding the bilateral ABM Treaty into a multilateral treaty.8
While the U.S. gets an anti-missile shield to protect its 50 states and can survive from a nuclear strike, however, the rule of MAD constituted by the ABM Treaty will be violated, and Russia’s confidence in its security will be weakened, both for practical and psychological reasons. This situation will inevitably harm the relationship between the United States and Russia. It is also not in the interest of China because “the development of China requires an environment of long-term international peace, especially a favorable peripheral environment.”9
If the U.S. clings to its NMD plan, this will bring about a stagnation in the process of nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia. China has attached great importance to the process. President Jiang Zemin addressed the Conference on Disarmament Conference on March 26, 1999: “As countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, the U.S. and Russia shoulder greater responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. The two countries should effectively implement the nuclear reduction treaties they have concluded and on that basis continue to substantially cut down their respective nuclear arsenals, thereby paving the way for the other nuclear-weapon states to participate in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process.”10
Though the U.S. Senate ratified START II in 1996, the Russian Duma has not done the same because of its anxiety that Russia may find its strategic force inferior in comparison with the U.S. if the treaty is implemented. Russia must destroy the MIRVed ICBMs in its nuclear arsenal, but has no money to make new ICBMs with a single warhead within the permitted limitation. The U.S. deployment of an NMD system will further weaken Russia’s retaliatory capability and jeopardize its policy of nuclear deterrence based on this capability, creating new barriers for Russia’s ratification of START II. In fact some people, even in the Pentagon, have admitted the rationality of the Russian position and are considering suggesting a deal with the Russians: If Moscow does not oppose the deployment of a limited NMD by the United States, Washington can approve the deployment of ICBMs that can carry three warheads.11
The deployment of an NMD system by the United States will neutralize China’s minimum strategic deterrence that is based on its very limited strategic nuclear force. According to the assessment of some Western experts, China currently has only approximately 20 ICBMs that are capable of reaching U.S. cities.
Up to now, China has upheld a “principle of self-defense” in terms of nuclear policy: “China possesses a small number of nuclear weapons, entirely for meeting the needs of self-defense.”12 In fact, this is also a concept of nuclear deterrence that has officially been denied by the Chinese government. With the deployment of an NMD system in the United States, however, China will lose the very limited capability to deter the U.S. from inflicting a first strike on it. In view of the U.S. refusal to accept the no-first–use principle and the noisy anti-China clamor raised by some politicians and journalists, it may be natural for China to have some worries over this prospect.
Regarding the TMD, the above criticism of the NMD are basically justifiable. In addition, we can find some more concrete reasons for denouncing it, especially the U.S. cooperative research and development with Japan, and the intention of some Americans to extend the TMD system to Taiwan, or transfer to it the relevant technology. This cooperation or transfer will promote the proliferation of missiles in East Asia; it will encourage ultra-nationalism in Japan and separatism in Taiwan; it will also encroach on China’s sovereignty. Therefore, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told a press conference in March 1999 that “China is very much concerned about it.”13
Missiles and anti-missiles are closely related to each other technologically. Many technologies used by offensive missiles are also used by intercepting missiles. Therefore, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told a press conference in March 1999 that “China is very much concerned about it.”13 Missiles and anti-missiles are closely related to each other technologically. Many technologies used by offensive missiles are also used by intercepting missiles. Therefore, the co-development or transfer of a TMD system and its technologies will promote the capability of cooperators and recipients to develop missiles, bringing about the proliferation of missiles or missile technologies controlled by the MTCR in East Asia, a very sensitive area. The United States should understand the danger of this proliferation more clearly than any other country.
Co-development or transfers of TMD systems and related technologies can also advance the proliferation of missiles in a direct way. If some states get TMD systems and technologies by cooperation with, or transfers from the United States, their opponents or competitors, feeling threatened, will responsively make efforts to develop their own missiles and squeeze into the club of missile owners. The TMD system is of a defensive nature, but defensive weapons can be used by an offensive military for offensive purposes. Therefore, defensive weapons are not absolutely defensive. In some cases they can serve aggressors by securing their survival for offensive pursuits. In other words, they complement offensive weapons in the hands of aggressors. In this sense, the research and development of the TMD jointly by the United States and Japan can greatly enhance Japan’s military capability to pursue offensive goals. With the bitter memory of Japan’s conquests during World War II, the Chinese people are horrified by this possibility.
Like other defensive weapons, the deployment of the TMD system also has its psychological consequence, stimulating and encouraging some political forces (such as ultra-nationalists in Japan and separatists in Taiwan) in East Asia to adopt more aggressive policies. The sense of protection offered by this anti-missile “shield” will increase the probability of risky actions in East Asia, destabilize the status quo, and provoke retaliatory actions on the part of China.
There are some Americans who advocate the transfer of TMD
technologies to Taiwan or suggest putting it under a co-developed TMD system by
the United States and Japan. There are also some people in Taiwan who have
tried all kinds of means to achieve these arrangements. Undoubtedly, this will
be regarded as an infringement on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
with the intention of obstructing China’s peaceful unification. “If one day,
there should be such a situation, the Chinese Government and people will of
course make the due and strong reaction to that,”14 said Foreign Minister Tang.
Though we don’t know what this “due and strong reaction” will be, China’s
relations with both the U.S. and Japan will be injured, and peace across the
Taiwan Strait or even in the whole of East Asia will be affected adversely. For
all the above reasons, if the United States can take a more cautious attitude,
canceling or slowing at least the plans for developing and deploying the NMD and
TMD systems, it will be a real blessing for global and East Asian stability and
peace.
Notes:
1 Isaacs, John, Cohen’s National Missile Defense Statement:
What did it mean? Council for A Livable World, Jan. 21, 1999,
http://www.clw.oprg.
2 “House Passes Missile Defense Bill,” AP, 03/18/99.
3 Cankao Ciaoxi (Beijing), 03/21/99
4 Beijing Review, v.42, no. 6, 02/8-14/99, p.9.
5 Jiefang Ribao (Shanghai), 04/18/99.
6 Richard. L. Garwin, Effectiveness of Proposed National
Missile Defense Against ICBMs from North Korea, March 17, 1999,
http://www.clw.org.
7 See, The Cold War and After, Scan M. Lynn-Jones and Steven
E. Miller, eds., The MIT Press, 1994.
8 See Ambassador Sha Zhkang’s speech at the Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington, DC on Feb. 11, 1999.
9 “China’s National Defense,” Beijing Review, 08/10-16/98,
p.15.
10 Beijing Review, .v. 42, no. 15, April 12-18, 1999.
11 Cankao Xiaoxi (Beijing), Jan. 25, 1999.
12 “China’s National Defense,” in Beijing Review, 08/10-16/98,
p.15.
13 Beijing Review, v.42, no.12, 03/22-28/99, p.9.
14 Beijing Review, v.42, no.12, 03/22-28/99, p. 11.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
