Summary:
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has not yet been negotiated, but such an agreement might prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives and the production of such material outside of international safeguards. An FMCT might extend verification measures to fissile material production facilities (i.e. enrichment and reprocessing) that are not currently subject to international monitoring. An FMCT's ban on unsafeguarded production of fissile material would place a quantitative constraint on the amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (48/75L) on cut-off, calling for the negotiation of a "nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The resolution called for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide assistance in examining verification arrangements.
In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution. In May 1995, at the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, NPT parties agreed to seek "the immediate commencement and early conclusion" of cutoff negotiations. However, despite the widespread international support for an FMCT, formal negotiations on cutoff have not yet begun in the CD. The CD can only approve decisions by consensus and since the summer of 1995, the insistence of a few states to link FMCT negotiations to other nuclear disarmament issues has brought progress on the cut-off treaty there to a standstill.
In 1998 the CD seemed to stir for a few weeks, roused by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests; however, gridlock-as-usual could not be broken, and has persisted since.
For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/index.htm.
China and an FMCT:
China did not support the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution that called for an FMCT, and in March 1994, China stated its opposition to the creation of an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations for an FMCT. However, by July 1994 China had shifted its position, calling the proposed FMCT "an important step toward nuclear disarmament." On 4 October 1994, US Secretary of State Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian issued a joint statement promoting the "earliest possible achievement" of an FMCT. Some reports indicated that China had switched its position because the United States had promised China advanced military technology transfers. China has reportedly already ceased production of fissile materials for military purposes--it halted uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1987 and plutonium production for military purposes in 1991.
However, despite China's official statements of support for an FMCT, progress stalled in 1995. US officials said that, although China had publicly stated support for an FMCT, China (along with France) had proven reluctant to sign any statement promising to stop production of fissile material. US-China talks on the FMCT were further hindered in May 1995, when China suspended nonproliferation discussions with the United States in retaliation for Washington granting a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. More recently, there have been indications from China that it will withdraw its support for an FMCT if the United States continues to pursue the development and deployment of theater missile defenses in East Asia.
During the October 1997 US-China summit, both countries stated in a joint statement that they "agree to pursue at the UN Conference on Disarmament the early start of the formal negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Materials Use in Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." [Joint US-China Statement, 29 October 1997.]
In March 1998, Li Changhe, China's Ambassador at the Conference on Disarmament, stated that it would support negotiations on a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear arms. "A convention on the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons will be conducive to the prevention of nuclear proliferation," Li said. [Statement by Li Changhe, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament, at the Plenary Meeting, 12 March 1998.]
In January 1999, Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, stated China's position on the FMCT
in a speech given at an international
nonproliferation conference in Washington, DC. He stated:
"Negotiation should start as soon as possible. All states should make the necessary efforts and demonstrate the necessary political will to conclude a good treaty at an early date, which guarantees the adherence of all states capable of producing nuclear materials."
Also, in January 1999, the Chinese held a two day, bilateral negotiation with the US State Department concerning the US and Chinese positions on the FMCT. During the meetings, the Chinese reportedly voiced their existing concerns about the scope and the verification provisions for the treaty. Both sides also agreed that negotiations must move forward within the Geneva based CD.
In February 1999, Li Changhe, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, again expressed support for the FMCT in a speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. He stated:
"China maintains that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices will be conducive to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and promotion of nuclear disarmament. Last year, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on FMCT. The Chinese delegation supports the re-establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee to negotiate, on the basis of the mandate contained in the "Shannon Report," a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as requested by the UNGA Resolution 48/75L." [Li Changhe, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 11 February 1999]
China's insistence on linking the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty to the issue of nuclear disarmament and a Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space treaty (PAROS), and the adamant opposition of others (most significantly the US) to this approach have prevented any progress on the FMCT in the UNCD. China views PAROS as vital to its own security interests in that it would potentially check America's NMD ambitions, and insists on having ideas of nuclear disarmament given weight as well, as a condition for proceeding with fissban (FMCT) negotiations.
Ambassador Li Changhe, in May, 1999, elucidated the Chinese perspective:
"Many delegations, including the Chinese Delegation, believe that the importance of Nuclear Disarmament and PAROS is no less than that of FMCT. At the beginning of this year, one country breached the existing arms control treaty by announcing its decision to accelerate the research and development of missile defense systems. At the same time, that country also has ambitious programs to extend its weaponry system to the outer space. The aim of such program is to seek absolute military dominance. These programs will certainly have negative impact on bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament process and on the global strategic security and stability as well. All these developments make the CD's deliberation on PAROS ever more relevant and pressing.
"To sum up, the agenda items of 'Nuclear Disarmament', NSA, PAROS and FMCT are inter-related. The issue of CD program of work should be addressed as a whole. Singling out any one of the items while excluding the others is unjustified and unhelpful." [Li Changhe, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 27 May 1999]
Key statements/documents on China and an FMCT:
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement at First Committee of 57th Session of UN General Assembly, 01 October 2002
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement at Plenary of the 2002 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, 28 March 2002
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement at Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, 30 August 2001
- Negotiation of FMCT, Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement at the Plenary of the CD, 14 Sep 2000
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement at Concluding Meeting of Sixth NPT Review Conference, 20 May 2000
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement on issue of CD's work program at Plenary Meeting of CD, 10 Feb 2000
- Proposals for inclusion in the Report of the Conference of the Parties to the NPT working paper submitted by China, 21 May 1999
- Li Changhe Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 27 May 1999
- [Li Changhe, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 11 February 1999]
- Sha Zukang, Director General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China speech, "Some Thoughts on Nonproliferation," given at the 7th Annual Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference on Repairing the Regime, 11-12 January 1999.
- [Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Stopping Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons, 4 October 1994.]
- [UN General Assembly consensus resolution (48/75L), December 1993.
For more on China and fissile material issues, see:
[CHINA’S FISSILE MATERIAL STOCKPILE AND PRODUCTION]
[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSILE DEFENSE]
Updated 03/07/2003
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